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This study examines the factors affecting Cambodian state capacity since 1993 
with illustrations from the fisheries and inundated forest subsectors. These two 
subsectors are used as an illustration due to their socio-economic and economic 
values and the limited state capacity to manage them. Based on primary and 
secondary documents and field interviews in Phnom Penh and two provinces 
around the Tonle Sap Lake with ninety-four key stakeholders, namely, fisheries 
officials, NGO officers, researchers, local authorities, community fisheries 
committees, lot concessionaires and operators and common fishers, it investigates 
the relations between the fragmentation of social control; limited state autonomy; 
limited Weberian state structure; weak civil society and state-society relations; a 
quest for internal political legitimacy, and impacts from donors’ assistance on 
Cambodian state capacity. Besides proving that the state capacity (penetration, 
regulation, extraction, appropriation, policy and legislation, midwifery and 
husbandry) in general and that of the subsectors in particular has been limited, 
albeit variable and improving, this research finds that the six factors above have an 
overall negative impact on Cambodian state capacity. On the theoretical front, this 
study locates the limited state capacity within the context of the post-communist 
electoral legitimacy where a dominant ruling party dominates and where there are 
less functional but politicized state apparatus and poor interactions amongst and 
within them, strong ego-centered social forces, less capable civil society and poorly 
engaging state-society relations, and limited meaningful engagement between 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1. The Importance of This Field to Understanding Cambodian State 
Development 
There are a few main reasons why this study on Cambodian state capacity, 
especially in fisheries and inundated forests subsectors, is required. Firstly, the 
subsectors are chosen as an illustration due to its socioeconomic and economic 
values to Cambodians, Cambodia and its economy and the state’s limited capacity 
to manage them. Millions of rural dwellers around the Tonle Sap Great Lake, the 
Mekong River and their tributaries depend on fishing as primary or secondary 
sources of incomes and livelihoods. Besides rice, fish is a second major source of 
protein.1 Inundated forests are equally important. They are fish habitats and 
breeding grounds and sources for non-forest timber products. In this sense, fisheries 
and forests have a socioeconomic value and are a source for national and food 
security. The economic value of fisheries is likewise great. It has contributed 
substantially to the gross domestic products (GDP) – an average of 8% over the last 
decade, and the landing values over the last two decades have been estimated at 
between $150-300 million.2 
Although Cambodian state capacity is variable in terms of time, space, sectors and 
types of capacity, its capacity can be generally said to be limited. In the subsectors, 
though their socioeconomic and economic values are huge, the state capacity to 
manage them is limited. As discussed later, its regulation capacity, as expressed in 
low compliance to state’s or communities’ rules and widespread selective law 
enforcement, is limited. It likewise extracts minimal rents from the resources. 
While the farm-gate value stands at between $150-300 million, the state only 
generates a few million dollars from large and medium scale fishing, while a much 
larger share of the profits goes to private pockets.3 In addition, the state capacity to 
assist fishing lot concessionaires and Community Fisheries (CFis) is also 
inadequate. The limited capacity is indeed applied to appropriation, penetration, 
and to a much lesser extent policy and legislation production. The status quo thus 
calls for one imperative expedition – an understanding of the current state capacity 
                                                          
1 A review by the MRC in 1992, for example, puts it that ‘in the Cambodian diet freshwater fish 
covers about 70 percent of animal protein intake.’ Cited in Seang Tana Touch and Todd Bruce, The 
Inland and Marine Fisheries Trade in Cambodia  (Phnom Penh: oxfam America, 2002). 9. 
2 Nicolaas van Zalinge as cited in Fisheries Action Coalition Team and Environmental Justice 
Foundation, Feast or Famine? Solutions to Cambodia's Fisheries Conflicts  (Phnom Penh: Fisheries 
Action Coalition Team, 2001). 6. Ministry of Economy and Finance, "Main Economic Indicators 
(2009)," (Phnom Penh2009), 13. 
3 The small or family-scale fishing is theoretically rent-free. 
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in general and in the subsectors in particular and a search for an inclusive factual 
and theoretical explanation. 
There is a significant body of work on fisheries and inundated forest management. 
There is, however, still little systematic academic research on state capacity to 
manage the resources, especially in the field of political science. This study 
therefore wishes to contribute to filling in this academic vacuum. As seen in 
Chapter 2, Cambodian political science since 1993 has been dominated by three 
main themes – democracy/democratization, decentralization and good governance. 
This study thus aims to draw more attention to the study of state capacity per se, to 
contribute to the understanding of state capacity in post-conflict Cambodia and to 
enrich literature on the state and state capacity in least developed countries. 
Specifically, this study will measure the Cambodian state capacity generally and on 
the sectoral basis against seven benchmarks and indicators devised from academic 
literature on state capacity and the claims of the Cambodian state and then discuss 
the major factors that affect the state capacity. 
2. Research Aim 
This study examines the factors affecting Cambodian state capacity since 1993 
with illustrations from inland freshwater fisheries and inundated forest 
management. It will investigate the relationships between the distribution of social 
control; weak civil society and state-society relations; limited state autonomy; 
limited Weberian state structure; a quest for internal political legitimacy; impacts 
from external aid agencies’ assistance and limited state capacity. It is hypothesized 
that state capacity in post-conflict Cambodia, referring to Cambodia after 1993, in 
general and specifically state capacity in inland freshwater fisheries and inundated 
forests, hereinafter fisheries and forests, management is rather limited. In addition, 
the above factors have an overall negative impact on Cambodian state capacity. 
3. Contextual Background to Fisheries and Forest Management 
Cambodia’s efforts to systematically manage both resources have a long history.4 
In 1296, Chou Ta-Kuan, the Chinese missionary to Angkor, reported the abundance 
of fish and other aquatic animals from the Great Lake;5 however, he stopped short 
of writing on fishing exploitation and forest management per se. Stone steles are 
                                                          
4 Fish bones were uncovered in settlements dated between 1,600 and 2,400 years ago in Angkor 
Borei. Vuthy, Voeun as cited in Kent G. Hortle, Sopha Lieng, and John Valbo-Jorgensen, An 
Introduction to Cambodia's Inland Fisheries  (Phnom Penh: Mekong River Commission, 2004). 7.  
5 Ta-Kuan Chou, The Customs of Cambodia, trans. Paul Pelliot (Bangkok: Siam Society, 1993). 53.  
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not informative on this matter either. Nevertheless, anecdotal evidence suggests 
that fishing was mainly for subsistence and small-scale bartering, and hence there 
probably was little effort to formalize resource exploitation. 
More formal management arrangements came in King Norodom’s reign (1863-
1904) through the leasing of fishing rights in some areas for large-scale 
exploitation.6 Under his and his predecessors’ reigns, the king was entitled to 
collect arbitrary taxes on fishing. ‘General farmers’ – Sino-Cambodian traders and 
investors – purchased the use rights of certain fishing grounds and paid the dues to 
the Royal Treasury. They then sub-leased them to other people, some of whom 
continued to sub-lease with a chain of five or six or more go-betweens.7 The 
French colonists further reinforced fisheries and forest management through 
passage of fisheries-cum-forests legal codes and legalization of industrial fishing. 
During the protectorate-ship, the monarch collected fisheries taxes and paid a 
portion to the French. From 1889, however, the French started to collect payments 
directly and introduced formal fishing lot leasing in 1900.8 
The first two post-independence regimes retained the colonial lot system. After 
1953 the Department of Hydrology, Forestry, Wildlife and Fisheries was 
established, and in 1960 a separate Department of Fisheries (DoF) was founded.9 
Due to increasing fishing conflicts, the Khmer Republic revoked some lot licenses. 
The Democratic Kampuchea (DK) terminated commercial fishing, while small-
scale fishing was neglected. Some former lots were operated as they used to by 
cadres and the produce was supplied to collectives, cadres and the administration in 
the capital. This period also experienced large-scale forest clearance to expand 
farmland.10 
                                                          
6 Hortle, Lieng, and Valbo-Jorgensen, An Introduction to Cambodia's Inland Fisheries: 20 and 26. 
7 Darboux, et. al. 1906 & Petillot, 1911 as cited in Peter Degen and Thuok Nao, "Inland Fishery 
Management in Cambodia: Is the Fishing Lot System the Basis for Improved Management or 
Should It Be Abolished?," (Phnom Penh: MRC/DoF/Danida, 1998), 6-7. 
8 Ibid; Fisheries Action Coalition Team and Environmental Justice Foundation, Feast or Famine? 
Solutions to Cambodia's Fisheries Conflicts: 40. For a list of the legal codes, see, for example 
Thuok Nao and Seng Choeu Po, An Executive History of the Creation of Fisheries Laws of the 
Kingdom of Cambodia  (Phnom Penh: Department of Fisheries, August 2006). 
9 Fisheries Action Coalition Team and Environmental Justice Foundation, Feast or Famine? 
Solutions to Cambodia's Fisheries Conflicts: 40.  
10 Cf. Degen and Nao, "Inland Fishery Management in Cambodia: Is the Fishing Lot System the 
Basis for Improved Management or Should It Be Abolished?," 7; Peter Degen et al., "Taken for 
Granted Conflicts over Cambodia's Freshwater Fish Resources," (Phnom Penh2000), 9; Wayne 
Gum, Inland Acquatic Resources and Livelihoods in Cambodia: A Guide to the Literature, 
Legislation, Institutional Framework and Recommendations (Phnom Penh: Oxfam, 2000). 16; 
Hortle, Lieng, and Valbo-Jorgensen, An Introduction to Cambodia's Inland Fisheries: 20; Peter 
Swift, Developing a Research Framework for the Fishing Lot System in Cambodia: Two 
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There was some remarkable development in the People Republic of Kampuchea 
(PRK) and the State of Cambodia (SoC). In late 1979, the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Forestry was re-established. Fisheries exploitation was generally collectively 
managed. From 1979 to 1987, it was done mostly by krom samaki (solidarity 
groups) and by some PRK’s departments and army units. The PRK privatized its 
economy in late 1980’s, and with this transformation, it re-introduced the lot 
system in 1987 in an attempt to privatize resource exploitation and earn more 
revenues. Thus the previous fisheries law and a lot leasing sub-decree were enacted 
in 1987 and 1989, respectively.11 Post-conflict Cambodia witnessed more 
development. The prioritization of revenue generation over rural livelihood and 
intensified resource privatization had worsened conflicts between 
concessionaires/operators and rural villagers. Therefore, in 2001 Hun Sen 
implemented a drastic fisheries reform – releasing 56% of the existing lot areas to 
communities. A new Fisheries Law (FL) was enacted in 2006, and new supporting 
decrees, sub-decrees, and prakas have been passed. 
Although the change from a socialist one-party to a liberal democratic multiparty 
regime was done with good faith, it was too abrupt. The sweeping reforms were, in 
large part, determined by the initiation and pressure from the external actors and 
factors. This hasty development has contributed to many dysfunctions, one of 
which is the state’s limited capacity to regulate, penetrate and extract from the 
society and to appropriate rent from its resources. It also cannot facilitate both 
private sector and local community development. This applies to fisheries and 
forest management. For instance, many lots, areas set aside for small-scale fishers 
within lots, open access areas and protected areas were not clearly demarcated and 
delineated before the privatization, leading to conflicts over access and poor 
regulation.12 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Preliminary Case Studies on Fishing Lots in Takeo and Kompong Chhnang Provinces  (Phnom 
Penh: MRC/DoF/Danida, 1997). Annex 17A; Touch and Bruce, The Inland and Marine Fisheries 
Trade in Cambodia: 8. 
11 Vibolrith Chheng, "Evaluation of Ex-Fishing Lot No. 5 after Its Abolishment in 1988, Siem Reap 
Province, Cambodia," in Management Aspects of Cambodia's Freshwater Capture Fisheries: 
Eleven Presentations Given at the Annual Meeting of the Department of Fisheries of the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 27-28 January 2000, ed. Nicolaas van Zalinge, Thuok Nao, 
and Sopha Lieng (Phnom Penh: MRC/DoF, 2000), 129; Degen and Nao, "Inland Fishery 
Management in Cambodia: Is the Fishing Lot System the Basis for Improved Management or 
Should It Be Abolished?," 7; Fisheries Action Coalition Team and Environmental Justice 
Foundation, Feast or Famine? Solutions to Cambodia's Fisheries Conflicts: 40; Swift, Developing a 
Research Framework for the Fishing Lot System in Cambodia: Two Preliminary Case Studies on 
Fishing Lots in Takeo and Kompong Chhnang Provinces: Annex 17A. 
12 See for example, McKenney Bruce and Tola Prum, Natural Resources and Rural Livelihoods in 
Cambodia: A Baseline Assessment  (Phnom Penh: CDRI, 2002). 
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There are a few explanations for the limited state capacity to manage the resources. 
One explanation is fragmentation of social control; that is, power to decide how the 
resources are managed is in the hands of private individuals and groups. In this 
case, concessionaires, operators and other fishers have their own rules of the games 
that are at odd with those passed by the state. Besides, state’s weaknesses can be 
understood in the context in which implementors and local and other relevant 
authorities are captured by vested interests. This has contributed to poor 
management of the resources and widening the gap between policy formulation and 
implementation. 
The macro-level accommodation and power struggle pose another threat to state 
capacity. Power struggle between various macro-level forces is still omnipresent in 
Cambodia. The 5/6 July 1997 internal fighting between the two main ruling parties 
– the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) and FUNCINPEC13 – is a telling example. 
As will be discussed later, accommodation at the top is also widespread, reflecting 
in politicians’ interventions into the affairs of state apparatus in favor of their 
clients or proxies. In the subsectors, interventions into auction lot bidding and 
‘research lot’ application are fairly common.14 
Related to the limited autonomy from private interests is the limited autonomy 
within and between state apparatus. The Cambodian political culture of centralized 
leadership gives rise to a ‘strong, albeit authoritarian’ leader and politics being 
perceived as a ‘zero-sum game’. Cambodian leaders are considered paramount and 
never tolerate opposition. This is against the backdrop of a lack of a loyal 
opposition group.15 This has restricted the development of a mature democratic 
parliamentary political society, contributing to limited checks and balances 
between the executive and the other branches of the state, rampant patronage 
politics within state agencies, and limited capacity to manage the resources. 
Weak civil society and state-society relations are another main factor. History 
shows that politics and state building has been predominantly the tasks of the 
educated and powerful elites. The exclusion of ordinary people affects the state’s 
                                                          
13 FUNCINPEC stands for the Unified National Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and 
Cooperative Cambodia. Some scholars label the fighting as a coup d’état. See for example, Sorpong 
Peou, Intervention and Change in Cambodia: Towards Democracy?  (Singapure: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 2000). 
14 See for example, Touch and Bruce, The Inland and Marine Fisheries Trade in Cambodia. 
15 Sinclair Dinnen in his study of the PNG also sees the relationship between its political culture and 
state capability – and in this case, state incapability. Sinclair Dinnen, "In Weakness and Strength - 
State, Societies and Order in Papua New Guinea," in Weak and Strong States in Asia-Pacific 
Societies, ed. Peter Dauvergne (Leonards: Unwin Publishers, 1998). 
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capacity as accountability takes its own shape – a sui generis patronage system 
with its own rule and norms of ‘accountability’. By and large, ordinary people 
adopt a more ‘passive participation’ approach to state building. Self-initiated or 
horizontal grouping or “linkages” have been hard to find in Cambodia throughout 
its history. Peter Degen and Thuok Nao argue that such absence also applies to 
fishing villages.16 
In late 1990’s, there were pilot efforts to establish rural communities. This has 
gained more momentum since 2000. Since then Development Partners (DPs) and 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) began to focus on establishing various 
rural communities or groups, including fisheries communities and later community-
based organizations (CBOs). Local NGOs (LNGOs), though having a better 
standing, are likewise new to Cambodia. It was after 1993 that NGOs and 
associations began to proliferate. Their relation with the state is ongoing and hence 
sometimes contentious and suspicious at best. They face other problems, including 
lack of grassroots ownership and good governance, dependency and elitism. These 
problems are more or less applied to rural associations/groups. These communities 
and the NGOs that assist them are generally powerless vis-a-vis rich and powerful 
local elites. 
Another challenge is the limited Weberian state structure and poor resources. Some 
prominent issues are power concentration, poor coordination and cooperation and 
patronage networks within state agencies. As discussed in Chapter 9, lower level 
bureaucrats are less daring to make decisions unless the matters have gone through 
their immediate ‘bosses’. Cambodian state agencies also have a poor track record 
of coordination/cooperation. Besides, state capacity is weakened by patronage 
networks and corruption. David Chandler notes that patronage arrangement has 
been “drummed into everyone from birth,”17 and this arrangement has seeped into 
state apparatus. Speaking about the fisheries bureaucracy in 2000, Hun Sen said: 
“Some government officials have been using the fishing lot systems as their 
‘chhnangbai,’ in exchange for pay-offs guaranteeing impunity for any violation of 
                                                          
16 Peter Degen and Thuok Nao, "Historical, Cultural and Legal Perspectives on the Fishing Lot 
System in Cambodia," in Common Property in the Mekong: Issues of Sustainability and 
Subsistence, ed. Mahfuzuddin Ahmed and Philip Hirsch (Penang: The WorldFish Center and the 
Australian Mekong Resource Centre, 2000), 49-60. See also, David Chandler, A History of 
Cambodia, 4th ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 2008); May Ebihara, "Svay: A Khmer Village in 
Cambodia" (Columbia University Ann Arbor, 1968). 
17 Chandler, A History of Cambodia: 127.  
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the law by the concessionaires. Some of these men, they are really corrupt. They 
don’t eat fish, [sic] they eat money.”18 
With the elections since 1993 came the democratic political legitimacy. The 
‘democratic’ elections do not replace patronage politics outright. The desire for 
political legitimacy by prominent parties makes patronage politics even more 
critical as more financial and structural resources are required to support and 
popularize a party at the expense of building ‘competent’ state agencies. Many 
political and bureaucratic positions and state resources have been granted to 
loyalists and supporters in exchange for their support. The need to sustain ‘mass 
patronage’ since 1998 has meant raiding the state apparatus, siphoning off its 
resources and back door trading with businesses. This has made compromise and 
co-optation even more necessary. The adoption of ‘mass patronage’ has, however, 
contributed to some development. 
Finally, external actors also impact state capacity and building of state institutions. 
Aid-dependent Cambodia needs international legitimacy as a condition to receive 
aid. Since 1992, Cambodia has received more than $12 billion in grants and 
loans.19 The money from multi-lateral and Western DPs (including Japan) is 
usually attached to promises of reforms. The strings attached and money injected, 
as discussed later, work to some extent and result in state capacity enhancement 
and institutional capacity building. On the other side, coordination and cooperation 
amongst DPs and between DPs and Cambodia is still fairly poor, thus undermining 
the impacts of the assistance. The rise of non-traditional DPs as major donors is 
also alarming, as these latecomers do not condition their assistance to good 
governance.20 
                                                          
18 As cited in Frank van Acker, "Don't Trust Fish When They Are in Water: Cambodia's Inland 
Fisheries in Transition," (n.a.), 11 and 24. Original quote with lot owners replaced by lot 
concessionaires. "Eat money" is a Khmer slang to mean 'take bribes'. 
19 For reports on 2010 pledges, see for example, Sebastian Strangio and Sovan Nguon, "$1.1 Billion 
Pledged in Donors Aid," The Phnom Penh Post 4 June, 2010; Sebastian Strangio, "Donors to Give 
near $3 Billion in 2010-2013," The Phnom Penh Post 8 June, 2010; Sebastian Strangio and Sokha 
Cheang, "Donors, Government Open Aid Talks," The Phnom Penh Post 3 June, 2010.  Aid pledges 
have increased over time, for example in 2007, it was $690 million, in 2008, $951.5 million, and 
2010, $1.1 billion. 
20 For example, in December 2009, China pledged $1.2 billion in economic aid agreements during a 
visit by Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping immediately after Cambodia agreed to expatriate 20 
Uighur asylum seekers whom Beijing had accused of being terrorists because of their alleged 
involvement in the Xingjiang uprising in July of the same year. Many observers drew a correlation 
between the two. See for example, Sebastian Strangio, "Asylum Policy Failed Uighurs, Activists 
Say," The Phnom Penh Post 22 December, 2009; ———, "Beijing Sends Note on Uighurs," The 
Phnom Penh Post 15 December, 2009; Sokha  Cheang and Sebastian Strangio, "China VP Lauds 
Gov't for Return of Uighurs," The Phnom Penh Post 22 December, 2009; Sebastian Strangio, 
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4. Research Methodology 
4.1. Research Design 
This explanatory, retrospective-prospective study is conducted qualitatively. As 
such interviewees were asked mainly about the current situations in the two 
subsectors and to recall their experiences, some dating to the 1980’s or early 
1990’s. Content analyses are used to identify categories and patterns emerging 
from interview scripts and primary and secondary documents. 
4.2. Data Collection Methods 
This study uses three principal sources of information. Semi-structured interviews 
were conducted with key informants. An interview schedule focusing on 
Cambodian state capacity and factors affecting state capacity in the two subsectors 
was produced. Spontaneous and probing questions were usually used. Second, it is 
based on substantial primary documents the researcher collected over the course of 
the fieldwork. Besides, secondary data are used quite extensively in this study. 
4.3. Research Sites 
The fieldwork was conducted in three locations – Phnom Penh and two provinces. 
The provinces are not identified, but are referred to as Province A and Province B. 
In each, the researcher conducted his research in three locations: the provincial 
towns and two villages each. In the last village, the researcher conducted interviews 
with Community Fisheries Committee (CFC) heads from three CFis. These 
locations are not identified by names either. The two villages in Province A are 
referred to as Sites 1-2 and the two in Province B as Sites 3-4. Where necessary, 
the three CFis in Site 4 are referred separately as CFi-A, CFi-B and CFi-C. The 
anonymity is required to ensure correspondents’ personal safety and security. 
4.4. Sampling Techniques 
This study employs chain referral sampling to select relevant participants. Between 
25 January and 24 February, 2011 initial contacts were done with seven NGO/IO 
staff, four Fisheries Administration (FiA) officials and four researchers. All but two 
each of the first and second categories failed to respond to the requests. During the 
course of the fieldwork, the researcher contacted some fishers independently, while 
                                                                                                                                                                 
"Uighurs' Fate Seen as Stain on Kingdom," The Phnom Penh Post 21 December, 2009. In a speech 
during the inauguration of the Prek Kdam Cambodian-Chinese Friendship Bridge, the PM praised 
China for ‘talking less, but doing more.” "China a Major Donor to Cambodia,"  in Radio Free Asia 
(Radio Free Asia, 31 May, 2010). 
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one NGO, two FiA officials and one village chief assisted with arrangements of 
three separate group discussions. The FiA officials also helped arrange meetings 
with three concessionaires. 
4.5. Sample Size 
Interviews were conducted with 94 informants between March and September. For 
their safety and security, they are referred anonymously as Informants 1-94.21 
There were forty-one, three and six solo, pair and group interviews, respectively. 
The interviewee composition is as follows: sixteen NGO/IO/DP staff, eleven FiA 
officers, nineteen CFC members, thirty-three fishers, four concessionaires/operator, 
six researchers and four commune council (CC) members and one village chief. 
5. What This Study Covers 
This study mainly covers Cambodian state capacity to manage inland freshwater 
fisheries and inundated forests since 1993. State capacity in this study refers to the 
capacity to penetrate and regulate the subsectors, extract resource rents, appropriate 
its resources, and midwife and husband concessionaires and CFCs. Besides, it 
relates the capacity in the subsectors to broader Cambodian state capacity. There 
are a few relevant state agencies responsible for fisheries and forest management, 
yet this study focuses mainly on FiA and, to lesser extent, the armed forces, courts 
and local authorities. 
6. Paper Outline 
This dissertation is divided into 12 chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the study. 
Chapters 2 and 3 review the existing literature on state capacity and Cambodian 
politics and state, and present the theoretical framework on state capacity, 
respectively. Chapters 4 and 5 assess the state capacity overall and on a sectoral 
basis. Chapters 6 and 7 focus on how social control fragmentation, weak civil 
society and existing state-society relations impact state capacity. Chapters 8 and 9 
concentrate on how limited state autonomy and weak state structures and resources 
affect state capacity. Chapters 10 and 11 draw the attention to how the quest for 
internal legitimacy and the impacts of DPs on state capacity and state institutional 
capacity building, respectively. Chapter 12 synthesizes the study and draws some 
implications on Cambodian state capacity. 
                                                          
21 For the list of interviewees, see Appendix B. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
This chapter discusses the literature on relevant theoretical issues on state capacity 
and considers some key studies on post-conflict Cambodian politics, governance 
and the state. First, it discusses some pertinent debates on state capacity, including 
paradigm shifts in political science over the last few decades; how different 
scholars relate state structure and state-society relations to state capacity; how state 
capacity is understood and measured, and how international factors and legitimacy 
relate to state capacity. It then presents some key research on post-conflict 
Cambodian politics, governance and the state and highlights the limited research on 
state capacity per se. 
1. Literature on State Capacity 
There are a few dichotomies on state capacity in the literature worth discussing. 
One is the paradigm shift over the past decades. Political science and sociology in 
the 1960’s and 1970’s were dominated by the ‘society-centered’ paradigm.1 Its 
central feature is ‘political practice and institutions were ultimately determined by 
broader social forces’ and that the state is not taken seriously as a unit of analysis2 
or is relegated to secondary importance. Talcott Parsons and Samuel Huntington 
(structural-functionalism), Seymour Lipset, Robert Dahl and James Hunter 
(pluralism), and Marx-Engels and their disciples exemplify the major advocates of 
this school.3 
In the 1980’s and 1990’s, there was an effort to ‘bring the state back in’. Some 
scholars were thus labeled ‘state-centric’ for taking the state as supreme, utmost 
powerful and autonomous actors from social actors and the effort amongst scholars 
to draw clear state-society boundaries. Thus, state received more attention, and 
social actors secondary importance in the analyses. Such dichotomous treatment 
                                                          
1 Badie and Birdbaun & King as cited in Bradley Nash, "Labor Law and the State: The Crises of 
Unions in the 1980’s" (Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 2000), 44.  
2 Skocpol as cited in Badie and Birdbaun & King as cited in ibid., 46-47.  
3 For a discussion of these approaches to the state, see ibid., especially Chapter 2. 
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‘proves detrimental to a fuller sociological understanding of the nature and role of 
political institutions in contemporary social life.4  
Another issue is whether the state shall be insulated from or embedded with the 
society for it to be effective. Max Weber supports state supremacy over and 
autonomy from society as a prerequisite for state capacity.5 One of his prominent 
adherents is Theda Skocpol. She argues that it can ‘formulate and pursue goals that 
are not simply reflective of the demands or interests of social groups,’ owing partly 
to its ‘organizationally coherent collectivities of state officials, especially 
collectivities of career officials relatively insulated from ties to currently dominant 
socioeconomic interests.”6 
Peter Evans, though treating the state as a prominent actor, focuses on how the state 
structure and its relations to social groups determine state capacity. He proposes 
‘embedded autonomy’ to explain developmental states’ success and intermediate 
states’ relative success in industrial transformation. The former’s internal structure, 
which resembles Weberian bureaucracy and its relations with, not its insulation 
from, industrial groups explain their ‘joint project’ success.7 Similarly, Francis 
Deng, Damien Kingsbury and others argue for the participation of civil society in 
the management of the state’s affairs and for mutual capacity enhancement.8 
                                                          
4 Badie and Birdbaun & King as cited in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, 
eds., Brining the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Nash, "Labor Law 
and the State: The Crises of Unions in the 1980’s," Chapter 2.  
5 For his discussion of the state, see for example, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, trans. H. 
H. & Mills Gerth, Wright (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1947); Julien Freund, The 
Sociology of Max Weber, trans. Mary Ilford (London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1968). Ho-
Soon Lee interprets his understanding as follows: “The state is founded on a separate and possibly 
competing basis of power to that of social classes. That basis is the established authority or 
bureaucracy…and the state bureaucracy is a powerful stratum distinct from the social classes.” Su-
Hoon Lee, State-Building in the Contemporary Third World  (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988). 12. 
6 Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research," in 
Bringing the State Back In, ed. Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 3-28. (Researcher’s emphasis); Nash, "Labor Law 
and the State: The Crises of Unions in the 1980’s," Chapter 2.  
7 Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: State & Industrial Transformation  (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1995). 12 and 39-42. Researcher’s emphasis. In an earlier study, Adrian Leftwich 
refers to a state with autonomy, effectiveness and legitimacy as a development state. Such a state 
has the ‘capacity to define, pursue and implement developmental strategies which can and do over-
ride class, regional and sectoral interests in putative national interest.’ However, due to his focus on 
economic growth as an indicator, he raises a few countries which Evans would consider 
intermediate states as developmental as well. Adrian Leftwich, "States of Underdevelopment: The 
Third World State in Theoretical Perspective," Journal of Theoretical Politics 6, no. 1 (1994): 68.  
8 See for example, Damien Kingsbury, Political Development  (Abingdon: Rouledge, 2007); Francis 
M. Deng et al., Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa  (Washington D.C.: 
Brookings Institution, 1996).  
12 
 
Joel Migdal also sees state-society relations as a determinant of state capacity, but 
as a zero-sum game. While Evans, inter alia, see capable society as a counterpart to 
state capacity building, Migdal argues that a ‘weak state’ with a ‘strong society’ 
results in weak capacity as social control is diffused rather than concentrated in the 
state.9 The anthology edited by Peter Dauvergne on Asia-Pacific societies contains 
good examples of the negative impacts of ‘weak states’ and ‘strong societies’ on 
state capacity.10 
Another debate is how to analyze the state and state capacity. Many neo-Weberian 
thinkers see the state as a centralized and institutionalized entity with good 
coordination amongst its agencies and power radiating from the center. Therefore, 
they frequently focus on ‘the very top leadership, the elites in the upper echelon of 
the state organization.’ To the contrary, Migdal suggests that to understand the state 
and the effectiveness of its policies, one should analyze its different components, 
which oftentimes have potential conflicts and may go into different directions, and 
their interactions with social forces. He thus proposes state and social force 
dissection to understand state capacity and the interactions amongst and between 
them.11 
The next issue is state-society boundary or distinction. Such scholars as Weber, 
Skocpol and Stephen Krasner suppose ‘that there are precise and unambiguous 
boundaries between state apparatus and society, state managers and social forces, 
and state power and societal power.’12 Migdal, on the other hand, proposes that the 
boundaries are fuzzy and dynamic. While the image of the state suggests that a 
clear boundary exists and that the state is not only separated but also aggrandized, 
the actual practices may bolster or erode its image; they may reinforce the notion of 
                                                          
9 Joel Migdal, State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One 
Another  (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001). especially 3-41. Although Migdal, along 
with Kholi and Shue, does agree that the interactions between the state and social forces may 
empower both, or one of the two, or even vitiate the power of both. Joel Migdal, Atul Kohli, and 
Vivienne Shue, "Introduction: Developing a State-in-Society Perspective," in State Power and 
Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World, ed. Joel Migdal, Atul Kohli, 
and Vivienne Shue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 4. 
10 Peter Dauvergne, ed. Weak and Strong States in Asia-Pacific Societies (Australia: Ellen & Unwin, 
1998). 
11 Migdal, State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One 
Another: 107-21 and 250-63.  
12 Yet as Mitchell Timothy shows, Skocpol and Krasner ‘find it hard to delineate state and society in 
their political analysis of the state.’ Cited in Say Sok, "State Building in Cambodia: The Politics of 
Land Management and Administration in Cambodia - Focusing on Ratanakiri Province" (Kobe 
University, 2005), 19-20.  
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the territorial and public-private boundaries or neutralize them. Benedict Kerkvliet 
also highlights the plurality of state organizations and the state’s inseparability 
from society; that is, ‘the degree of coherence among the organizations within it 
[state] varies over time and from one state to another…. [W]hile the state is 
different from society, it is not separable from it.”13 The study on post-communist 
states further supports that the boundaries are not clear-cut and that the boundaries 
between state agencies and political parties are likewise not unambiguous.14 
That international factors and actors matter is another debate. Migdal sees the 
colonial/imperialist administration’s manipulation of a colony as a determinant of 
post-independence state capacity.15 Evans proves that ‘new internationalization,’ 
has brought with it more opportunities; consequently, careers in the private sector 
are more promising and has lured the ‘best and brightest,’ while positions within 
the bureaucracy become a second best. The shrinking in material rewards poses 
another potential threat as it may increase craft and bribery.16 Anna Grzymala-
Busse and Pauline Luong propose that post-communist state building is influenced 
by international pressure, which has an effect on the types of formal institutions in 
which elites compete.17   
Another issue is that legitimacy matters to state capacity; however, different 
regimes and leaders may need or popularize different forms of legitimacy. Weber 
divides sources of legitimacy into three ideal types: traditional, charismatic and 
legal-rational. The first is ‘the eternal yesterday.’ The ruled are peers or subjects 
                                                          
13 Benedict J. Tria Kerkvliet, "Land Regimes and State Strengths and Weaknesses in the Philippines 
and Vietnam," in Weak and Strong States in Asia-Pacific Societies, ed. Peter Dauvergne (Leonards: 
Unwin Australia, 1998), 160.  
14 Timothy J. Colton and Stephen Holmes, eds., The State after Communism: Governance in the 
New Russia (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publication, 2006); Anna Grzymala-Busse and Pauline 
Jones Luong, "Reconceptualizing the State: Lessons from Post-Communism," Politics and Society 
30, no. 4 (2002): 529-36; Coner O'Dwyer, Runaway State-Building: Patronage Politics and 
Democratic Development  (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006). 
15 Some colonial masters help build and work through the colony’s structure and hence build its 
capacity, whereas others use divide-and-rule policies, channeling huge wealth to social 
organizations and therefore strengthened their social control at the detriment of state capacity. 
Besides, the expanding of world economy has routed resources ‘selectively to build up the strength 
of such social groups,’ thus further weakening state capacity. Such factors as civil wars and 
revolutions also affect sate capacity and state-society relations. Cited in Sok, "State Building in 
Cambodia: The Politics of Land Management and Administration in Cambodia - Focusing on 
Ratanakiri Province," 34.  Migdal’s grand historical theory fails to capture how the existing external 
actors in aid dependent countries affects state capacity – a subject of further discussion in Chapter 
11. 
16 Evans, Embedded Autonomy: State & Industrial Transformation: especially Chapter 8. 




and the sovereign’s rule is governed by ‘customary laws of equality and moral 
justice or by personal expediency.’ The people aiding him are not bureaucrats, but 
servants of some sort. The two characteristics of this legitimacy are: the lack of 
clear separation of the ruler from the institutions of rule and the corresponding lack 
of broad, meritocratic recruitment and autonomy and security of tenure for his 
subordinates. The second is ‘authority of the extraordinary.’ The ruler acquires 
legitimacy from sources within himself, which can be dangerous as the leader 
stands ready to renounce or get rid of those of his subordinates who fail to adhere 
to the path ‘whose direction he alone may specify.’ The final type is based on the 
belief in the rationally established rules and in the legitimacy of the ruler who gains 
authority within the establishment of the law. The most typical form is 
bureaucracy. Weber cautions that these pure types rarely exist in reality.18 These 
types of legitimacy affect the relationship between political leaders, state 
agencies/agents, treatment of state resources and the populace, and hence state 
capacity. 
Leaders of many developing countries base their legitimacy on, at least, two more 
things: performance and/or electoral victory, and this too affects state capacity. 
Muthiah Alagappa identifies four elements of legitimacy: shared norms and values, 
conformity with established rules for power acquisition, proper and effective use of 
power and consent of the governed. In this vein, “[a] command-obedience 
relationship may be defined as legitimate if that power is exercised within 
prescribed limits for the promotion of the community’s collective interest.”19 As 
discussed later, performance in turn affects legitimacy and state capacity. Post-
communist regimes/leaders need electoral legitimacy to be seen legitimate. As 
Coner O’Dwyer and Grzymala-Busse and Luong show, leaders of many countries 
                                                          
18 From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology: 79-82; Freund, The Sociology of Max Weber: 229-34. 
Weber defines legitimacy in terms of psychological ‘belief’. That is, an order is legitimate, if the 
ruled perceive it to be legitimate – the order in this sense must conform to any of the three arch-
types of legitimacy he proposed. For further details, see Duncan Kelly, The State of the Political: 
Conceptions of Politics and the State in the Thought of Max Weber, Carl Schmitt and Franz 
Neumann  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 103-05. The four sub-types of patrimonialism 
are gerontocracy, patriarchalism, sultanism, and patrimonialism. From Max Weber: Essays in 
Sociology: 78-82; Freund, The Sociology of Max Weber: 229-322; Andrian Leftwich, "Theorizing 
the State," in Politics in Developing Countries, ed. Peter Burnell and Randall Vicky (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), 213. 
19 Muthiah Alagappa, ed. Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 14-15. Researcher’s emphasis 
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adopt elections as a means to attain legitimacy. Yet, whether electoral legitimacy 
means more state capacity depends on many other factors.20  
The final issue is the difference in defining and measuring state capacity. The term 
has been defined and understood differently. Skocpol and others define it in terms 
of the state’s ‘organizational and/or structural powers’ to achieve its agendas. 
Byongil Rho links state capacity to its resources, autonomy, and legitimacy.21 
Many other authors define it in terms of roles or functions. Neil A. Englehart 
equates state capacity to the ability and willingness of the state apparatus to carry 
out government policies. Brian Smith and Francis Fukuyama focus, amongst 
others, on policy and legislature capacity. Dauvergne associates it to social control 
maintenance, policy production, rule and regulation imposition, basic service 
provision and economic management. Verena Fritz proposes that it be measured by 
weighing state’s functionalities against dysfunctionalities and three indicators to 
measure it: decision making, implementation and control. Ho-Soon Lee 
understands state capacity as state power to extract resources from the citizens, 
coerce them to abide by its rules and incorporate them into the society.22 
Migdal views state capacity as the state leader’s capability to use subordinates to 
make people within its territory do what they want the people to do. It is measured 
through the level of citizen compliance to state rules, participation in the channels it 
sets and legitimacy. He proposes four state capabilities: to penetrate the society, to 
regulate social relationship, to appropriate resources and to extract resources from 
                                                          
20 These include the state of pre-reform state structure and society, nature of post-communist 
competition and international contexts. Grzymala-Busse and Luong, "Reconceptualizing the State: 
Lessons from Post-Communism."; O'Dwyer, Runaway State-Building: Patronage Politics and 
Democratic Development. 
21 Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol, Brining the State Back In, 351-52; Byeongil Rho, "State 
Capacity and Third World Politics: A Comparative Analysis of South Korea and Philippine Cases" 
(University Microfilm International, 1992), 35. 
22 Peter Dauvergne, "Weak States and the Environment in Indonesia and the Solomon Islands," in 
Weak and Strong States in Asia-Pacific Societies, ed. Peter Dauvergne (Leonards: Unwin Australia, 
1998), 137; Neil A. Englehart, "State Capacity, State Failure, and Human Rights," Journal of Peace 
Research 46, no. 163 (2009): 167; Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World 
Order in the 21st Century  (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004). especially Chapter 1 and 4; Lee, 
State-Building in the Contemporary Third World: 25-31; Brian Smith, "State-Building," in Politics 
in Developing Countries, ed. Peter Burnell and Vicky Randall (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008), 242-45. Fritz sees a ‘functional’ or ‘capable state’ as ‘a state that enables society to respond 
continuously and dynamically to a changing international environment.’ For more details, see 
Verena Fritz, "State Weakness in Post-Communist Countries: The Concept of State Capacity," 
Romanian Journal of Political Science 3, no. 2 (2003). 
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the society. Kingsbury reduces the criteria to compliance and legitimacy, while 
Kerviet adopts the three but disagrees with the hierarchy Midgal suggests.23 
Evans defines it in terms of means (roles) and end (development). State capacity is 
the ‘ability to implement strategies to achieve its economic, political, or social 
goals in society.’ He elaborates four roles the state shall execute to attain its goal. 
They are custodianship, demiurge, midwifery and husbandry. Custodianship refers 
to a restrictive regulator; demiurge denotes the role as a producer. Developmental 
states play two more important roles to bolster the private sector: midwifery, 
assisting the private sector to venture into a new challenge or inducing new groups 
of entrepreneurs and husbandry, ‘cajoling and assisting’ private entrepreneurs to 
meet up the challenges from the global forces and actors.24 
All authors above but Evans focus mainly on the top-down and unilateral nature of 
state capacity. A capable state in a developmental sense, however, is the one able 
not only to penetrate and regulate the society, extract resources from the society 
and use the resources in a determined way unilaterally, but also to enter into 
discussion with and assist society. Thus, the state shall devise a workable policy 
and assist social groups through meaningful engagement and consultation. 
 
 
                                                          
23 Kerkvliet, "Land Regimes and State Strengths and Weaknesses in the Philippines and Vietnam," 
160-62; Kingsbury, Political Development: 67; Joel Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: 
State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World  (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1988). xiii.  
24 Cited in Karen Barkey and Sunita Parikh, "Comparative Perspectives on the State," Annual 
Review of Sociology 17(1991): 525-26; Evans, Embedded Autonomy: State & Industrial 
Transformation: 12-17. ibid.  John McKay vividly exemplifies these four roles of the developmental 
state as follows: “In Japan, more recently in South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, and later still in 
China, the role of the government has certainly been central. Governments had clear and detailed 
strategic plans for the development of their economies and indeed their wider societies. Key 
industries were identified, protected and supported until they were strong enough to be competitive 
in world markets. Extremely large investments were made in physical infrastructure, such as ports, 
roads and telecommunications systems, and in social infrastructure, especially education. In most 
cases, competition within key sectors was carefully managed and emerging 'national champions' 
were often given a monopoly position. Trade union activity and hence wage increases were 
carefully controlled in the name of maintaining export competitiveness, for it was the emphasis on 
exports of manufactured products that was also a very distinctive component of the Asian model. At 
the same time, the lack of market discipline within most individual industrial sectors was replaced 
by strong government supervision.” John McKay, "The Economics of Development," in 
International Development: Issues and Challenges, ed. Damien Kingsbury, et al. (New York: 
Palgrave McMillan, 2008), 115.  
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2. Literature Review on Cambodian Politics and State 
There are a number of established studies and academic research on international 
intervention and/or democracy in post-conflict Cambodia. Cambodia’s New Deal is 
a first report on state of the political after the 1993 elections. William Shawcross 
discusses some contemporary issues such as weak state institutions, intra- and 
inter-party power wrangling, the CPP’s domination over the state apparatus, 
patronage politics and their hindrance to reforms, and civil society’s weaknesses.25 
In Intervention and Change in Cambodia, Sorpong Peou invokes the relationship 
between international intervention and ‘power relationship among factional groups 
within the state and between state and social actors’ to explain the ‘unconsolidated’ 
and ‘illiberal’ democracy in the 1990’s. The United Nations Transitional Authority 
in Cambodia’s (UNTAC’s) inability to divorce the SoC’s structure from the CPP, 
poorly coordinated intervention from and a priority on ‘stability’ by the 
‘international community’ and limited ability of the other factions within the state 
to check the CPP’s power have given rise to a ‘hegemonic’ party and leader, anti-
democratic practices and limited democratization.26  
In another paper, he discusses some critical issues Cambodia faces. The state 
apparatus was weak and dominated by the CPP, ‘fragmented along the line of sub-
factional and interest groups unwilling and/or unable to transcend their parochial 
interest’ and lacked necessary resources and organizations. Political development 
and critical reforms were hamstrung by patronage politics and politicized state 
agencies. Moreover, checks and balances were limited as power was concentrated 
in the more institutionalized executive and dominant ruling party. Civil society, 
though emerging, was weak. Politics was elite-based, and political parties heavily 
depended on ‘strong leaders’ for electoral success.27  
                                                          
25 William Shawcross, Cambodia's New Deal  (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 1994). 
26 Peou, Intervention and Change in Cambodia: Towards Democracy?: especially Parts 2 and 3. For 
a discussion of political economy of aid and regime legitimacy, see Sophal Ear, "The Political 
Economy of Aid and Regime Legitimacy in Cambodia," in Beyond Democracy in Cambodia: 
Political Reconstruction in a Post-Conflict Society, ed. Joakim Ojendal and Mona Lilja 
(Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2009), 151-88.  
27 Sorpong Peou, "Cambodia after the Killing Fields," in Government and Politics in Southeast 
Asia, ed. Jonh Funston (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001). 
18 
 
Another work on this period is Political Transition in Cambodia 1991-1999. David 
Roberts focuses on how Cambodian cultural values and experiences present a 
‘challenge’ to alien multi-party liberal democracy. Deeply-rooted ‘absolutism’ and 
patronage are at odds with the newly imported and externally ‘superimposed’ 
democratic values and institutions. Political elites thus tried to manipulate this 
‘democratic’ transition, and stability could be attained only when major elites and 
their factions were satisfied with the power-arrangement.28  
Kheang Un draws a link between Cambodian ‘patronage politics’ and ‘hybrid 
democracy,’ in which elements of ‘liberal democracy’ co-exist with illiberal ones 
and where patronage is banked upon by ruling elites to maintain ‘political control’. 
To sustain procedural legitimacy, the CPP has relied on ‘dual methods of 
domination’: surveillance over and intimidation of rural voters by elements of state 
apparatus, but more importantly rural development projects and ‘material favors’ 
financed by contribution from state agents and big businesses, and such ‘pork-
barrel politics’ breeds corruption, favoritism and patronage.29 
In another study, he links the limited democratic consolidation to the ‘absence of 
horizontal and vertical accountability’ with an illustration in the judiciary. Each 
state institution is not accountable to another, nor independent from each other, but 
is instead plagued by patronage, corruption and intervention. This state of affairs is 
further aggravated by the limited accountability towards the weaker citizens and 
civil society groups. In an expansion to this study, he later turned to the structural 
analysis of the judiciary, discussing its limited independence from other state 
agencies and parties, structural challenges to its operations and their impacts on 
democratization.30 
While the studies above focus mainly on international interventions, political 
society and democracy/democratization, the following two studies focus mainly on 
society. The first by Yukiko Yonekura emphasizes the contribution from civil 
                                                          
28 David Roberts, Political Transition in Cambodia: Power, Elitism and Democracy  (Surrey: 
Curzon Press, 2001). 
29 Kheang Un, "Patronage Politics and Hybrid Democracy: Political Change in Cambodia, 1993-
2003," Asian Perspective 29, no. 2 (2005). 
30 ———, "State, Society and Democratic Consolidation: The Case of Cambodia," Pacific Affairs 
79, no. 2 (2006): 225-45; ———, "The Judicial System and Democratization in Post-Conflict 
Cambodia," in Beyond Democracy in Cambodia: Political Reconstruction in a Post-Conflict 
Society, ed. Joakim Ojendal and Mona Lilja (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2009), 70-100. 
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society associations to democratization. Her survey indicates that their contribution 
to democratization was limited because of their weaknesses vis-à-vis the state and 
political parties and limited pressure from their foreign donors who can or were not 
willing to push state leaders to open up more political space for them. Besides, they 
have quite limited historical roots. Many had a nasty relationship with the state, and 
themselves lacked democratic attributes. The other study focusing on rural villages 
shows that in the 1990’s social organizations above the family were noted for their 
absence and that citizen interactions with the local state agencies/agents were 
infrequent and top-down.31 
A closer emphasis on the state itself is Political Economy of Cambodian 
Transition: 1991-2001. Caroline Hughes links the entrenched patronage politics, 
extraction from the office and unwillingness to reforms to the central government’s 
(ruling parties’) need for support from state agencies/agents, especially local 
governments and the armed forces to win an election through voter surveillance 
and campaigns of inclusion/exclusion. To strengthen the ties between the dominant 
parti(es) and state agents, the central government needs not only to allow but also 
to protect ‘entrepreneurial activities’ by the local governments and military. 
Additionally, the inability to arrest the rampancy of ‘entrepreneurial activities’ was 
due partly to array of donors that could not forge a united front to demand better 
governance. Civil society as a sphere of power to check the state’s power was also 
limited.32 
Philippe Le Billon brings political economy to the sectoral level. He employs the 
commodity chain analysis and discursive practices to identify a chain of actors 
involved in timber businesses and to explain the ‘exclusionary’ capitalist 
exploitation of Cambodian forestry in favor of the central and provincial politico-
military elites and well-connected private logging companies. Social networks and 
power, rather than a right-based access, determine how much one could benefit 
from forestry exploitation. The drastic deforestation was exacerbated by the global 
                                                          
31 Jan Ovesen, Ing-Britt Trankell, and Joakim Ojendal, When Every Household Is an Island: Social 
Organization and Power Structures in Rural Cambodia  (Stockholm: Uppsala University, 1996). 
especially Parts 3 and 4; Yokiko Yonekura, "The Emergence of Civil Society in Cambodia: Its Role 
in the Democratisation Process" (University of Sussex, 1999).  
32 Caroline Hughes, The Political Economy of Cambodia's Transition, 1991-2001  (New York: 
Routledge Curzon, 2003). See also ———, "Reconstructing Legitimate Political Authority through 
Elections?," in Beyond Democracy in Cambodia: Political Reconstruction in a Post-Conflict 
Society, ed. Joakim Ojendal and Mona Lilja (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2009), 31-69.  
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need for timber, tacit involvement of elements from the neighboring countries, 
financial need to fight the war and to sustain the fighting after 1993, and ruling 
parties’ need for resources to maintain patronage-based power maintenance.33 The 
harsher conditionality from donors after 1997 and its promotion of an ‘idealized 
timber commodity chain’ in an environment of weak governance only serve to 
legalize and consolidate existing ‘shadow state politics’ and reinforce inequitable 
resource rent distribution and ‘crony capitalism’.34 
The discussion so far portrays politics as mainly elite-based; hence elites’ support 
was necessary for rulers to stay in power. Kimchoeun Pak and David Craig, 
however, observe the evolution of politics from ‘elite patronage’ to ‘mass 
patronage’. They focus on rural development projects provided by the CPP’s Party 
Working Groups (PWGs). Central and provincial officials and businesses are 
responsible for fund-raising, and district and commune officials for implementing 
the projects. In this ‘mass-patronage,’ the support from the mass is needed to 
sustain its legitimacy; therefore, rural development is essential. Investigating three 
case studies, they report substantial injection of capital into rural development and 
argue that such has an impact on socio-economic development,35 although impacts 
of such ‘party-dispensing’ development on state capacity were not probed. 
The quest for electoral legitimacy and mass-patronage have altered local 
governments’ relationship with the electorates and caught them in a dilemma. The 
discourse that describes their previous relationship was a lot of fear, very little 
admiration and some respect. Decentralization has reversed the order to more 
respect, some admiration and little fear. A case-study research by Hughes and 
others supports this change; however, it shows that they are caught between 
representing and being accountable to their constituency and party patronage 
                                                          
33 Philippe Le Billon, "The Political Ecology of Transition in Cambodia 1989-1999: War, Peace and 
Forest Exploitation," Development and Change 31(2000): 785-805.  
34 Ibid; ———, "Logging in Muddy Waters: The Politics of Forest Exploitation in Cambodia," 
Critical Asian Studies 34, no. 4 (2002); Philippe Le Billon and Simon Springer, "Between War and 
Peace: Violence and Accommodation in the Cambodian Logging Sector," in Extreme Conflict and 
Tropical Forests, ed. Wil De Jong, Deanna Donovan, and Ken-ichi Abe (Dordrecht: Springer, 
2007), 17-36. 
35 David Craig and Kimchoeun Pak, "Party Financing of Local Investment Projects: Elite and Mass 
Patronage," in Cambodia's Economic Transformation, ed. Caroline Hughes and Kheang Un 
(Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2011). 
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politics and that their options are constrained by party-affiliated local big 
businesses.36 
The jargon aside, many of these authors converge at a few points that: international 
intervention and support matters to democracy; democratization and/or good 
governance, Cambodian politics is dominated by the CPP and other parties are 
weaker; legitimacy matters; the state structure and/or resources are manipulated by 
political parties; checks and balances amongst the three branches of the state are 
weak, and civil society is weak and young. 
The departure of a majority of the studies on Cambodian politics and in Cambodian 
political science starts with international interventionism, democratization and/or 
local governance, while very few studies focus on state capacity per se. Therefore, 
this study attempts to contribute to ‘bringing the state and state capacity analyses 
in’. Moreover, a lot of academic literature focuses on politics as it plays out 
between prominent leaders, though there has been a shift to research on local 
governance. What is missing is an emphasis on how social actors affect state 
capacity – a gap this study hopes to highlight. 
Although the degree of ‘stateness’ in many developing countries is low, deleting 
the state from the analyses of state capacity would be counter-productive. Yet 
treating it as unitary, dominant and autonomous would likewise obscure the 
interactions and struggle between state agencies, social and political forces, civil 
society groups and international actors for domination and contradictory practices 
by state agencies and social forces. The existence of the dichotomous social actors 
likewise calls for dissection of society to better explain state capacity and 
understand its dynamics. This study thus accepts that the state be included in the 
analysis, but be treated as one actor amongst others (political and social), that state 
and non-statal actors be dissected, that state must be both autonomous from and 
embedded to civil society and that insulation itself do not bring about successful 
‘joint projects’.  
                                                          
36 Caroline Hughes et al., "Local Leaders and Big Business in Three Communes," in Cambodia's 
Economic Transformation, ed. Caroline Hughes and Kheang Un (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2011); 
Joakim Ojendal and Sedara Kim, "Korob, Kaud, Klach: In Search of Agency in Rural Cambodia," 
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 37, no. 3 (2006).  
22 
 
Migdal’s portrayal of social actors is mainly negative. This sole emphasis on the 
negativity overshadows the situation where these forces co-exist with civil society 
groups working to promote the ‘image of the state’ – ones attempting to 
depoliticize state institutions, promote their independence from social forces and 
political pressure or cooperate with the state to develop its agencies or agents. 
Evans proves that the state must be competent, autonomous and embedded in social 
groups to achieve development. Many other scholars also support that strong civil 
society can enhance state capacity.  
However, in many post-communist countries, including Cambodia, the existence of 
‘strong’ egocentric social forces, ‘weak’ civil society and ‘less capable’ state 
exacerbates and thwarts state capacity. This state of affairs is further complicated 
by the presence of external actors and factors. The nature of state and society and 
their relations and capabilities are still evolving and dynamic, and egoistic social 
forces co-exist with emerging civil society associations. Likewise, relationship 
between foreign agencies and state and societal counterparts are being defined and 
embryonic. This dynamism hence demands eclecticism to explain the state 
capacity. Thus, this study adapts ‘state-in-society’ and ‘embedded autonomy’ (its 
limitedness) as they play out in a post-communist context where electoral and 
developmental legitimacy dominates and local and foreign agencies interact to 
explain the limited state capacity. 
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Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework on State Capacity 
This chapter presents the theoretical framework on state capacity. It starts with the 
outline of how this study measures state capacity. This is followed by an analysis 
of six factors that affect state capacity. Since this study discusses how the 
Cambodian state structure and state-society relations impact state capacity in the 
post-communist context, it invokes these factors as determinants of state capacity: 
fragmentation of social control; weak civil society and its limited and imbalanced 
relations with the state; limited state autonomy from social and political forces and 
amongst state agencies; limited Weberian state structure; the quest for internal 
legitimacy and impacts from external agencies. 
1. State Capacity Measurement 
Adapting from Migdal, Evans, Fritz and Smith, this study focuses on the following 
state capacity characteristics: penetration, regulation, extraction, appropriation, 
policy and legislation, midwifery and husbandry. Penetration focuses on population 
and civil servant ratios and civil servant distribution. Appropriation emphasizes 
resource distribution, disbursement and usage, funding to CFis, and fishing area 
distribution. To measure extraction, the study investigates revenue collection, 
nature of the economy and rent extraction from the subsectors. To measure 
regulation capacity, the research probes the scope of the crackdown on illegal 
fishing and forest clearance. 
In addition, the research investigates the evolution of state capacity in planning, 
policy and legislation production and briefly discusses how much these are put into 
practice. Even in these purely extractive subsectors, midwifery and husbandry are 
needed. Midwifery here refers to insurance of internal peace and stability, 
provision of a forum to exchange ideas between and amongst public and private 
sector actors and facilitation to concerned stakeholders in getting their 
businesses/communities established and running, and husbandry deals with 





2. Factors Affecting State Capacity 
2.1.  Fragmentation of Social Control 
A factor that impacts state capacity is the fragmentation of social control, viz. the 
heterogeneity of rule-making and implementation or state’s inability to successfully 
subordinate “people’s own inclinations of social behavior or behaviors sought by 
other social organizations in favor of the behavior prescribed by state rules.” Thus 
the state and social forces are in fierce struggle for domination and control and in 
such “an environment of conflict, especially, the social control exercised even by 
small social organizations tucked away in remote areas constrains the state 
tremendously.1 That is, neither the state nor society can claim a priori to have 
precedence over the other. In total statelessness, society gains ‘integrated 
domination’. Yet, in most cases ‘dispersed domination’ prevails – neither the state 
nor the constellation of social forces gain total social control. The state capacity is 
thus determined by the “particular array of forces in their arenas and their relative 
weights.” In policy areas, especially ones which ‘demand changes in behavior’ of a 
broad segment of the citizens, the state usually fares poorly.2  
Other authors agree that this fragmentation matters. Jeff Haynes emphasizes that 
the state incapability is resulted from ‘political and societal fragmentation.’ 
Englehart and Harold Crouch argue that a limited state may find it troublesome to 
make its rules binding and experience blatant violation of its rules by private actors. 
Moreover, according to Gunner Myrdal, in a ‘soft state’ there is a ‘general 
inclination of people in all strata to resist public controls and hinder policy 
implementation.’3 Migdal likewise observes the limited capacity of many states, 
stating: “All states have not succeeded in reshaping mattering maps, as their leaders 
have envisaged. Like any other organizations, states have real limits to their power: 
                                                          
1 Joel Migdal, "Vision and Practice: The Leader, the State, and the Transformation of Society," 
International Political Science Review 9, no. 1 (1988): 22; ———, State in Society: Studying How 
States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another: 99-100 and 235.  
2 Dauvergne, "Weak States and the Environment in Indonesia and the Solomon Islands," 92; 
Migdal, Kohli, and Shue, "Introduction: Developing a State-in-Society Perspective," 2-20; Migdal, 
State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another: 23-56 
and 232-63.  
3 Harold Crouch, "Indonesia's Strong State," in Weak and Strong States in Asia-Pacific Societies, ed. 
Peter Dauvergne (Leonards: Unwin Australia, 1998), 102; Englehart, "State Capacity, State Failure, 
and Human Rights," 163; Jeff Haynes, Third World Politics: A Concise Introduction  (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers, 1996). 28-29; Leftwich, "States of Underdevelopment: The Third World State 
in Theoretical Perspective," 56-58.  
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what they can do and what they cannot do, when they can collect taxes and when 
not, which rules they can make binding and which not.”4 
Case studies on Asia-Pacific states have epitomized the state’s incapability to 
completely shape their ‘mattering maps’. Sinclair Dinnen’s study on Papua New 
Guinea (PNG) shows how associations of local kinship and lineage and organized 
criminals contested the state law and order and impose their versions. Similarly, in 
the Philippines when state policies did not conform to the interests of local power 
brokers and/or strongmen, compliance or their implementation was weak.5 
Rather than advocating for and influencing public policies, social forces vie for 
‘who establishes the procedures.’ That is, the state and social forces compete with 
one another and for social control. The higher the social control the state garners, 
the higher the ‘collective state power’ However, in many states various social 
forces can hold ‘tenacious grip on local power and politics prevent[ing] states from 
consolidating overall social control from the centre.’6 
2.2.  Society and State-Society Relations 
While egocentric social forces challenge state capacity and that such state-society 
relations are a zero-sum game, a strong and capable civil society7 and well-
                                                          
4 Migdal, State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One 
Another: 106.  
5 Dinnen, "In Weakness and Strength - State, Societies and Order in Papua New Guinea."; 
Kerkvliet, "Land Regimes and State Strengths and Weaknesses in the Philippines and Vietnam."; 
Ron May, "State, Society, and Governance: Reflections on a Philippines-Papua New Guinea 
Comparison," in Weak and Strong States in Asia-Pacific Societies, ed. Peter Dauvergne (Leonards: 
Unwin Australia, 1998), 67-68. 
6 Leftwich, "States of Underdevelopment: The Third World State in Theoretical Perspective," 68; 
Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power: The Rise of Classes and Nation States, 1760-1914, 
vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 183; Migdal, "The State in Society: An 
Approach to Struggles for Domination," 18-22. 
7 This study adopts this definition of civil society: ‘‘An intermediate associational realm composed 
of social organizations with some degree of autonomy from the state between the state and the basic 
social units such as individuals, families and firms’. White, et. al. cited in Yonekura, "The 
Emergence of Civil Society in Cambodia: Its Role in the Democratisation Process," 5. In another 
study, White is reported to define it as: ‘an intermediate associational realm between state and 
family populated by organizations which are separate from the state, enjoy autonomy in relation to 
the state and are formed voluntarily by members of society to protect or extend their interests or 
values.’ Cited in Un, "State, Society and Democratic Consolidation: The Case of Cambodia," 234.  
The italicized part of the definition is problematic for many Cambodian civil society groups, 
including NGOs and even grassroots associations whose existence is anything but formed 
voluntarily by members of society. A study by the World Bank defines the term even more broadly. 
It refers to “the public sphere, outside of government, market and the family, where citizens and a 
wide array of non-governmental and not-for-profit organizations associate, express their interests 
and values and seek to advance the common good”.  Carmen Malena et al., Linking Citizens and the 
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functioning state-society relations are conducive to state capacity attainment and 
enhancement. The belief in a ‘strong society’ as a counterbalance to the state dates 
to Aristotle and more recently to Montesquieu.8 This research argues that less 
institutionalized civil society and its limited interactions with (embeddedness) and 
weaker power-relations vis-à-vis the state are a challenge to state capacity. 
Evans suggests that the state be embedded in society. Thus, unlike Weber, who 
proposed that the bureaucracy be insulated from society, he suggests that it be 
connected to social groups via social ties ‘that binds the state to society and 
provides institutionalized channels for the continual negotiation and re-negotiation 
of goals and policies.’ Embedded without or with limited autonomy and vice versa, 
however, will not produce desirable results. The successful ‘development’ is ‘only 
when embedded and autonomy are joined together,’ while partial ‘embedded 
autonomy’ brings about partial transformational success. Experiences from 
predatory states attest the importance of society and state-society relations to state 
capacity. Such predatory states as textbook Zaire treat civil society groups as a 
menace and endeavor to predate and to disorganize them before they can pose a 
threat to their survival. With this systematic cleansing vanish the organizations with 
the intent of transformation and the possibility of a ‘joint project’.9 
That civil society and state-society cooperation improves or increases state capacity 
(or better still each other’s capacity) is well-founded. Haynes argues that a strong 
civil society ‘functions as the citizens’ curb on the power of the state.’ Similarly, 
Smith argues that strengthening the demand side of capacity building via 
improvement of civil society groups is crucial for state capacity. As for state-
society relations, Dietrich Rueschemeyer views positive state-society relations, 
social structures and interest constellations crucial for and conducive to state 
                                                                                                                                                                 
State: An Assessment of Civil Society Contributions to Good Governance in Cambodia  (World 
Bank, 2009). 74. Many CFCs, for example, were founded by DoF in response to the order from the 
prime minister and sustained by external support and even guidance. Manfield and MacLeod define 
civil society more narrowly as ‘all associations and interactions that exist outside of the government 
and market sectors.’ Cristina Manfield and Kurt MacLeod, Advocacy in Cambodia: Increasing 
Democratic Space  (Phnom Penh: Pact Cambodia, 2002). 6. 
8 Aristotle championed for a constitutional government and believed that ‘the guest will judge better 
of a feast than the cook,’ while Montesquieu saw a correlation between power concentration and 
despotism and argued for civil society as a mechanism to contain and check state power. William A 
Collins, "Grassroots Civil Society in Cambodia," Center for Advanced Study, 
http://www.cascambodia.org/grassroots.htm; William Ebenstein and Alan Ebenstein, Great 
Political Thinkers: Plato to the Present, 6th ed. (Fort Worth: Harcourt College Publishers, 2000). 
410-20.  
9 Evans, Embedded Autonomy: State & Industrial Transformation: 45-70. Researcher's emphasis.  
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effectiveness. Likewise, Crouch proves that a capable state and reform-demanding 
society could usher in a more capable state. Deng and others also argue for a 
‘strong state’ and ‘active-demand-bearing groups’ to solve or prevent conflicts in 
Africa.10 Kingsbury is more explicit, stating: “[W]here there is strong civil society 
and strong positive state power, the two are likely to interact together to increase 
their respective capacities.” An advantage of their engagement is their contribution 
to the judgement and improvement of the services. Their active participation helps 
arrest the deterioration and corrosion of public institutions.11 Highlighting the 
essence of civil society, O’Dwyer pinpoints to the correlation between weak civil 
society and runaway state building in post-communist countries. This demobilized 
society can be explained by the communist regime’s suppression of civil society 
and forced participation in the communist party, generating ‘ingrained’ suspicion in 
political participation and a culture of nonparticipation, resulting in underdeveloped 
civil society.12 
In summary, effective state building does not necessarily mean weakening of or 
need for ‘weak society’. A strong and capable civil society can be an effective 
partner to arrest institutional decay, curb state despotic power and increase its 
institutional power. Moreover, cooperation between a functional open state and 
competent and cooperative civil society groups, which can actively create civic 
engagement and encourage citizens’ broad participation in state building, can help 
augment state capacity. And the missing link, therefore, affects the state capacity. 
 
                                                          
10 Crouch, "Indonesia's Strong State," 111-12; Deng et al., Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict 
Management in Africa: 34-60; Haynes, Third World Politics: A Concise Introduction: 32; Dietrich 
Rueschemeyer, "Building States - Inherently a Long-Term Process? An Argument from Theory," in 
States and Development: Historical Antecedents of Stagnation and Advance, ed. Matthew Lange 
and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (New York: Palgrave McMillan 2003), 149-53; Smith, "State-
Building," 242-45. For his discussion of civil society in developing countries, see Haynes, Third 
World Politics: A Concise Introduction: 32-37. This view is shared by other authors. See for 
example, Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., Politics in Developing 
Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1995). 
11 Cf. Kingsbury, Political Development: 18 and 146-52; ———, "Political Development," in 
International Development: Issues and Challenges, ed. Damien Kingsbury, et al. (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 205-07.   Jackson also concurs that the transformation from a ‘weak’ to 
‘strong’ state also needs the participation of civil society groups to counterbalance the state power. 
Richard Jackson, "The State and Internal Conflict," Australian Journal of International Affairs 
55(2001): 78. 
12 O'Dwyer, Runaway State-Building: Patronage Politics and Democratic Development: 19-22. See 
also Stephen Holmes, "Conclusion: The State of the State in Putin's Russia," in The State after 
Communism: Governance in the New Russia, ed. Timothy J. Colton and Stephen Holmes 
(Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), 307. 
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2.3. State Autonomy 
Next, this research argues that the limited state autonomy from social and political 
forces (manipulation of state agencies by social or political actors to accommodate 
to their interests) and limited autonomy amongst state agencies (domination or 
manipulation of one state agency by another) affect state capacity. State autonomy 
(or the lack of, hereafter also referred to as state capture) is seen differently by 
different scholars. Statist thinkers, for example, normatively see state as highly 
autonomous of society. Therefore, they see state autonomy as the formulation and 
pursuit of state goals and interests independent of social pressure or demands.13 
Jones Hellman and Daniel Kaufmann refer state capture to the manipulation by or 
influence from social groups on state policy and legislation formulation.14 Donald 
Crone, advocating for state autonomy from social groups, focused both on policy 
formulation and implementation.15 Evans advocates for strong state-society 
relations, yet state agencies and agents must be autonomous from social pressure to 
make ‘joint projects’ viable. O’Dwyer, Grzymala-Busse and Luong and Kingsbury, 
as will be discussed later, caution the impact that the lack of state autonomy from 
its very own agents may have on state capacity. Despite their differences, all agree 
that state autonomy is important for state capacity. 
One way social forces can reduce state capacity is the ability to capture state 
material and human resources, or even the whole bureau of the state, to adopt their 
rules. Their presence has put state agents in the trenches and dispersed field offices 
in a dilemma as to whether to follow instructions from the central or regional 
supervisors or to adapt to the strongmen’s demands. Because of a weak political 
                                                          
13 The state is sovereign as ‘it gives order to all and receives order from none.’ Bodin cited in 
Harold J. Laski, The State: In Theory and Practice  (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1935). 21-
22. Cf. Barkey and Parikh, "Comparative Perspectives on the State," 525-26; Bob Jessop, "Bringing 
the State Back In (Yet Again): Reviews, Revisions, Rejections, and Redirections," International 
Review of Sociology 11, no. 2 (2001): 153-54; Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of 
Analysis in Current Research," 9.  
14 See for example, Hellman & Kauffman cited in Timothy J. Colton, "Introduction: Governance 
and Post-Communist Politics," in The State after Communism: Governance in the New Russia, ed. 
Timothy J. Colton and Stephen Holmes (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), 12-13; Anna 
Grzymala-Busse, "Beyond Clientelism: Incumbent State Capture and State Formation," 
Comparative Political Studies 41, no. 4-5 (2008): 640. For Marxists and neo-Marxists, state either 
lacks autonomy at worse from mainly the dominant class, or at best attains ‘relative autonomy’. In a 
similar vein, Transparency International in its 2009 Global Corruption Barometer defines state 
capture as: “the private sector uses bribery to distort the policy-making process in their country.” 
Transparency International, Global Corruption Barometer  (2009). 15. 
15 Donald K.  Crone, "State, Social Elites, and Government Capacity in Southeast Asia," World 
Politics 40, no. 2 (1988). 
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base and the lure for state officials of empowerment or enrichment, these 
strongmen can easily capture them to dictate the implementation to their 
advantages. Besides the local state capture, power struggle and accommodation at 
the central level can further reduce the state capacity. The struggle here can be 
between different state agencies and between the state and central level social 
forces. Even central level state apparatus can be captured. Moreover, the political 
power struggle at the center shifts the state’s attention from politics of local 
administration. In summary, the power struggle between various forces and 
accommodation of the state’s tentacles at all levels cripple the state capabilities.16 
Dinnen and Peter Larmour in their respective study of PNG and Melanesia have 
empirically validated this point. In the former, security forces were lured by 
opposing local clans to further their ends. In the latter, state officials have been 
bribed in exchange for licenses to exploit timber trade.17 
Crone proves that state autonomy has an impact on state capacity and explains why 
some of them are not autonomous from social forces. He argues that the existence 
of social/economic elites representing broad groups provides state managers a 
channel for cooperation, while a narrow elite structure with shallow social support 
presses the state to opt for a more coercive means and that the dominant 
social/economic groups’ structure has an effect on ‘policy flexibility’ and state 
capacity. When there is a limited range of important social/economic elites, the 
state hardly desists particularistic demands – reducing its autonomy and thus 
capacity, whereas when there is a wider array of elite groups, the state can better 
defuse demands from them via balancing ‘such elements against each other’ in 
pursuit of its own policies.’18 To conclude, in (neo)-patrimonial, soft or post-
communist states, a recurring theme is the collusion between state agents and 
powerful private elite individuals or groups. The state is unable to control its poorly 
                                                          
16 Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the 
Third World: 4; ———, State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and 
Constitute One Another: 16-81. Emphasis in original. 
17 Dinnen, "In Weakness and Strength - State, Societies and Order in Papua New Guinea," 54; Peter 
Larmour, "Migdal in Melanesia," in Weak and Strong States in Asia-Pacific Societies, ed. Peter 
Dauvergne (Leonards: Unwin Australia, 1998), 78-79. 
18 Crone, "State, Social Elites, and Government Capacity in Southeast Asia," 257-58.  
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paid officials, who, instead of facilitating effective governance, are more likely to 
derail it and manipulate their offices for wealth and personal power accumulation.19 
Other authors raise the issue of state autonomy from its own agents as crucial for 
its capacity. Haynes, for instance, argues that political leaders’ reliance on 
clientelism to retain power and to maintain or gain constituencies in the face of 
their inability to build a nation-state “interacts, feeds off and helps sustain the 
other.” Adrian Leftwich reckons likewise, arguing that in many countries, public 
institutions experience the lack of such independence because of patrimonialism, 
patronage politics and politicians’ interference into the public institutions’ affairs, 
resulting in impartial, biased and ineffective bureaucracy.20 
Kingsbury also underlines that many developing states’ apparatus are neutralized or 
captured due to the establishment of the state by certain agents of the state. In such 
a situation, the independence [and impartiality] of ‘state functions has been 
seriously compromised.’ Therefore, the success or otherwise of the state depends 
on the state’s independence from its agents. Further, he argues for each branch of 
the state to be autonomous from one another to enable them to act as checks and 
balances on each other.21 
Experiences from many post-communist states show that they have limited 
autonomy from political actors. Because of the communist legacy, state agencies 
are not autonomous from politicians’ intervention into their affairs. Larry Diamond, 
Linz Juan and Seymour Lipset argue for bureaucracy’s relative autonomy from 
politicians’ interference to enable it to ‘check on the potential patronage and 
corruption.’22 However, politicians in these countries usually abuse their status and 
interfere in the affairs of the politically weak bureaucracy and judiciary in favor of 
                                                          
19 Cf. Dinnen, "In Weakness and Strength - State, Societies and Order in Papua New Guinea," 57-
58; Englehart, "State Capacity, State Failure, and Human Rights," 163-64; Fritz, "State Weakness in 
Post-Communist Countries: The Concept of State Capacity," 9-18; Grzymala-Busse, "Beyond 
Clientelism: Incumbent State Capture and State Formation," 638-40; Leftwich, "States of 
Underdevelopment: The Third World State in Theoretical Perspective," 56-58; Leftwich, 
"Theorizing the State," 213; O'Dwyer, Runaway State-Building: Patronage Politics and Democratic 
Development: 1.    
20 Haynes, Third World Politics: A Concise Introduction: 29-31; Leftwich, "Theorizing the State," 
222-25. As noted elsewhere, his characterization of ‘developmental state’ is not necessarily as rigid 
as that of Evans’s. 
21 See, Damien Kingsbury, South-East Asia: A Profile  (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
6 and 22; ———, Political Development: especially Chapters 4 and 5. 
22 Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with 
Democracy, 23.  
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particular social individuals/groups or their proxies.23 All in all, state capture by 
social and political forces and poor checks and balances between state institutions 
undermine state capacity.  
2.4.  State Structure and Resources 
State structure and resources, or the scarcity of Weberian bureaucracy, to borrow 
terms from Evans, also affect state capacity. Weber believes that bureaucracy is 
essential for present mass administration.24 This body of impersonal officials has 
six major characteristics: legally rigid and authorized jurisdictions; a hierarchy of 
authority without the taking over of subordinate’s authority; management of the 
office based on files with clear public-private separation; the requirement of expert 
and thorough training; a requirement of full working capacity of officials, and 
finally bureaucrats’ adherence to a learnable, fairly stable and clear rules.25 
For ‘embedded autonomy’ to work, in line with Weber’s argument, Evans argues 
that the state internal structure matters. The developmental state is functional 
because of its close proximity to Weberian bureaucracy. Such state is imbued with 
‘highly selective meritocratic recruitment and long-term career rewards,” 
generating genuine commitment and corporate coherence, which in turn produces 
‘autonomy’. In predatory states, by contrast, their inability to usher in 
‘development’ results partly from the scarcity of the bureaucracy. As a corollary, 
incumbents pursue their own goal at the expense of state capacity and social 
welfare enhancement, and personal ties and personal gain maximization take 
precedence and supersede collective wellbeing.26 In the words of Smith, a 
                                                          
23 Cf. Colton, "Introduction: Governance and Post-Communist Politics," 11-13; Fritz, "State 
Weakness in Post-Communist Countries: The Concept of State Capacity," 8-9; Grzymala-Busse and 
Luong, "Reconceptualizing the State: Lessons from Post-Communism," 532-37; Holmes, 
"Conclusion: The State of the State in Putin's Russia," 300-07.     
24 Cited in Freund, The Sociology of Max Weber: 238-39.  
25 What can be inferred is that, firstly, ‘office holding is a vocation’ with prior training and 
competitive examinations and that the tasks ascribed to an office is viewed as a duty, and not as a 
source for rent-seeking and the officer in charge is not considered a leader’s personal servant. 
Second, the office holders enjoy social respect, are appointed by his superior based on functionality 
and work experience, hold the tenure for life, receive remuneration in salary while at work and as 
pension after retirement based on functions and length of office, and are promoted based on 
seniority or expert examinations. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology: 196-204; ———, The 
Sociology of Max Weber: 234-39. For the influence that Nietzsche, Machiavelli, Hegel, and Jellinek 
had on Weber’s conception of the state, see Kelly, The State of the Political: Conceptions of Politics 
and the State in the Thought of Max Weber, Carl Schmitt and Franz Neumann: 40-110. 
26 Evans, Embedded Autonomy: State & Industrial Transformation: 12 and 39-47. Cf. Adrian 
Leftwich refers to a state with autonomy, effectiveness and legitimacy as a developmental state. 
32 
 
predatory state is led by ‘rapacious officialdom’ whose government is neo-
patrimonial in nature. Soharto’s New Order Indonesia confirms that poor state 
structure and resources affect state capacity.27 
Other studies concur that competent state institutions and resources, or their lack 
of, affect state capacity. Leftwich observes a correlation between successful and 
effective modern state institutions and successful economies. Richard Jackson 
affirms a strong relationship between economic development and vigorous state 
institutions and a causal relationship between inability to implement policies, 
economic underdevelopment and under-resourced and underdeveloped institutional 
capacity. Smith suggests that social development requires strong state institutions, 
while the absence of a well-functioning bureaucracy can lead to corrupt practices 
and economic underdevelopment, etc. A comparative study between Indonesia and 
the Solomon Islands exemplifies that under-institutionalized and poorly equipped 
state agencies are a major factor contributing to poor forestry management.28 
Jaime Becker and Jack Goldstone agree that state structure and resources are 
crucial for state capacity and draw three main conclusions with regards to resources 
a post-revolutionary state can count on to rebuild itself. They are “prior and 
centralization and professionalization, human and cultural capital and visionary and 
pragmatic leadership.29 To expand the first point, the more developed, centralized 
and professional the civil service and military of the former regime, the more 
effective and efficient the new administration can utilize them to rebuild the state. 
On the contrary, the more patrimonial and personally attached to the previous 
regime’s leadership the civil service and military are, the more difficult the new 
administration can rely on them for state rebuilding. 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Such a state has the ‘capacity to define, pursue and implement developmental strategies which can 
and do over-ride class, regional and sectoral interests in putative national interest.’ However, due to 
his focus on economic growth as an indicator, he raises a few countries which Evans would consider 
intermediate states as developmental as well. Leftwich, "States of Underdevelopment: The Third 
World State in Theoretical Perspective," 68. 
27 Crouch, "Indonesia's Strong State," 105-10; Smith, "State-Building," 234.  
28 Dauvergne, "Weak States and the Environment in Indonesia and the Solomon Islands."; Jackson, 
"The State and Internal Conflict," 70-71; Leftwich, "Theorizing the State," 215-27; Smith, "State-
Building," 231-41.  
29 Jaime Becker and Jack A. Goldstone, "How Fast Can You Build a State? State Building in 
Revolutions," in States and Development: Historical Ancedents of Stagnation and Advance, ed. 
Matthew Lange and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2003), 194-202.  
33 
 
Another common explanation for the relative absence of Weberian state structure 
in many Southeast Asian (SEA) states is their deeply-rooted historical-cultural 
legacy. Before Western colonization, many inland indigenous states adopted Hindu 
and/or Buddhist concepts of governance. Martin Stuart-Fox asserts that in this 
process of state formation, similar power structures exist at different levels. Carter 
Bentley describes this power-relation arrangement as ‘pyramidal in form.’ 
Accordingly, the power available to each level was not equal; however, the power 
available to leaders of all levels is ‘essentially the same.’30 
Kingsbury depicts the power relations between the SEA centre-periphery in this 
manner. The indigenous SEA states expanded or retracted around an ‘exemplary 
centre,’ where the highest authority resided. Power receded in accordance with the 
distance. “At or near the centre, authority was greatest; at the periphery, it was 
dispersed, often through local rulers of increasing independence and increasingly 
doubtful loyalty, until it ceased to exist in practice.”31 Stanley Tambiah, who 
advanced the ‘galactic polity’ to explain power relations in these states, ascribed 
this ‘pulsating character’ to ‘structural constraints on royal power,’ and to 
centrifugal forces. With this mandala comes the indigenous intrastate governance 
system. The monarch with the highest authority ruled via a system of informal 
clientage relations. He may also settle a bargain with other regional powerful 
individuals or substate groups to maintain stability or remain in power, yet this 
further diminished the centralized power.32 
Kingsbury asserts that certain aspects of this power model have persisted into the 
post-colonial period. Hence ‘centralization of power and the distribution of 
patronage continue to be hallmarks of SEA political models, to varying degrees.’33 
                                                          
30 G. Carter Bentley, "Indigenous States of Southeast Asia," Annal Review of Anthropology 
15(1986): 292; Martin Stuart-Fox, The Lao Kingdom of Lan Xang: Rise and Decline  (Bangkok: 
White Lotus Press, 1998). 13-15. Coedes names the Hindu influence ‘Indianization’ or 
‘Brahmanization’. Goerge Coedes, The Indianized States of Southeast Asia  (Hawaii: East West 
Center Press, 1968). It should be called the ‘localization of the Indian culture’ to better reflect the 
differences between Indian proper and Indian-influenced Southeast Asian cultural practices. See for 
example, Craig J. Reynolds, "A New Look at Old Southeast Asia," The Journal of Asian Studies 54, 
no. 2 (1995). 
31 Kingsbury, South-East Asia: A Profile: 15-16.  See also ———, Political Development: 70-71.  
32 Bentley, "Indigenous States of Southeast Asia," 292-93; Lawrence Palmer Briggs, The Ancient 
Khmer Empire  (Bangkok: White Lotus, 1999); Kingsbury, South-East Asia: A Profile: 16; ———, 
Political Development: 71.  
33 Examples are Soharto’s Indonesia, Hun Sen’s Cambodia and Ne Win’s Cambodia. ———, 
South-East Asia: A Profile: 15-16.  See also ———, Political Development: 71.  For criticisms of 
the mandala model, see, for example, Bentley, "Indigenous States of Southeast Asia," 292-93.  
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Such power arrangement affects state capacity and its implementation of a uniform 
rule. Other authors also find that states are ‘much stronger’ in the capital and urban 
areas than in the hinterlands where ‘petty despots fill the vacuum’ and where 
human rights abuses are more rampant.34  
For post-communist countries, another plausible explanation is the legacy from 
communism – power centralization and neo-patrimonialism. Post-communist states 
are far from being consolidated and functional and red tape is still uncontrollably 
high. Civil servants, party activists and leaders generally lack experience in public 
administration. Interagency coordination, as attested in Yeltsin’s Russia, is a 
failure. These states usually undergo rapid and sweeping state building; the process 
is dominated as much by informal structures and practices as by formal institutions, 
both of which are used to varying degrees by both actors seeking to establish their 
authority and those seeking to resist this authority. Furthermore, they have 
inherited broad and politicized state apparatus and are left with ‘an intricate and 
robust set of informal structures and practices utilized by political elites, factory 
managers, and ordinary citizens alike, which have survived the collapse of 
communism.’35 
2.5.  The Quest for Internal Political Legitimacy 
The quest for internal political legitimacy also impacts state capacity. To legitimize 
their domination, state leaders in many developing countries endeavor to promote 
performance. Many Asian leaders understand that ‘political legitimacy and stability 
depended in part on a well-managed and growing economy, and on improving the 
welfare of the rural poor.”36 Similarly, Deng and others advocates for linking state 
legitimacy and capacity to provide at least basic services and respecting basic rights 
and freedoms. Kerkvliet likewise argues that ‘political legitimacy is a mixture of 
competence, reciprocity, abiding by the rules, and the appropriate use of coercion 
                                                          
34 Englehart, "State Capacity, State Failure, and Human Rights," 163 and 77.  
35 Grzymala-Busse and Luong, "Reconceptualizing the State: Lessons from Post-Communism," 
529-36; Holmes, "Conclusion: The State of the State in Putin's Russia," 300. Besides when a party 
other than the former Communist Party comes to power, it inclines to replace these red 
administrative officials because of their ‘communist credentials.’ O'Dwyer, Runaway State-
Building: Patronage Politics and Democratic Development: 23-34. 
36 Tadao Chino. 'Foreword,' in  Toshiyasu Kato et al., Cambodia: Enhancing Governance for 
Sustainable Development  (Manila: ADB, 2000). vii. 
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or force.’37 The fall of Soharto regime is a powerful testimony to this thesis.38 The 
anthology by Diamond, Linz and Lipset also highlights the relationship between 
performance and legitimacy. A developing democratic country pivots on, amongst 
others, economic and political performance for its legitimacy. The better the state 
in meeting its citizens’ needs, the greater and more deeply rooted its legitimacy is 
and the better it is to weather crises, whereas the state with shallow legitimacy 
often bases its legitimacy on current performance which can easily crumble.39 
While the foregoing discussion underlines the influence that performance has on 
legitimacy, the reverse is equally true. A legitimate government, being able to 
formulate and implement policies without pressure from vested interests, can 
mobilize resources and carry out long-term policies, and therefore enhances its 
legitimacy and shores up institutionalization, generating a virtuous cycle. A 
government experiencing contested legitimacy finds itself investing heavily in 
physical violence to stay in power, reducing its resources for citizens’ welfare 
enhancement and state institutional building; poor performance further saps its 
legitimacy.40 Michelle Ann Miller concurs that there is a relationship between state 
capacity and legitimacy – a state which is seen as legitimate in the eye of the 
majority can govern more effectively, whereas a state which loses or lacks 
legitimacy more likely encounters the resistance from social groups, resulting in the 
state resorting to the use of forces to achieve unity.41 Post-independence PNG is a 
good example. Its leaders often rely on security forces to enforce law and order 
which fuels distrust between the state and the citizens. This reliance on violence 
reduces the state’s ability to build physical and institutional infrastructure.42 
                                                          
37 Deng et al., Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa: xi-xxiii and 1-33; 
Kerkvliet, "Land Regimes and State Strengths and Weaknesses in the Philippines and Vietnam," 
161.  
38 See, for example, Crouch, "Indonesia's Strong State."; Kingsbury, South-East Asia: A Profile: 
especially Chapter 14. 
39 Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with 
Democracy, 9-14.  
40 Alagappa, Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority, 3-4 and 43. 
Diamond et al. also agree with this analysis. See Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, Politics in Developing 
Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy, 10.  An aid dependent country like Cambodia 
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41 Michelle Ann Miller, "Reformasi and Rebellion: Jakarta's Security and Autonomy Policies in 
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42 Dinnen, "In Weakness and Strength - State, Societies and Order in Papua New Guinea." 
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Related to performance legitimacy is electoral legitimacy. Many post-communist 
states are pressured to conform to some resemblance of electoral legitimacy, and 
this quest for legitimacy has an impact on state capacity. Whereas Migdal 
downplays the impact that a political party has on state’s impartiality, neutrality, 
independence and capacity, Bob Jessop points out that to understand state capacity, 
one must view it as ‘conditional and relational,’ for example, between the state and 
the wider political system and the connections between the state apparatus and 
other political forces.43 
The study on post-communist states testifies to the hijacking of state agencies by 
political parties to build and strengthen the latter’s power. According to O’Dwyer, 
where civil society is weak, opposition parti(es) are poorly institutionalized and 
ruling parti(es) are dominant, the state agencies are usually raided by the ruling 
parti(es) to strengthen itself/themselves. In the case of weak civil society, a strong 
opposition and a weak and uncompromised ruling coalition, the partners in the 
government are unlikely to propose institutional changes and reforms for fear of 
strengthening an untrustworthy partner. O’Dwyer furthers that state bureaucracy 
evolution in post-communist countries is paradoxical because despite severing ties 
between the communist party and the state, the bureaucracy is still bloated, yet 
“these states continue to underperform, and in some cases have even declined, in 
their capacity for governance.”44  
While the sequencing explanation, which proposes that where party building occurs 
prior to state consolidation, the party builders tend to use patronage politics to build 
the party at the expense of the state, gives the ‘best answer’ as to why patronage 
politics occurs in some new democracies and not others, O’Dwyer argues that it 
cannot explain state capacity variations in post-communist countries. He proposes 
that these variations are best explained by his ‘party systems explanation,’ which 
has three elements: demobilized societies, delegitimized states and the logic of 
party system competition. First, in a demobilized society, political parties find it 
hard to build party organizations on the ground of mass membership; therefore, 
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they are more inclined to build support via ‘activists and popular leaders’ who can 
attract supporters and who can be held in line via patronage. The second aspect is 
de-legitimated and unconsolidated states. The administrative officials are 
remembered as ‘remnants of the nomenklatura system,’ and for its ‘widespread 
corruption and informal connections needed to get things done.’45 
The last aspect is the logic of party system competition. The competition can result 
in one of the three scenarios. In the worst scenario, ‘weak governance’ logic, 
competition produces an incoherent government and a divided opposition. The 
many parties in the government, instead of building a programmatically unified 
agenda and state agencies, maximize patronage and dispense state positions to 
loyalists, while the multiple, unstable opposition parties are a less-than-ideal 
alternative to the governing parties. In the second scenario, elections may give rise 
to a dominant party. This partial and uneven political institutionalization makes the 
rest of the party systems left under-institutionalized, small, unstable and 
unpredictable. Such an arrangement spawns either an arrogant government and an 
ineffectual opposition or an incompetent government and an unyielding opposition. 
In the first case, the government party monopolizes and maximizes patronage, 
while officials holding different views are purged. The last and best scenario is 
‘responsible party logic of governance.’ The government can be formed by a few 
parties with similar programs, reducing patronage as a means to build and maintain 
majority. The existence of only a few opposition parties makes them a check to the 
governing coalition. 
In the weak governance and dominant-party logics scenarios, power tips towards 
politicians and away from administrative personnel. When patronage politics 
factors in as politicians intervene in and infiltrate the administrative apparatus for 
political support, the prospect for careerism is bleak at best. Therefore, “[a] critical 
mass of professional administrators never forms, and the state administration 
remains mired in the patrimonial mode.” The failure to bureaucratize brings about a 
vicious cycle: the ineffective administration makes the politicians unable to deliver 
their campaign program promises, disillusioning voters, and increases parties’ 
reliance on popular leaders and party activists ‘whose own loyalty rests on the 
                                                          
45 Ibid., 19-22. Grzymala-Busse and Luong also view state building in post-communist countries as 
‘neither stable nor consolidated’ but ‘ongoing and dynamic.’ Grzymala-Busse and Luong, 
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informal quid pro quo of patronage politics.’46 In these scenarios, thus, 
patrimonialism fuses with legal-rationalism, emasculating state capacity. 
Grzymala-Busse and Luong, like O’Dwyer, draw a link between mode of elite 
competition and state capacity. Firstly, the clearer the distinction was made 
between state and society before the collapse of communism, the more 
representative the competition is, whereas the less clear the distinction, the more 
self-contained the competition is. The existence of voluntarily organized groups 
before the reforms creates potential constituencies and hence representation and 
mobilization. On the contrary, elites in states where voluntarily organized groups 
were non-existent or organized along patronage lines are now involved in self-
contained competition for authority. 
Secondly, the institutional means for competition: formal (codified and 
depersonalized) or informal (discretionary and personalized) also shapes and 
constrains competition. If well-developed state apparatus exist, elites usually 
compete via formal institutions and resources for implementation are channeled via 
formal established mechanisms; however, if elites compete via informal means 
such as patronage networks, informal practices of decision-making and policy 
execution, and open opposition to formal structures are the rule rather than 
exception. The domination of each means depends on the strength of the other.47 
Besides, elite competition is influenced by the pacing of transformation. Fast 
transformation requires elites to involve in the competition quickly and directly and 
to use the existing institutional and cognitive shortcuts, which is usually at the 
advantage of the ruling elites. If the transformation is slightly gradual, they are 
more likely to resort to a combination of the old and new institutions. Such 
recombinance favors the elites who control the new resources of the state; they can, 
for example, draw on such informal acts as surveillance, exclusion and theft to 
sabotage the aspiration of formal structures and to weed out potential challengers or 
                                                          
46 O'Dwyer, Runaway State-Building: Patronage Politics and Democratic Development: 7 and 23-
34.  
47 If the formal mechanisms are well-developed, the informal augment it, while the less developed 
the formal, the informal will decree the political and economic system. Grzymala-Busse and Luong, 
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opponents. In contrast, more gradual transformation allows more elites to mobilize 
and build up and increases the number of competitors and impacts on the process.48 
All in all, who competes and how they compete determine the type of state that 
emerges and can result in one of the four types of state building processes. First, 
formalized and representative competition produces a democratic state. In this, 
elites are more accountable and responsive, and the populace is more willing to 
comply with state rules. Second, formalized but self-contained competition results 
in an autocratic state as elites can rule with few constraints from the population or 
other elites. The populace’s compliance is also low. Third, representative but 
informal competition leads to fractious state building. Elites are only accountable to 
their respective constituencies to stay in power, and there is little concurrent 
popular compliance. Lastly, both informal and self-contained competition generates 
personalistic state building. There is minimal constraint on elites, while the absence 
of formal channels leads to low compliance. Distribution of resources is instead 
based on personal or familial ties to elites and other patronage networks.49 To 
conclude, this research argues that the requirement for performance legitimacy has, 
to some extent, increased state capacity; however, it is constrained by the fact that 
electoral competition is fairly close to O’Dwyer’s second scenario and Busse and 
Luong’s fourth type of competition. 
2.6.  Contribution from External Development Partners 
That international and regional actors and factors impact state capacity has been 
widely studied and discussed in Chapter 2. Migdal’s discussion, drawing attention 
to historical and imperial factors, understates the impacts that current international 
and regional forces and movement have on state capacity. For least developed 
countries, assistance from external actors, which can come in the form of material 
resources and/or frameworks for a new state, affects state capacity.50 Kingsbury, 
Grzymala-Busses and Luong, O’Dwyer, Deng and others and Dauvergne underline 
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the impacts that global or regional bodies, international agencies and frameworks 
and global economy have on the state capacity and roles.51  
To expand Grzymala-Busse and Luong’s discussion here, international actors and 
factors have put tremendous pressure on state building in post-communist countries 
via demands for formal political and economic institutions up to an international 
standard and the impacts on the pacing of transformation. The attached carrots or 
sticks impact how elites behave, and as discussed above, the pacing impacts how 
elites compete. For instance, when there is a strong ambition to join an 
international body, elites are pressured to engage in representative contestation. 
However, when there are few incentives or no sanctions for nonconformity, the 
competition is self-contained.52 
As will be discussed later, aid dependent countries like Cambodia witness even 
more pressure from international and regional forces. Aid agencies have injected 
substantial amount of money for state institutional rebuilding and state capacity 
enhancement and demanded structural reforms from the state. Such pressure has 
pushed them to adopt some structural reforms, but less successfully to adopt new 
state behavior. Moreover, their loose coordination, donor-driven reforms and 
approaches to the assistance they adopt have contributed to limited state.53 
To conclude, this chapter discusses six main factors that affect state capacity. They 
are social control fragmentation, strength/weakness of civil society and state-
society relations, state autonomy or capture, state structure and its resources, a 
quest for internal legitimacy and contribution from external actors and factors. 
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Contemporary Third World: 88-89 and 153.  
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Chapter 4: Measuring Cambodian State Capacity (1) 
This chapter discusses Cambodian state capacity in general and four types of state 
capacity: penetration, appropriation, regulation and extraction in general and 
DoF/FiA-specific. After a brief discussion of Cambodian state capacity and 
institutional capability, it analyzes civil-servant-population ratios and DoF/FiA 
staff distribution. As for appropriation, it discusses financial resource allocation 
amongst state agencies and within DoF/FiA and its disbursement, and fishing areas 
distribution between different scales of fishers. It then discusses the scales of 
crackdowns on illegal fishing and forest clearance and gears used and activities 
carried out by different scales of fishers. Finally, to measure extraction, it probes 
revenue collection and pertinent issues, capacity to extract from the fishing 
industry, mainly from concessionaires, and benefits accrued to them.  
1. Cambodian State Capacity and Institutional Capability 
State capacity differs with respect to sector, agency, time and location. However, 
Cambodian state capacity and institutional capabilities are believed to be limited 
but have slowly increased. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) states that the 
‘donor community’ agrees that Cambodia lacks strong state institutions and limited 
state capacity, reflecting in poor public service provision, low revenue collection 
and limited long-term investments from the private sector – a stance the World 
Bank (WB) concurs.1 Likewise, the PM, though noting the improvement in the 
government’s performance, admits that the state capacity is ‘limited.’2 
At the sectoral and sub-sectoral levels, the picture is as ambivalent as at the 
national level. Kol Vathana accurately depicts the ten agencies responsible for 
water and wetland management as having ‘limited capacity’. The Ministry of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) and Ministry of Water Resources and 
Meteorology (MOWRAM) raise a few issues affecting them, including their 
                                                          
1 Asian Development Bank, Country Assistance Plan 2000-2002: Cambodia  (Manila: Asian 
Development Bank, 1999). 6; Kato et al., Cambodia: Enhancing Governance for Sustainable 
Development: 1; World Bank, Country Assistance Strategy Progress Report for the Kingdom of 
Cambodia for the Period FY05-08  (Washing D.C.: South East Asia Country Unit, East Asia and 
Pacific Region, World Bank, 2008). 1. 
2 Cambodia New Vision, "Address of Samdach Hun Sen to the Government-Donor Monitoring 
Meeting," Cambodia New Vision April 2000, 2-3; ———, "Prime Minister Hun Sen Addressed the 
Closing Session of the Government-Donor Monitoring Meeting," Cambodia New Vision January 
2001, 2 and 5. 
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limited institutional, management and project implementation capacity, extension 
staff’s limited capacity, lack of proper training and incentives and ineffective staff 
mobilization. The ADB also shares these concerns.3 
At the sub-sectoral level, according to Mahfuzuddin Ahmed and Nicolaas van 
Zalinge, fisheries/forest management is plagued by limited human resources, 
research facilities and infrastructure, lack of up-to-date data, and poor compliance. 
Frank van Acker and Try Ing and others identify the lack of logistical means and 
human capacity and limited reliable data, respectively, as obstacles to DoF’s ability 
to function properly. A decade after Ahmed and van Zalinge’s complaints, Mak 
Sithirith and as recently as 2011, the first over-arching Strategic Planning 
Framework for Fisheries: 2010-2019 (SPF) still complained about similar things.4 
2. Penetration Capacity 
2.1.  Civil Servant-Population Ratio 
Fukuyama argues that a developing country requires a smaller state. Yet a bloated 
state is usually a challenge for post-communist states.5 Before 1993, Cambodia had 
some 60,000 civil servants.6 Table 1 shows that unlike other post-communist 
countries, the size of civil servants during the SoC was small. However, it reached 
147,000 in 1994 due to staff integration from other political factions and 
transitional staff inflation. It did not increase much in nominal terms since then. 
Further, the population-civil servant ratio decreased from 1.7 in 1994 to 1.2 in 
2011. Initially, donors conditioned that the government stop recruiting civil 
                                                          
3 Asian Development Bank, Independent Evaluation Department, Agriculture and Rural 
Development Sector in Cambodia  (Manila: ADB, 2009); Vathana Kol, "Review of Wetland and 
Aquatic Ecosystem in the Lower Mekong River Basin of Cambodia," (Phnom Penh2003), 35-45; 
Technical Working Group on Agriculture and Water, Strategy for Agriculture and Water 2006-2010  
(Phnom Penh: MAFF and MOWRAM, 2007). 6 and 59. 
4 Mahfuzuddin Ahmed and Nicolaas Van Zalinge, "Management of Freshwater Capture Fisheries of 
Cambodia," Mekong Fish Catch and Culture 1996, 1; Fishereis Administration, The Strategic 
Planning Framework for Fisheries: 2010-2019, vol. 1 (Phnom Penh: Fisheries Administration, 
2011). 39; Try Ing, Vansereyuth Sao, and Somony Thay, "Small-Scale Fisheries Management in 
Cambodia," in Interactive Mechanisms for Small Scale Fisheries Management: Report of the 
Regional Consultation, ed. Heiko E. W. Seilert (Bangkok: Food and Agriculture Organization, 
2002); Frank van Acker, Cambodia's Commons: Changing Governance, Shifting Entitlements?  
(Centre for ASEAN Studies, 2003).  
5 See for example, Colton and Holmes, The State after Communism: Governance in the New Russia; 
Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century: 120; O'Dwyer, 
Runaway State-Building: Patronage Politics and Democratic Development. 
6  Informants 8-9 citing a CoM high ranking official, Informants 8-9, 19th April, 2011. 
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servants, yet later the government has bought into the idea and voluntarily stopped 
recruiting more administrative civil servants.7 
Table 1: Civil Servants in Selected Years8 
Year Number of Civil Servants Population Ratio 
1994 147,000 1.7 
1995 164,900 1.5* 
1996 168,100 1.5* 
1997 174,400 1.5* 
1998 172,600 1.5* 
1999 163,000 1.4 
2000 163,000 1.4* 
2003 166,600 1.4* 
2011 170,000** 1.2*** 
(NB: *ratios from researcher’s calculations based on 1998 population census figure of 11,437,656; 
**Figure from Informants 8-9; ***researcher’s calculation based on 2008 population census figure 
of 14,021,762 as cited in Ministry of Environment, and United National Development Program in 
Cambodia. Building Resilience: The Future of Rural Livelihoods in the Face of Climiate Change. 
Phnom Penh: Ministry of Environment and UNDP Cambodia, 2011). 
Initially, donors and academia condemned that the bureaucracy was overstaffed, a 
stance the government echoed.9 Since 2000, there has been a shift in perception. 
Two reports agree that the public administration is still small and might not exceed 
the public sector needs. Moreover, in comparison to countries in the region, the size 
of the bureaucracy is smaller and costs much less. However, disproportionate civil 
servant distribution across ministries/agencies and having the wrong people doing 
the wrong jobs are still the concerns.10 
 
 
                                                          
7  See for example Cambodia New Vision, "National Program: Subnational Democratic 
Development," Cambodia New Vision August 2010; World Bank, "2008 Country Policy and 
Institutional Assessment for Cambodia," (2009). 
8 Data sources: Kato et al., Cambodia: Enhancing Governance for Sustainable Development; 
Francis B. Narayan and Tedd Godden, Financial Management and Governance Issues in Cambodia  
(Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2000); Shawcross, Cambodia's New Deal; World Bank, 
Country Assistance Strategy for the Kindgom of Cambodia  (World Bank, 2005). 
9 See for example, Asian Development Bank, Developing the Capacity for Reconstruction and 
Development  (Manila: ADB, 1995); Cambodia New Vision, "Opening and Closing Addresses of 
Samdach Prime Minister Hun Sen to the 2nd Donor Monitoring Meeting in Phnom Penh on October 
27, 1999," Cambodia New Vision October 1999; Shawcross, Cambodia's New Deal; World Bank, 
Country Assistance Strategy of the World Bank Group for the Kingdom of Cambodia  (Washington 
D.C.: East Asia and Pacific Region, World Bank, 1995). 
10 Narayan and Godden, Financial Management and Governance Issues in Cambodia: 43; World 
Bank, "2008 Country Policy and Institutional Assessment for Cambodia," 17-18. See also, Kato et 
al., Cambodia: Enhancing Governance for Sustainable Development. 
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2.2.  DoF/FiA Civil Servant Distribution 
There are a few critical challenges to DoF/FiA full penetration. First, it is plagued 
by inappropriate staff distribution. DoF is described as having ‘a big head with 
much tinier legs and body.’11 This certainly applies to its parent ministry and other 
ministries/agencies. Existing studies also decry this vertically disproportionate staff 
distribution. Table 2 confirms skewed staff distribution between the central and 
sub-central levels, with the former accrued with almost half of the staff, while 
twenty or so provinces are allotted with the rest, and each provincial 
office/cantonment with a dozen or two staff. Rural provinces with fewer lots but 
many water bodies have even fewer staff.12 
The closer to the field, where more implementors are needed, the body and legs 
wane. Because fisheries management means managing both fishers and fishing 
gears, the small number of field staff is daunting. Before the 2008 restructuring, 
each district had one or two officials, and there was no staff at the commune level 
and districts that did not have a water body.13 After the restructuring, each division 
is staffed with 1 to 4 people and at each sangkat, there are between 1 and 3 staff.14 
 
                                                          
11 Informant 7, 11th April, 2011. 
12 Informant 80, 28th July, 2011. See for example, Asian Development Bank, Cambodia: Country 
Environmental Analysis  (Manila: ADB, 2004); Kato et al., Cambodia: Enhancing Governance for 
Sustainable Development; Kol, "Review of Wetland and Aquatic Ecosystem in the Lower Mekong 
River Basin of Cambodia."; Sithirith Mak, "The Tonle Sap and Its Fisheries Management: A Case 
in Cambodia," (Phnom Penh: Fisheries Action Coalition Team); Bonheur Neou et al., "Towards a 
Holistic Approach to Wetland Governance: The Legal and Institutional Framework and Economic 
Evaluation of Wetland Resources in Cambodia," in Wetland Governances in the Mekong Region: 
Country Reports on the Legal-Institutional Framework and Economic Evaluation of Aquatic 
Resources, ed. Edmund J. V. Oh, et al. (Penang: WorldFish Centre, 2005). Before 1993, such 
provinces as Stung Treng and Kratie had few fisheries staff. Syrabo Khai and Kimseng Thai, 
"Community Participation in Fisheries Management: A Case Study from Tboung Khlaa and O 
Mreah Villages, Stung Treng Province, Kingdom of Cambodia," (Phnom Penh2002), 5. Central 
level in this study includes the regional inspectorate. 
13 Informant 89, 29th July, 2011. See for example, Department of Fisheries, "Inland Fisheries 
Review," (Phnom Penh: Department of Fisheries, 2001); Thuok Nao and Sina Ly, "Review of the 
Fisheries and Aquaculture Sector in Cambodia," (Phnom Penh: Department of Fisheries, 1997). 
14 Informant 3, 11th March, 2011; Informant 80. A division covers a few small districts or one big 
district. Forestry and Fisheries Ministry of Agriculture, "Decision on Civil Servant Appointment," 
(Phnom Penh: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 6 February, 2009). Only one sangkat 
has 4 officers; 27 have 3 each; 38 have 2 each; 74 have 1 each, and 19 have one officer overseeing 
two sangkats. Also, Informant 3; Informant 66, 20th July, 2011; Informant 80. A fisheries sangkat 
covers one commune or multiple communes, depending on their sizes. 
45 
 
Table 2: DoF/FiA Civil Servant Distribution in Selected Years15 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1999 2000 2001 2002 2008/10 
Total 1,288 1,314 1,422 1,457 1,597 1,568 1,400* 1,341 1,070* 
Central 491 535 660 696 729 571 (n.a) 552 (n.a) 
Sub-central 797 779 762 761 868 761 (n.a) 789 (n.a) 
Battambang 49 50 50 51 63 57 55 54 58 







Kampong Thom 51 62 36 36 70 63 56 
Kandal 108 100 100 102 111 107 87 
Takeo 36 32 33 34 35 36  
(n.a) Kampong Cham 50 35 33 38 40 34 
Phnom Penh 113 113 113 93 92 74 65 
(NB: n.a. = not available; *Data from Informant 11; Informant 80.) 
Studies and stakeholders give different answers as to whether there is enough staff 
and raise some concerns. An NGO board member, a cantonment leader, Mak and 
Carl Grundy-Warr draw the attention to the sheer size of the water bodies as a 
concern for full penetration. Besides, many informal fish landing sites pose another 
problem of accurately recording catch statistics and other monitoring activities. 
Case studies and interviews with stakeholders point to difficulty in 
communications, long distance between crime scenes and DoF’s local offices and 
limited ground staff as a challenge to timely crackdowns and surveillance.16  
                                                          
15 Data Source: Battambang Fisheries Cantonment, "Fisheries Activity Annual Report for 
Battambang for 2008," (2008); Department of Fisheries, "Annual Report for 1993 and Action Plans 
for 1994," (Phnom Penh: Department of Fisheries, 1993); ———, "Annual Report for 1994 and 
Action Plans for 1995," (Phnom Penh: Department of Fisheries, 1994); ———, "Annual Report for 
1995 and Action Plans for 1996," (Phnom Penh: Department of Fisheries, 1995); ———, "Annual 
Report for 1996 and Action Plans for 1997," (Phnom Penh: Department of Fisheries, 1996); ———
, "Annual Report Note for Semester 1 of 1999," (Phnom Penh: Department of Fisheries, 1999); —
——, "Report for Fishing Season 1999-2000 and Semester 1 of 2001," (Phnom Penh: Department 
of Fisheries, 2001); ———, "Annual Report for 2002 and Action Plans for 2003," (Phnom Penh: 
Department of Fisheries, 2002); Battambang Department of Agriculture, "Fisheries Activity Annual 
Report for Battambang for Fishing Season 1999-2000," (2000); ———, "Fisheries Activity Annual 
Report for Battambang for Fishing Season 2000-2001," (2001); Kandal Provincial Department of 
Agriculture, "Fisheries Activity Annual Report for Kandal for Fishing Season 2007-2008," (2008); 
Kampong Thom Department of Agriculture, "Fisheries Activity Annual Report for Kampong Thom 
for Semester 1 of 2008," (2008). 
16 See for example, Sodary Chap, Middleton Carl, and Sarom Leng, "Fisheries Conflict and a Failed 
Community Fishery in Phat Sanday Commune, Kampong Svay District, Kampong Thom Province," 
(Phnom Penh: Fisheries Action Coalition Team, 2005); Channarith Em and Team Members, 
"Approach to Build up Assembly of Cambodia’s Fishers around Tonle Sap Lake," (Phnom Penh: 
Fisheries Action Coalition Team, 2005); Sithirith Mak and Sokkhoeun Te, "Enabling Fisheries 
Conflict Management: A Case Study in Cambodia," (Phnom Penh: Fisheries Action Coalition 
Team, 2005); Sithirith Mak, Piseth Vann, and Sokkhoeun Te, "Communication Strategies for 
Fisheries Conflict Management: A Case Study in Cambodia," (Phnom Penh2004). Informant 79, 
26th July, 2011. 
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The answers as to whether there are sufficient officials vary between over-
government, being enough, to being understaffed.17 The current structural reform 
acts as a brake to staff recruitment.18 The analysis above, nonetheless, indicates that 
the central level is bloated, while there are too few at the division and sangkat 
levels. Since there are million fishers, and between 1,700 to 1,070 officials, many 
of whom are posted in Phnom Penh, the ratio between the two is very large. The 
FiA has a most widely distributed network of enforcers; however, what is needed, 
as Mak put it, is rationalization.19 
The penetration capacity is further plagued by too many ‘ghosts,’ high absenteeism 
and incompetency.20 The FiA likewise faces a dire situation. A leader and two 
former officials believe that there are “too many officials” with at least half 
absenteeism or half-day work.21 In the two provinces visited, the situation is quite 
similar. Apart from the problems above, the cantonment, division and sangkat 
levels suffer from having some officials pursuing their degrees and having some 
positions staffed by officers from elsewhere, and hence some of them only show up 
occasionally and do not stay onsite at the weekend.22 
Finally, the Khmer Rouge posed another problem to penetration. Pre-1999 
Cambodia best represented the inability of the state to fully rule its territory with 
the Khmer Rouge and bandits plundering and attacking parts of Cambodia. It was 
the capture of Ta Mok in 1999 that the state finally eliminated the threat from the 
Khmer Rouge. Before then, the Khmer Rouge and bandits posed a challenge to 
                                                          
17 Informant 3; Informant 6, 8th April, 2011; Informant 10, 22nd April, 2011; Informant 11, 2nd 
May, 2011; Informant 12, 4th & 12th May, 2011; Informant 22, 20th June, 2011; Informant 66; 
Informant 89. See for example, I. Csavas et al., Cambodia, rehabilitation and development needs of 
the fishery sector  (Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 1994); Ing, 
Sao, and Thay, "Small-Scale Fisheries Management in Cambodia."; Mak, Vann, and Te, 
"Communication Strategies for Fisheries Conflict Management: A Case Study in Cambodia."; 
Thuok Nao, Korn Long, and Chenda Taing, "Fisheries Monitoring, Control and Surveillance in 
Cambodia," (Phnom Penh1998); Magnus Torrell, Albert M. Salamanca, and Blake D. Ratner, eds., 
Wetlands Management in Cambodia: Socioeconomic, Ecological and Policy Perspectives (Penang: 
The WorldFish Center, 2004); Emma W Whittingham, "Sites of Practice: Negotiating Sustainability 
and Livelihoods in Rural Cambodia" (University of Exeter, 2010).  
18 Informant 10. 
19 Informant 6. Asian Development Bank, Cambodia: Country Environmental Analysis: 1-2; Mak, 
"The Tonle Sap and Its Fisheries Management: A Case in Cambodia," 13-15. Nao Thuok puts the 
number of fishers in 1995 and 2005 at 1.2 million and 1.5 million, respectively. Tonle Sap 
Authority, "Report on Results from Implementing Royal Government of Cambodia's Order 01BB 
on Measures to Protect and Protection of Areas Around Tonle Sap Lake " (Phnom Penh: Tonle Sap 
Authority, 31 August, 2010). 
20 Hun Sen correctly labels the last aspect as: “too many, but too few;” that is, too many officials, 
but too few competent ones. 
21 Informant 5, 6th April & 3rd June, 2011; Informant 7; Informant 20, 25th May, 2011. 
22 Informant 66; Informant 67, 21st July, 2011; Informant 80; Informant 89. 
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DoF’s penetration.23 A report commissioned by the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) in 1994 underlined DoF’s inability to carry out its monitoring, 
control and surveillance due to the Khmer Rouge’s threat. This lack of penetrative 
capacity was supported by numerous complaint letters from concessionaires on the 
disruption onto their businesses and the inability of the armed forces and DoF to 
protect their operations.24 
3. Appropriation 
Migdal suggests that appropriation be measured by whether the state “uses 
resources in determined ways,” while Fritz suggests investigating whether the state 
can pursue its policy goals for common good.25 Therefore, this section probes if the 
state uses its resources in determined ways to meet its goal. At the national level, 
the vision the state sets for Cambodia since 1993 has been to do with poverty 
reduction, good governance, equitable and inclusive development and high 
standard of living.26 As for the subsector, up to 2005, there was no policy paper that 
clearly set the common vision for the subsectors.27 The vision was first spelled out 
                                                          
23 Informant 7; Informant 65, 19th-22nd, 24th & 26th July, 2011; Informant 68, 22nd July, 2011; 
Informant 92, 7th July, 2011. 
24 Csavas et al., Cambodia, rehabilitation and development needs of the fishery sector: 56. For some 
complaint letters, see for example, Department of Fisheries, "Proposal for Battambang Lot 1 Fee 
Reduction for Fishing Season 1995-06," (Phnom Penh: Department of Fisheries, 5 August, 1996); 
———, "Proposal for Kandal Lots 8, 14, 15, 11 and Siem Reap Lots 4-5-6 Fee Reduction," (Phnom 
Penh: Department of Fisheries, 28 June, 1993). 
25 Fritz, "State Weakness in Post-Communist Countries: The Concept of State Capacity," 14-16; 
Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the 
Third World: 5. 
26 See for example, Royal Government of Cambodia, National Programme to Rehabilitate and 
Develop Cambodia  (Phnom Penh: Royal Government of Cambodia, 1994); ———, First Five Year 
Socioeconomic Development Plan 1996-2000  (Phnom Penh: Royal Government of Cambodia, 
1997); ———, The Second Five Year Socioeconomic Development Plan 2001-2005  (Phnom Penh: 
Royal Government of Cambodia, 2002); ———, National Strategic Development Plan 2006-2010  
(Phnom Penh: Royal Government of Cambodia, 2006). 
27 The first few national programs merely jotted down a few broad objectives. Concurrently, there 
was no over-arching vision for the subsectors in sectoral plans or policies. The first National 
Programme to Rehabilitate and Develop Cambodia 1994 only jots down ‘efficient exploitation’ of 
the resource as its objective. The Socio-Economic Rehabilitation Plan 1994-5, the First and Second 
Five Year Socioeconomic Development Plans (SEDPs) 1996-2000 and 2001-2005, and the National 
Strategic Development Plan 2006-2010 allocate a few pages for the fisheries and inundated forest 
subsectors, and set the objectives for fisheries and forest management, which can be summed up, as 
increase in revenue generation, conservation, sustainable exploitation, equitable distribution of the 
resources, livelihood enhancement, and strengthening CFis as their objectives. ———, National 
Programme to Rehabilitate and Develop Cambodia: 23; ———, Socioeconomic Rehabilitation 
Plan 1994-5  (Phnom Penh: Royal Government of Cambodia, 1995). 25 and 72; ———, First Five 
Year Socioeconomic Development Plan 1996-2000: 33-36; ———, The Second Five Year 
Socioeconomic Development Plan 2001-2005: 27; ———, National Strategic Development Plan 
2006-2010: 46-47. The brief Report on the Development Plan for Cambodia’s Fisheries Sector 
1991, and Five Year Socioeconomic Planning 1996-2000 (for the DoF) do not mention any 
objectives for the sector, while the successor of the latter for the period 2001-2005 adopts objectives 
quite like above. Department of Fisheries, "Five Year Socioeconomic Plan for Fisheries Sector 
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in the brief “Statement of the Royal Government of Cambodia on the National 
Fisheries Sector Policy,” which stated it as: “[m]anagement, conservation, and 
development of sustainable fisheries resources to contribute to ensuring people’s 
food security and to socioeconomic development in order to enhance people’s 
livelihood and the nation’s prosperity” – a vision the SPF adopts.28 Appropriation 
here thus covers funding to the priority ministries, including MAFF and DoF/FiA 
(to ensure conservation, management and development), resource (re)allocation 
(equitable distribution, food security and socioeconomic development) and 
sustainable resource exploitation. 
3.1. Financial Resource Allocation and Disbursement 
After protracted wars “everything is the priority for Cambodia.”29 However, given 
the limited financial resources, the state should prioritize the priorities. Therefore, 
in 1998 four ministries were identified as ‘priority ministries;’ the number has since 
climbed to seven. The first cohort was health, education, rural development and 
agriculture; the latter were land management, women’s affairs and justice.30 This 
sub-section thus focuses on the expenditure on these ‘priority ministries,’ 
especially, MAFF and DoF/FiA. 
Analyzing expenditure is cumbersome since substantial capital expenditure is 
under DPs’ direct management. This study hence only discusses the actual 
operating current expenditure and capital expenditure as stated in the Budget 
Laws.31 During 1993-98, the state spent roughly 50% (reducing to 1/3) of its 
current budget on defense and security (D&S). This is justifiable given the 
                                                                                                                                                                 
1996-2000," (Phnom Penh: Department of Fisheries); ———, "Five Year Socioeconomic Plan for 
Fisheries Sector 2001-2005," (Phnom Penh: Department of Fisheries), 15; State of Cambodia, 
Report on the Development Plan for Cambodia’s Fisheries Sector  (Phnom Penh: State of 
Cambodia, 1991). 
28 Cited in Fisheries Administration, The Strategic Planning Framework for Fisheries: 2010-2019, 
vol. 2 (Phnom Penh: Fisheries Administration, 2011). 1.  
29 International Development Association and International Monetary Fund, "Assessment of Interim 
Poverty Reduction Strategy," (Phnom Penh2000), 16. 
30 In numerous of its policy papers, these ministries and sectors are likewise labeled as priority. See 
for example, NGO Forum on Cambodia and Economic Institute of Cambodia, Guide to the National 
Budget  (Phnom Penh: NGO Forum on Cambodia, 2007); Royal Government of Cambodia, 
Rectangular Strategy for Growth, Development, Equity and Efficiency in Cambodia  (Phnom Penh: 
RGC, 2004); ———, National Strategic Development Plan 2006-2010; ———, Rectangular 
Strategy for Growth, Development, Equity and Efficiency in Cambodia: Phase Two  (Phnom Penh: 
Royal Government of Cambodia, 2008); ———, National Strategic Development Plan Update 
2010-2013  (Phnom Penh: Royal Government of Cambodia, 2010); World Bank, Country 
Assistance Strategy of the World Bank Group for the Kingdom of Cambodia  (Washington D.C.: 
Southeast Asia and Mongolia Country Unit, East Asia and Pacific Regional Office, World Bank, 
2000). 
31 NGO Forum on Cambodia and Economic Institute of Cambodia, Guide to the National Budget. 
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mounting pressure from the Khmer Rouge. Upon final Khmer Rouge integration, 
the PM vowed to fast-track the reforms.32 Since then, there has been an increase in 
the expenditure on the seven priority ministries, increasing from 30.6% in 2000 to 
35.5% in 2006. Concurrently, D&S expenditure slid from 37.2% to 21.1%. Yet the 
‘non-priority ministries’ saw their share surged quickly from 9.9% to 25.4% too. 
The capital expenditure on the ‘priority ministries’ during this period also 
experienced a slight increase from 28.7% to 32.5% of the total expenditure.33 In 
real terms, the current expenditure on the priority ministries during 2000-07 was 
roughly a half more than that for D&S. Overall, the state has, to large extent, 
shifted its spending from D&S to other (non) priority ministries since 1999. 
Table 3: Current Expenditure for Defense & Security, (Non-) Priority 
Ministries, MAFF and MoJ34 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
General Administration* 277,655 262,659 290,959 325,271 291,679 343,914 432,935 1,041,273 
Defense & Security 450,725 417,323 406,754 411,013 422,820 451,183 520,154 615,867 
Defense 308,560 277,026 264,615 269,515 271,739 289,373 328,146 372,613 
Security 142,165 140,297 142,139 141,498 151,081 161,810 192,008 243,254 
Priority Ministries 361,664 452,029 590,053 619,452 676,265 674,501 831,408 972,960 
Non- Priority Ministries 125,436 283,621 286,349 388,840 354,886 497,858 570,140 784,740 
MAFF 23,415 30,468 39,652 39,024 38,552 47,099 55,941 57,655 
MoJ 5,784 6,298 7,195 11,099 10,487 11,733 13,229 15,632 
(NB: * Except budgets for the Ministry of Justice ((MoJ). 
In percentage, MAFF share of the current expenditure increased quite 
insignificantly from 1.9% in 2000 to 2.4% in 2006. However, according to the 
                                                          
32 See for example, Asian Development Bank, Country Assistance Plan 2000-2002: Cambodia: 3; 
———, Country Assistance Plan 2001-03: Cambodia  (Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2000). 
30; Cambodia New Vision, "Opening and Closing Addresses of Samdach Prime Minister Hun Sen 
to the 2nd Donor Monitoring Meeting in Phnom Penh on October 27, 1999," 3; J. Verbaas, "Starting 
from Scratch: Building Capacity in Cambodia" (Twente University, 1997), 33; World Bank, 
Country Assistance Strategy of the World Bank Group for the Kingdom of Cambodia  (Washington 
D.C.: East Asia and Pacific Region, World Bank, 1997). 2-3; ———, Cambodia: Country 
Assistance Evaluation 1992-1999  (Operations Evaluation Department, Washington D.C.: World 
Bank, 2000). 5. The expenditure on D&S relative to other countries in the region in 1995 also puts 
Cambodia in a median position. Kato et al., Cambodia: Enhancing Governance for Sustainable 
Development: 24. 
33 NGO Forum on Cambodia and Economic Institute of Cambodia, Guide to the National Budget. 
According to the ADB, in 1999 the expenditure for the four ‘priority ministries’ was merely 24%, 
while the expenditure on D&S was 40%. Asian Development Bank, Country Assistance Program 
Evaluation for Cambodia  (Manila: Operations Evaluation Department, Asian Development Bank, 
2004). 64. 
34 In billion riels. Source of data: researcher’s calculation from Ministry of Economy and Finance, 
"Main Economic Indicators (2009)." 
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budget laws, its share of the capital expenditure increased quite dramatically from 
0.9% in 2000 to 6% in 2006.35 Moreover, in real terms, as seen in Table 3, if 
judged against D&S, the current expenditure is approximately 1/10th, and hence 
still small. The paradox also happens to FiA, which ‘has a low profile,’ thus does 
not attract much funding from the state.36 An expatriate advisor to a local NGO 
noted: “It is astonishing that in a lot of government reports fisheries is emphasized 
in importance to the people, culture, and stuff… but the sector is under-funded and 
gets very little financial support from the government.”37 
Similarly, DoF/FiA annual reports and key informants within the administration 
continually complain of lack of funds for its operation.38 A draft report for fishing 
season 1999-2000 reports the enacted budget for DoF at roughly $332,080,39 and 
the budget for 2007-08 from the government was some $200,000. The SPF 
estimates the required budget to attain the goals it sets for 2010-19 at $78.55 
million, with an annual requirement of some $8 million. The government promises 
to contribute $1.25 million annually with a possible 15% increase with no 
guarantee.40 Overall, the government’s funding to DoF/FiA has been small. 
Existing evidence similarly points to poor budget allocation to its central 
offices/department and sub-national line agencies. According to FiA officials, the 
funding to the Community Fisheries Development Department (CFDD) and 
provincial cantonments for CFi affairs is minimal. A division and two sangkat 
leaders confirmed that there is no funding flown down to these implementing levels 
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37 Informant 4, 17th &18 March, 2011. 
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for CFi-related activities.41 Generally, such disproportionate vertical funding 
distribution also occurs in other agencies.42 
Fund disbursement presents another challenge. Revenue collection and allocation 
was centralized in 1993, leading to myriad problems, including untimely 
distribution of funds (even to the priority ministries), poor participation from the 
local administration in budget allocation, poor and untimely budget implementation 
and “off-the-record tax,” (to quote the PM). The longer the funding chain the 
harder it is to get the funds and more leakage there is; therefore, when funds do 
reach the local level, there can be little left.43 As some Informants put it, they put 
the “signature to receive mere paper.”44 The DoF Institutional Review also raises 
the lack of funds and late budgeting as an impediment to its operation. Since 2005, 
there has been improvement in budget disbursement after some reform measures.45 
However, the situation is apparently continuing. 
With limited budget, DoF/FiA and its line agencies face another dilemma, where to 
invest the money. They need funding for both administration and maintenance and 
development-oriented activities, including CFi assistance and R&D. They do not 
have much choice, but to spend a majority of fund on staff salaries and some office 
and field equipment, and to leave a fraction for development activities. The current 
limited Provincial Investment Fund (PIF) does not fund much of the provincial 
cantonment’s activities either. Neither do the CCs which spend their funds mainly 
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on basic physical infrastructure building and maintenance.46 
In summary, there has been some improvement in financial resource distribution 
and allocation for development and conservation both at the macro- and micro-
levels. There has been a shift to spending on development-oriented sectors, and for 
DoF/FiA, PIFs and Commune Council Funds (CCF), from purely administrative 
purposes to some development-oriented programs. Besides, the state has allocated 
more funds to FiA in recent years; however, spending on ‘priority ministries’ and 
DoF/FiA is still small. 
3.2. Fishing Area Distribution and Resource Conservation 
This sub-section discusses distributive justice and sustainability. Starting with 
almost 2 million hectares in 1988, the lot size was reduced to roughly 1 million 
hectares before 2001 and to 422,216 hectares afterwards.47 With the nullification of 
36 lake/stream ‘research lots’ in the Tonle Sap and some others in four provinces 
around the Mekong in 2012, the lot size has again been drastically reduced. Over 
the last two decades the resource allocation between the haves and the have-nots 
has improved. However in retrospect, in the 1990’s (and to some extent, 
afterwards), a lot of injustice befell the poorer population, whose livelihood 
critically depended on the resources. 
Here are a few basic facts to show that the resource allocation was not just and fair. 
First, some 3 million people, a majority of whom are fishers or fishers/farmers, live 
in the six provinces around Tonle Sap Lake.48 Degen and others showed that small 
and medium scale fishers can earn $183 million per annum from fishing. Yet, they 
were allotted only 20% of the lake before 2001. Fifty-six lots (with at most 500 
shareholders) held a much larger share and the most productive areas. Even after 
2001, more than 50% of the most productive area within the Lake was still under 
thirty-eight lots until the 2011 suspension. Disproportionate distribution of forests 
                                                          
46 Danith Chan, The Review of the Roles and Linkages of Sub-National Fisheries Institutions for 
Service Deliveries  (Phnom Penh: Secretariat of the Technical Working Group on Fisheries, 
Fisheries Administration, 2006). 9-16. Informant 62-64, 22nd June, 2011; Informant 79. 
47 Department of Fisheries, "Table of Lots and Sanctuaries 1980-2008," (Phnom Penh: Department 
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also occurs, with 0.45 million hectares within lot boundaries and 0.23 million 
hectares within CFi areas.49 
Second, there is a negative correlation between the areas for concessionaires and 
small-medium scale fishers and employment. The large-scale fishing hired 1% of 
the fisher-laborers, while some ¾ are small-scale full-time or seasonal fishers and 
some ¼ medium-scale fishers.50 Third, there were poor lot designs. There was little 
preparation in 1988 when lots were privatized, so the boundaries created a century 
ago were adopted, resulting in almost a million people living within lots, creating 
tremendous conflicts and competing fishing.51 
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Many stakeholders, including fisheries officials, have observed this inequitable 
distribution and limited distributive justice. They have called for reforms since 
1996, labeling the allocation more and more ‘inequitable, divisive and destructive;’ 
‘inappropriate;’ ‘limited access and acute competition;’ ‘bias(ed);’ ‘breaking 
inequity’ and ‘endangering [fishers’] livelihoods’.52 The 2001 reforms were 
therefore enthusiastically applauded and drew praises from many stakeholders, 
calling the reforms ‘more pro-poor’ and ‘a step in the right direction’.53 
Nevertheless, there were later complaints and concerns. First, the release was done 
with little grassroots participation and consultation.54 The process can be at best 
described as ad-hoc and variable in terms of who participated and how many local 
people were asked to participate. Local fishers’ participation was overall limited.55 
Next, there was a complaint that the released areas were shallow and unproductive, 
while the lots still retained the richest parts.56 In general, this may hold true as the 
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released areas were either from the most inexpensive lots or edges around bigger 
lots. A former DoF official accused DoF of having special interests and hence did 
not release the most productive areas;57 however, DoF actually had little time and 
limited human resource and capacity to properly execute the order. 
All-out anarchic fishing upon the reforms was another concern. All DoF 
implementors were withdrawn from the water – creating an institutional vacuum 
where no other state or non-state institutions were ready to replace. One NGO 
worker monitoring fishing in the Tonle Sap during this time described: “Lighting 
from the boats on the Tonle Sap was like that of lighting in Phnom Penh during the 
night time now.”58 Moreover, the reform released hundreds of thousand hectares of 
forests to communities or public access areas. With initially no and currently weak 
institutional capacity on the part of CFCs, there was the concern that large areas 
would be cleared and claimed privately. This has been confirmed by the 
fieldwork.59 Fourth, there is the issue of ‘selective overfishing’ and unsustainable 
exploitation. There is no limit on how much or of which species concessionaires 
can exploit, although some endangered species have been prohibited from 
harvesting. There was/is no limit on the number of small and middle scale fishers 
and how much they can catch. Though there is no scientific study on the matters, 
anecdotally there is a trend of selective overfishing and unsustainable harvest.60 
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Finally, another concern is the correlation between a CFi population and the CFi 
area. Currently there is no mechanism to determine the best size of a CFi area. CFis 
were allotted with ad hoc sizes without taking into account the population within 
that CFi and/or productivity of the areas. As an illustration, a CFi in Site 4 with a 
population of 1,550 receives about 1,200 hectares, while another in Site 1 with 
2,229 people receives a more productive area of almost 16 times bigger.61 Besides 
these issues, in terms of post-reform income re-distribution and access to resources, 
the picture is mixed and skewed towards middle scale fishers. Some reports and 
evaluations painted a rosier picture of the reforms in terms of income generation, 
fish catch, less bribery, but warned of unsustainable exploitation, income inequality 
and ecological destruction.62 
3.3. Resource Re-Concentration and Unsustainable Exploitation 
Starting in 1997, DoF kick-started another round of re-concentration with initially 
seven of the ‘big, expensive, and most lucrative’ lots allocated to some 
concessionaires for four consecutive seasons without any bidding. This was later 
expanded to fifty-four concessionaires (with some lot holding extended to six 
years) through its introduction of ‘research lots’. This was done without any prior 
consultation with the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) and other 
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stakeholders, including concessionaires and field implementors.63 Though the 
auction system is far from perfect, the ‘research lot’ introduction makes re-
distribution much worse. The covert negotiation between the fishing elites (with 
usually powerful backers) and selected DoF officials and probably provincial 
administration led to poor transparency and accountability and opaque resource 
allocation. In the first two seasons when this ‘system’ was introduced, the 
concessionaires’ identities were not revealed, even in DoF’s reports. That there 
were interventions from some politicians and/or their relatives suggested that some 
deals were offered to the politically well-connected. One DoF insider called this 
introduction ‘a way to collect [a] commission.’64 
The problem drew the PM’s attention. He branded the ‘system’ as ‘caus[ing] a very 
bad phenomenon’ and ordered MAFF to return the lots to open bidding once the 
mandate was over.65 However, this practice has stayed intact for more than a 
decade afterwards with 87 lots (as of 2011) labeled ‘research lots’. These had 
become more skewed towards the richest and well-connected elites, with ¾ of 60 
lots being held by the same individuals for between 8-12 years and the rest between 
4 to 6 years before 2012. Besides, the 1987 sub-decree on lot renting set the limit of 
one lot per person; the new ‘system’ has witnessed many individuals (in his/her 
own name or by a proxy) holding more than one lot – in one extreme case, one 
person held 18 lots before 2012.66 According to three DoF officials, one rich local 
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elite in Province A held fishing rights to five lots by having his relatives standing 
as proxies.67 
The Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC), as expressed in its policies, vows to 
‘promote economic development [and] ensure equitable distribution of fruits of 
progress and reduce poverty.’ However, in reality, the state agencies and agents 
seem not to fully support the state to live up to the vision.68 Although resource 
distribution has been fairer, fair distribution came slowly often in reaction to 
malpractices. Besides, there is an issue of unsustainable and unregulated 
exploitation within these lots. A number of people who held the rights to these lots 
were pure businesspeople or fisher-cum-businesspeople who partitioned them for 
sub-leasing. As the name suggests, the lots are supposed to be for research and 
rehabilitated and since 2010 are not for sub-lease. However, on the ground, their 
partition for sub-leases was common and varied only by extent.69 
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Fees for Kandal, Prey Veng, Kampong Cham, Kampong Thom, Siem Reap, Battambang, Pursat, 
and Kampong Chhnang for Fishing Seasons 2003-2007 and 2003-2009," (Phnom Penh: Ministry of 
Economy and Finance and Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 14 October, 2003); ——
—, "Joint Decision on Fixation of Research and Development Lot Fees for Kandal, Prey Veng, 
Kampong Cham, Kampong Thom, Takeo, and Banteay Meanchey for Fishing Seasons 2006-2007 
and 2007-2008," (Phnom Penh: Ministry of Economy and Finance and Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries, 15 February, 2006); ———, "Joint Decision on Fixation of Research and 
Development Lot Fees for Kandal, Prey Veng, Kampong Cham, Kampong Thom, Siem Reap, 
Battambang, Pursat, and Kampong Chhnang for Fishing Seasons 2005-2007 and 2005-2009," 
(Phnom Penh: Ministry of Economy and Finance and Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries, 29 September, 2005); ———, "Joint Decision on Fixation of Research and Development 
Lot Fees for Kandal, Prey Veng, Kampong Cham, Kampong Thom, Kampong Chhnang,Takeo, 
Siem Reap, Pursat, Banteay Meanchey, and IFReDI for Fishing Season 2009-2010 and 2010-2011," 
(Phnom Penh Ministry of Economy and Finance and Ministry of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries, 
5 February, 2010). 
67 See also for example, Fisheries Administration, "Notes on Fixation of Lot Fees and Capital for 
Rehabilition for Fishing Seasons 2009-2011."; Ministry of Agriculture, "Decision on Granting of 
Fisheries Exploitation Rights for 2009-2011." Informant 65; Informant 67; Informant 92. 
68 Privatization and commercialization in Asia, one author correctly notes, seem to provide ‘a 
window of opportunity for the powerful and rich people’. "New Tonle Sap Developmental 
Paradigm: Chong Kneas Environmental Improvement," Tonle Sap Briefing August-September 
2004, 1; Royal Government of Cambodia, "Political Platform of the Fourth Mandate," (Phnom 
Penh: Royal Government of Cambodia, 2008). 
69 Informant 65; Informant 66. Chhin Bin, "Report on the Result from Implementing Decision 39 
SSR Dating 01 July 2011 of the Royal Government of Cambodia on the Establishment of 
Commission to Inspect Development Lot around the Tonle Sap Lake," (10 August, 2011). To be 
fairer to these concessionaires, to some extent, they have rehabilitated some part of the lots via, for 
example, protecting sections of inundated forests, replanting sections of the lots with inundated 
trees, rehabilitating some shallow streams and lakes, and so on. See for example, Department of 
Fisheries, "Meeting Minutes on Evaluation of Research Lot in Pursat," (2001); ———, "Meeting 
Minutes on Evaluation of Research Lot in Kampong Chhnang," (2001). 
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4. Regulation Capacity 
4.1. Crackdowns on Illegal Fishing and Forest Clearance 
The state capacity to regulate these subsectors, as seen in the number of arrests and 
prosecutions, shows a large variation over time and space.70 There were substantial 
crackdowns in 1994 and 1995. However, the number of cases had been decreasing 
until 2001. Since then there has been more momentum in the crackdowns. Yet 
fishers and NGOs denounce that most of the arrested are poor fishers.71 Anecdotal 
evidence also confirm that no concessionaires were brought to justice even during 
the 2001 and 2012 reforms despite reports and investigations proving that they had 
conducted massive illegal activities. 
Table 4: Crackdown Cases in Selected Years72 
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1998 1999 
** 
2000 
** 2002 2003 2004 2009 2010 
Cases 615 1,753 1,312 578 36 535 453 1,348 2,080* 2,574 2,921 1,681 





**** 144 166 
Imprisonment 37 61 47 52 (n.a.) 21 42 40 49 3 107 91 
(NB: *Researcher’s calculation based on provincial figures from Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fisheries. "Annual Report for Fisheries Sector for Ministry of Agriculture, Forestries and 
Fisheries for 2004-05 and Action Plan for 2005-06." **Data for the first semester only; 
***Including marine fisheries crimes &****For semester 1, including marine fisheries crimes). 
As seen above, the number of people sent to court is just a fraction of those 
arrested. Moreover, the number of people prosecuted relative to the lodged cases 
differs substantially. A DoF report shows that during 2002-2004, 8.83% of the 
arrest was sent to courts, yet only 1.7% of this was found guilty, while the other 
cases were dismissed or the perpetrators were set free. The report opined: ‘[S]uch 
settlements are not proportionate with the crimes committed and cannot deter the 
                                                          
70 For the variation over provinces in selected years, see for example, Department of Fisheries, 
"Result of Fisheries Crimes Crackdown between 1998 and 2004 and Recommendation for 
Sustainable Fisheries Resource Protection." 
71 See for example, Mak, Vann, and Te, "Communication Strategies for Fisheries Conflict 
Management: A Case Study in Cambodia," 30. 
72 Data source: ———, "Annual Report for 1993 and Action Plans for 1994."; ———, "Annual 
Report for 1994 and Action Plans for 1995."; ———, "Annual Report for 1995 and Action Plans 
for 1996."; ———, "Annual Report for 1996 and Action Plans for 1997."; ———, "Annual Report 
for 1998."; ———, "Annual Report for 1999-2000 and Semester One of 1999," (Phnom Penh: 
Department of Fisheries, 2000); ———, "Report for Fishing Season 1999-2000 and Semester 1 of 
2001."; ———, "Annual Report for 2002 and Action Plans for 2003."; ———, "Result of Fisheries 
Crimes Crackdown between 1998 and 2004 and Recommendation for Sustainable Fisheries 
Resource Protection," (Phnom Penh: Department of Fisheries, 2004); ———, "Table of Crackdown 
Cases for 2009," (2009); ———, "Table of Crackdown Cases for 2010," (2010); Forestry and 
Fisheries Ministry of Agriculture, "Annual Report for Fisheries Sector for Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forestries and Fisheries for 2004-05 and Action Plan for 2005-06," (Phnom Penh: Ministry of 
Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries, 2005). 
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perpetrators from the illegal acts.’73 In 2010, the MAFF minister also accused the 
courts of “dragging their feet on forestry, agriculture and fisheries crimes, claiming 
70% nationwide have not been to trial.”74 Likewise, a division and three CFC 
leaders criticized their provincial court for not taking strict actions against 
perpetrators.75 Overall, the arrest and prosecution show that the state has some 
regulation capacity; however, it is so variable and limited.76 
There are three more important issues: poor and selective enforcement, low 
compliance and challenges from the Khmer Rouge. Stakeholders agreed that law 
enforcement countrywide is weak and uneven.77 A study, for example, puts the use 
of explosive devices for fishing in Stung Treng during 1993-1997 at 8,000, and 
another reports that the use of samrah has been common.78 Low compliance is 
                                                          
73 Department of Fisheries, "Result of Fisheries Crimes Crackdown between 1998 and 2004 and 
Recommendation for Sustainable Fisheries Resource Protection," 21-22. 
74 Sophakcharya Khouth, "Forestry, Fisheries Crimes Lost in Red Tape: Minister," Phnom Penh 
Post Tuesday, 3 August, 2010. 
75 Informant 86-88, 29th & 31st July, 2011; Informant 89. 
76 For example, Informant 1, 4th March, 2011; Informant 2, 6th & 19th March, 2011; Informant 4; 
Informant 6. The crackdowns as reported represented only 20-30% of the illegal cases, alleged by 
the Tonle Sap Authority (TSA) in 2011. Tonle Sap Authority, "Request for Strict and Effective 
Measures to Preserve Fisheries Resources for Next and Following Years," (Phnom Penh: Tonle Sap 
Authority, 15 March, 2011). 
77 Asian Development Bank, Cambodia: Enabling the Socio-Economic Renaissance  (Manila: Asian 
Development Bank, 2000). 16; Peter Degen and Leng Mong, "Socio-economic Issues: Fisheries 
Research Activities and 'Awareness Building'," in Present Status of Cambodia’s Freshwater 
Fisheries and Management Implications: Nine Presentations Given at the Annual Meeting at the 
Department of Fisheries, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 19-21 January, 1999, ed. 
Nicolaas Van Zalinge, Thuok Nao, and Loeung Deap (Phnom Penh: Mekong River Commission 
and Fisheries Department, 1999), 1-2; Degen et al., "Taken for Granted Conflicts over Cambodia's 
Freshwater Fish Resources," 1; A. Gartrell, Resource management in the Cambodian Mekong basin  
(Asia Research Centre, 2009); Gum, Inland Acquatic Resources and Livelihoods in Cambodia: A 
Guide to the Literature, Legislation, Institutional Framework and Recommendations iii and 17-18; 
Ing, Sao, and Thay, "Small-Scale Fisheries Management in Cambodia," 45; Barushi M. Koroma, 
"Local Reforms of Community Forest and Fisheries Management," International Review for 
Environmental Strategies 3, no. 2 (2002): 310; Dirk Lamberts, Tonle Sap Fisheries: A Case Study 
on Floodplain Gillnet Fisheries in Siem Reap, Cambodia  (Bangkok: Regional Office for Asia and 
the Pacific, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2001). 57; Sithirith Mak, 
"Vulnerability of Fisheries in Cambodia," (Phnom Penh: NGO Forum on Cambodia, 2000); Mak 
and Te, "Enabling Fisheries Conflict Management: A Case Study in Cambodia," 10; Mak, Vann, 
and Te, "Communication Strategies for Fisheries Conflict Management: A Case Study in 
Cambodia," 30; H. Milner et al., "Cambodia: Establishment of the Tonle Sap Basin Management 
Organization 2," (Phnom Penh: Asian Development Bank, 2005), 6; Touch and Bruce, The Inland 
and Marine Fisheries Trade in Cambodia: 18; K. Viner et al., Development of Fisheries Co-
management in Cambodia: A Case Study and Its Implications  (Penang: WorldFish Center, 2006); 
Informant 1; Informant 4; Informant 11; Informant 20; Informant 23, 20th & 22nd June, 2011; 
Informant 62-64; Informant 65; Informant 66. 
78 Lamberts, Tonle Sap Fisheries: A Case Study on Floodplain Gillnet Fisheries in Siem Reap, 
Cambodia; Viner et al., Development of Fisheries Co-management in Cambodia: A Case Study and 
Its Implications. A report by DoF reports that illegal fishing activities started as early as 1979. 
Department of Fisheries, "Financial and Technical Report on the Construction of the Poles for 
Reserved Areas and Fishing Lots in the Tonle Sap in the province of Pursat, Siem Reap and 
Kampong Thom," (1987).  
61 
 
another issue. According to many studies and reports, there is a large gap between 
what is stipulated in the prakas on gear types and what fishers and concessionaires 
actually use.79 While the use of gears larger in sizes or numbers than legally 
allowed is common, the use of illegal gears under the law is persuasive yet 
crackdowns are few.80 An FiA leader, cantonment leaders, field implementors and 
other stakeholders agreed that illegal fishing is rampant, though there has been 
more effort to crackdown since 2010.81 
The FLs bans more than a dozen gears and activities and restrict fishing in 
sanctuaries.82 However, the use of illegal gear is reportedly common. A study by 
Seang Tana Touch and Bruce Todd identify nine most destructive fishing methods 
commonly used in the 1990s. These were small mesh size fishing gears, fishing 
with explosives, electro-fishing, brush parks, motorized push net, motorized 
surface trawling, motorized bottom trawl fishing, spear fishing with spotlights and 
fish fry collection.83 Informants in Site 1 reported the widespread use of pumping, 
brush parks, bor and electro-fishing in nearby public access areas and their CFi 
                                                          
79 Gum, Inland Acquatic Resources and Livelihoods in Cambodia: A Guide to the Literature, 
Legislation, Institutional Framework and Recommendations 28; Sithirith Mak and Carl Grundy-
Warr, "Changes in Fishing Technologies and the Politics of Environmental Transformation," 
(Phnom Penh: Fisheries Action Coalition Team, 2005), 20; ———, "Spaces of Engagement and 
Contested Territories of the Tonle Sap," 17; Mak and Te, "Enabling Fisheries Conflict 
Management: A Case Study in Cambodia," 11. 
80 Asian Development Bank, Cambodia: Country Environmental Analysis: 2-3; Asian Development 
Bank and Cambodia Development Research Institute, "Rapid Analysis of the Commune Workshops 
in Tonle Sap," (2010); Degen and Nao, "Inland Fishery Management in Cambodia: Is the Fishing 
Lot System the Basis for Improved Management or Should It Be Abolished?," 11; Fisheries Action 
Coalition Team and Environmental Justice Foundation, Feast or Famine? Solutions to Cambodia's 
Fisheries Conflicts: 21; Ing, Sao, and Thay, "Small-Scale Fisheries Management in Cambodia," 34; 
Ratner, "Community Management by Decree? Lessons from Cambodia's Fisheries Reform," 83. 
Asian Development Bank, Cambodia: Country Environmental Analysis; Asian Development Bank 
and Cambodia Development Research Institute, "Rapid Analysis of the Commune Workshops in 
Tonle Sap."; Degen and Nao, "Inland Fishery Management in Cambodia: Is the Fishing Lot System 
the Basis for Improved Management or Should It Be Abolished?."; Fisheries Action Coalition Team 
and Environmental Justice Foundation, Feast or Famine? Solutions to Cambodia's Fisheries 
Conflicts; Ing, Sao, and Thay, "Small-Scale Fisheries Management in Cambodia."; Ratner, 
"Community Management by Decree? Lessons from Cambodia's Fisheries Reform." 
81 Informant 3; Informant 11; Informant 20; Informant 66; Informant 67; Informant 71-78; 
Informant 79; Informant 80. 
82 People Republic of Kampuchea, Fisheries Management and Administration Law  (Phnom Penh: 
Council of Ministers, 1987); Royal Government of Cambodia, "Law on Fisheries," (Phnom Penh: 
RGC, 2006). 
83 Touch and Bruce, The Inland and Marine Fisheries Trade in Cambodia: 38-44. Similarly, in 1999 
Acker reported common use of excessive net sizes, small-meshed nets, brush parks, electro-fishing 
and trawling river bed in public access areas. Cited in Fisheries Action Coalition Team and 




area. Similarly, the use of pumping and brush parks is rife in Site 3 in Province B.84 
Illegal fishing in sanctuaries is likewise common.85 
The capacity to manage forests is also poor and compliance is weak.86 According to 
a DoF report during 2000-2006, 9,672 hectares was cleared and other 20,531 
hectares of degraded forest was claimed by private individuals and companies.  The 
PM put the figure of destruction in the six provinces around the Tonle Sap Lake 
during 2005-2010 at 48,170 hectares.87 There is no common definition of flooded 
forest; hence data is largely incomparable. There is nevertheless an agreement that 
the destruction rate since 1930’s is extremely alarming. A survey in 1992/3 put the 
figure at 370,700 hectares. The figure for 1997-98 was 360,000 hectares, and that 
for 2007/8 was 197,000 hectares.88 Compared to the 1930’s and 1990’s, 4/5 and ½ 
                                                          
84 Informant 18-19; Informant 24, 20th June, 2011; Informant 25-27; Informant 28; Informant 29-
43; Informant 45-59, 21st June, 2011. On the days when the researcher was in the field there, 
pumping of a one-hectare or so lake in a nearby area was on-going. 
85 Chap, Carl, and Leng, "Fisheries Conflict and a Failed Community Fishery in Phat Sanday 
Commune, Kampong Svay District, Kampong Thom Province."; Degen and Mong, "Socio-
economic Issues: Fisheries Research Activities and 'Awareness Building'," 27; Vuthy Ly, Dara Yin, 
and Peter Degen, "Management Aspects of Cambodia’s Freshwater Capture Fisheries," in 
Management Aspacts of Cambodia's Freshwater Capture Fisheries: Eleven Presentations Given at 
the Annual Meetings of the Department of Fisheries, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
27-28 January, 2000, ed. Nicolaas Van Zalinge, Thuok Nao, and Sopha Lieng (Phnom Penh: 
Mekong River Commission and Department of Fisheries, 2000), 94; Mak, "The Tonle Sap and Its 
Fisheries Management: A Case in Cambodia," 13; NGO Forum on Cambodia, "Review of Fishery 
Conflicts in Stung Treng," (Phnom Penh: NGO Forum on Cambodia, 2004), 4; Bunnat Pech and 
Robert van Zalinge, "A Survey of Boeung Tonle Chmar Core Area of the Tonle Sap Biosphere 
Reserve," (2006); Try, "Making Space and Access in Fisheries Resource Management for Local 
Communities in Stung Treng Province," 2; Viner et al., Development of Fisheries Co-management 
in Cambodia: A Case Study and Its Implications. A central fisheries official also encounters 
frequent trawling of sanctuaries in his field trips over the last decades. Informant 92. 
86 Fisheries Action Coalition Team and Environmental Justice Foundation, Feast or Famine? 
Solutions to Cambodia's Fisheries Conflicts: 13; Seng Keang et al., "Conflicts Arising from Re-
Allocation of Fishing Lots: Perceptions from Community Fisheries in Cambodia," (Phnom Penh: 
IFReDI), 10; Sithirith Mak, "The Environmental Management in Tonle Sap Lake, Cambodia," 
(Phnom Penh: Fisheries Action Coalition Team, 2006), 10-14; Wildlife Conservation Society and 
Administration, "Comparson between Outcomes under the Proposed Prek Toal Sanctuary and 
Alternative Management Regime," 108. Informant 7; Informant 13; Informant 68; Informant 86-88. 
87 Department of Fisheries, "Cumulative Report on Destruction of Inundated Forest and the 
Grabbing of Land for Possession within Fisheries Domain " (Phnom Penh: Department of Fisheries, 
16 February, 2006); Tonle Sap Authority, "Report on Results from Implementing Royal 
Government of Cambodia's Order 01BB on Measures to Protect and Protection of Areas Around 
Tonle Sap Lake ". 
88 The coverage of the permanent flooded forest in the 1930’s was 1 million hectares. This figure 
dropped over time and reached 567,100 hectares in the 1985/7’s. Ahmed, et al. as cited in "The 
Tonle Sap and Its Fisheries,"  2-3; Sithirith Mak, "Sustainability, Livelihoods and Development in 
the Tonle Sap Lake," (Phnom Penh: Fisheries Action Coalition Team), 10. According to the 
MRC/GTZ, the size of the inundated forest was 473,800 hectares in 2002. Cited in Nov Sam, 
"Clarification on Article Published in Reaksmey Kampuchea No. 3997 Issued on 5 June, 2006 
Titled ‘Inundated Forest around Tonle Sap Lake Is Undergoing Worrying Destruction," (2006). 
Informant 1. The figure from the government is quite similar. According to Yim Chhay Ly, a deputy 
PM, the loss between 1970 and 2010 was 354,175 hectares or on average more than 9,000 hectares 
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of the flooded forests, respectively, has been cleared. The rapid destruction is 
supported by provincial and regional level data. A report in 2004 stated that almost 
50% of the Tonle Sap forests had been cleared. In 1997, Peter Swift reported the 
nullification of flooded forest in Takeo and substantial forest clearance in 
Kampong Chhnang. Half of the area in Siem Reap and Kampong Thom has 
reportedly been cleared.89 
Before 1999, the Khmer Rouge presented challenges to crackdowns because parts 
of the Tonle Sap and Mekong were under its control, while some others were grey 
zones. A review in 1994 and key informants, for example, admit the threats that it 
had on its monitoring, control and surveillance.90 
4.2.  Legal Gears with Illegality 
Another challenge to regulation is the common use of gears that are larger in size 
or numbers than legally permitted by small and medium-scale fishers. Nao and 
Ahmed say that this was ‘common’ in the 1990’s.91 A few studies and interviews 
with fishers lend support to this assertion. This practice has persisted or probably 
intensified after 2001 as officials have been more lenient on such usage and there 
has been more gear graduation.92 
                                                                                                                                                                 
per year. Tonle Sap Authority, "Report on Results from Implementing Royal Government of 
Cambodia's Order 01BB on Measures to Protect and Protection of Areas Around Tonle Sap Lake ". 
For elaboration by Lim Kean Hour, see ibid., 30-36. 
89 Informant 1. NGO Forum on Cambodia, "Fishing Conflicts in Battambang."; Swift, Developing a 
Research Framework for the Fishing Lot System in Cambodia: Two Preliminary Case Studies on 
Fishing Lots in Takeo and Kompong Chhnang Provinces. Many site specific studies show the 
pervasiveness of illegal fishing and forests clearance. "New Tonle Sap Developmental Paradigm: 
Chong Kneas Environmental Improvement,"  3; Chap, Carl, and Leng, "Fisheries Conflict and a 
Failed Community Fishery in Phat Sanday Commune, Kampong Svay District, Kampong Thom 
Province."; Khai and Thai, "Community Participation in Fisheries Management: A Case Study from 
Tboung Khlaa and O Mreah Villages, Stung Treng Province, Kingdom of Cambodia," 3-4; Patrick, 
Melissa, and Puadyal, Flood Forest, Fish and Fishing Villages: Tonle Sap, Cambodia: 16. 
90 Csavas et al., Cambodia, rehabilitation and development needs of the fishery sector: 56. 
Informant 7; Informant 65; Informant 68; Informant 82. 
91 Cited in Thuok Nao, "Community Fish Refuge Husbandry in Lowland Agricultural Ecosystem: 
An Alternative Option for Increasing Fish Supply and Improving Economic Condition of Farmers in 
South-Eastern Region of Cambodia" (Build Bright University, 2009), 32. 
92 Cf. Informant 1; Informant 24; Informant 25-27; Informant 28; Informant 61; Informant 79. See, 
for example, Piseyrith Luy, "Family Fishing in Ralear Pa’ear District in Kampong Chhnang" (Royal 
Agriculture University, 1993); Sithirith Mak, "Cooperation in the Mekong River Basin: A 
Reflection of Cambodia Experiences in the Mekong Development" (paper presented at the The 
Regional Center for Sustainable Development Chiang Mai, 2005); Swift, Developing a Research 
Framework for the Fishing Lot System in Cambodia: Two Preliminary Case Studies on Fishing Lots 
in Takeo and Kompong Chhnang Provinces; Dara Yin et al., "Time Allocation of Fisher-Farmer 
Households in Phlong Village of Kampong Chhnang," in Cambodia Fisheries Technical Paper 
Series (Phnom Penh: IFReDI, 2001). 
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A review of work by Keang Seng shows that small-scale fishers used gears 
considered medium scales in both 2000 and 2006. According to the tables below, 
the use of gears that conform neither to communities’ internal rules nor to the 2011 
prakas, let alone the more restricted 1987 prakas on gear types and numbers. While 
family scale fishers use medium scale gears, medium scale fishers further upgrade 
their gears beyond what the law allows. For example, the use of arrow-shaped traps 
could be three or four times longer than the length allowed.93 An unpublished 
report shows that in Battambang there were 240 arrow-shaped traps with length 
between 500 and 1,500 meters illegally stationed within two CFi and Prek Toal 
areas in 2009. In Site 1, these gears increased from 24 in 2009 to 32 in 2010.94 
Table 5: Gear Lengths and Units Used in Different Regions95 
 Lower 
Mekong Upper Mekong Tonle Sap 
1987 Prakas on 
Gear Types 
(Medium Scale) 
Long Hook Line 600 (2000) 
235 (2000) 1,964 (2000) 5 hooks 
675 (2006) 445 (2006) 1,192 (2006) 
Gillnet 
746 (2000) 643 (2000) 1,064 (2000) > 10 meters 
768 (2006) 707 (2006) 914 (2006) 
Arrow-Shaped 
Fence Trap with 
Horizontal 
Cylinder Trap and 
Trap 
5 traps 




gear with length 









(2000) 1 unit (2000) 
(none) (Outlawed) 1 unit 
(2006) 
1 unit (2006) 









                                                          
93 Lamberts, Tonle Sap Fisheries: A Case Study on Floodplain Gillnet Fisheries in Siem Reap, 
Cambodia: 57; Mak, "The Tonle Sap and Its Fisheries Management: A Case in Cambodia," 11-12. 
94 Battambang Fisheries Cantonment, "Name List of Potential Perpetrators Using Bor in 
Battambang." Informant 25-27; Informant 29-43; Informant 45-59. All informants within this 
village complain of the use of ‘bor’. 
95 Data source: Adapted from Forestry and Fisheries Ministry of Agriculture, "Prakas on Fishing 
Gears Allowed to be Used for Exploitation in Freshwater and Marine Fishing Domain," (Phnom 
Penh: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 9 June, 1987); Keang Seng, Impact of 
Community Fisheries Management on Livelihood of Small-Scale Fishers in Cambodia  (Phnom 
Penh: IFReDI, 2006). 18-23. 
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Table 6: Selected Common Gears Used in Site 196 
Gear Name Used Size/Unit Internal Regulation Prakas on Gear Types 
Floating Gillnet 20-30m (length) 100m (length) 
50m (Closed) 
100m (Open) 
Hook Lines 1,000-1,500 1,000 
50 (Closed) 
100 (Open) 





Table 7: Selected Common Gears Used in Site 297 
Gear Name Used Size/Unit Internal Regulation Prakas on Gear Types 
Floating/Fixed Gillnet 300m (length) 150m (length) (As above) 
Hook Lines 1,000 
500 (Closed) 
1,000 (Open) (As above) 
Lon 50-100 50 (Closed) 
100 (Open) (As above) 
Table 8: Selected Common Gears Used in Site 498 
Gear Name Used Size/Unit Internal Regulation Prakas on Gear Types 





300 (Open) (As above) 
Lon 20-50 50 (As above) 
 
4.3.  Fishing Lots – A Pandora’s Box 
Lot regulation is not any better, though the levels of compliance vary. Lot 
regulation is lax and compliance is poor.99 Apart from catch under-reporting, the 
                                                          
96 Source: Informant 61. Site 1 Community Fisheries, "Internal Rules of Site 1 Community 
Fisheries," (2007). Fisheries Administration, "Prakas on Fishing Gears for Freshwater and Marine 
Fishing Domain in Kingdom of Cambodia," (Phnom Penh: Fisheries Administration, 11 April, 
2011). 
97 Source: Informant 71-78. Fisheries Administration, "Prakas on Fishing Gears for Freshwater and 
Marine Fishing Domain in Kingdom of Cambodia."; Site 2 Community Fisheries, "Internal Rules of 
Site 2 Community Fisheries," (2007).  
98 Source: Informant 86-88. Fisheries Administration, "Prakas on Fishing Gears for Freshwater and 
Marine Fishing Domain in Kingdom of Cambodia."; Site 4 Community Fisheries, "Internal Rules of 
Site 4 Community Fisheries," (2007). 
99 For example, Eric Baran, Teemu Jantunen, and Chiew Kieok Chong, Values of Inland Fisheries 
in the Mekong River Basin  (Phnom Penh: The WorldFish Center, 2007). 45; Dirk Lamberts, "The 
Unintended Role of the Local Private Sector in Biodiversity Conservation in the Tonle Sap 
Biosphere Reserve, Cambodia," Local Environment 3, no. 1 (February 2008): 50-51; Mak, 
"Vulnerability of Fisheries in Cambodia."; Mak and Grundy-Warr, "Changes in Fishing 
Technologies and the Politics of Environmental Transformation," 20; Sovathana Seng, Sokkhoeun 
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use of illegal gears and activities are common and widespread – existing ‘in almost 
all fishing lots.’100 Before the 2011 suspension, the situation had not seen any 
significant improvement. While a fisheries official complained that the gears used 
by concessionaires/operators are ‘not in compliance with the burden books,’ fishers 
complained that officials overlook ‘larger scale destructive fishing practices.’101 
Senior and junior fisheries officials and local authorities agreed that despite 
widespread illegal fishing within lots, punishment, warning and crackdowns are 
rare.102 One official described lot crackdowns as ‘a showcase game – with the 
burning and dismantling of materials that are unworthy and with lot having 
removed the more valuable materials or submerged them.’103 The 2011 Tonle Sap 
Authority’s (TSA) report and the subsequent large-scale crackdowns and the 
deputy-PM’s report unearthing massive illegal activities in research lots around the 
Tonle Sap Lake are the most recent evidence of concessionaires’ illegal 
activities.104 
Both prakas on gear types list barrage traps and dai (bag nets) as industrial fishing 
gears.105 These are used in this industrial-scale fishing. However, concessionaires 
and operators use other illegal gears and activities.106 Some figures may help. A 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Te, and Sithirith Mak, "Construction of Space for Small Fishermen in Tonle Sap: Building the 
Fisherman Organization," (Phnom Penh: Fisheries Action Coalition Team, 2006), 1; Sten Sverdrup-
Jensen, Fisheries in the Lower Mekong Basin: Status and Perspectives, vol. 6 (Phnom Penh: 
Mekong River Commission, 2002). 18. 
100 Degen and Nao, "Inland Fishery Management in Cambodia: Is the Fishing Lot System the Basis 
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Conflict Management: A Case Study in Cambodia," 10; Mak, Vann, and Te, "Communication 
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Poor Fishers: 12. Informant 16, 17th May, 2011; Informant 68. 
101 Informant 1; Informant 21, 20th June, 2011; Informant 65. Wildlife Conservation Society and 
Administration, "Comparson between Outcomes under the Proposed Prek Toal Sanctuary and 
Alternative Management Regime," 111.  
102 Informant 65; Informant 66; Informant 67; Informant 79; Informant 89. 
103 Informant 65. CFCs and fishers know that illegal fishing exist in lots, but many mistakenly 
believed that they have no rights to complain as ‘it is within the lots, it is their land and they have 
the rights to do whatever they want.’ Informant 28; Informant 29-43; Informant 86-88. 
104 Bin, "Report on the Result from Implementing Decision 39 SSR Dating 01 July 2011 of the 
Royal Government of Cambodia on the Establishment of Commission to Inspect Development Lot 
around the Tonle Sap Lake."; Tonle Sap Authority, "Request for Strict and Effective Measures to 
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for Exploitation in Freshwater and Marine Fishing Domain." 
106 Gum, Inland Acquatic Resources and Livelihoods in Cambodia: A Guide to the Literature, 
Legislation, Institutional Framework and Recommendations 23-28; Ly, Yin, and Degen, 
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survey of 30 lots across 7 provinces in 1999 reports that 27% of lots used pumping; 
40% electro-fishing; 70% multiple sweeping, and 73% brush parks.107 The peak 
year of illegal fishing was probably 2001 when almost all lots adopted ‘total 
harvest mentality’ before the handover.108 
The field interviews and the deputy PM’s report suggest that these activities were 
still widespread before 2011.109 Some fisheries officials added two more problems: 
many legal gears not being placed as stipulated in the ‘burden books’ and major 
lifting of the gears without notifying them as decreed.110 The deputy PM’s report 
lists the following illegal gears and activities as commonly used by the ‘35 research 
lots’ investigated: gears disproportionate with the legal stipulation; poisoning 
outside lots to force fish into the lot areas; multiple trawling of riverbed or multiple 
sales of fishing rights afterwards; bamboo fencing and traps (preus) at the edge of 
the lot boundaries to catch fish from outside; forest clearance; major fish collection 
two-three times per season; bamboo spacing of 0.8-2 centimeters; (double) fine-
meshed fencing of the lots; fine-meshed net gears of between 0.8-2.5 centimeters; 
bag nets with 1.5cm nets extending 2-3 kilometers with multiple traps (lok); canal 
building and pumping followed by electro-fishing; flying trawling; gill nets of 0.5-
                                                                                                                                                                 
"Management Aspects of Cambodia’s Freshwater Capture Fisheries," 94; Mak, "The Tonle Sap and 
Its Fisheries Management: A Case in Cambodia," 10-11; Mak and Grundy-Warr, "Changes in 
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Te, "Communication Strategies for Fisheries Conflict Management: A Case Study in Cambodia," 
25; McKenny and Prom, Natural Resources and Rural Livelihoods in Cambodia: A Baseline 
Assessment: 60; NGO Forum on Cambodia, "Fishing Conflict in Kompong Chhnang," 13; Swift, 
Developing a Research Framework for the Fishing Lot System in Cambodia: Two Preliminary Case 
Studies on Fishing Lots in Takeo and Kompong Chhnang Provinces; Touch and Bruce, The Inland 
and Marine Fisheries Trade in Cambodia: 33 and 137; Nicolaas van Zalinge and Thuok Nao, 
"Summary of Project Findings: Present Status of Cambodia's Freshwater Capture Fisheries and 
Management Implications," in Present Status of Cambodia’s Freshwater Capture Fisheries and 
Management Implications: Nine Presentations Given at the Annual Meeting at the Department of 
Fisheries, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 19-21 January, 1999, ed. Nicolaas Van 
Zalinge, Thuok Nao, and Leoung Deap (Phnom Penh: Mekong River Commission and Department 
of Fisheries, 1999), 14. Informant 84-85, 30th July, 2011; Informant 86-88. 
107 Cited in Ly, Yin, and Degen, "Management Aspects of Cambodia’s Freshwater Capture 
Fisheries," 97. The survey by Acker in 1999 sees 19% of operators used water pumping, 9% 
excessive size nets, 12% fine-meshed nets, 14% brush parks, 13% electro-fishing and 9% trawling 
the riverbeds more than once. Cited in Fisheries Action Coalition Team and Environmental Justice 
Foundation, Feast or Famine? Solutions to Cambodia's Fisheries Conflicts: 21. 
108 Patrick, Melissa, and Puadyal, Flood Forest, Fish and Fishing Villages: Tonle Sap, Cambodia: 
16; van Acker, Cambodia's Commons: Changing Governance, Shifting Entitlements?: 18. 
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Informant 79; Informant 80; Informant 86-88; Informant 92. 
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2.5cm and brush parks. His report is supported by various specific case studies and 
the field interviews.111 
The resistance to the 2001 reforms, expansion of lot boundaries into the public 
access areas and more recently into nearby communities and payment to CFCs to 
fish within CFi areas, expropriation of areas set aside for fishers and prohibition of 
fishers to access the lot areas during the closed season are other serious violations 
and evidence of limited regulation capacity.112 These illegal expansions had 
persisted until 2011.113 Besides, informal sub-leasing does not conform to laws; 
that is, concessionaires exploited the fishing industry ‘beyond rules, regulations and 
other conditions being documented in the burden book[s].’114 The actual sub-
leasing, as discussed later, was a mess. The most severe violations of the law 
occurred in 2010 and 2011 when sub-leasing was strictly prohibited, yet informal 
sub-leasing took place in both years.115 
                                                          
111 Bin, "Report on the Result from Implementing Decision 39 SSR Dating 01 July 2011 of the 
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Provinces: 13-14. Informant 16; Informant 17, 17th May, 2011; Informant 21; Informant 25-27; 
Informant 28; Informant 86-88. 
112 Degen and Nao, "Inland Fishery Management in Cambodia: Is the Fishing Lot System the Basis 
for Improved Management or Should It Be Abolished?," 10; Gum, Inland Acquatic Resources and 
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Recommendations 24-28; Keang et al., "Conflicts Arising from Re-Allocation of Fishing Lots: 
Perceptions from Community Fisheries in Cambodia," 10; Lamberts, "The Unintended Role of the 
Local Private Sector in Biodiversity Conservation in the Tonle Sap Biosphere Reserve, Cambodia," 
50; Ly, Yin, and Degen, "Management Aspects of Cambodia’s Freshwater Capture Fisheries," 95; 
Oxfam Great Britain, Evaluation of the Impact of the Fisheries Reform in Cambodia on the 
Livelihoods of Poor Fishers: 12; Swift, Developing a Research Framework for the Fishing Lot 
System in Cambodia: Two Preliminary Case Studies on Fishing Lots in Takeo and Kompong 
Chhnang Provinces: 61; Touch and Bruce, The Inland and Marine Fisheries Trade in Cambodia: 
34. Informant 71-78; Informant 80; Informant 86-88. For selected case studies, see for example, 
Gum, Inland Acquatic Resources and Livelihoods in Cambodia: A Guide to the Literature, 
Legislation, Institutional Framework and Recommendations 24-26; NGO Forum on Cambodia, 
"Fishing Conflict in Kompong Chhnang." 
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around the Tonle Sap Lake."; Patrick, Melissa, and Puadyal, Flood Forest, Fish and Fishing 
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114 Mak, "The Tonle Sap and Its Fisheries Management: A Case in Cambodia," 7-10; Neou et al., 
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Economic Evaluation of Wetland Resources in Cambodia," 70-71; Thay, Sim, and So, "Fisheries 
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Battambang 9 82 9 64 7 
Banteay Meanchey 4 34 8 21 5 
Kampong Chhnang 6 51 8 128 21 
Pursat 4 42 10 204 51 
 
That lots were associated with private enforcement, human rights abuses and 
conflicts is another testimony to poor regulation.117 As Table 9 shows, the numbers 
of military guards and weapons per lot were considerable. Furthermore, some 
civilian concessionaires were reported to hold several guns.118 Concessionaires still 
hired armed men to guard their lots recently. Lot 2 in Battambang and 7 in Siem 
Reap in 2008 had 15 and more than 20 armed guards, respectively. A few nearby 
lots to Site 3 were protected by armed men in 2011.119 
Finally, Fritz suggests that to measure ‘control capacity’ one should look at high 
profile corruption prosecution of officials involved120 and by extension here 
prosecution of social actors committing wrong doing. Anecdotal evidence suggests 
that prosecution of officials involved in corruption in the sub-sectors is rare. In 
addition, some authors bemoaned the lack of prosecution of concessionaires, 
operators and armed guards who committed flagrant human rights violation and 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Agreement and Payment of Fishing Fee," (Phnom Penh: Royal Government of Cambodia, 25 
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116 Source: Saroeun as cited in Fisheries Action Coalition Team and Environmental Justice 
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117 Cf. Fisheries Action Coalition Team and Environmental Justice Foundation, Feast or Famine? 
Solutions to Cambodia's Fisheries Conflicts: 24; Gum, Inland Acquatic Resources and Livelihoods 
in Cambodia: A Guide to the Literature, Legislation, Institutional Framework and 
Recommendations 17-18; Sithirith Mak, "Fishing for Lives: Conflicts and Struggles between 
Communities and Fishing Lots in Kompong Chhnang Province," (Phnom Penh: NGO Forum on 
Cambodia, 2000). 
118 Gum, Inland Acquatic Resources and Livelihoods in Cambodia: A Guide to the Literature, 
Legislation, Institutional Framework and Recommendations 25-26; Mak, "Fishing for Lives: 
Conflicts and Struggles between Communities and Fishing Lots in Kompong Chhnang Province," 
15. 
119 Aipira, "Against All Odds: Construction of Livelihoods in the Absence of Rights to Nature in 
Cambodia," 35-37; Nicolaas van Zalinge and Rath Troeung, "Organization of Fishing Operations in 
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illegal activities.121 A sangkat, cantonment and commune leader in Province A 
responded that they had never seen concessionaires sent to court, though there were 
occasions when they were fined or warned of misconducts.122 The 2001 and 2011 
reforms prove that many (if not all) concessionaires/operators and officials had 
committed illegal activities, yet post-reform prosecution are never heard of, 
although some fisheries officials were ‘transferred’ and fishing rights to certain lots 
terminated. In short, the state regulation capacity of the fishing industry is limited. 
5. Extraction Capacity 
“[T]he growth of the very first modern states in Europe included building a triad of 
essential state tentacles – a standing army, a vastly improved tax-collecting 
mechanism, and an expanded set of judicial courts.”123 However, clientistic/fusion 
states like Cambodia are not willing to raise revenues as rulers need to keep 
patronage system in place, while many bureaucrats also see few reasons to improve 
the state extraction capacity.124 
5.1. State Revenue Collection 
This section looks into GDP trends, revenue/GDP, tax/GDP, corruption perception 
and the formality of the economy as indicators for extraction capacity. As seen in 
Table 10, Cambodia has achieved tremendous economic growth, as seen in the 
steady GDP growth rates and in real terms, especially since 1999. The nominal tax 
and revenue increased ten-fold between 1995 and 2008. The percentage of tax and 
revenue to GDP experienced positive trends, too. These indicate that the state’s 
extraction capacity has increased. 
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Table 10: Selected Macro-Economic Indicators125  
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008e 
GDP  
(Million Dollar) 3,420 3,481 3,387 3,105 3,515 3,649 3,984 4,280 4,663 5,339 6,293 7,275 8,613 10,495 
GDP  
Growth Rate 
6.7 5.0 6.8 3.7 10.8 8.8 8.1 6.6 8.5 10.3 13.3 10.8 10.2 7.0 
Tax* 445 534 597 679 948 1,040 1,131 1,269 1,267 1656 1,990 2,392 3,584 4,463 
Domestic  
Revenue* 
643 749 881 942 1,316 1,423 1,564 1,786 1,821 2,220 2,719 3,394 4,235 5,362 
Tax  
(% of GDP) (n.a.) 6.4 6.5 6.4 8.3 7.4 7.2 7.6 6.8 7.7 7.7 8.0 10.2 10.4 
Revenue  
(% of GDP) 8.5 9.0 9.6 8.9 11.5 10.1 10.0 10.6 9.8 10.4 10.6 11.4 12.1 12.5 
Fisheries  
Revenue* 
(n.a) 7.1 7.4 8.2 9.2 9.9 5.8 8.8 5.8 7.0 7.4 7.0 7.1 8.8 
(*in billion riels) 
Nevertheless, many underlying systemic problems exist. The RGC explicitly 
admits that the financial management system is very weak. On many occasions, the 
PM publicly acknowledges this, complaining about substantial loss from taxation, 
inefficient tax and revenue collection, massive illegal smuggling and lack of ‘tax 
culture’126 A WB review estimates that in 1996-97, 5-6% of GDP was lost to illegal 
activities and tax exemption, while a speculation puts the tax loss of $400 million 
per annum to tax evasion.127 Many reports by the ADB criticize the state’s weak 
revenue raising capacity and ranked it one of the lowest in the region. Between 
1992 and 2004, Cambodia’s revenue and tax ratio to GDP was about half of the 
average for low-income countries. The ADB reports also lament the ‘limited 
capacity in tax and customs administration’ and poor public financial management 
(PFM) capacity.128 Other reports underline the widespread corruption in public 
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2005-2009: Kingdom of Cambodia  (Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2005). 5-6; Kato et al., 
72 
 
agencies, prevalent tax evasion and capture of state resources by political and 
military elites. Moreover, off-budget revenue is leaked to private individuals due to 
opaque dealings with private individuals by state agencies without transferring the 
fund to the treasury.129 There is both ‘living corruption’ and ‘clandestine’ 
corruption.130 Both Transparency International’s (TI) ranking of Corruption 
Perception Index for 2005-09 and Kaufmann and others’ Governance Indicators for 
control of corruption for 1996-2008 rank Cambodia better than Burma, and 
sometimes Laos amongst the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
members.131 This confirms that the extraction capacity is limited. 
Table 11: Kaufmann's Indictors for Corruption Control 
Country 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 20007 2008 
Brunei 0.37 0.43 0.33 0.33 0.29 0.40 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.51 
Cambodia -1.17 -1.11 -0.93 -0.98 -0.93 -1.05 -1.18 -1.21 -1.11 -1.14 
Indonesia -0.51 -1.16 -0.98 -1.13 -0.97 -0.91 -0.87 -0.77 -0.69 -0.64 
Laos -1.18 -0.69 -0.92 -0.92 -1.01 -1.10 -1.16 -1.12 -1.04 -1.23 
Malaysia 0.54 0.61 0.40 0.36 0.32 0.42 0.32 0.36 0.23 0.14 
Myanmar -1.23 -1.37 -1.39 -1.36 -1.38 -1.69 -1.62 -1.72 -1.47 -1.69 
Philippines -0.31 -0.37 -0.55 -0.52 -0. -0.62 -0.64 -0.79 -0.79 -0.75 
Singapore 2.23 2.19 2.18 2.37 2.31 2.31 2.17 2.19 2.22 2.34 
Thailand -0.34 0.02 -0.19 -0.33 -0.26 -0.21 -0.13 -0.24 -0.41 -0.38 
Timor-Leste    -0.53 -0.52 -0.53 -0.79 -0. -0.93 -0.89 
Vietnam -0.55 -0.68 -0.77 -0.70 -0.62 -0.80 -0.80 -0.76 -0.68 -0.76 
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130 See for example, ———, Country Assistance Strategy of the World Bank Group for the 
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The informality of the economy is another challenge to extraction. The PM notes 
that not all taxable enterprises are registered and that there is collusion in tax 
collection.132 Therefore, formal sector of the economy is very small and many 
enterprises opt out of the formal sector. Fritz suggests that a shadow economy of 
15% of GDP represents dysfunctional extraction capacity. Against this, the 
Cambodian state is far from functional as the informal economy accounts for up to 
80% of the GDP.133 As of 2002, 9,265 enterprises registered with the Ministry of 
Commerce, while more than 90% were in the informal sector. The picture seven 
years later is strikingly similar. A survey in 2009 indicates that only 9,024 or 2.4% 
of the establishments were registered, leaving the rest in the informal sector.  The 
informal/estimated tax regime leaves the discretion to tax collectors, who negotiate 
the taxable amount with enterprises, leading to the loss of state revenue and 
corruption.134 
5.2. Extraction Capacity in the Fisheries Subsector 
The fisheries subsector situation is likewise not rosy. In the 1990’s and 2000’s, its 
contribution to GDPs was between 8-10% and 8-12%, respectively. An RGC’s 
report puts its contribution of $426 million to the economy in 2005.135 In the 
1990’s, the farm-gate value was estimated at $150-250 million, and the revised 
estimate for 2000’s was $200-300 million with the retailed value of $500 
million.136 
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Statistics, Ministry of Planning, 2009). Table1-4; Schneider, Ka, and Roy, Private Sector 
Assessment for the Kingdom of Cambodia: 34-35. 
135 Cambodia National Mekong Committee, Integrated Water Resources Management in 
Cambodia: National Sector Review: 50; Fisheries Administration, The Strategic Planning 
Framework for Fisheries: 2010-2019, 2: 17; Gum, Inland Acquatic Resources and Livelihoods in 
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Yet, the state’s capacity to capture appropriate rent has always been a challenge.137 
The figures calculated below can be under-estimates because the actual catches are 
believed to be higher and the mean values at the landing sites can be higher. The 
calculations are mainly to illustrate the meager rent extracted by the state from the 
fisheries subsector. While the annual fish catch is valued at $200 million (or more), 
the state extracts on average less than $2 million in tax and non-tax revenues per 
annum (of which roughly 2/3 is from fishing lots138 and medium-scale fishing 
fees). While fishing lots (and before 2001, medium-scale fishers) could make on 
average $50-60 million per annum from fishing, the state manages to extract a little 
over a million dollars in leasing fees (including a 5% tax on the lease fees) from the 
fishing industry. Taking the catch under-reporting into account, the takings were 
certainly much more than $50-60 million per annum. In 2001, Degen and others, 
for example, estimated the commercial value at $110.3 million with a total value of 
$276 million. The Cambodia’s National Mekong Committee (CNMC) in 1998 puts 
the landed value from commercial and middle-scale fishing from the Tonle Sap 
Lake alone at between $62-80 million.139 
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Table 12: Inland Freshwater Fish Values and Revenues from Fisheries140 
















1994 65,000 88.5 65,000 88.5 
1995 72,500 95 72,500 95 
1996 63,510 85 2.7*** 63,510 85 
1997 73,000 90 2.5*** 73,000 90 
1998 75,700 94.5 2.2*** 75,700 94.5 
1999 231,000* 115.5 2.4*** 71,000 35.5** 
2000 245,600* 123 2.6*** 84,940 42.5** 
2001 385,000* 192.5 2.3 135,000 67.5** 
2002 360,300* 180 2.6 110,000 55** 
2003 308,750* 154.5 1.7 94,750 47.5** 
2004 250,000* 125 1.8 68,100 34** 
2005 324,000* 162 1.9 94,500 47** 
2006 422,000* 211 1.8  
(n.a.) 2007 395,000* 197.5 1.8 
2008 365,000* 182.5 1.7 115,000 57.5** 
2009 390,000* 195 1.7 120,000 60** 
2010 405,000* 202.5 (n.a.) 125,000 62.5** 
(NB: *Total production, including rice-field fisheries, small-scale, medium and large-scale fisheries. 
Before 1999 the first two categories were not included; **Researcher’s calculation based on the 
suggested price of $0.50/kg; ***Researcher’s calculation based on figures from Ministry of 
                                                                                                                                                                 
McKenny and Prom, Natural Resources and Rural Livelihoods in Cambodia: A Baseline 
Assessment: 55; Nao, "Community Fish Refuge Husbandry in Lowland Agricultural Ecosystem: An 
Alternative Option for Increasing Fish Supply and Improving Economic Condition of Farmers in 
South-Eastern Region of Cambodia," 2-3; Thay, Sim, and So, "Fisheries Policy Reform and Legal 
Framework for Community Fisheries," 98-99; Nicolaas van Zalinge, Thuok Nao, and Nuov Sam, 
"Status of the Cambodian inland capture fisheries sector with special reference to the Tonle Sap 
Great Lake," in Cambodia Fisheries Technical Paper Series, ed. Nicolaas Van Zalinge, et al. 
(Phnom Penh: Inland Fisheries Research and Development Institute of Cambodia, 2001), 4; 
Andreas Zurbrugg, "Where There Is Water, There Is Fish: An Analysis and Critical Assessment of 
Cambodia's Tonle Sap Fisheries" (Univ. of New South Wales, 2004), 15. 
140 Data Source: Forestry and Fisheries Ministry of Agriculture, "Inland Capture,"  
http://www.stats.maff.gov.kh/en/index.php?page=stat&mode=inlandcapture&option=com_content
&Itemid=94; Department of Fisheries, "Annual Report for Fishing Season 1999-2000," (Phnom 
Penh: Department of Fisheries, 1999); Fisheries Administration, "Table of Commercial Fish Catch 
2009-2010," (Phnom Penh: Fisheries Administration); ———, "Table of Commercial Fish Catch 
2008-09," (Phnom Penh: Fisheries Administration); ———, The Strategic Planning Framework for 
Fisheries: 2010-2019, 2; Department of Fisheries, "Meeting Minutes for Fisheries Activities for 
Fishing Season 1998-99," (Phnom Penh: Department of Fisheries, 1999); Ministry of Economy and 
Finance, "Main Economic Indicators (2009)."; Srun et al., "The Unsustainable Exploitation of 
Inland Fisheries Resources in Cambodia."; Tep et al., Asserting Rights, Defining Responsibilities: 




Economy and Finance, “Main Economic Indicators (2009)” and annual mean riel-dollar exchange 
rates from the National Bank of Cambodia as given by Informant 94. Calculation adapted from Srun 
et al., "The Unsustainable Exploitation of Inland Fisheries Resources in Cambodia.") 
5.3. Lot Concessionaires’ Benefits 
Another good indication of extraction capacity is the extent of benefits accrued to 
concessionaires. Concessionaries usually complain that lot operation is not 
profitable.141 As seen in Table 13, numerous compulsory research studies on 
‘research lots’ support this claim. Some studies and informants, on the contrary, 
believe that lot operation is lucrative.142 While the operation of small lots may not 
be cost-effective, bigger lots have gained tremendously from this business. Even a 
small lot concessionaire (whose lot fee is $11,000) reported that he and two 
shareholders usually made $15,000 per annum from the operation. A fisheries 
official believed that the profit could actually be a few times higher.143 
Table 13: Profits from Lot Operations for Selected Research Lots Based on 
DoF Research144 
Lot Number Year Profit (In Riels) Lot Fee (In Riels) 
 
Tonle Sap Fishing Unit 2 
1994 24,049,761 45,500,000 
1995 23,134,500 40,350,000 
1999 18,238,800 80,500,000 
 
Lot 2 (Battambang) 
1998 -402,566,130 180,000,000 
1999 543,577,400* 180,000, 000 
2006 111,500,000 226,000,000 
                                                          
141 Gum, Inland Acquatic Resources and Livelihoods in Cambodia: A Guide to the Literature, 
Legislation, Institutional Framework and Recommendations 23. Informant 82. 
142 Mak, "Fishing for Lives: Conflicts and Struggles between Communities and Fishing Lots in 
Kompong Chhnang Province," 9; van Acker, "Don't Trust Fish When They Are in Water: 
Cambodia's Inland Fisheries in Transition," 14-18. Informant 13; Informant 65; Informant 89. 
143 Informant 68; Informant 82; Informant 89. 
144 Data sources: Hang Tong Chhun, Tang Ly  Chroeung, and Bun Thai Hoeum, "Research Study on 
Tonle Sap Lake Unit: Barrage Lot 2 for Fishing Season 1994-95," (Phnom Penh: Department of 
Fisheries, 1995); Pech Chin et al., "Research on Lot 6 in Kampong Thom for Fishing Season 1997-
98," (Phnom Penh: Department of Fisheries, 1998); Leoung Deap, Saveng Pen, and Tuo Chhin, 
"Research Study on Tonle Sap Lake Unit: Barrage Lot 2 for Fishing Season 1993-94," (Phnom 
Penh: Department of Fisheries 1994); Vuthy Huot and Y Len Kak, "Research Study on Tonle Sap 
Lake Unit: Barrage Lot 2 for Fishing Season 1998-99," (Phnom Penh: Department of Fisheries, 
1999); Sok Sopheak Mith, Phon Duk, and Chuob Sophal Ra, "Research on Lot 2 in Battambang for 
Fishing Season 1997-98," (Phnom Penh: Department of Fisheries, 1998); Sok Sopheak Mith et al., 
"Research on Lot 2 in Battambang for Fishing Season 1998-99," (Phnom Penh: Department of 
Fisheries, 1999); Phok Noy and Sok Huor Lim, "Research on Lot 12 in Kandal for Fishing Season 
1999-2000," (Phnom Penh Department of Fisheries, 2000); Kong Som and Thea Seng, "Research on 
Lot 2 in Battambang for Fishing Season 2005-2006," (Phnom Penh: Department of Fisheries, 2006); 
Borin Suos, Kunthea Oeung, and Sopheak Srey, "Research on Lot 7 in Siem Reap for Fishing 
Season 1997-98," (Phnom Penh: Department of Fisheries, 1998); Sokhem Vong, "Research on Lot 5 
in Takeo for Fishing Season 2009-10," (Phnom Penh: Department of Fisheries, 2010). 
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Lot 6 (Kampong Thom) 1998 6,708,350 335,000,000 
Lot 7 (Siem Reap) 1998 103,540,000 235,000,000 
Lot 12 (Kandal) 2000 -21,977,000 52,000,000 
Lot 5 (Takeo) 2010 31,589,100 28,000,000 
(NB: *Reporting as 141,451,270 riels due to subtraction of 1998 loss) 
Existing studies substantiate the disproportionate benefits to concessionaires and 
hence confirm poor state extraction capacity. Firstly, a study in 2001 on five lots 
show that the benefit from just renting lot sections alone was between 3 and 7 times 
the auction fees. Lot 12 in Kandal in 2000 as reported above lost almost $55,000. 
However, Olesen reports that in 2000 by sub-leasing alone this lot earned 3.5 times 
($43,000) the fee it paid to DoF.145 Another study on lot operations and subleasing 
during 1998-2004 of four lots in Takeo attests to the lucrativeness. Lots 1 and 3 
earned just half the lot fee due to reportedly massive spending on facilitation fees 
(twice the profit at roughly $10,000); the concessionaires of Lots 2 and 5, on the 
other hand, earned three times the lot fees (55,000,000 riels for Lot 2 and on 
average 115,000,000 riels for Lot 5).146 Thirdly, a study of Fishing Lots 14 and 18 
in Prey Veng for fishing season 2001-02 shows that irrespective of the investment 
on gears, the lots earned 7.5 ($54,590 in revenues vs. $7,436 in fees) and 3 times 
($98,150 in revenues vs. $33,846 in fees), respectively, the fees they paid to 
DoF.147 Finally, a more systematic cost-benefit analysis of Lot 2 in Kampong 
Chhnang reveals that this lot earned six times the lot fee (earning 99,877,667 riels, 
excluding alleged pay of 20,000,000 riels to the Khmer Rouge and 2,000,000 riels 
to the military).148 
                                                          
145 Olesen as cited in Fisheries Action Coalition Team and Environmental Justice Foundation, Feast 
or Famine? Solutions to Cambodia's Fisheries Conflicts: 6. A study by Peter Swift of Lot 19 in 
Takeo also shows that by simply partitioning this lot for sub-lease alone, the concessionaire could 
earn more than one time the amount he paid to the government. Swift, Developing a Research 
Framework for the Fishing Lot System in Cambodia: Two Preliminary Case Studies on Fishing Lots 
in Takeo and Kompong Chhnang Provinces: 18-19.  
146 Ana Norman-Lopez, "Effect of the Reform of Fishing Lots in the Year 2000 to the Commercial 
Fisheries and Family Scale Fisheries in the Province of Takeo" (University of Portsmouth, 2004). 
147 Department of Fisheries, "Table of Lot Revenues for Fishing Season 2001-2002," (Phnom Penh); 
Roth Troeung et al., "A Comparison of Fish Yields and Species Composition between One Fishing 
Lot in Battambang province and Two Fishing Lots in Prey Veng Province" (paper presented at the 
5th Technical Symposium on Mekong Fisheries, Phnom Penh, 2003). The riel-dollar exchange is 
calculated based on National Bank of Cambodia, Annual Report 2001  (Phnom Penh: National Bank 
of Cambodia, 2001). 




Lot 2 in Battambang is the outstanding example of poor rent extraction. Unlike the 
research by DoF staff above which reports huge loss or insignificant gains, other 
studies point to the windfall benefits. According to a study based on data provided 
by the concessionaires, the average annual value for black fish alone for 1994-2000 
was $524,182. While the DoF’s study records huge loss for 1998 and puts the total 
income at $252,713, according to this study, the sale of black fish alone was 
$594,717,149 not to mention hundreds of thousands of dollars from sales of white 
fish. Another study in 2001-02 puts the landed value from this lot at $1,771,108.150 
A calculation of catch by barrages alone in this lot for 2007-08 fishing season puts 
the landed values at $464,500. Besides, in the other research based on interviews 
with the sub-leasees and concessionaires in the same year reveals that the 
concessionaires could earn between $942,000-1,024,000 from sub-leasing five big 
lakes and 7 streams. This practice of sub-leasing at exorbitant prices had been a 
practice for decades.151 In 2010, the Wildlife Conservation Society and FiA 
conducted a systematic study of fish catch in this lot. The annual fish catch was 
estimated $3.2 million per season, and this estimate is still considered 
‘conservative’.152 Judging against the average fee of $50,000 (plus $3,000-4,000 
for ‘research’ and rehabilitation), the state received too little a share, while the two 
concessionaires who had held fishing rights to this lot since 1997 had benefited 
tremendously from this lot.153 Degen and Nao rightly note that even after some 
                                                          
149 Cited in Sophie Allebone-Webb et al., "The Value of Commercial Fisheries," in Integration of 
Commercial and Conservation Objectives in Prek Toal, Tonle Sap and Battambang Fishing Lot #2 
(Phase 1: Understanding Current Management Systems and Recommendations for Reforms, ed. 
Tom Clements and Sophie Allebone-Webb (Phnom Penh: Wildlife Conservation Society and 
Fisheries Administration, 2010).The lot concessionaire admitted that he did sell some sections of the 
lots, but did not specify the amount collected. Chea Phal, "Clarification on Fishing Lot 2 in Koh 
Chiveang Commune, Ek Phnom District, Battambang Province," (January 1998). 
150 Troeung et al., "A Comparison of Fish Yields and Species Composition between One Fishing 
Lot in Battambang province and Two Fishing Lots in Prey Veng Province." The riel-dollar 
exchange is calculated based on National Bank of Cambodia, Annual Report 2001. 
151 Allebone-Webb et al., "The Value of Commercial Fisheries."; National Bank of Cambodia, 
Annual Report 2008  (Phnom Penh: National Bank of Cambodia, 2008). Researcher’s calculations 
based on the prices for each species suggested in the study and by Informant 93, 26th September, 
2011. According to Informant 93, the price of kranh and kanthor was 2,000 riels per kilogram, while 
the price of andeng was 6,000 riel per kilogram in 2007-8. Carl Middleton, Sodary Chap, and Sarom 
Leng, "Resettlement of Peam Psot Village, Ta Pon Commune, Sangke District, Battambang 
Province," (Phnom Penh: Fisheries Action Coalition Team, 2005); van Zalinge and Troeung, 
"Organization of Fishing Operations in Lot 2 Battambang and Proposed Sampling Plan to Assess Its 
Fish Catch." 
152 Allebone-Webb et al., "The Value of Commercial Fisheries," 46. 
153 Department of Fisheries, "Table of Research Lot Fees for 1999-2001 and 2001-2003," (Phnom 
Penh: Department of Fisheries); Ministry of Agriculture, "Decision on Granting of Fisheries 
Exploitation Rights for 2009-2011."; Forestry and Fisheries Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of 
Economy and Finance, "Joint Decision on Fixation of Research and Development Lot Fees for 
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years of investment on necessary infrastructure, the benefits accrued to the 
concessionaires are ‘generally far greater’ and that ‘the major fisheries remain too 
profitable for scientific monitoring to be allowed by [concessionaires]’.154 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Kandal, Kampong Cham, Prey Veng, Kampong Chhnang, Battambang, Siem Reap, Kampong 
Thom, and DoF’s Fishing Units for Fishing Seasons 1997-1998 and 1998-1999," (Phnom Penh: 
Ministry of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries and Ministry of Economy and Finance, 26 
November, 1997); Ministry of Economy and Finance and Ministry of Agriculture Forestry and 
Fisheries, "Joint Decision on Fixation of Research and Development Lot Fees for Kandal, Prey 
Veng, Kampong Cham, Kampong Thom, Kampong Chhnang,Takeo, Siem Reap, Pursat, Banteay 
Meanchey, and IFReDI for Fishing Season 2009-2010 and 2010-2011."; ———, "Joint Decision on 
Fixation of Research and Development Lot Fees for Kandal, Prey Veng, Kampong Cham, Kampong 
Thom, Siem Reap, Battambang, Pursat, and Kampong Chhnang for Fishing Seasons 2003-2007 and 
2003-2009."; ———, "Joint Decision on Fixation of Research and Development Lot Fees for 
Kandal, Prey Veng, Kampong Cham, Kampong Thom, Takeo, and Banteay Meanchey for Fishing 
Seasons 2006-2007 and 2007-2008."; ———, "Joint Decision on Fixation of Research and 
Development Lot Fees for Kandal, Prey Veng, Kampong Cham, Kampong Thom, Siem Reap, 
Battambang, Pursat, and Kampong Chhnang for Fishing Seasons 2005-2007 and 2005-2009."; ——
—, "Joint Decision on Fixation of Research Lot Fees after Fisheries Reform," (Phnom Penh: 
Ministry of Economy and Finance and Ministry of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries, 2001); Mith, 
Duk, and Ra, "Research on Lot 2 in Battambang for Fishing Season 1997-98."; Mith et al., 
"Research on Lot 2 in Battambang for Fishing Season 1998-99."; Som and Seng, "Research on Lot 
2 in Battambang for Fishing Season 2005-2006."  
154 Cited in Baran, Jantunen, and Chong, Values of Inland Fisheries in the Mekong River Basin: 45; 
Wildlife Conservation Society and Administration, "Comparson between Outcomes under the 
Proposed Prek Toal Sanctuary and Alternative Management Regime," 105. 
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Chapter 5: Measuring Cambodian State Capacity (2) 
‘Policy capacity’ is crucial for economic development and success of the state. This 
no doubt applies to legislation production and execution. Jeffrey Sachs and Deng 
and others argue that policy capacity is necessary for any interventions to have 
positive impacts.1 Furthermore, the state needs to ensure a business-friendly 
environment and assist and work in partnership with the private sector and 
communities to effect efficacy and development. This chapter therefore discusses 
Cambodian state capacity to produce policies and legislation, viz, its evolution, 
pertinent issues and challenges in their production and their implementation. As for 
midwifery and husbandry, it discusses political stability, assistance and facilitation 
provided to private sector and rural communities, including concessionaires and 
CFCs, and ‘lot research’ and development activities carried out by concessionaires. 
1. Legislation and Policy Capacity 
1.1. Evolution of Policy and Legislation Capacity 
Many laws and policies from the previous regimes were destroyed during the DK. 
In addition, the few and mainly sketchy socialist-oriented laws from the 1980’s 
needed modification after 1993 to suit the new political and economic regime.2 
Thus there has been an urgent need for legislation and policy capacity. 
The post-conflict policy capacity can be divided into three phases. The first saw 
policies devised mainly by donors. This started with the “Interim Strategy” devised 
by donors in 1992 for the ‘reconstruction and development’ of Cambodia. Next 
came the more detailed but not-all-inclusive National Programme to Rehabilitate 
                                                          
1 Cf. Matthew Clarke, "Poverty: Concepts, Measures, Trends and Responses," in International 
Development: Issues and Challenges, ed. Mark McGillivray, et al. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2008), 173-74; Deng et al., Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa: 124-25; 
Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with 
Democracy, 10; Kerkvliet, "Land Regimes and State Strengths and Weaknesses in the Philippines 
and Vietnam," 161-62; Leftwich, "States of Underdevelopment: The Third World State in 
Theoretical Perspective," 58; Smith, "State-Building," Chapter 12. For a difference between 
legislation and a policy, see for example, Robert B. Oberndorf, "Overview of the Policy and Legal 
Framework Related to CBNRM," in The Development of CBNRM in Cambodia, ed. Serey Rotha 
Ken, et al. (Phnom Penh: CBNRM Learning Institute, 2005), 59-61. 
2 See for example, Porn Moniroth Aun, Democracy in Cambodia: Theories and Realities  (Phnom 
Penh: Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace, 1995). 38-39; Cambodia New Vision, "New 
Criminal Procedure Code, End of 1992 UNTAC Law," Cambodia New Vision August 2007, 6; ——
—, "Launching of Civil Code and Civil Procedure Code," Cambodia New Vision July-August 2008, 
1; World Bank, Country Assistance Strategy of the World Bank Group for the Kingdom of 




and Develop Cambodia (NPRD) 1994 and its revised Socio-Economic 
Rehabilitation Plan 1994-5, devised with the ‘assistance from the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) and ADB’. The Socio-Economic Development 
Plan 1995-2000 (SEDP I) devised with the ‘assistance’ from ADB institutes the 
first post-war medium-term development planning. 
The second phase, starting in 2001, witnessed donors ‘competing’ to ‘assist’ 
Cambodia to develop different medium-term strategies. The production of SEDP II 
2001-2005 was assisted by the ADB; the National Poverty Reduction Strategy 
(NPRS) 2003-2005 and Interim NPRS 2000-2003, the financing and costing plan 
for SEDP II, from the WB, and the Cambodia’s Millennium Development Goals 
(CMDGs), SEDP II’s targets, was assisted by the UNDP. These important papers, 
supposed to be complementing and building up each other, were drafted by three 
different DPs with little coordination and cooperation. In addition, there was the 
Governance Action Plan (GAP) I (2001-3) and shorter strategies, such as the 
Triangle Strategy (1998-2003) and the Rectangular Strategy (RS) (2004-2008). 
Hence, there was no ‘overarching development strategy’ in this period.3 
These two phases also experienced deficiency of and little focus on sectoral 
strategies. In 1991, DoF formulated a scant fourteen-page descriptive Development 
Plan for Fisheries. The national plans then also contained little focus on these 
subsectors. The first medium-plan for the subsectors is the eight-page Five Year 
Socio-Economic Plan for the Fisheries Sector 1996-2000. This is followed by a 
slightly more detailed successor for 2000-2005. Overall, these two plans contain 
                                                          
3 Cf. Asian Development Bank, Developing the Capacity for Reconstruction and Development; —
——, Cambodia: Enabling the Socio-Economic Renaissance; ———, Country Strategy and 
Program Update; ———, Country Assistance Program Evaluation for Cambodia; ———, 
Cambodia: Growth and Sector Reforms  (Manila: ADB, 2009); Ministry of Planning, "Progress in 
Achieving Cambodia’s Millennium Development Goals: Challenges and Opportunities," (Phnom 
Penh: Ministry of Planning, 2007); Royal Government of Cambodia, National Programme to 
Rehabilitate and Develop Cambodia; ———, Socioeconomic Rehabilitation Plan 1994-5; ———, 
First Five Year Socioeconomic Development Plan 1996-2000; ———, "Triangle Strategy," (Phnom 
Penh: Royal Government of Cambodia, 1998); ———, "Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy," 
(Phnom Penh: Royal Government of Cambodia, 2000); ———, Governance Action Plan  (Phnom 
Penh: Council for Administrative Reform, 2001); ———, The Second Five Year Socioeconomic 
Development Plan 2001-2005; ———, "National Poverty Reduction Strategy 2003-2005," (Phnom 
Penh: Royal Government of Cambodia, 2003); ———, Rectangular Strategy for Growth, 
Development, Equity and Efficiency in Cambodia. 
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mainly what to achieve and aggregate costing, with no provision of how these 
activities were to be financed and little focus on CFCs.4 
The last phase started in 2006. The National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP) 
2006-2010, incorporating the previous ‘multiple competing strategies’ represents 
the inception of an overarching national strategy. This policy was updated in 2010 
and became the NSDP Update 2010-2013.5 Concurrently, more attention to 
develop comprehensive sectoral policies has gathered pace. As for fisheries/forests, 
the first attempt to produce a broad strategic framework by the Technical Working 
Group on Fisheries (TWGF) was the Fisheries Development Action Plan (FDAP) 
2005-8 in 2004. This is followed by the three-volume SPF 2010-2019, which is the 
most current and detailed plan for fisheries/forest management.6 
Post-conflict Cambodia also faces an absence of and vagueness in its legislation. 
PRK’s legislation formulation capacity was limited, manifesting in very few 
detailed laws and sub-laws.7 The contents often lacked details and were socialist-
oriented. Most of these laws and sub-laws were/are in force some two decades 
later. For example, the 1987 FL and 1989 sub-decree on lot exploitation rights were 
                                                          
4 See for example, Department of Fisheries, "Five Year Socioeconomic Plan for Fisheries Sector 
1996-2000."; ———, "Five Year Socioeconomic Plan for Fisheries Sector 2001-2005."; Gum, 
Inland Acquatic Resources and Livelihoods in Cambodia: A Guide to the Literature, Legislation, 
Institutional Framework and Recommendations ; Kol, "Review of Wetland and Aquatic Ecosystem 
in the Lower Mekong River Basin of Cambodia."; Mak, "The Tonle Sap and Its Fisheries 
Management: A Case in Cambodia."; Royal Government of Cambodia, National Programme to 
Rehabilitate and Develop Cambodia; ———, Socioeconomic Rehabilitation Plan 1994-5; ———, 
First Five Year Socioeconomic Development Plan 1996-2000; ———, The Second Five Year 
Socioeconomic Development Plan 2001-2005; State of Cambodia, Report on the Development Plan 
for Cambodia’s Fisheries Sector; van Acker, Cambodia's Commons: Changing Governance, 
Shifting Entitlements? Informant 10. 
5 The PM first expressed his appeal to incorporate key foreign-financed projects into the RGC’s 
budget process in 2002. See for example, Asian Development Bank, Cambodia: Growth and Sector 
Reforms: 6; NGO Forum on Cambodia and Economic Institute of Cambodia, Guide to the National 
Budget: 17; Royal Government of Cambodia, National Strategic Development Plan 2006-2010; —
——, National Strategic Development Plan Update 2010-2013; World Bank, Country Assistance 
Strategy Progress Report for the Kingdom of Cambodia for the Period FY05-08: 1-2. 
6 In 2001, the WB attempted to push for a comprehensive Fisheries Master Plan for 2001-2011. The 
English draft emerged in 2001, yet the plan has never been formally adopted. Cf. Department of 
Fisheries, "Master Plan for Fisheries 2001-2011," (Phnom Penh2001); Fisheries Administration, 
The Strategic Planning Framework for Fisheries: 2010-2019, 2; Schneider, Ka, and Roy, Private 
Sector Assessment for the Kingdom of Cambodia: 97; Sverdrup-Jensen, Poul, and Ahmed, Guide to 
Fisheries Policy Research in Cambodia – The Institutional and Legal Context: 20. Informant 90, 
12th July, 2011. 
7 For some laws and sub-laws from this period, see for example, Department of Fisheries, 
"Documents from the 1980’s."; ———, "Compilation of 1980’s Documents."; ———, 
"Compilation of Policies, Accounting and Finance," (Phnom Penh1985). 
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in effect until 2006 and 2010, respectively.8 To exemplify the vagueness, the FL 
stipulates that small-scale fishing was for subsistence, however, there was no clear 
definition or clarification of what subsistence was.  
Over the last decade, however, there has been considerable increase in legislation 
(overall and fisheries/forest-specific) and more detailed supporting sub-decrees and 
prakas. Despite the vast improvement, there is a lingering problem of inadequacy, 
incompleteness and conflicting stipulations. The pending production of (as of 
2011) 4 out of 7 sub-decrees, 15 out of 24 prakas and two technical orders to 
support the entirety of the FL, temporal inconsistency between the CC law (2001), 
CFi management sub-decree (2007) and de-concentration legislation (2008), and 
sectoral nature of the FL, Environmental Management Law and Water 
Management Law provide living examples of these shortcomings.9 
 
 
                                                          
8 Cf. Csavas et al., Cambodia, rehabilitation and development needs of the fishery sector: 40; Gum, 
Inland Acquatic Resources and Livelihoods in Cambodia: A Guide to the Literature, Legislation, 
Institutional Framework and Recommendations ; Samnang Ham, "A Competition Study in the 
Fisheries Sector in Cambodia," (Phnom Penh: Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace, 
2006), 30; Ing, Sao, and Thay, "Small-Scale Fisheries Management in Cambodia," 30; Kol, 
"Review of Wetland and Aquatic Ecosystem in the Lower Mekong River Basin of Cambodia."; 
Mak, "The Tonle Sap and Its Fisheries Management: A Case in Cambodia," 17-; ———, 
"Vulnerability of Fisheries in Cambodia," 1; ———, "The Environmental Management in Tonle 
Sap Lake, Cambodia," 15; Mak and Grundy-Warr, "Changes in Fishing Technologies and the 
Politics of Environmental Transformation," 11; Mak and Te, "Enabling Fisheries Conflict 
Management: A Case Study in Cambodia," 20; Manfield and MacLeod, Advocacy in Cambodia: 
Increasing Democratic Space: 33-46; NGO Forum on Cambodia, "Fishing Conflicts in 
Battambang."; ———, "Fishing Conflict in Kompong Chhnang," 26; Technical Working Group on 
Agriculture and Water, Strategy for Agriculture and Water 2006-2010; van Zalinge, Nao, and Sam, 
"Status of the Cambodian inland capture fisheries sector with special reference to the Tonle Sap 
Great Lake," 6. 
9 Cf. Asian Development Bank, Country Operations Business Plan: Cambodia 2008-2010: 42-44; 
Kol, "Review of Wetland and Aquatic Ecosystem in the Lower Mekong River Basin of Cambodia," 
70; Mak, "The Tonle Sap and Its Fisheries Management: A Case in Cambodia," 15; Melissa 
Marschke, "Livelihood in Context: Learning with Cambodian Fishers" (University of Manitoba, 
2005), 187; van Acker, Cambodia's Commons: Changing Governance, Shifting Entitlements?: 17. 
Informant 5. For the related legislation, see for example, Fisheries Administration, "Report on 
Statuses of Legal Formalities Related to Fisheries Law as of November 2010," (Phnom Penh: 
Fisheries Administration, 2010); Forestry and Fisheries Ministry of Agriculture, "Sub-Decree on 
Community Fisheries Management," (Phnom Penh: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 
2007); Royal Government of Cambodia, "Water Management Law," (Phnom Penh: Royal 
Government of Cambodia); ———, "Law on the Environmental Management," (Phnom Penh: 
Royal Government of Cambodia, 1996); ———, "Law on Commune/Sangkat Administrative 
Management," (Phnom Penh: MoI, 2001); ———, "Law on the Administrative Management of the 
Capital, Provinces, Municipalities, Districts and Khans," (Phnom Penh: Royal Government of 
Cambodia, 2008). As of 2011, more than 400 laws had been enacted by the National Assembly. 
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1.2. Formulation Capacity 
Cambodia’s capacity to formulate development strategies and legislation is still 
‘weak’.10 One problem with a strategy is that there is an unrealistic consideration of 
the planned targets against available financial resources, and for sectoral strategies 
there are few formal mechanisms for participation by other relevant state agencies. 
An exception may be the joint strategy, such as the Strategy for Agriculture and 
Water (SAW) 2006-2010. Another issue is slow production of policies, legislation 
and supporting documents. The initiation of the fisheries strategic framework, for 
example, started in 2004 and the FL was in the draft form in 1999; however, the FL 
was only passed in 2006 with many supporting sub-decrees, prakas and orders 
pending and the SPF passed in 2011.11 Third, any enacted laws are usually 
incomplete and leave important details to sub-decrees and prakas. Therefore, laws 
that are in force are not in full operation even a few years afterwards.12 Fourth, 
there is limited coordination amongst government agencies in policy and legislation 
production. The separate preparation of SEDP II and NPRS by two groups of state 
agents; the limited coordination in producing the Public Investment Program 1995-
1998 between the Ministry of Planning (MoP) (for planning), MEF (for 
government financing and foreign loans) and Cambodia’s Development 
Cooperation (CDC) (for external grants), and the ministerial-level preparation of 
such related laws as forestry, water management, fisheries and land laws, resulting 
in overlapping mandates and conflicting stipulations, are the cases in point.13 
However, there has been some improvement in policy and legislation formulation, 
for example, with the establishment of inter-ministerial committees. 
At the department/administration level (in the case of DoF/FiA), the annual action 
plans lack details. The one-two page action plans (usually forming a part of the 
previous year annual review) simply set the targets for the following year.  They 
                                                          
10 Asian Development Bank, Developing the Capacity for Reconstruction and Development: 7-15; 
———, Cambodia: Enabling the Socio-Economic Renaissance: 20; ———, Country Operations 
Business Plan: Cambodia 2008-2010: 42-44. 
11 Cf. Informant 5; Informant 10. 
12 Cf. Kato et al., Cambodia: Enhancing Governance for Sustainable Development; Kol, "Review of 
Wetland and Aquatic Ecosystem in the Lower Mekong River Basin of Cambodia." 
13 Asian Development Bank, Cambodia: Enabling the Socio-Economic Renaissance: 19-21; ———
, Country Assistance Program Evaluation for Cambodia: 47; Kato et al., Cambodia: Enhancing 
Governance for Sustainable Development: 72; Kol, "Review of Wetland and Aquatic Ecosystem in 
the Lower Mekong River Basin of Cambodia," 69-71; Mitchell, Tonle Sap Biosphere Reserve 
Policy Analysis and Secretariat Strategic Action Plan: 2; World Bank, Country Assistance Strategy 
of the World Bank Group for the Kingdom of Cambodia: 92-96. 
85 
 
exist only as bullet points on what actions to do and provide few details of how to 
attain them, including costing and financing. For each national office/department, 
provincial office/cantonment, district-level division and commune-level sangkat, 
the annual action plans running from ½ to one page each follows this format.14 
Furthermore, due to the top-down nature of planning and legislation formulation 
there are passive participation or insufficient inputs from the sub-national officials; 
hence there is little ownership of or buy-in to the documents. This is not, however, 
to downplay their participation via national workshops or meetings.15 
The SPF production witnessed broader collective and bottom-up participation with 
inputs from all national departments and sub-national levels which help with data 
compilation and district-level workshop organization. Nonetheless, according to a 
division leader, he and his sangkat subordinates were not asked to contribute 
anything to the SPF, though to what extent this applied nationwide is not known.16 
However, it may have been that selected division and sangkats were requested to 
organize district-level workshops to seek inputs from relevant stakeholders. With 
the SPF, there is now a new way to formulate annual action plans as well. Before 
2008, when it was under the provincial department of agriculture (DoA), the 
fisheries office was not asked to propose annual operational budget. The divisions 
and sangkats were still not asked to prepare such plans during 2008-10. Yet in 
2010, the division and sangkat heads in Province B (and probably countrywide) 
were then asked to formulate action plans and proposed estimated budgets for their 
annual operation to the cantonment. However, as of July 2011, there had not been 
any disbursement as requested. Since 2010, there has been another development; 
                                                          
14 For selected reports, see for example, Battambang Department of Agriculture, "Annual Report for 
Fisheries Sector for 1998," (18 December, 1998); Battambang Fisheries Cantonment, "Battambang's 
Fisheries Cantonment 2009 Activities and Action Plan for 2009-2010 Fishing Season."; Department 
of Fisheries, "Annual Report for Fisheries Sector for Fishing Season 1990," (Phnom Penh: 
Department of Fisheries, 1990); ———, "Annual Report for Fisheries Sector for Office for 
Fisheries Exploitation," (Phnom Penh1999); ———, "Annual Report for 2002 and Action Plans for 
2003."; Kampong Chhnang Department of Agriculture, "Annual Report for Fisheries for Kampong 
Chhnang for 1999," (1999); Pursat Department of Agriculture, "Report on Achievements of 
Fisheries Sector for 1998," (18 December, 1998); Siem Reap Department of Agriculture, "Report on 
Fisheries Sector for 1999," (23 November, 1999). This practice is also confirmed by Informant 80; 
Informant 89. 
15 Informant 3; Informant 7; Informant 89. 
16 Informant 2; Informant 3; Informant 66; Informant 80; Informant 89. 
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that is, Denmark’s Development Cooperation (Danida) has experimented with 
provincial budget de-concentration in selected provinces.17 
Overall, the state’s (or more accurately, the government’s) formulation capacity is 
improving with assistance from donors and the Supreme National Economic 
Council playing a central advisory role to the government.18 At the FiA, the policy 
and legislation formulation capacity may be limited but it is increasing as seen in 
the SPF production and changing nature of the annual action plan preparation. 
However, how long this will last or whether it will continue once DPs stop funding 
FiA is another matter altogether. 
Another issue deserved attention is how much Cambodia owns its strategies and 
legislation. The degree has changed over time. In early and mid-1990’s there was 
an urgent need for policies and legislation to deal with the influx of aid; thus it 
relied heavily on donors for policy and legislation formulation. In the first and 
second phases, many strategies and legislation were drafted in totality by donors or 
with slight consultation with relevant ministries. The development of such 
strategies as NPRD, SEDP I and II, (I)NPRS, CMDG and GAP I was, 
euphemistically, ‘assisted’ by donors and their foreign consultants. Many laws that 
were parts of donor conditionality such as FL were drafted by foreign consultants. 
During this period, the PM frequently complained about foreign consultants 
working for (not with) government counterparts in policy and legislation 
formulation; therefore, there was little capacity building of the Cambodian 
counterparts as required. These foreign consultants, as one scholar puts it, are 
‘highly influential’.19 This has led to laws being in drafts for years and once passed 
being incomplete or loosely implemented. These laws and policies also suffer from 
limited buy-in. Besides, due to the stand-alone project nature of aid, there is a lack 
of coordination amongst donors in formulating related policies. SEDP II, NPRS 
and CMDGs formulation is a good example. The most serious consequence of the 
                                                          
17 Informant 10; Informant 89.  
18 Cf. Asian Development Bank, Country Strategy and Program Update: 1-3; ———, Country 
Operations Business Plan: Cambodia 2008-2010: 69-701. However, as Chan, et al. show the 
development of sectoral and provincial plans [and indeed the capacity to plan] ‘has been highly 
uneven, with some sectors well-advanced, and others struggling at an early stage of the process.” 
Sophal Chan et al., "Cambodia Evaluation of Aid Effectiveness," (2008), 45. 
19 Carl Middleton, "The Expansion of the ADB’s Influence in Cambodia’s Water Sector: Judging 
the Effectiveness of ADB Water Management Projects in the Tonle Sap Basin," (Phnom Penh: 
Fisheries Action Coalition Team), 9. 
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fragmentation is that for a decade and a half, Cambodia did not have its own one 
all-inclusive development strategy.20 
At the sectoral level, the picture was similar. There was little donor coordination in 
policy and legislation production. It was WB consultants who drafted FL and 
Fisheries Master Plan 2001-2011, while the ADB’s drafted the CFi management 
sub-decree and a five-year master plan for the Tonle Sap Fisheries. Other donors 
produced their plans to achieve their goals with little coordination with each other 
or consultation with DoF. Such an approach does not ‘respond to the long-term 
development of the sector.” Therefore, the price DoF paid is that Cambodia did not 
have a comprehensive fisheries strategy until 2011.21 
The NSDP and NSDP Update production represents a new phase of the 
government’s attempt to produce and own its development strategy. Likewise, the 
government’s capacity to produce and revise legislation has accumulated. The FL, 
for instance, went through several rounds of revisions before its adoption. There 
has also been change in sectoral policy (such as the SPF) preparation though the 
sectoral capacity is still, as some Informants put it, quite limited, but improving. 
The framework was initiated by the then lead DP (Danida) and the TWGF 
secretariat and drafted by an English consultant, but with inputs from all FiA’s 
departments and line agencies. Some informants, as a result, doubt the FiA’s 
ownership of and capacity to produce its self-made framework. All said, the SPF 
could be labeled a first ‘joint product’.22 
1.3. Implementation Capacity 
The bigger concern is whether the policies and legislation have been put into 
practice. As discussed in Chapter 4, implementation capacity varies from sector to 
                                                          
20 Cf. Asian Development Bank, Developing the Capacity for Reconstruction and Development; —
——, Country Strategy and Program Update; ———, Country Assistance Program Evaluation for 
Cambodia; ———, Country Strategy and Program 2005-2009: Kingdom of Cambodia; Kato et al., 
Cambodia: Enhancing Governance for Sustainable Development; Oberndorf, "Overview of the 
Policy and Legal Framework Related to CBNRM."; World Bank, Country Assistance Strategy of 
the World Bank Group for the Kingdom of Cambodia. Informant 12 also complains about legislation 
and policies being drafted by foreign consultants with little consultation with local counterparts. 
Informant 12. 
21 Cf. Campbell, Department of Fisheries Institutional Review: 41-43; Mak, Heun, and Pen, 
"Decentralization and Natural Resource Management in Cambodia: Implication of the 
Decentralization Process to Date, A Case Studies in Pursat Province," 13-15; Marschke, 
"Livelihood in Context: Learning with Cambodian Fishers," 54; Srun et al., "The Unsustainable 
Exploitation of Inland Fisheries Resources in Cambodia," 270-71. Informant 90. 
22 Informant 4; Informant 6; Informant 7; Informant 90. 
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sector (fisheries vs. arm control), even within a sector (fisheries exploitation vs. 
aquaculture), on temporal basis (pre- and post-2000 reforms) or relative to 
oversight from above. At a brushstroke, to adopt the judgment by the ADB, “the 
rate of overall progress in implementation of these reforms efforts has been 
slow.”23 The implementation of the natural resource management policies and 
legislation and that of the fisheries and forests in particular, as many writers and 
informant acutely condemn, is ‘lacking,’ ‘weak,’ ‘selected,’ ‘inconsistent,’ 
‘sectorial,’24 biased and exploitative. 
2. Midwifery and Husbandry 
2.1. Peace and Political Stability 
After prolonged wars, what Cambodia needs as a prerequisite for development is 
peace and political stability. The PM rightly noted: “As long as peace prevails, 
development can be attained [and] as long as development is attained, peace can be 
guaranteed.”25 After 1993, Cambodia was not peaceful and stable. The Khmer 
Rouge was still a threatening force and the factions in the government did not trust 
each other, resulting in multiple maneuvers against one another and culminating in 
the factional fighting in 1997. It was not until 1999 that the threat from the Khmer 
Rouge eventually ended, and political parties and state institutions have better 
institutionalized. The RGC, donors and Cambodian people have admitted that 
Cambodia has attained ‘peace and political stability’. An article published by the 
WB praised: “Cambodia has generated a growth peace dividend by establishing a 
track record of political and macroeconomic stability.26 With the Khmer Rouge 
gone and the armed forces withdrawn to the barracks, peace and stability prevails 
on the Tonle Sap Lake and Mekong River. This has eased pressures on lot 
operations and smaller scale fishing tremendously. 
                                                          
23  Asian Development Bank, Country Operations Business Plan: Cambodia 2008-2010: 69-70. 
24 Cambodia National Mekong Committee, Integrated Water Resources Management in Cambodia: 
National Sector Review: 49-50; Gum, Inland Acquatic Resources and Livelihoods in Cambodia: A 
Guide to the Literature, Legislation, Institutional Framework and Recommendations iii; Kato et al., 
Cambodia: Enhancing Governance for Sustainable Development: 15; Koroma, "Local Reforms of 
Community Forest and Fisheries Management," 2; Ly, Yin, and Degen, "Management Aspects of 
Cambodia’s Freshwater Capture Fisheries," 90; Mak, "The Tonle Sap and Its Fisheries 
Management: A Case in Cambodia," 1; ———, "Vulnerability of Fisheries in Cambodia," 15; 
Technical Working Group on Agriculture and Water, Strategy for Agriculture and Water 2006-
2010: 6. Informant 2; Informant 23; Informant 25-27. 
25 Cambodia New Vision, "When Peace Prevails, Development Is Attained," Cambodia New Vision 
April 2002, 7. 
26 Stephane Guimbert, "Cambodia 1998-2008: an episode of rapid growth," (Washington D.C.: East 
Asia and Pacific Region, World Bank, 2010), 8. 
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Table 14: Political Stability and Absence of Violence27 
Country 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Brunei 1.11 1.20 1.22 1.00 1.08 1.36 1.27 1.23 1.23 1.22 
Cambodia -1.37 -1.15 -0.75 -0.72 -0.74 -0.47 -0.50 -0.42 -0.52 -0.27 
Indonesia -0.85 -1.39 -1.69 -1.61 -1.99 -1.54 -1.25 -1.21 -1.08 -1.00 
Laos 1.02 -0.32 -0.73 -0.26 -1.05 -0.58 -0.28 0.01 -0.04 -0.01 
Malaysia 0.67 0.13 0.28 0.42 0.33 0.29 0.47 0.34 0.23 0.13 
Myanmar -1.30 -1.29 -1.57 -1.33 -1.28 -0.95 -0.90 -0.82 -1.26 -1.56 
Philippines -0.42 -0.17 -0.78 -0.66 -1.18 -1.21 -1.05 -1.30 -1.31 -1.41 
Singapore 1.16 1.11 1.23 1.34 1.02 1.15 1.18 1.30 1.22 1.33 
Thailand 0.10 0.40 0.35 0.38 -0.01 -0.41 -0.60 -0.89 -1.01 -1.19 
Timor-Leste   0.30 -0.57 -0.22 -0.35 -0.68 -1.16 -1.09 -1.13 
Vietnam 0.34 0.35 0.23 0.33 0.18 0.21 0.37 0.43 0.28 0.32 
As Kaufmann and others’ indicators above suggest, there has been huge 
improvement in ‘political stability and absence of violence’. Cambodia has done 
much better than many peer ASEAN members and even surpassed many countries, 
which were politically more stable than it was two decades ago. The indicators 
nevertheless illustrate a worrying sign. The country is not totally stable as indicated 
in low scores that it gets. To adopt Diamond’s terms, the institutions have perhaps 
acquired some measure of depth, flexibility, and value, but not enough to ensure 
them safe passage through severe challenge.’ All said, one would appreciate how 
much Cambodia has achieved, if he/she had lived here in the 70’s and 80’s.28 
2.2. Public Private Sector Forum 
After 1993, the Cambodian state recognized the need to move from production to 
business facilitation. However, the focus was on policy production and provision of 
                                                          
27 Data source: Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, Governance Matters VIII: Aggregate and 
Individual Governance Indicators 1996-2008. 
28 Moreover, the RGC has vowed to sustain this hard-won peace and stability. Cf. Asian 
Development Bank, Cambodia: Enabling the Socio-Economic Renaissance: 1-2 and 44; ———, 
Cambodia: Growth and Sector Reforms: 4; Cambodia New Vision, "When Peace Prevails, 
Development Is Attained," 7; Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, Politics in Developing Countries: 
Comparing Experiences with Democracy, 1; Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research and National 
Democratic Institute, "Cambodian Public Opinion in Advance of the 2003 Elections," (2003), 2-4; 
Guimbert, "Cambodia 1998-2008: an episode of rapid growth."; Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 
Governance Matters VIII: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators 1996-2008; Thuok Nao 
and Nicolaas van Zalinge, "Challenges in Managing Cambodia’s Inland Fisheries: How Can We 
Meet Them?," in Management Aspects of Cambodia’s Freshwater Capture Fisheries: Eleven 
Presentations Given at the Annual Meeting of the Department of Fisheries, Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries 27-28 January 2000, ed. Nicolaas Van Zalinge, Thuok Nao, and Sopha 
Lieng (Phnom Penh: Mekong River Commission and Department of Fisheries, 2000), 12; Royal 
Government of Cambodia, Rectangular Strategy for Growth, Development, Equity and Efficiency in 
Cambodia: 9; ———, Rectangular Strategy for Growth, Development, Equity and Efficiency in 
Cambodia: Phase Two: 17; World Bank, Country Assistance Strategy of the World Bank Group for 
the Kingdom of Cambodia: 1; ———, Country Assistance Strategy Progress Report for the 
Kingdom of Cambodia for the Period FY05-08: 1. 
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social service facilities and physical infrastructure. Even in 2000, private 
businesses still complained about the lack of consultation with them on policy 
production, implementation and wider reforms and about centralized decision-
making by a small circle of senior politicians and technocrats. Since 1999, the 
government began to engage more meaningfully with the private sector, and the 
Public-Private Sector Forum was established in 1999 to discuss policies and 
challenges that the private sector faces and for them to seek solutions from the 
government. A WB report notes that the forum ‘is a mechanism for improving the 
business environment, building trust between the public and private sector, and 
fostering private investment.’ The forum meets on a semester basis, is chaired by 
the Prime Minister and attended by relevant ministries and businesses. In 2004, a 
Steering Committee for Private Sector Development was established and is 
supported by three sub-committees.29  
In 2001, seven working groups (later eight) were established. They represent the 
following areas: manufacturing and small and medium enterprises, export 
processing and business facilitation, energy and infrastructure, tourism, legislation, 
tax and governance, finance banking and related services, and agro-industry and 
food processing. These groups are made up of representatives from relevant 
government agencies and private businesses and hold regular meetings, although 
Hun Sen used to reprimand some groups for their passivity. The groups allow the 
government and private sector to exchange ideas and experiences, promote 
communication and seek joint solutions to various issues.30 As seen in the areas 
above, unfortunately, fisheries exploitation is nowhere to be seen in this forum and 
the working groups. 
 
                                                          
29 For more details, see for example, Cambodia's Development Council, "Cambodia’s Report on 
Progress toward Enhanced Aid Effectiveness," (Phnom Penh: Cambodia's Development Council, 
2005), 6. 
30 Asian Development Bank, Developing the Capacity for Reconstruction and Development: 9; ——
—, Cambodia: Growth and Sector Reforms: 4; Cambodia New Vision, "Address to the Fourth 
Government-Private Sector Forum in Phnom Penh," Cambodia New Vision August 2001, 7-8; ——
—, "Addressing the 7th Royal Government-Private Sector Forum," Cambodia New Vision August 
2004, 1-8; ———, "The Fifth Government-Private Sector Forum," Cambodia New Vision February 
2002, 1-2; Guimbert, "Cambodia 1998-2008: an episode of rapid growth," 11; International 
Development Association and International Monetary Fund, "Assessment of Interim Poverty 
Reduction Strategy," 31-33; Kato et al., Cambodia: Enhancing Governance for Sustainable 




2.3. Business Facilitation 
The state ceased assisting the private sector after 1993. Yet the PM later recognized 
that it was a strategic mistake.31 Therefore, since 1994 the state has re-committed 
into assisting private businesses. It re-iterates that the private sector is the engine of 
growth and a partner in development and that it is committed to working closely 
with and providing it with facilitation.32 Nevertheless, rhetoric and reality do not 
often match. Private businesses usually complain about corruption in dealing with 
state agencies, and the assistance to the private sector is ‘scattered and at times 
redundant’ and little assistance is provided in the ‘form of market information, 
trade promotion, matching services or training.’33 In fishing lot operations, this also 
holds true. According to an FiA leader, the support FiA gives to lots is teaching 
some of them how to raise fingerlings and to prepare sanctuaries.34 Two 
cantonment and another central leaders confide that the only main assistance FiA 
officials provides to concessionaires is the preparation of applications for lot 
exploitation rights. This is confirmed by a concessionaire and a unit official who 
add that the facilitation is not free; that is, concessionaires have to pay informally 
for such services.35 
2.4. CFC Assistance 
DoF, and certainly many other state agencies, are more familiar with law 
enforcement and conservation than with fostering participatory management. A 
review of its history shows that it was never tasked with assisting communities, yet 
since 2001 it has been assigned with a new role – assisting CFCs with CFi 
establishment and management.36 The RGC has expressed its commitment to adopt 
community-based natural resources management and to assist communities with 
                                                          
31 Because interference into its affairs was thought to be ‘communist,’ something the unpopular 
SoC’s successor was eager to shed. Cambodia New Vision, "Kraing Yov: A Model of Rural 
Development," Cambodia New Vision June 2009, 5. 
32 See for example, Asian Development Bank, Developing the Capacity for Reconstruction and 
Development; Royal Government of Cambodia, Rectangular Strategy for Growth, Development, 
Equity and Efficiency in Cambodia. 
33 See for example, Asian Development Bank, Country Operations Business Plan: Cambodia 2008-
2010: 76; Schneider, Ka, and Roy, Private Sector Assessment for the Kingdom of Cambodia: 147; 
World Bank, Country Assistance Strategy for the Kindgom of Cambodia; ———, Country 
Assistance Strategy Progress Report for the Kingdom of Cambodia for the Period FY05-08: 193. 
34 Informant 11. 
35 Informant 20; Informant 65; Informant 66; Informant 68; Informant 80. 
36 Department of Fisheries, "Inland Fisheries Review," 48-48; van Acker, Cambodia's Commons: 
Changing Governance, Shifting Entitlements?: 36; ———, "Don't Trust Fish When They Are in 
Water: Cambodia's Inland Fisheries in Transition," 33. Informant 3; Informant 7; Informant 10. 
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their management. However, there is a persistent problem of communicating the 
commitment to the field implementors who are often unable to deliver the services 
‘that they are mandated to provide.’37 
DoF/FiA faces numerous challenges in assisting CFCs. It has only limited 
institutional capacity in dealing with CFCs and CFis – though that has been 
increasing. The abrupt reforms simply give it a large new task, but not much 
institutional preparation. When CFis were introduced, only a few individuals at the 
national level knew what CFis would be, and later a few sub-national officials were 
recalled to the capital to learn about CFis and facilitation and communication skills 
and to relay the knowledge to their peers. The scope was probably too small to 
have any significant impacts. Thus, many sub-national officials were unfamiliar 
with and inexperienced in CFi management when this ‘management system’ was 
introduced.38 
Nor did it have sufficient time to prepare CFis. The PM ordered that they act 
immediately, not to await the CFi sub-decree and do it successfully. With no time 
to spare, no experience and no legal/policy blueprint, it was no wonder that no two 
communities were the same. A cantonment leader informed that in order to meet 
the central demand, in one day one or two CFis were created and with little 
                                                          
37 Ministry of Agriculture, "Sub-Decree on Community Fisheries Management," 3-8; Sovanna 
Nhem, "Mainstreaming Natural Resources and Environmental Management: The Seila 
Decentralization Program," ed. Serey Rotha Ken, et al. (Phnom Penh: CBNRM Learning Institute, 
2005), 87; Royal Government of Cambodia, Rectangular Strategy for Growth, Development, Equity 
and Efficiency in Cambodia: 15; ———, "Law on Fisheries," 3-4; Verbaas, "Starting from Scratch: 
Building Capacity in Cambodia," 38-39.  
38 Cf. Cambodia National Mekong Committee, Integrated Water Resources Management in 
Cambodia: National Sector Review: 56-57; Campbell, Department of Fisheries Institutional 
Review: 48-49; Vannaren Chean and Kin Sean, "Fisheries Preservation in the Mekong River Pools 
in Stung Treng and Kratie," in Management Aspects of Cambodia’s Freshwater Capture Fisheries: 
Eleven Presentations Given at the Annual Meeting of the Department of Fisheries, Ministry of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 27-28 January 2000, ed. Nicolaas Van Zalinge, Thuok Nao, 
and Sopha Lieng (Phnom Penh: Mekong River Commission and Department of Fisheries, 2000), 
108; Degen et al., "People, Power, and Fisheries Policy: Fisheries Management Reform Addressing 
Community Fisheries in Cambodia," 23; Department of Fisheries, Impacts of the Fisheries Policy 
Reforms in Kampong Cham, Pursat and Takeo Provinces: First Round Assessment Report: 52-53 
and 67; Khai and Thai, "Community Participation in Fisheries Management: A Case Study from 
Tboung Khlaa and O Mreah Villages, Stung Treng Province, Kingdom of Cambodia," 81; Nhem, 
"Mainstreaming Natural Resources and Environmental Management: The Seila Decentralization 
Program," 126; Sverdrup-Jensen, Poul, and Ahmed, Guide to Fisheries Policy Research in 
Cambodia – The Institutional and Legal Context: 28; van Zalinge, Nao, and Sam, "Status of the 
Cambodian inland capture fisheries sector with special reference to the Tonle Sap Great Lake," 15. 
Informant 80; Informant 81, 28th July, 2011; Informant 89. To be fair to DoF/FiA, the issue of 
limited and uneven capacity is not confined to this agency. It is a general problem of most state 
agencies in Cambodia.  See for example, Technical Working Group on Agriculture and Water, 
Strategy for Agriculture and Water 2006-2010. 
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meaningful participation from the communities. He referred to their establishment 
as ‘a process of trials and errors and learning by doing.’ The rapid increase in the 
number of CFis is hauntingly ‘impressive’. In 2000 there were only 30 CFCs, by 
2001, 2002 and 2003, the numbers climbed to 165, 246 and 316, respectively.39 
Next are issues of limited community empowerment and assistance provision to 
CFis in resource monitoring and surveillance. First, some fisheries officials, as well 
as other authorities, saw CFis as a threat to their livelihoods and hence were 
reluctant to support to these new institutions.40 Nowhere is this lack of support 
more apparent than in CFi patrol and crackdowns. Irrespective of the law, 
assistance in crackdowns on violators varies from communities to communities. 
That is, communities closer to shore, those with assistance from NGOs or donors’ 
projects, or those having built good relations with the relevant agencies receive 
more assistance. Assistance also varies from time to time with more assistance 
during a project’s lifetime; more daytime versus nighttime patrols, or more when 
there is pressure from above. Generally, cooperation is limited and poorly timed, 
and in some cases there is outright refusal to be involved in enforcement. Further, 
there is accusation that opportunistic authorities collude with perpetrators and are 
reluctant to ‘smash their own cooking pots’ and that some even threaten and get rid 
of CFC and CFi members who are active and interfere with their affairs.41 
DoF’s assistance to the communities is further hindered by reluctance to delegate 
authority to its sub-central agencies. For example, the CFi management sub-decree 
outlines a tedious eight-step process for CFi registration starting from recognition 
by a CC until the final approval by MAFF. This process is so centralized and can 
                                                          
39 Degen et al., "People, Power, and Fisheries Policy: Fisheries Management Reform Addressing 
Community Fisheries in Cambodia," 23; Oxfam Great Britain, Evaluation of the Impact of the 
Fisheries Reform in Cambodia on the Livelihoods of Poor Fishers: 1; Patrick, "Fishing Disarmed," 
10; Tep et al., Asserting Rights, Defining Responsibilities: Small-Scale Fishing Communities and 
Fisheries Management. Perspectives in Asia, A Study on Cambodia: 12. Informant 80. 
40 Informant 7. See for example,Patrick, Melissa, and Puadyal, Flood Forest, Fish and Fishing 
Villages: Tonle Sap, Cambodia: 32. 
41 Mak and Te, "Enabling Fisheries Conflict Management: A Case Study in Cambodia," 24; Mak, 
Vann, and Te, "Communication Strategies for Fisheries Conflict Management: A Case Study in 
Cambodia," 10-15; Marschke, "Livelihood in Context: Learning with Cambodian Fishers," 211; 
Melissa Marschke and A. John Sinclair, "Learning for Sustainability: Participatory Resource 
Management in Cambodian Fishing Villages," Journal of environmental management 90, no. 1 
(2009); Sok Tath et al., "Case Study on Community Fisheries Established in Kampong Chhnang and 
Battambang Provinces, Cambodia," (Phnom Penh: Fisheries Action Coalition Team); Whittingham, 
"Sites of Practice: Negotiating Sustainability and Livelihoods in Rural Cambodia." Informant 2; 
Informant 5; Informant 14, 10th May, 2011; Informant 15, 13th May, 2011; Informant 21; 
Informant 29-43; Informant 45-59; Informant 86-88. 
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take up to two to three years to complete. Another indication of centralization is 
that for sangat and division officials to offer a community or CFC any training or 
to attend its meeting, they have to receive a green light from the cantonment.42 
The major challenge for CFDO/D to assist CFis in any meaningful way is its 
limited funding for its operation – something that the leadership admits. It and its 
line agencies are ‘ordered’ to shoulder a challenging task of organizing, managing 
and assisting 500 CFis with little financial support. Cantonment leaders in the two 
provinces disclosed that the cantonments do not have any budget for CFi 
development. A sangkat, division and provincial unit official in the two provinces 
complained that they are responsible for assisting CFCs but are not provided with 
per diem, means of transport or budget. Besides, CFDO/D and its line agencies lack 
the financial resources for such follow-ups such as joint patrols or CFC and CFi 
capacity building, etc.43 
Because of the limited budget (hence commitment), its assistance to the 
communities for their establishment and operation is inadequate and often ragged. 
For instance, many CFC elections were conducted in haste, creating many dire 
consequences. Offenders, non-fishers and even former concessionaires/operators 
were elected to some CFCs, and many fishers did not participate in the elections. 
This led to dysfunction and loose solidarity in many CFCs. Moreover, after 2001, 
many CFCs that were established received little follow-up support in patrol back-
up, capacity building, monitoring of progress, management planning, by-laws and 
agreement preparation etc. Some CFCs immediately collapsed; others did not 
function; some had internal disputes and most did not clearly understand their 
rights and responsibilities; many did not even have the necessary documentation 
nor the budgets to run the CFis.44 
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43 Cambodia National Mekong Committee, Integrated Water Resources Management in Cambodia: 
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Resources in Kampong Siem District, Kampong Chhnang Province," 32-33; Ly, Yin, and Degen, 
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It was not until more funding from NGOs and the disbursement of the ADB’s loan 
for the belated Tonle Sap Environmental Management Project (TSEMP) that saw 
more active involvement from DoF in the re-organization and/or re-elections of 
Tonle Sap-wide CFCs; preparation of documentation for CFi registration with 
MAFF; establishment of conservation areas; provision of concrete tubes and 
boundary poles for their conservation areas; capacity building; awareness raising 
and legal training to CFC and CFi members, etc.45 Overall, this assistance is case-
specific and project-based, potentially undermining its sustainability. In summary, 
despite its effort to assist CFis, the state provides all CFCs with little financial or 
in-kind support for their operation. 
Like DoF/FiA, CCs’ assistance to CFCs is limited and has evolved from being 
none to blurry at best. This also applies to the district and provincial authorities. 
When a few NGOs organized and experimented with CFis in the late 1990’s, there 
was no legal framework stipulating what roles the councils should play. It was the 
2001 Law on Commune/Sangkat Administrative Management which states that one 
of their roles is to ‘protect and preserve the environment and natural resources.’ 
The CFi management sub-decree confirms that the CCs shall cooperate to establish 
a CFi and nothing more.46 These laws stop short of defining their roles in CFi 
management. This lack of legal clarity and vested interests produced a mixed blend 
of councils and regional authorities. Despite the lack of clarity, some authorities 
gave CFCs their support and participated actively in their establishment.47 
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45 Department of Fisheries, "Report on Organization and Management of CF and Community Fish 
Refuges for First Nine Months of 2006," (Phnom Penh: Department of Fisheries, 9 October, 2006); 
———, "Statement of Nao Thuok in 2007 Cambodia Development Cooperation Forum," (Phnom 
Penh2007); Ministry of Agriculture, "Sub-Decree on Community Fisheries Management." 
Informant 2; Informant 3; Informant 4; Informant 11; Informant 12; Informant 13; Informant 20; 
Informant 23; Informant 65; Informant 80; Informant 81. 
46 Ministry of Agriculture, "Sub-Decree on Community Fisheries Management."; Royal 
Government of Cambodia, "Law on Commune/Sangkat Administrative Management." 
47 See for example, Department of Fisheries, Impacts of the Fisheries Policy Reforms in Kampong 
Cham, Pursat and Takeo Provinces: First Round Assessment Report: 39; Mak and Te, "Enabling 
Fisheries Conflict Management: A Case Study in Cambodia," 15; Marschke, "Livelihood in 
Context: Learning with Cambodian Fishers," 82; Patrick, Melissa, and Puadyal, Flood Forest, Fish 
and Fishing Villages: Tonle Sap, Cambodia: 11. 
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However, there were some which were reluctant to support CFis and to provide 
them with the necessary recognition.48 
CCs also lack the necessary skills, knowledge and experiences in local 
participatory natural resources management and budget to support CFis. Due to the 
change in legal status and a decade-long communist system plus another decade 
under its shadow, they are unfamiliar with their new roles and responsibilities and 
way of working.49 Moreover, local and provincial authorities have little budget for 
CFi affairs. For example, one of the two CCs contacted in Province A had no funds 
for fisheries affairs, while the other had $12.50 as a counterpart fund with one 
NGO for a CFi patrol. Likewise, three CFCs in Province B reported that they 
receive no financial support from CCs and that what they receive is the ‘green 
light’ for patrol and their participation in training and meetings they organize. 
Similarly, a review by the TWGF secretariat shows that provincial and district 
authorities have allotted little funding for fisheries management. Besides, they lack 
the necessary skills and knowledge in this new management system.50 
The latest positive development of CCs’ assistance to CFis is the integration of 
CFC annual projects into the commune development plans (CDP) as a priority so 
that they can help attract funding from NGOs and state agencies. There has been 
some remarkable development in this. A survey of the forty registered CFCs in 
Battambang in 2007 indicates that only two and five had fully or partially 
integrated their projects into CDPs, respectively. The situation improved 
significantly in 2010. Twelve and fifteen of thirty CFCs had their work plans fully 
                                                          
48 See for example, Department of Fisheries, Impacts of the Fisheries Policy Reforms in Kampong 
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or partially integrated, accordingly.51 Given the good cooperation between the other 
ten CFCs and councils in 2007, it is very probable that most of them had their 
projects either fully or partially integrated in 2010 as well. 
Finally, with facilitation of and sponsorship from NGOs and DPs, there have been 
more contacts and interactions between CFCs and CCs via capacity building 
provision by council members to CFi and/or CFC members, CCs’ field visits to 
successful CFCs, etc. Furthermore, the Tonle Sap Sustainable Livelihood Project 
(TSSLP) has strengthened their ties through the provision of basic equipment to the 
Tonle Sap core zone CFCs by 37 councils in this region.52 
2.5. Research and Development 
The RGC provides FiA with little funding for R&D activities. Established in 2002, 
the Inland Fisheries Research and Development Institute is the FiA’s R&D arm.53 
However, it is not covered in this study. This thesis only focuses on the research on 
“research lots” with financial support from respective concessionaires and their lot 
development activities. 
Evans suggests that social actors join a ‘joint project’ with the state when they view 
it as a positive-sum game. This is achievable when they share the state’s vision and 
the state apparatus are embedded, but competent and autonomous. In ‘research lot’ 
R&D, the concessionaires and ‘research lot’ researchers see more personal benefits 
from opting out of the joint project; hence many researchers instead act with the 
current concessionaires to reap the short-term benefits. One former DoF official 
thus criticized that these officials, instead of working against the concessionaries’ 
wrongdoings, are captured by them54 for mutual gains. 
The raison d'être for a research lot is to conduct research to determine fish catch; to 
develop the lots via re-planting inundated trees; to conserve some endangered 
                                                          
51 Informant 7; Informant 79. Rath Troeung, "Community Fisheries Committee Quality Assessment 
2007," (2007); ———, "Community Fisheries Committee Quality Assessment 2010," (2010). 
52 Informant 23; Informant 70, 24th & 26th July, 2011; Informant 79; Informant 80; Informant 86-
88; Informant 91, 31st August, 2011. Asian Development Bank, "Project Brief: Tonle Sap 
Sustainable Livelihood Project." 
53 Campbell, Department of Fisheries Institutional Review: 35; Sam Onn Mao, "Improving Inland 
Fisheries Management in Cambodia" (Memorial University of Newfoundland, 2001), 45. Another 
research institute on marine fisheries was established in 2011 with the assistance from Japan. 
54 Informant 7. 
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species, to rehabilitate some lakes/streams etc.55 The rental contracts since 2002 
have been more extensive on what concessionaires shall fulfill. However, in reality, 
little meaningful research is carried out, and some DoF/FiA staff assigned to this 
task does not have enough capacity to carry out meaningful research; some lot 
researchers do not even hold a bachelor’s degree.56 
FiA national officials responsible for such research, their sub-national peers and 
some concessionaires interviewed confided that the researchers mostly collect the 
data from concessionaires or leave them record books to fill in, or in most cases 
such statistics as fish catch and expenses are collected from the concessionaires via 
sangkat officials. Some do not even go to the field, according to some insiders, and 
rely solely on information relayed from sangkat and division officials and/or 
concessionaires. Concessionaires have an interest in hiding accurate data, and this 
severely affects the research quality. Mak therefore argues that such results 
‘contribute little to any reformulation of policies on fisheries management’57 and 
fisheries/forest management generally. 
As for lot development and rehabilitation, selected reviews by Provincial Fisheries 
Offices (PFOs) over a few years on whether research lots had fulfilled the contracts 
report that in most cases they had, though some were slow to fulfill the contracts 
due to ‘natural causes’ and some points were not honored or fell short of 
agreements in the contracts. Two cumulative reports by DoF for 2000 and 2007 
likewise paint a rosy picture of contract fulfillment. It was the 2001 reports by the 
provincial offices and central (sub)committees to evaluate research lots which 
unearthed that in that particular year, most contracts were not fulfilled because of 
the fisheries reforms and the attempt to cancel research lots. Only the sub-
committees for Kampong Chhnang and Kampong Thom report that research lots in 
these provinces to a greater extent fulfilled the contracts, although the reviewers for 
Kampong Thom did not go to inspect onsite and relied entirely on information 
from fisheries officials and local authorities.58 
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Though undeniably some lots have fulfilled their contracts, the current report by 
the deputy PM shows that research lots’ research and development are more a 
Pandora’s box. While most of the reports above depict the concessionaires as law-
abiding contractors, his review shows, on the contrary, that only a small fraction of 
them honored the contracts. Only a few of them, for example, have a hatchery 
station, release brood stock into the wild, replanting inundated trees, and 
rehabilitating lakes and streams. Informant 5 complained that concessionaires 
usually fall short of fulfilling the contracts, while Informant 65 lamented the lack of 
an ‘audit’ on these research activities.59 
In retrospect, provincial authorities and fisheries officials have an interest in the 
longevity of the research lots, and hence there is a need to hide as much sensitive 
information as possible. For example, a top fisheries official in Province A is 
responsible for nursing inundated trees and fingerlings for some research lots.60 
According to a fisheries official and some studies, officials in provincial 
governorship receive substantial money from facilitating granting of research lots.61 
Therefore, the need to produce good reports and to keep the research lot fees low is 
necessary. Besides the issue of capacity, there are few incentives for DoF/FiA 
researchers to conduce any meaningful research, since the research provides them a 
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chance to ask for some more money. As of 2001, more than 200 million riels or as 
of 2006, 759 million riels (or $185,484) per annum were allotted by 
concessionaires for R&D62 and that there is little meaningful monitoring and 
evaluation means that the state has lost millions of dollars and that little 
rehabilitation and development activities have taken place within lots. 
In summary, the overall and sectoral analyses of the Cambodian state capacity so 
far prove that the state capacity is limited and variable over time, space and types 
of capacity, although the overall and sectoral capacity has been increasing. As can 
be seen above, the state’s capacity to formulate policies and legislation is higher; 
the capacity to appropriate its resources has somewhat improved, yet overall 
regulation, penetration, extraction and midwifery/husbandry are weak. 
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Chapter 6: Fragmentation of Social Control 
This chapter discusses the impacts that social forces, including the Khmer Rouge, 
small and medium scale fishers, lot concessionaires and operators and CFCs, have 
on Cambodian state capacity by investigating how they accumulate and/or exercise 
their ‘social control’ and how these affect state capacity. It also deals with how 
concessionaires translate state legislation/policies into practices and their power 
vis-à-vis other statal and non-statal local actors. The discussion proves that least 
developed states like Cambodia are far from a single dominant actor and that the 
considerable social control fragmentation has a great impact on Cambodian state 
capacity to properly manage the resources. 
1. The Khmer Rouge and State Debility 
The state is more than a mere arena where social forces make claims to their 
demands; it has ‘relative autonomy’ vis-à-vis the forces. However, in less 
functional states like Cambodia the degree of autonomy from social forces can be 
relatively low, and these forces may resist the state’s endeavor to manage them. 
While Migdal identifies such formal actors as tribes, clans and businesses as formal 
forces in struggle for social control, in Cambodia before 1999, one major formal 
force that threatened the state’s dominance was the Khmer Rouge. 
Shawcross and Peou point out the Khmer Rouge’s strength and resilience during 
1991-95. For example, it could retake control two of its last strongholds in a few 
weeks after they had been captured by Phnom Penh in 1994.1 In the sub-sectors, the 
prevention of state’s full internal sovereignty attainment dates to the 1980’s.2 As 
discussed in Chapter 4, its presence did not allow the state to fully penetrate and 
regulate the society and extract and appropriate the resources, let alone midwife or 
husband the sub-sectors. For example, its presence prohibited DoF from carrying 
out full monitoring, control and surveillance and accessing many areas under its de 
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facto control.3 Besides, its resistance required the state to spend huge budget on 
weaponry and armed forces, greatly reducing the possibility to allocate more funds 
to development-oriented activities.4 
In addition, the Khmer Rouge created its own rules for resource exploitation. 
Analyses of many DoF central and provincial reports reveal that cases of demands 
for protection money; kidnapping and killing of concessionaires/operators; 
destruction of their gears and capture of certain lakes within lots and giving them to 
smaller scale fishers were reported, and these were substantiated by letters from the 
Khmer Rouge.5 In 1994 and 1995, for example, DoF reports stated that 56 out of 
141 lots were suffering from demands for protection money from the Khmer Rouge 
and had their gears destroyed.6 It was not until 1999 that its threat to the state 
capacity was diminished.7 Yet even with the full integration, some local Khmer 
Rouge leaders were allowed de facto control over the territory formerly under their 
control.8 
2. Small and Medium Scale Fishers 
One of the biggest challenges to the state to penetrate and regulate fisheries and 
forests and extract rents from their users is the sheer size of small scale fishing 
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Cambodia: 1-2. 
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in Battambang," (9 September, 1994); ———, "Request for Lot Fee Reduction for Lot 2 in Siem 
Reap for Fishing Season 1995-96," (12 August, 1996); ———, "Request for Lot Fee Reduction for 
Lot 4 in Kampong Thom," (21 July, 1994); ———, "Report on Killing of Concessionaire of Lot 7 
in Kampong Thom by Khmer Rouge," (Phnom Penh: Department of Fisheries, 24 March, 1997); —
——, "Report on Khmer Rouge Killing Concessionaire of Lot 7 in Kampong Thom," (Phnom Penh: 
Department of Fisheries, 28 April, 1997); ———, "Request for Lot Fee Reduction for Lots 1 & 2 in 
Battambang," (28 July, 1995); ———, "Proposal for Kandal Lots 8, 14, 15, 11 and Siem Reap Lots 
4-5-6 Fee Reduction."; Forestry and Fisheries Ministry of Agriculture, "Request for Lot Fee 
Reduction for Lot 2 in Battambang for Fishing Season 1995-96," (6 December, 1996 ). For a letter, 
see for example, Chantha Om, "A Letter to Beloved Uncle Tak," (6 September, 1997). 
6 Department of Fisheries, "Annual Report for 1993 and Action Plans for 1994."; ———, "Annual 
Report for 1994 and Action Plans for 1995."; ———, "Annual Report for 1995 and Action Plans 
for 1996." 
7 Cf. See for example, Battambang Department of Agriculture, "Annual Report for Fisheries Sector 
for 1997," (14 January, 1998); ———, "Annual Report for Fisheries Sector for 1998."; Department 
of Fisheries, "Annual Report for 1998."; Pursat Department of Agriculture, "Report on 
Achievements of Fisheries Sector for 1998."; ———, "Report on Achievements of Fisheries Sector 
for 1999," (20 December, 1999); Siem Reap Department of Agriculture, "Annual Report for 1997," 
(17 December, 1997); ———, "Report on Fisheries Sector for 1999."; ———, "Report for Fishing 
Season 1998-99," (30 May, 1999). 
8 Caroline Hughes, "The Seila Program in Cambodia," in Aid that works: successful development in 
fragile states, ed. Jame Manor (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2007), 86-87. 
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population. This indeed applies to other natural resources involving huge and 
diverse users, such as forestry and mining.9 Data on the total number of fishers is 
unavailable. Surveys on selected provinces, however, show that the number is 
substantial. A survey of eight provinces in 1995/6, for example, found that more 
than 1 out of 4.2 million people were either full- or part-time fishers, with the rest 
fishing occasionally.10 There is further demographic pressure with almost 1/3 of the 
total population living in the Tonle Sap Lake Basin where fishing is a major means 
of livelihood.11 This area also has larger family sizes with an average of 6-8 
persons per family and the highest incidences of poverty with 40-60% of the 
households living in poverty.12 At the country level, the population has almost 
quadrupled to 15 million in the last three decades, with a population growth rate of 
1.54%, putting 210,000 people into the labor force every year. Because job creation 
in other sectors cannot absorb most new entrants, many are likely to enter into 
fishing or fishing/farming – hence likely to increase the incidences of illegal fishing 
and forest clearance.13 
Weber argues that the state (successfully) claims control over its territory and the 
people within it; however, controlling million hectares of water body and flooded 
forest and (disorganized) rural fishers and fishers/farmers is almost untenable. 
Illegal fishing activities, extraction using medium-scale gears with little or no 
formal rent payment and flooded forest clearance by small and medium scale 
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fishers/farmers is ubiquitous, and there is no sign that these activities are abating.14 
Experts thus correctly believe that the sub-sectors are ‘too dispersed to be 
efficiently monitored.’15 Gamal Abdul-Nasser stated: ‘[F]ighting against ourselves 
is naturally much more difficult than fighting against an outside enemy.’16 
Likewise, for the Cambodian state, to successfully challenge the ‘cooking pots’ of 
million citizens is more than an uphill battle. 
The state capacity to manage medium scale fishers before the reforms did not fare 
any better.17 To exemplify, the FL decrees that this scale be licensed and carried 
out in a designated area using gears specified in the license.18 Studies and this 
research prove that the reality was messy at best with fishers fishing where they 
wanted, used gears without any regards to the licenses and in many cases without 
payment of formal rents. In addition, they have carried out illegal activities in 
public access areas and sanctuaries.19 Their most flagrant defiance against any rule 
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19 Cf. Sithirith Mak and Sokkhoeun Te, "Community Fisheries--Up and Down the Hill: A Case 
Study of Phat Sanday Community Fishery in Kampong Svay District, Kampong Thom Province," 
(Phnom Penh: Fisheries Action Coalition Team), 2-3; Khai and Thai, "Community Participation in 
Fisheries Management: A Case Study from Tboung Khlaa and O Mreah Villages, Stung Treng 
Province, Kingdom of Cambodia," 2-4; Somony Thay, "Current Perceptions of Local Fishers of 
Community Fisheries or Co-Management of Fisheries: A Case Study" (paper presented at the 4th 
Technical Symposium on Mekong Fisheries, Phnom Penh, 2001), 37; Swift, Developing a Research 
Framework for the Fishing Lot System in Cambodia: Two Preliminary Case Studies on Fishing Lots 
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of law is the survival of this scale beyond 2001, when a prime ministerial prakas 
ordered its abolition. Over the past few years, the use of large-medium scale gears 
such as arrow-shaped traps extending a few kilometers in public access areas and 
large dragging nets in sanctuaries is well-documented and found to have been 
extensively used by fishers in Province A.20 A letter from the Governor of 
Kampong Thom to the Minister of Interior (MoI) in January 2009, for instance, 
reports that there were between 20 to 100 pair dragging nets of between 1,000 to 
2,000m or longer with mesh sizes of between 1 to 2cm dragged by 180-250 
horsepower engines in Tonle Sap operating since November 2008.21 
Where CFCs are weak, this form of large-medium scale fishing and illegal fishing 
seep in. Selected case studies show that this large-medium scale fishing occurred in 
many CFi areas in violation to the communities’ internal rules and CFi 
management sub-decree.22 Over the past decade, Site 1 suffered from such a 
practice of fine-meshed net arrow-shaped traps each extending between one to 
three kilometers, fine-meshed dragging nets with high capacity boats and pumping 
lakes/streams, mainly by outsiders. Such incidences indeed take place in many 
other CFi areas around Cambodia.23 In countries with poor law and order the 
powerful private interests have more power to coerce citizens to follow their 
                                                                                                                                                                 
in Takeo and Kompong Chhnang Provinces: 10; Chap, Carl, and Leng, "Fisheries Conflict and a 
Failed Community Fishery in Phat Sanday Commune, Kampong Svay District, Kampong Thom 
Province."; Sopheap Ken et al., "Sustainable Livelihood in Anlong Raing Community Fisheries," 
(2004), 1-2; Ahmed, Touch, and Nao, "Sustaining the Gifts of the Mekong: The Future of 
Freshwater Capture Fisheries in Cambodia," 6. Informant 79. 
20 Cf. Mak and Grundy-Warr, "Changes in Fishing Technologies and the Politics of Environmental 
Transformation," 20; Patrick, Melissa, and Puadyal, Flood Forest, Fish and Fishing Villages: Tonle 
Sap, Cambodia: 34; Try, "Making Space and Access in Fisheries Resource Management for Local 
Communities in Stung Treng Province," 6; NGO Forum on Cambodia, "Review of Fishery 
Conflicts in Stung Treng," 5; Lamberts, Tonle Sap Fisheries: A Case Study on Floodplain Gillnet 
Fisheries in Siem Reap, Cambodia: 57.. Informant 92. 
21 Kampong Thom Provincial Hall, "Report on the Illegal Fishing in Tonle Sap in Phat Sanday and 
Peam Bang Communes in Kampong Thom," (2 January, 2009).  An investigation in Chong Khneas 
commune in Siem Reap in 2006 by the ACU also found out that gears of similar capacity were used 
as well. Council of Ministers, "Report on the Investigation of Complaint by Fishers in Chong 
Khneas village, Chong Khneas Commune, Siem Reap District and the Collection of Information on 
the Tax Payment of Hotel, Guesthouses, Massage Clubs and Restauratns in Siem Reap," (10 May, 
2007). 
22 Tep et al., Asserting Rights, Defining Responsibilities: Small-Scale Fishing Communities and 
Fisheries Management. Perspectives in Asia, A Study on Cambodia: 7-14; Khai and Thai, 
"Community Participation in Fisheries Management: A Case Study from Tboung Khlaa and O 
Mreah Villages, Stung Treng Province, Kingdom of Cambodia," 7; Viner et al., Development of 
Fisheries Co-management in Cambodia: A Case Study and Its Implications: Chapter 2; Marschke, 
"Livelihood in Context: Learning with Cambodian Fishers," 72. 
23 Informant 23; Informant 24; Informant 25-27; Informant 29-43; Informant 45-59; Informant 60; 
Informant 62-64; Informant 67. Battambang Fisheries Cantonment, "Name List of Potential 
Perpetrators Using Bor in Battambang." 
106 
 
rules,24 and this applies to these powerful fishers. In Site 1, they did not allow CFi 
members to go close to their gears or use small gears near an arrow-shaped trap for 
fear of disturbing ‘their fish’. Likewise, CFi members were not permitted to go to 
the lakes when they were being pumped. Some community members report that 
they had been verbally threatened for the disobedience to these prohibitions.25 
In post-communist countries, informal practices and structures thrive as much as 
formal ones.26 In Cambodia, three informal social relations are identified as 
essential for a successful fishing business: khnong (backers), khsae/tuyo 
(string/pipe) and moy (some sort of lop-sided business partnership).27 To illustrate, 
the money to make an arrow-shaped trap is huge. Key informants put the amount 
between $15,000 and $70,000 per trap – something some fishers cannot afford.28 
Hence they need to borrow money from a rich fisher/trader to construct ones, 
usually on the condition that they sell the fish to the latter below the market price, 
and some simply rent the traps from rich ethnic Vietnamese fish traders. Likewise, 
some fishers do not have enough money to buy dragging nets; they too rent the nets 
from richer fishers/traders on similar conditions. It is these higher bosses who deal 
with any issue that may arise from using these illegal gears.29 Edward Shils 
understands the periphery as a ‘passive recipient’ and does not affect the 
capabilities of the center. By contrast, as van Acker put it: “The state may order but 
it does not exist in a void;” there are other individuals, and in these cases they are 
the medium-scale fishers and/or their backers, who try ‘to position themselves to 
exploit’ the natural resources, propose their rules, offer their versions of the 
survival strategies to other fishers and adopt practices which resemble little to what 
the state dictates.30 
                                                          
24 Englehart, "State Capacity, State Failure, and Human Rights," 168. 
25 Informant 29-43; Informant 45-59. 
26 Grzymala-Busse and Luong, "Reconceptualizing the State: Lessons from Post-Communism," 
534. 
27 For example, loans on the condition that the fish is sold to a lender or advancement of fund for lot 
bidding on the condition that once the bidder won the smaller lenders would gain an access to a 
section of the lot. Piseth Chiep, "A Case Study of Everyday Practices among Fishers in Tonle Sap 
Lake, Cambodia" (Chiang Mai University, 2001), iv; Try, "Making Space and Access in Fisheries 
Resource Management for Local Communities in Stung Treng Province," 16-17. 
28 Informant 24; Informant 25-27; Informant 29-43. 
29 Informant 24; Informant 62-64. 
30 Cf. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in 
the Third World: 8-33; ———, State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and 
Constitute One Another: 45-65; Try, "Making Space and Access in Fisheries Resource Management 
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The 2001 reforms were an attempt to attain more distributive justice. The reforms 
were well-intended, yet due to the weak post-reform legal-institutional framework, 
the benefit was more than less skewed towards richer fishers. Kingsbury notes that 
‘the incapacity of a state to extend its power and authority to the extent of its 
sovereign territory…implies that the equitable and consistent rule and application 
of law are reduced or no longer available.’31 Post-reform reports and evaluations 
show that wealthier fishers and businesses quickly exploited the vacuum through 
gear graduation and intense exploitation, while some others have carried out 
extensive forest clearance for farming or purely speculative purposes, hence they 
have benefited disproportionately from the reforms.32 As an illustration, a DoF 
report lists numerous instances of forest clearance of between 20 and 2,000 
hectares between 2000-06 by farmers and businesses for possession.33 All in all, 
though much smaller in number, these medium scale fishers and businesses owing 
to their socio-economic and political power pose substantial challenge to state 
capacity. 
Before 2001 there was almost no community representative of any form speaking 
on behalf of small or medium scale fishers. The nullification of medium-scale 
fishing in 2001 only makes it illegal, but not illegitimate. All this points to one 
thing: It was impossible to involve millions of small and medium scale fishers into 
any meaningful policy and legislation discussions or into meaningful R&D 
activities or to provide them with assistance. While small scale fishing is rent-free 
(at least formally), the disorganization and mismanagement of the medium scale 
                                                                                                                                                                 
for Local Communities in Stung Treng Province," 11; van Acker, Cambodia's Commons: Changing 
Governance, Shifting Entitlements?: 23.  
31 Kingsbury, Political Development: 183-84.  
32 Manfield and MacLeod, Advocacy in Cambodia: Increasing Democratic Space: 48; Tep et al., 
Asserting Rights, Defining Responsibilities: Small-Scale Fishing Communities and Fisheries 
Management. Perspectives in Asia, A Study on Cambodia: 7-14; Thay, "Current Perceptions of 
Local Fishers of Community Fisheries or Co-Management of Fisheries: A Case Study," 99; van 
Acker, "Don't Trust Fish When They Are in Water: Cambodia's Inland Fisheries in Transition," 31; 
Mak, "The Environmental Management in Tonle Sap Lake, Cambodia," 9-21; Oxfam Great Britain, 
Evaluation of the Impact of the Fisheries Reform in Cambodia on the Livelihoods of Poor Fishers: 
5-13; Thay, Sim, and So, "Fisheries Policy Reform and Legal Framework for Community 
Fisheries," 31-37; Patrick, Melissa, and Puadyal, Flood Forest, Fish and Fishing Villages: Tonle 
Sap, Cambodia: 5-6; Department of Fisheries, Impacts of the Fisheries Policy Reforms in Kampong 
Cham, Pursat and Takeo Provinces: First Round Assessment Report: 25-52. Informant 1; Informant 
13; Informant 66; Informant 68; Informant 80. 
33 Department of Fisheries, "Table of Names of People Destroying Flooded Forest and 
Expropriating Land in Fishing Lots and CF Areas," (14 February, 2006). 
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fishing saw the state extracted only minimal rent before 2001, and its out-law 
simply exhausts the state from any rent collection from it. 
3. From No Representation to Pseudo-Representation? 
According to Kingsbury, in more traditional societies, localized elite groups may 
occupy positions in their communities.34 Besides, in states with limited capacity, 
the formalization of relationship between state and society might result in elites 
carving up ‘the benefits of state institutions to maintain their own networks of 
power-preserving patronage and clentelism.’ That is, the de-concentration of 
administrative responsibilities for natural resource management to small groups of 
local elites may see the domination of those ‘proficient in and connected to 
administration’ and endanger and narrow political representation.35 Migdal’s 
examples of villages undergoing external market penetration and the case study of 
Egypt prove the state’s inability to minimize the local elites’ power through local 
institutional reforms. Local elites can be so adaptive and manipulative, spring up in 
other forms to dominate and exploit local politics and adopt rules that do not 
necessarily reflect state desires.36 Evans emphasizes that embeddedness and 
autonomy must go hand in hand to produce a positive-sum result. In the subsectors 
in this study, embeddedness with little capacity and morale on the part of the 
society and little motivation and rationale for the state’s apparatus to engage 
meaningfully with the CFCs ensures that the embeddedness is unlikely to bear 
much fruit. 
The political landscape in rural Cambodia is not stagnant. It was observed that 
‘rural society in becoming more plural, more complex and more open, and at the 
same time less predictable, less docile and less easily subdued.’ However, politics 
is still dominated by local elites of different walks of life.37 Even when new 
institutions such as Village Development Committees (VDCs) are established, they 
                                                          
34 Damien Kingsbury, "Community Development," in International Development: Issues and 
Challenges, ed. Damien Kingsbury, et al. (New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2008), 231. 
35 David Roberts, "Post-Conflict Statebuilding and State Legitimacy: From Negative to Positive 
Peace?," Development and Change 39, no. 4 (2008): 544-45.Van Koppen cited in Frank van Acker, 
Free Riders and Social Fences: Common Property, Collective Action and Decentralized Natural 
Resource Management in Cambodia  (Phnom Penh: The Learning Institute and German 
Development Cooperation, 2010). 110-01. 
36 Joel Migdal, Peasants, Politics, and Revolution: Pressures toward Political and Social Change in 
the Third World  (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1974); ———, Strong Societies and 
Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World: 190-98. 
37 Ojendal and Kim, "Korob, Kaud, Klach: In Search of Agency in Rural Cambodia," 526. 
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can be quickly transformed into a patronage-based institution and captured by local 
authorities. In the words of Judy Ledgerwood and John Vijgen: “It will be no 
surprise that former ‘patrons’ took over the new power positions. Village chiefs, 
their deputies or their relatives became chairmen, or at least members of the VDC, 
and thus re-established their power base.’38 This has re-enforced the patron-client 
relationship and allowed local elites to dominate local committees – a phenomenon 
prevalent in both government and NGO-established institutions.39 
Aristotle contends that the ‘best political community’ is one where a large middle 
class exists and plays a balancing act between other classes. However, in small 
states, citizens are usually divided into two classes ‘who are either rich or poor and 
[] leave nothing in the middle,’ and this affects the proper functioning of the state.40 
Cristina Manfield and Kurt MacLeod observed such phenomenon in Cambodia: 
“As Cambodia’s middle class is just barely emerging, the country does not benefit 
from this central stabilizing factor.’41 Local politics in Cambodia is thus affected by 
the fact that the educated middle class is almost absent, while the overwhelming 
majority of the poor and illiterate are too powerless or ignorant to get involved in it, 
leaving local politics, including the management of government-established or 
NGO-created local bodies, to a small pool of local elites – those who have time, 
money and/or literacy.42 
 
                                                          
38 Cited in Hughes, The Political Economy of Cambodia's Transition, 1991-2001: 55-56. 
39 van Acker, Cambodia's Commons: Changing Governance, Shifting Entitlements?: 43-44; 
Amanda Bradley, Natural Resources Management Networking in Cambodia: Status, Lessons 
Learned, and Future Possibilities  (Community Forestry International, 2005). 30. 
40 Cited in Ebenstein and Ebenstein, Great Political Thinkers: Plato to the Present: 112. 
41 Manfield and MacLeod, Advocacy in Cambodia: Increasing Democratic Space: 8. 
42 The Ministry of Planning and the World Bank highlight that poverty in Cambodia is a ‘rural 
phenomenon.’ The national poverty rate is 39.7%. Of this, 93.4% lives in rural areas, making up of 
4.7 million people. Moreover, there is a positive correlation between poverty, income earning 
capacity and level of education and the chances of sustaining a child’s education. In 1990, the adult 
literacy rate was predicted to be 62%, increasing to 73.6% in 2004. Like poverty, illiteracy is also a 
rural phenomenon. As illustrated with the four CFCs, there is only a tiny fraction of household 
heads who attain senior high school education, and almost none attain post-secondary education. 
Field interviews with villagers in Site 1 reveal that none of the children in the village goes to 
university and only a few complete senior high school education. World Bank, Cambodia Halving 
Poverty by 2015?: Poverty Assessment 2006  (Washington D.C.: East Asia and the Pacific Region, 
World Bank, 2006). 17-54; Asian Development Bank, Country Strategy and Program 2005-2009: 
Kingdom of Cambodia: 34; Ministry of Planning, A Poverty Profile of Cambodia 2004  (Phnom 
Penh: Ministry of Planning, 2006). vii-xvi. Informant 45-59. 
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Table 15: Educational Attainment of Household Heads in Selected CFCs43 







Otrel 13% 46% 36% 5% 0% 
Srey Chik 26% 53% 16% 5% 0% 
Chroy Chek 50% 44% 5% 0% 0% 
Thnal Dach 28% 58% 9% 4% 1% 
The new politics of fisheries/forest management, though allotting more physical 
space to smaller scale fishers, continues to see the rise of a new group of local 
elites – CFC members – and their manipulation by former concessionaires. After 
the 2001 reforms, there were complaints that previous local elites defied or 
manipulated the order and continued to exploit the released areas.44 Moreover, 
some DoF-established CFCs were allegedly dominated by former 
concessionaires/operators and proved to be self-serving and destructive.45 Apart 
from this manipulation by outsiders, an LNGO advisor warns that the CFi 
registration process and management is too complicated and time consuming for 
the poor to get involved in it; therefore, CFi registration and management is carried 
out by a small group of well-off or well-connected elites sometimes for their 
personal benefits.46 Two case studies of four different CFCs substantiate this claim 
– that is, the CFCs are staffed by people with affluence and influence: people who 
have relationships and strong networks. The CFC introduction has therefore 
reinforced the social position and hierarchy: those with ‘freedom to maneuver’ 
participate actively. Those with less privilege participate more passively and those 
using illegal gears are ostracized or excluded.47 
                                                          
43 Data sources: Chap, "Effectiveness of Participation in management and Use of Community-Based  
Fishery Resources in Kampong Siem District, Kampong Chhnang Province."; Meas, "Effectiveness 
of the Participation Management of Fisheries Resources as Community Fishery-Base, in Srey Chik, 
Kanh Chor Commune, Konn Dieng District Pursat Province."; Phlang, "Management and 
Utilization of Fisheries Resources on Fisheries Community in Otroel Thalaboriwat Stung Treng 
Province."; Sophanha Chap, "The Situation of Inundated Forest after Fisheries Reform: A Case 
Study in Thnal Dach Community in Sotra Nikorm District, Siem Reap Province" (Royal University 
of Agriculture, 2004). For Otrel CFC, the educational attainment is of sampled CF members. 
44 Cf. van Acker, Free Riders and Social Fences: Common Property, Collective Action and 
Decentralized Natural Resource Management in Cambodia: 110-01; Department of Fisheries, 
Impacts of the Fisheries Policy Reforms in Kampong Cham, Pursat and Takeo Provinces: First 
Round Assessment Report: 24; Mak and Grundy-Warr, "Spaces of Engagement and Contested 
Territories of the Tonle Sap," 21. 
45 Mak, Heun, and Pen, "Decentralization and Natural Resource Management in Cambodia: 
Implication of the Decentralization Process to Date, A Case Studies in Pursat Province," 13. 
46 Informant 4. 
47 Two are coastal-based CFCs. Melissa Marschke, "From Planning to Action: What Can 
Community-Based Management Look Like 'on the Ground'," in The Development of CBNRM in 
Cambodia, ed. Serey Rotha Ken, et al. (Phnom Penh: CBNRM Learning Institute, 2005), 268; ——
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The fieldwork shows another sign of local elite capture of the reforms; that is, 
many of the old guards ‘elected’ into this new institution back to 2001 or a bit later 
have still stayed intact. This is the case in a floating CFC in Pursat, three CFCs in 
Province B and one CFC in Province A. There was a re-shuffle in the latter in 2006 
because the head had resigned. The deputy was promoted and a patrol team 
member added to the CFC with no election in contradiction to the law.48 According 
to an LNGO working on CFCs and a division leader in Province B, no-elections 
and patronage appointments are generally the case for other CFCs in this 
province.49 The other CFC in Province A experiences regular elections due in part 
to the funding from NGOs. However, some old members accused of practicing 
destructive fishing or collecting bribes have been re-elected.50 
There are two more issues related to elite capture of the reforms. Available 
literature shows that some CFC members have too many roles and some 
government officials and local authorities are members of CFCs, which may 
compromise their work quality and neutrality. Melissa Marschke, for instance, 
finds that in the sites she studies, some CFC members sit in three or four village 
level committees.51 In Site 1, the newly elected CFC head is also the CBO head, 
and according to the village chief, some CFC members sit in other village level 
committees, including the agricultural groups.52 Furthermore, there are cases in 
which elements of village/commune authorities and government officials sit in 
CFCs. A village chief who is also a CFC head opines that the CC overseeing his 
village wants to see more village authorities in the CFCs as that ‘may help facilitate 
contacts between the two institutions.’53 
                                                                                                                                                                 
—, "Livelihood in Context: Learning with Cambodian Fishers," 66-67; Whittingham, "Sites of 
Practice: Negotiating Sustainability and Livelihoods in Rural Cambodia," 169-90. 
48 Informant 21; Informant 71-78; Informant 86-88. 
49 Informant 84-85; Informant 89. A few CFC heads in this province reason that elections may even 
backfire as ‘bad’ fishers can be voted into the committees; thus sometimes appointments can work 
better. Informant 21; Informant 71-78; Informant 86-88. This may hold some truth as the election in 
Site 1 shows. 
50 Informant 24; Informant 25-27; Informant 60. 
51 van Acker, "Don't Trust Fish When They Are in Water: Cambodia's Inland Fisheries in 
Transition," 41; Oxfam Great Britain, Evaluation of the Impact of the Fisheries Reform in 
Cambodia on the Livelihoods of Poor Fishers: 10-11; Marschke, "Livelihood in Context: Learning 
with Cambodian Fishers," 7. 
52 Informant 24. The issue was not probed in the other four CFs. 
53 Informant 21; Informant 86-88. Also, Bunthoeun Sim et al., "Overall Analysis and Synthesis," in 
Key Factors That Influence the Success of Community Fisheries Management, ed. Vuthy Ly, et al. 
(Phnom Penh: CBNRM Learning Institute, 2006), 62; Chap, "The Situation of Inundated Forest 
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The other is the manipulation of the resources by former concessionaires/operators 
or rich villagers and the resulting poor governance within CFCs. There are 
accusations that CFC members use their positions to generate money with little 
accountability and transparency.54 One way to do so is through the sales of fishing 
rights.55 For instance, a CFC head in a floating village in Pursat confesses to such 
sale of the CFC’s section to a nearby lot in 2011, arguing that it is necessary for the 
running of his CFC. His CFi members were not consulted and not even informed of 
the deal.56 There are no sales of fishing rights in the two CFCs in Province A, while 
the three CFCs in Province B have rented parts of the CFi areas since 2001. 
However, the deal is more transparent, participatory and accountable, though the 
standard is still low. A lottery is used to determine who has access rights. Fund 
allocation is consulted with CFi members in a meeting and decided by an open 
vote. The responsible persons are asked to collect the money and thumbprint the 
receipt. However, there is no mechanism to track down how the funds are used, and 
the ‘facilitation’ money given to relevant officials had no receipt.57 
The two CFCs in Province A are not involved in such sales, but some of their CFC 
and patrol team members are implicated in pocketing money from illegal fishers. 
The CC leader in Site 2 reports that CFC members in his commune had pocketed 
money from illegal fishers before the establishment of a CFC union a few years 
ago.58 In the other, selected CFC and patrol team members for the 1st and 2nd 
mandates (2004-2010) were involved in bribery. The alleged bribe per arrow-
shaped trap and lake/stream pumping is between $12-25 and $25-50, accordingly. 
Therefore, they could collect considerable bribes because in 2009 and 2010, 24 and 
32 traps, respectively, were spotted in this CFi area and eight big and many smaller 
lakes/streams were pumped. The heads and their deputies were not implicated in 
this collusion; however, the 2nd mandate head was alleged by a patrol member to 
have profited from attending NGO-sponsored seminars and funds for 
dissemination.59 Apart from collecting bribes, some CFC members in this village 
                                                                                                                                                                 
after Fisheries Reform: A Case Study in Thnal Dach Community in Sotra Nikorm District, Siem 
Reap Province," Annex 5. 
54 Informant 7. 
55 See for example, Keang et al., "Conflicts Arising from Re-Allocation of Fishing Lots: Perceptions 
from Community Fisheries in Cambodia," 58. 
56 As interviewed by Informant 21. 
57 Informant 20; Informant 21; Informant 79; Informant 80; Informant 84-85; Informant 86-88. 
58 Informant 79. 
59 In discussing their disunity and breakdown, the village chief metaphorically describes the CFC 
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also use destructive gears – an incidence that is not confined to this village. That is, 
collusion between CFC members and enforcement agencies in collecting fees or 
fines happens elsewhere.60 
4. Fishing Lots – An impediment to State Capacity 
While the sheer number of small and medium scale fishers poses a challenge to the 
state capacity, the power of the handful of concessionaires/operators and their 
challenges to the state’s predominance are likewise enormous, and their 
involvement in augmenting developmental capacity is limited. They set their own 
rules within lots in defiance to the rules set by the state and they participate in the 
minimal level in resource conservation and development. These peripheral social 
actors indeed impact the capacity of the ‘center’ tremendously. Their challenge to 
the state’s predominance and capacity is partly reflected in their defiance to the 
gear stipulation as set forth by the state.61 As discussed earlier, countless illegal 
gears and activities within lots have been reported. The situations are described by 
some as illegal ‘beyond rule of law’ and ‘common’.62 
Field interviews and the deputy PM’s report show that the state of affairs was 
persistent and ongoing, even in research lots whose major role was to balance 
commercial exploitation and environmental protection.63 In June 2011, in response 
to TSA reports, a MAFF undersecretary of state in an internal report states that 
‘there are always illegal activities within lots’ though he doubts the picture that the 
MOWRAM (TSA) depicts.64 Instead of adhering to regulations, these forces use 
gears that enable them to meet their goals – profit maximization – with few 
                                                          
60 Informant 15; Informant 21; Informant 24; Informant 44; Informant 65. See for example, Tom 
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sanctions from the state. Above all, despite the illegality and their running counter 
to the state’s desire, the lot system had stayed intact for more than two decades 
with mostly the same old hands in the business. In a sense, these 
concessionaires/operators defy any penetration into and regulation of their affairs 
and the appropriate use of the resources. These strongmen tugged in rural 
Cambodia cripple the state’s capabilities and hinder the state’s pursuance of its 
development goals and programmes.65 
Besides, these local strongmen have their own informal rules on how other fishers 
can or cannot fish within their lots and the vicinity – another manifestation of the 
‘currency’ in their hands. The mandala model suggests that in the periphery where 
the state capacity is low, regional strongmen are quick to fill in the vacuum and 
establishing a centralized state authority is a challenge. These local strongmen 
‘have been unwilling to relinquish their prerogatives, their ability to devise rules 
governing some aspects of people’s lives… and developed practices contradicting 
the official laws and regulations.’66 This is nowhere truer than in Cambodia and 
especially in these sub-sectors. Hughes’s view of the Cambodian state is that it is 
incapable of maintaining coherence and projecting its power vis-à-vis society.67 
There is a belief in Cambodia, historically reinforced, that ‘paper [law] does not 
have power, people have power.’ That is, power comes from a person and/or a 
weapon.68 In the two sub-sectors, the ‘state may order but it does not exist in a 
void;’ the influential, powerful and wealthy concessionaires put the law into their 
hands and make rules on ‘almost all aspects of the local fisheries, including 
decisions violating the burden book stipulations and requirements.’69 The look into 
how these local chiefs manage lease arrangements and enforce rules in and around 
‘their lots’ below further testifies how much social control they have. 
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Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the 
Third World: xvii. 
66 ———, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the 
Third World: xiii and 30; ———, State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform 
and Constitute One Another: 10 and 49-50. Case studies from Latin American similarly show that in 
new states establishing central authority over and reining in local forces is a major challenge. Daniel 
Levy, "Mexico: Sustained Civilian Rule Without Democracy," in Politics in Developing Countries: 
Comparing Experiences with Democracy, ed. Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and S.Martin Lipset 
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According to Figure 1, the state decrees that fishing lot operations can be done by 
the concessionaires and/or shareholders in the open season. Before the passage of 
the 2010 sub-decree, which bans all types of leases, concessionaires could enter 
into a leasing arrangement with other fishers as far as their catch did not exceed 
50% of the total catch; the leasees abided by the burden book and fisheries 
regulations, and a contract was made and authenticated by relevant PFOs. Family 
scale fishing is not allowed in a lot in the open season, but it is allowed within areas 
set aside within lots year round and within lots in the closed season. Figure 2 
presents how concessionaires/shareholders have translated the law into actual 
practices over the last two decades, bearing little resemblance to what the state 
desires and dictates. It is not a caricature of rules and regulations, but a de-
configuration beyond recognition. 
There could be those holding rights to small lots who operate them by themselves. 
There are also different degrees of lease and sub-lease. However, as a whole 
leasing and sub-leasing is common – one study regards it as ‘the standard system 
for commercial fishing lot management.’72 Some concessionaires/shareholders 
allegedly rent lots from the state for simply leasing, which is totally illegal.73 The 
leasing and multiple sub-leasing are usually done without a contract and on the 
verbal basis. While the leasing is usually on a yearly basis, the sales of fishing 
rights, as seen in Figure 2, are more ad hoc.74 Whereas the de facto leasing and sub-
leasing are already illegal, some concessionaries/operators lease some areas to 
fishers who conduct illegal activities, doubling or tripling the illegal acts.75 Touch 
and Todd are correct to say that with this chaotic arrangement, the imposition of 
the stipulated below 50% catch by leasees is impractical.76 Existing studies provide 
                                                          
72 Bin, "Report on the Result from Implementing Decision 39 SSR Dating 01 July 2011 of the Royal 
Government of Cambodia on the Establishment of Commission to Inspect Development Lot around 
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detailed accounts of messy leasing and sub-leasing as practiced in Lot 19 in Takeo 
in 1997 and Lot 2 in Battambang in 2007-08. Other literature and field interviews 
support these studies, showing that such were practiced in other lots and that such 
arrangement was still ongoing despite its ban.77 
Besides the de facto arrangement above, many concessionaires and sub-leasees 
challenged or disenfranchised small-scale fishers and expropriated the areas set 
aside for them and public and CFi areas.78 Though it is impossible to gauge the 
extent of the illegal expropriation or disenfranchisement, case studies, reports and 
the field interviews show many instances abound and are still ongoing. The 
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Kampong Chhnang PFO head in 2000 described the illegal expropriation as their 
‘customary practice’.79 The expropriation has been probably less intense after the 
withdrawal of the armed forces in 2001. 
Moreover, lots are associated with private enforcement beyond what the state 
allows. The 1989 sub-decree allowed concessionaires the authority to temporarily 
arrest illegal fishers, while the current burden book stipulates that they can 
cooperate with FiA officials to crack down on illegal fishing within lots. However, 
with power, wealth and weapons on their side, such arrangement is open to abuses 
and manipulation. Concessionaires and sub-leasees sometimes arrest, levy fines on 
fishers for poaching and passing through lots, detain alleged poachers by 
themselves, and even inflict injuries or death.80 In countries with poor law and 
order, powerful interests have more elbows to move and coerce the citizens and 
commit human rights abuses.81 With the de facto privatization of fines, arrests and 
a lag in supervision, ‘equitable and consistent rule and application of law are 
reduced or no longer available.’82 
To illustrate, a case study in Kampong Chhnang in 2000 shows two 
concessionaires taking ‘law and order’ into their own hands. Twenty-eight people 
were reported to have been arrested. Thirteen of them were forced to work between 
one week and one month to pay for their alleged illegal fishing. Five were forced to 
pay between 100,000 to 200,000 riels for their freedom. One saw his/her gears 
confiscated and nine were detained. The report added: 
These people were forced to stay at the lot camp and were not allowed to come home 
in the evening. The life in the camp could be compared to a prison. There is a guard, 
keeping an eye on these people to avoid them escaping from the center. They were 
forced to do a variety of works including fishing, cutting forest and making samrah etc. 
The people were arrested mainly because they were accused of trying to fish in the 
fishing lot areas. Most of these people were unaware that these areas belong to the lots, 
for as many years people used to fish there.”83 
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Another separate case study on one of the lots reports that a lot guard killed a fisher 
and that another fisher was on the run due to the allegation of illegal fishing.84 With 
power, money, support, ‘legal loopholes and weak enforcement, fishing lot 
concessionaires continue to practice these methods but are never convicted.’85 
To maintain and enforce their conflicting rules on leasing and access, these 
strongmen are supported by a small colony of private hired guards made up of 
soldiers, police and/or local militia.86 Lot 2 in Battambang, for example, was like a 
‘small empire’ with each entrance to the lot being guarded, a resident armed solider 
protecting each outer fence pen and guards keeping an eye on permitted illegal 
activities.87 In a country like Cambodia, especially in the hinterlands, where power, 
wealth, weapons and politico-military khsae or khnong meet and reinforce each 
other, the power of these ‘neakthom’88 is immense. The lot operation arrangements 
are like a small state within a state with each lot having its rules, norms, sanction, 
rewards, partial sovereignty and armed guards to enforce the rules. 
Besides hindering the penetration, regulation and appropriation as discussed thus 
far, these local chiefs also thwart the state capacity to extract the necessary rents. 
The fishing industry is still ‘too profitable’ for fishing lots to allow scientific 
monitoring by the state,89 which only extracts a fraction of its share. Complaints of 
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catch under-reporting which distort appropriate rent calculation are numerous; 
nevertheless, serious investigation and punishment are rarely heard of.90 In the 
words of van Acker, the involvement of business community in Cambodia’s 
countryside with its weak institutions usually tends to be ‘exploitative, as 
illustrated by commercial logging and fisheries.’91 To recap, these wealthy and 
powerful social forces are particularly capable of weakening the state capacity. In 
addition, to maintain their own version of ‘rules and regulations’, they have both 
positive and negative sanctions, including provisions of protection and a means of 
living to those adhering to them and intimidation, fines, threat, violence or even 
deaths to those who do not support their cause.92 
The concessionaires’ involvement in bolstering the state’s developmental capacity 
has a poor record as well. To recall, a shared project is possible when the social 
actors see positive-sum outcomes.93 In the case of fishing lots, a two-year contract 
does not guarantee that the current lot holders will reap the benefits from resource 
conservation and preservation. A DoF report in 1999, for instance, stated that 
auction lot concessionaires did not conserve and preserve the fisheries resources, 
but focus on the maximal exploitation of the resources.94 The shorter-term leasees 
and sub-leasees find it even more meaningless to conserve the resources and adhere 
to proper management.95 
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With limited oversight, even the long-term lease (4 and 6 years) does not make 
much difference with respect to conservation and rehabilitation. A former fisheries 
official underscores that even when the terms and conditions were lighter and 
expenses on such were less, many ‘research lot’ concessionaires did not even 
bother to fulfill the contracts. In his evaluation, the deputy PM likewise reported 
blatant breaches of the contracts.96 When participation does not produce any direct 
benefits or absence from participation does not have any direct consequences, 
participation is low. For example, not many concessionaires participated in the SPF 
preparation.97 They also provide lot researchers with unreliable information and 
hence contribute little to policy reformulation98 and proper resource management. 
Probably their most meaningful participation in natural resources management is 
flooded forest protection, though this too is ambivalent. There are reports that 
concessionaires clear flooded forest for rice cultivation and gear production.99 For 
example, Nao, Ahmed and Nov Sam reported: “Fishing operations in a fishing lot 
uses on average 20 to 40 km of bamboo fences and 40,000 to 80,000 poles to 
encircle the fish shoal each fishing season.’100 Generally, the lot system has created 
some ad hoc and de facto environmental protection. Even auction lots in the 1990’s 
took some measures to protect the forest and wildlife. Lot 2 in Battambang 
prohibits burning of forest, and if such occurs the contract will be nullified or not 
renewed. Further, flooded forests within lots are better protected than those 
outside.101 All in all, the concessionaires’ participation in the lot development is not 
promising. 
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Apart from the de facto practices discussed so far, another major indication of their 
social control is the big gap in their power vis-à-vis other local actors. More than 
3/4 of conflict managers Mak and Te interviewed believe that powerful groups, and 
in this case, fishing lots and leasees, ‘will be able to win their conflicts over the less 
powerful groups of fishers’102 unless there is political support from the ‘center,’ 
which comes only occasionally and only when it is under intense pressure.103 
Therefore, conflicts are settled by power rather than through rule of law, and there 
is a prevalence of ‘rule by law’ and culture of impunity.104 Because of the weak 
rule of law “a local process to determine exclusion and access, based on equal 
voice and opportunity, has limited currency in the world of the wealthy and 
powerful [and] there is no other way to stop the wealthy and powerful from 
railroading local rule setting.’105 
The power of CFis as an entity vis-à-vis the concessionaires does not fare much 
better. To illustrate, with a fisheries official’s facilitation, a boundary dispute 
between Lot 8 in Province A and a nearby CFC in 2010 ended with a compromise. 
That is, the concessionaire agreed to rehabilitate a CFi lake, constructing two 
concrete guard posts, placing 25 concrete tubes in and releasing 350 kilograms of 
fingerlings into its conservation area.106 While this CFC can demand some 
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contribution from the lot in exchange for its expansion, the placement of bor by a 
lot operator in another CFi in this province did not see any protest from the then 
CFC. Some CFi members chastised: “The CFi does not lodge a complaint against 
the lot operator. How can we lodge a complaint against him when we are not even 
able to deal with the smaller scale fishers – such as fishers using electro-
fishing?”107 A CFC head in the nearby province admits the difficulty in enforcing 
rules onto concessionaires because ‘these people have money and power.’108 
Referring to the pre-CFC union establishment, a CC leader in Site 2 noted: “The 
CFCs [in his commune] were never in the eyes of the lot concessionaires.109 
The power of commune councilors and village chiefs is also no match for 
concessionaires’. A report by an NGO accuses concessionaires of having little 
respect and regard for the less powerful local authorities, while Swift describes 
concessionaires as ‘probably more powerful than the district chief.’110 According to 
a CC leader, there are illegal activities within lots in his commune; nevertheless, 
they are usually not dealt with unless such an act affects his villagers.111 Villagers 
in Kampong Chhnang believe that such an attitude from their ‘parents’ is because 
they are bought either with fish or money. It is probably more accurate to perceive 
these ‘meso-level statal actors’ as relatively powerless vis-à-vis the more powerful 
interests and hence have to accommodate to their demands.112 
The power of field implementors – sangkat and division officials – vis-à-vis 
concessionaires is not much different from the local politicians’ since they have 
limited capacity to enforce the fisheries law, especially onto concessionaires.113 
Furthermore, they are perceived as ‘allies of the wealthier lot operators and less 
concerned or supportive of small-scale operators.’114 The deputy PM’s report 
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reveals that there was no inspection of gears and activities and no crackdowns on 
illegal activities within lots from fisheries and other relevant officials.115 A 
cantonment and division leader interviewed agrees that there are illegal activities 
within lots, but they are rarely clamped down unless they affect nearby 
communities.116 Key informants believe that FiA officials’ inability to bring the 
concessionaires to obey the state’s law and policies is to do with their limited 
power vis-à-vis these strongmen. According to an NGO director, for example: 
‘[L]ot concessionaires are even more powerful than the RGC’s staff stationed in the 
field to manage the fisheries resources.’117 A former FiA official adds that the 
repercussion of dealing with these big businesses, especially when they have big 
backers, could be a loss of one’s position. A sangkat leader in Province A describes 
his request for fisheries statistics from concessionaires as ‘begging for it,’ while his 
provincial boss identifies research lot concessionaires as less ‘afraid of the FiA’ 
than auction lot concessionaires.118 
As an illustration of concessionaires’ power, these are how two field officials 
locate their position in this power relation. According to the first: 
Lot concessionaires are usually powerful as they have good relationship with officials 
of all levels. They have good relationship with officials from the commune officials, 
provincial joint armed forces, provincial officials, and even officials at the central FiA 
and ministerial levels. Sangkat officials are just very ‘small’ and how can they dare 
challenge lot concessionaires. The field implementors are also afraid of their security 
as they live in a remote area, while those lot concessionaires and the other state armed 
apparatus have money and/or power.119 
The other added: 
The relationship between lot concessionaires/operators and sangkat and division 
officials is generally not so good as the former (the rich ones, particularly) do not 
respect the roles of the latter as they think that they have nothing to be afraid of these 
officials. They only need the cooperation from and build good relationship with the 
cantonment head and provincial governors as they need their support to propose a 
research lot hiring.120 
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Finally, how did these strongmen emerge and sustain their dominance? The origin 
of these local chiefs can be traced to the quick and manipulated liberalization in the 
late 1980’s and early 1990’s, and their sustenance is supported by the fortune they 
have collected and hence diversification to other businesses and in a majority of 
cases backstage support from powerful military or political figures. Daniel Levy 
notes that the Mexican corporatist state under the ‘hegemonic party’ gives special 
treatment to privileged groups for political stability.121 The situation is not much 
different in Cambodia, where “[e]lite groups often receive differential access to 
public services, national resources, and business opportunities.’122 The control over 
fishing lots is a telling example. They are concentrated into the hands of a small 
group of ‘politically and financially powerful.’ In the 1990’s they were in the hands 
of just 135 concessionaires123 and even fewer in the subsequent decades. 
Grzymala-Busse and Luong observe that state building in post-communist 
countries is rapid and unstable, and dominated by both formal and informal 
structures and practices, which ‘are used to varying degrees by both [international 
and domestic] actors seeking to establish their authority.’ This usually gives 
privilege to those who participate in the initial stage of the transition; therefore, 
those accessing the ‘economic, political and/or ideational resources’ have an upper 
hand in resource exploitation.124 The transformation in Cambodia is harsher than 
the description above. Indeed, the socialist-oriented 1980’s was not conducive to 
the rise of a business class – it was also too short a period for political elites to 
amass wealth in large amount. However, the harsher reality is that the country’s 
business groups had perished in or fled the DK regime. Therefore, with the 
overnight liberalization, the business group was too small to handle the enterprises 
that were to be controlled privately. In the fishing lot operation specially, two main 
phenomena helped establish an ‘artificial’ business elite group – rich enough to bid 
for a lot – simulated wealth accumulation and simulated auctions.  
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The state legally prohibits bidders from collecting fees from leasees before the 
auction.125 Yet in the 1980’s and 1990’s and beyond, many concessionaires 
collected fees from potential leasees beforehand to deposit to the auction 
committee as required by law.126 This informal practice allows mediocre businesses 
to have enough startup capital to bid for the lots. Other sources of initial capital 
include having relatives or friends as shareholders or lending from relatives, friends 
and/or informal moneylenders. 
As a rule of thumb, to acquire an auction lot, two more informal steps are 
necessary: negotiation with other bidders and arrangements with the auction 
committee. Due to capital intensive and highly organized nature of lot operations, 
the business is dominated by few individuals – therefore bidding is participated 
among limited number of bidders.127 Statal and non-statal stakeholders agree that 
there are collusions and prior arrangements between concessionaires to keep the 
offering prices low. A Battambang deputy governor and the former DoF director, 
for example, concur that there are collusions amongst bidders for either tea money 
or low lot fees.128 A concessionaire recalled the competition in the early 1990’s: 
When the krom samaki system ended in 1991, many in the krom samaki leadership did 
not become lot owners; it was business people who bid for the lots and hired dangkhao 
[lead fishers] to fish on their behalf. There were a lot of cutthroat competitions between 
and amongst those who had expertise in fishing and those business people who had 
money but not fishing technical expertise. This was especially true between 1993 and 
1997.129 
A DoF report refers to the collusion as ‘too complicated for the committees to 
identify’ and to a majority of bidders as ‘rogue’.130 According to a cantonment 
leader, there are two main types of collusions: (1) a discussion between the bidder 
who wants to hire a lot and other bidders on the highest price to be offered and the 
tea money for the latter and (2) a prior discussion amongst bidders for mutual 
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assistance – exchanged promises for not bidding to a certain level for one lot in 
exchange for a similar promise for another lot.131 
Besides this bidder-to-bidder arrangement, there must be arrangements with the 
auction committees. Touch and Todd describe the auction as ‘a mob in the auction 
hall’ with poor organization, collusion and corruption, and enormous expense is 
unavoidable to come on terms with government bureaucrats and skilled 
intermediaries.132 In 1999, letters from many fishers in Kampong Cham accused 
bidders and committees of collusion in price setting, though DoF quickly rejected 
the claims.133 More than a decade later (in 2011), TSA still accused auction 
committees of irregularity and corruption in bidding of seven lots in Kampong 
Cham, Prey Veng and Kandal.134 Likewise, two fisheries officials report that there 
are collusions between bidders and auction committees; a cantonment leader refers 
to the money paid as ‘rotka’ –‘money for facilitation.’135 If the collusions with all 
actors fail to produce any result, competitive (or bloated) bidding takes place or 
else an arrangement with the central administration is needed before another round 
of bidding.136 
Where market mechanisms were still undeveloped, post-communist simulated 
transition in Cambodia ‘allows political capital to substitute for economic capital’ 
or the ‘recycling of the old political elite as an economic one.’137 That is, ‘[a]s the 
state withdrew, informal alliances of state patronage (state bureaucrats, former 
communist party members and cronies) appropriated these assets. Network 
contacts…were transformed into power, and power into property relations and 
private ownership of economic capital.”138 With this high incidence of patronage, 
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‘many privatized assets did not end up in the hands of entrepreneurs who could 
make them productive.’139 All in all, the fisheries resources fell into the hand of 
those who could accumulate enough capital to benefit from the liberalization and 
who had some form of connection to relate to the committees or central DoF and so 
could gain access to the lots and then partition them for profits. The FL sets that 
any collusion in the bidding shall lead to the nullification of bidding results; 
however, that a lot holding is nullified on the ground of collusion has rarely ever 
been heard of.140 
The collusion and corruption in bidding allows an elite group of concessionaires to 
build up and concentrate in this business. An analysis of auction lot concessionaires 
in Kandal and Battambang, for example, shows that in the 1990’s eleven and seven 
concessionaires gained the rights to exploit the same or adjacent lake/stream lots 
for between four and six years (out of eighteen and twelve lots) respectively,141 and 
indeed this pattern of domination happened in other provinces.142 The introduction 
of research lots further sustains and consolidates their power. While many statist 
thinkers draw a line between the state and society, the experience of post-
communist countries reveals that there is little distinction between the private and 
public. Crone shows that even in non-communist countries where business elite 
number is small the state finds it hard to resist the economic dominant groups’ 
interests. And when the interests are implicitly linked to political, military or 
                                                          
139 Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century: 18-19. 
140 An exception was probably the nullification of a number of bidding results in 2011 by the PM 
after TSA found out that there had been irregularity in the bidding in Kampong Cham, Prey Veng 
and Kandal. 
141 Researcher’s calculation from: Battambang Department of Agriculture, "Results of the 
Implementation in the Fisheries Sector: Fishing Lot Fees and Fees on Medium Scale Gears from 
1989 to 1998."; ———, "Report on Incidences of Fishing Disputes on Fishing Exploitation between 
Fishers and Lot concessionaires and Results from Research on Geographical Location of Lakes in 
Fishing Lots in Battambang for Fishing Season 1999-2000 "; Department of Fisheries, "Statistical 
Table of Lots Which Have Deposited for Exploitation for Fishing Seasons 1997-98 and 1998-99."; 
———, "Request for Withdrawal of Exploitation Rights from 53 Research Lot Concessionaires for 
Not Paying Fishing Lot Fees for Fishing Season 2000-2001 as Stipulated in Burden Books or Did 
not Conform to Contracts on Lot Rehabilitation," (Phnom Penh: Department of Fisheries, 8 June, 
2001 ); Kandal Provincial Fisheries Office, "Reports on Fishing Lot Fees for Kandal from 1991."; 
Forestry and Fisheries Ministry of Agriculture, "Decision on Granting of Rights to Bidders for Lot 
Exploitation in Kampong Cham, Kratie, Prey Veng, Kandal, Phnom Penh, and Takeo for Fishing 
Seasons 1997-98 and 1998-99." 
142 Degen & Nao; Luco citied in van Acker, "Don't Trust Fish When They Are in Water: 
Cambodia's Inland Fisheries in Transition," 20-21. Also, Nao, "Community Fish Refuge Husbandry 
in Lowland Agricultural Ecosystem: An Alternative Option for Increasing Fish Supply and 
Improving Economic Condition of Farmers in South-Eastern Region of Cambodia," 42. 
129 
 
bureaucratic leaders, it is even much harder to resist.143 This is nowhere truer than 
in Cambodia, and especially in the fishing industry. Big business through their 
connections and ‘power of the purse’ have favorable access to ‘state resources, 
protection and a wide range of kickbacks…based upon the proliferation of multiple 
inter-personal power relationships in which those with wealth, arms or political 
protection were privileged.’144 The FL and the Order on Management of State 
Property were used to start the rental of research lots.145 However, due to the 
opaque and non-participative nature of its handling, the laws are manipulated by 
‘means of informal alliances and negotiations outside legal frameworks,’ through 
which key figures within the states interfere into DoF’s affairs on behalf of big 
businesses and their relatives.146 Probably business elites find it much easier to 
bank on a central or provincial powerful backer to intervene on their behalf than to 
deal with the auction committees and other ‘rogue’ bidders on more favorable 
terms. Chapter 8 will discuss this topic in more details. 
Migdal theorizes that to maintain their dominance or expand their domination, the 
strongmen have three options, two of which are more concentration in a particular 
field or expansion into other fields. The ‘research lot’ introduction feeds into this, 
thanks partly to the handsome profits from exploiting auction lots for a few 
consecutive seasons. As discussed earlier, since its establishment there has been 
more skewed concentration of the productive lots into the hands of just a few 
dozens of individuals. Besides, the rich concessionaires have expanded their 
businesses into other sectors, such as construction, manufacturing, processing, agri-
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businesses, aquaculture and exporting.147 All these simply build up and consolidate 
their social control vis-à-vis the state and civil society. 
In summary, the state is far from being the sole dominant actor in the sub-
sectors,148 and lot concessionaires held substantial social control before 2012. To 
appreciate the local strongmen’s power, it is worth quoting two informants here. 
One NGO staff opined: 
The state does not have much authority to stop the forest clearance on the Tonle Sap. 
The RGC is only one of the key actors in the Tonle Sap management area. There are 
different levels of government and non-state actors that impact the reduction of the 
inundated forest, and the state does not have the time, money and energy to sort those 
players out.149 
With regards to the danger that LNGO staff may face in their day-to-day 
operations, an NGO board member added that since they are 
working on natural resources [and] working on projects that may challenge those that 
may make a profit…what is probably more dangerous is the upsetting of local power 
men – like the one clearing flooded forest, for example, to create an irrigation scheme 
that the private interest is more dangerous even if they have collusion with the state in 
some way.150 
All in all, such social forces as the Khmer Rouge, CFC members, and all scales of 
fishers flagrantly abuse the fisheries legislation and policies and establish their 
rules and practices, which hinders the state from realizing its full capacity. 
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Chapter 7: Society and State-Society Relations 
As discussed in the theoretical framework, a competent civil society and its 
strength vis-à-vis the state can be a balancing act against the state despotic power 
and can enhance state capacity. Furthermore, a strong and competent civil society 
can check against strong and exploitative social forces. While the previous chapter 
proves that exploitative social actors limit the state capacity, this chapter will prove 
that overall the reform-demanding society is weak and that its engagement with the 
state is restricted, albeit improving. Moreover, its strength vis-à-vis the state is 
rather limited.  
This chapter thus highlights local NGOs’ contributions to state and communities’ 
capacity building and discusses factors limiting their community capacity 
enhancement and their relationship with and power relations vis-à-vis state 
agencies with illustration from LNGOs working on fisheries and forest 
management. This chapter then investigates CFis’ and CFCs’ competency and 
weaknesses with regards to fisheries/forest management and their relationship with 
and power relations vis-à-vis relevant local statal actors. It ends with a brief 
discussion of the absence of fishing lot associations and concessionaires’ 
relationship with relevant state agencies. 
1. Evolution of Society and State-Society Relations at a Glance 
The concept of civil society does exist in Cambodia, although formal social groups 
were rare and bridging groups spanning a few villages probably never existed 
before 1990’s. Little is known about social interactions in Funan and Chenla. This 
too applies to Angkor, though they could have been very ‘structured’. One aspect 
of relations that does have more details is the patronage nature of its religious 
foundations, which could have been ‘economic colonies’ run on endowments, labor 
and in-kind support from assigned villages probably in exchange for protection 
from the lordly families.1 Even during pre-French arrival and decades after 
independence, traces of civil society groups were thin; patron-client relations still 
ruled, and rural dwellers’ contacts with central and regional state agencies/agents 
were sporadic and unfriendly, for example, for taxation and labor conscription.2  
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The term ‘civil society’ (sangkum civil in Khmer) itself had been alien to 
Cambodians before 1992. Even ‘society’ as a lexicon emerged in as late as 1930’s, 
and Cambodians have “preferred to think of themselves in terms of a king and his 
subjects.”3 Even when the ‘modern state’ was established, Sihanouk’s ruling style 
of ‘l’etat c’est moi’ and his treatment of his relationship with the ‘subjects’ as 
‘Papa’ and ‘children and grand-children’ are not role models or an aspiration for 
state-society separation and citizens’ empowerment for latter regimes.4 
Post-communist scholars argue that civil society density and its boundary clarity 
vis-à-vis the state before the collapse of communism affect post-communist elite 
competition and state capacity. Moreover, the discouragement of association and 
coercion to participate in state-sponsored groups impedes post-communist civic 
participation and civil society building. Entrepreneurialism was not supported; such 
endeavor was instead suppressed.5 In Cambodia, the few loosely organized and 
weak state-sponsored mass associations representing youth, workers and women in 
the 1980’s were captured, accommodated or dissolved before and upon the 
perestroika.6 In post-SoC, these organizations or those derived from them are still 
affiliated with the Solidarity Front,7 which is associated with the CPP. Like these 
mass associations, the numerous imposed krom samaki (solidary groups) for 
farming and fishing were likewise not cohesive, but diluted and dissolved in the 
late 1980’s.8 All in all, little trace of ‘civil society’ groups left over from the 
1980’s. 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Ebihara's observation of Svay, for example, is that it lacked ‘indigenous, traditional, organized 
associations, clubs, factions, or other groups that are formed on non-kin principles.” ibid., 148-49. 
3 Chandler, A History of Cambodia: 108.  
4 Sihanouk was not the first king who described the relationship between a king and his subjects in 
familial terms, though. Jayavarman V is inscribed in his eulogy as saying: “Like a father cherished 
by his children, he dried the tears of his afflicted subjects.” Mabbett and Chandler, The Khmer: 163-
64. 
5 Bratton & Walle also concur that the pre-existing conditions of the regimes in Africa determine 
‘the dynamics and outcomes of political transitions.” Michael Bratton and Nicolas Van de Walle, 
"Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa," World Politics 46, no. 4 (1994): 454 
and 85. Although illegal smuggling was happening sometimes with even implicit or explicit support 
from the cadres and family businesses were allowed to operate. See for example, Margaret 
Slocomb, The People's Republic of Kampuchea 1979-1989: The Revolution after Pol Pot  (Chiang 
Mai: Silkworms Books, 2003). Chapter 5. 
6 See for example, Veasna Nuon and Melisa Serrano, Building Unions in Cambodia: History, 
Challenges, Strategies  (Singapore: Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung, 2010); Yonekura, "The Emergence of 
Civil Society in Cambodia: Its Role in the Democratisation Process." 
7 Wim Swann, 21st Century Cambodia: View and Vision  (New Delhi: Global Vision, 2009). 117-
18. 
8 For a discussion of farming solidarity groups, see for example, Sok Udom Deth, "The People’s 
Republic of Kampuchea 1979–1989: A Draconian Savior?" (Ohio University, 2009); Evan 
Gottesman, Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge: Inside the Politics of Nation Building  (New Haven 
133 
 
With the UN’s arrival in 1991 emerged a new ‘civil society’ groups – local NGOs. 
They have contributed quite substantially to state capacity enhancement and civil 
society building; however, there are shortcomings in their operations, and generally 
their relationship with state agencies is not always cordial, but distant and lopsided 
and interactions are less frequent. As for the rural society, in the 1990’s the rural 
social landscape was quite similar to that of the pre-war period with little trace of 
formal civil society groups.9 Joakim Ojendal and Sedara Kim observed: 
“Throughout the 1990s, excluding the organisations crafted by the foreign 
development industry, the ‘Wat Committee’ would typically be the only 
nongovernmental group in most villages and communes.”10 Since then the rural 
social bonds have been denser and varied thanks to the introduction of various 
types of externally funded CBOs. In the sub-sectors, this has given birth to more 
than 500 CFis and their committees (CFC). Frieson argues that the tumultuous past 
has affected Cambodian communities, but ‘there are very few who would argue 
against their resilience.’11 Yet, how Cambodians will transform such groups as 
‘community’ is yet to be seen. 
2. NGOs in Cambodia 
2.1. NGOs’ Contributions to Capacity Building 
Migdal’s focus on society as usurpers of state capacity overshadows the civility of 
organizations that help boost state capacity. While ‘predatory states’ would prefer 
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to delete every trace of civil society, ‘intermediate states’ like Cambodia opt for 
selective suppression and cooperation. This study thus refutes Andrew Cock’s 
condemnation that the ruling elites are trying to ‘disorganize’ civil society and that 
‘state’s energies are thus directed towards preventing the emergence of social 
groupings that might have an interest in transformation.’12 More accurately, Grant 
Curtis notes that ‘limited civil space’ has developed and been permitted,13 and one 
type of civil society organizations that have come to dominate the Cambodian 
political and social landscape since 1990 are NGOs. 
Since 1991 “[c]ivil society organizations and the media have flourished like 
mushrooms after rains,” noted Hun Sen.14 This is an accurate observation of the 
development when it comes to their numbers. Starting with one LNGO (with a 
foreign director) in 1990, the number has increased drastically. The total figure for 
2009 was 3,207 of which 1,933 were NGOs.15 In 2000, over fifty NGOs worked in 
the fisheries/forestland subsectors. According to the SPF, thirty NGOs have worked 
on conservation, development, post-harvest and industry development, credit 
provision,16 and research. 
 
 
                                                          
12 Andrew Robert Cock, "External Actors and the Relative Autonomy of the Ruling Elite in Post-
UNTAC Cambodia," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 41, no. 02 (2010): 247. 
13 Grant Curtis, "Beyond Transition: Cambodia in the Post-UNTAC Period," (United Nations 
Research Institute for Social Development, 1996), Chapter 5, 10.  
14 ———, "Samdach Hun Sen's Key Note Address to the Opening Ceremony of the National 
Conference on 'Democracy, Good Governance and Transparency'," Cambodia New Vision March 
2000, 2. 
15 This first one was the Cambodian Development Research Institute. The first NGO with a 
Cambodian director – Khemara – was established in 1991. Yonekura, "The Emergence of Civil 
Society in Cambodia: Its Role in the Democratisation Process," 53. Including a few hundred 
INGOs. The initial purpose for the establishment of the local NGOs was to carry out development 
programs of parents INGOs or other aid agencies. However, over the years, they have diversified 
and engaged in activities ranging from pure human rights advocacy, legal representation, research, 
social service deliveries, rural community development, etc. Cf. Asian Development Bank, 
"Cambodia: Overview of NGOs," (2005), 2-3; Manfield and MacLeod, Advocacy in Cambodia: 
Increasing Democratic Space: 7. 
16 Campbell, Department of Fisheries Institutional Review: 16; Fisheries Administration, The 
Strategic Planning Framework for Fisheries: 2010-2019, 2: 56. FAO, World Fish Center, Oxfam 
GB, Leuceana, JICA and Forum Syd are some INGOs that have programs dedicated to fisheries 
and/or inundated forest issues. Some prominent local NGOs working on fisheries and inundated 
forests are the Fisheries Action Coalition Team (FACT), the Learning Institute (LI), and the more 
nascent Cambodian Coalition of Fishers (CoCF). There are also province-based LNGOs working on 
the issues. For example, in Battambang there are Krom Aphiwat Phum (KAWP), Village Support 
Group (VSG), Aphiwat Satrey (AS), and CSID. 
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Table 16: Number of NGOs and Associations in Cambodia17 
Year INGOs LNGOs and Associations Miscellany 
1990 ≈ 30 1 1 LNGO 
1998 133 159  
1999 200 > 250 Both stood at some 900, according to Hun Sen. 
2001 250 867 Only 200-400 LNGOs were active. 
2003 ≈ 200 > 800 93% and 45% of international NGOs (INGOs) and LNGOs, 
respectively, were active. 
2005 337 1,495  
2009 3,207 1,933 NGOs and 1,274 associations 
There are four ways NGOs help boost the state capacity: advocating for other civil 
society groups; strengthening their capacity; building up a sense of community and 
giving weight to communities in dealing with other stakeholders. First, many 
NGOs are active in advocating for the rights of rural communities and committed 
to human right protection and act as watchdogs against its violations.18 The 2001 
reforms were, for example, attained due partly to NGOs’ advocacy. Then NGO 
Forum on Cambodia conducted workshops to discuss fisheries issues and studies 
unearthing concessionaires’ culpability and fishers’ suffering, and advocated on 
fishers’ behalf. In 1999, fishers in Site 2 were accused of destroying a 
concessionaire’s gears and he brought the matter to court, resulting in the arrest of 
eight alleged leaders. During a protest for their release, two NGOs provided 
protesters with logistical and moral support.19 
                                                          
17 Data source: Researcher’s compilation from Asian Development Bank, A Study of NGOs: 
Cambodia  (Manila: Asian Development Bank, 1999). 2; ———, Country Assistance Program 
Evaluation for Cambodia: 50; Cambodia New Vision, "Samdach Hun Sen: A Good Friend (NGOs) 
Singled Out During Hardship," Cambodia New Vision November 1999, 1-3; Kato et al., Cambodia: 
Enhancing Governance for Sustainable Development: 31; ———, "Summary of Cambodia 
Governance Assessment," in Key Governance Issues in Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand, and Viet 
Nam, ed. Clay G. Wescott (Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2001), 11; Malena et al., Linking 
Citizens and the State: An Assessment of Civil Society Contributions to Good Governance in 
Cambodia: 9; Manfield and MacLeod, Advocacy in Cambodia: Increasing Democratic Space: 6; 
Yonekura, "The Emergence of Civil Society in Cambodia: Its Role in the Democratisation Process," 
52-53. Also, Cambodia New Vision, "Samdach Hun Sen: A Good Friend (NGOs) Singled Out 
During Hardship," 3. 
18 Cf. CICP as cited in Hughes, The Political Economy of Cambodia's Transition, 1991-2001: 155; 
Un, "State, Society and Democratic Consolidation: The Case of Cambodia," 236. 
19 Informant 71-78. According to their account, the previous lot operator allowed fishers to fish in 
ponds and lakes near the village. However, in 1999 a new operator claimed that the area belonged to 
the lot and prohibited villagers from fishing there, while villagers claimed that this area traditionally 
belongs to them. The lot operator employed gears to catch fish in this area; however, the villagers 
took the matter into their own hands and destroyed the gears. Some of the accused, according to the 
informants, did not even participate in this. A former villager chief, who was alleged to have thumb-
printed identifying the eight as leaders, denied that he ever gave his thumbprint and reported that he 
did not even meet the police officer. He believed that it was the police officer who falsified his 
print. A few village elders consulted with one of the two NGOs and asked for their help; however, 
the NGO encouraged them to protest on their own and gave them some ideas of how to go ahead. 
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Next, NGOs facilitate establishment of community-based groups/associations, 
including CFis, and have contributed to establishing hundreds of them. In the 
subsectors, according to field observations, facilitation includes training key 
fishers, conduct of elections and provision of per diems to government officials for 
their participation. NGOs also play an active role in CFi capacity and institutional 
development.20 Some post-election assistance provided by two NGOs in both 
provinces to partner CFis includes consulting on by-laws and other legal 
requirements, CFC registration, capacity building via awareness raising workshops 
and study tours, meeting facilitation, cash and in-kind support, and linking 
communities to local statal actors.21 Two things are noteworthy: CFCs with a few 
years of NGOs support are more capable than their counterparts with no such 
support, and the presence of active NGOs usually facilitates the working 
relationship between CFCs and local authorities (and to some extent fisheries 
officials). While CFis with no such facilitation can end up in hostility and/or power 
imbalance in favor of state agencies.22 Overall, NGOs receive positive rating from 
researchers and communities they assist.23 
Third, with a change in their donors’ development approach, many LNGOs are 
shifting their focus and are assisting communities with the establishment and 
                                                          
20 Asian Development Bank, A Study of NGOs: Cambodia: 2; Kate Grace Frieson and Sithan Pech, 
"Social Landscape and Rural Livelihoods in Transition," in Social Landscape and Rural 
Livelihoods: Cambodian Communities in Transition, ed. Kate Grace Frieson (Phnom Penh: The 
Learning Institute, 2010), 36; World Bank, Country Assistance Strategy of the World Bank Group 
for the Kingdom of Cambodia: 13-14. 
21 Informant 70; Informant 71-78; Informant 84-85; Informant 86-88. Cf. Degen et al., "People, 
Power, and Fisheries Policy: Fisheries Management Reform Addressing Community Fisheries in 
Cambodia," 24; Neou et al., "Towards a Holistic Approach to Wetland Governance: The Legal and 
Institutional Framework and Economic Evaluation of Wetland Resources in Cambodia," 74; Oxfam 
Great Britain, Evaluation of the Impact of the Fisheries Reform in Cambodia on the Livelihoods of 
Poor Fishers: 1. For case studies, cf. Khai and Thai, "Community Participation in Fisheries 
Management: A Case Study from Tboung Khlaa and O Mreah Villages, Stung Treng Province, 
Kingdom of Cambodia," 6-8; Tath et al., "Case Study on Community Fisheries Established in 
Kampong Chhnang and Battambang Provinces, Cambodia."; Katherine Viner, "Assessing Success 
of Community Fisheries in Cambodia: An Institutional Analysis of Co-management Arrangements" 
(University of London, 2004), 76-78; Viner et al., Development of Fisheries Co-management in 
Cambodia: A Case Study and Its Implications. 
22 Informant 6; Informant 12. Khai and Thai, "Community Participation in Fisheries Management: 
A Case Study from Tboung Khlaa and O Mreah Villages, Stung Treng Province, Kingdom of 
Cambodia," 14; Middleton, "The Expansion of the ADB’s Influence in Cambodia’s Water Sector: 
Judging the Effectiveness of ADB Water Management Projects in the Tonle Sap Basin," 16-17; 
Patrick, Melissa, and Puadyal, Flood Forest, Fish and Fishing Villages: Tonle Sap, Cambodia: 1; 
Tath et al., "Case Study on Community Fisheries Established in Kampong Chhnang and 
Battambang Provinces, Cambodia."  
23 Informant 12. Kato et al., Cambodia: Enhancing Governance for Sustainable Development: 46-
47; P. Ngor et al., Pilot Participatory Policy Impact Assessment: Fisheries Policy Related to 
Conservation in Battambang, Kampot and Kratie  (Phnom Penh: Fisheries Administration, 2009). 
16; Tath et al., "Case Study on Community Fisheries Established in Kampong Chhnang and 
Battambang Provinces, Cambodia." 
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management of so-called CBOs, linking various community-based groups and 
associations to build up and strengthen a sense of ‘community’. Finally, since 
2001, they have continued to advocate for fishers, including protests against forest 
clearance and legal representation provision.24 In the words of three fishers: “Now 
that we have partnered with an NGO, the expertise officials such as the fisheries 
officials and military police also somewhat are afraid of us. Previously, they could 
ride a free hand.”25 
Many NGOs also help the state in capacity enhancement in certain ways. They act 
as catalysts bringing relevant state agencies/agents closer to the people. With their 
continuous coordination, interactions between state agencies and communities and 
amongst sub-national state agencies have been strengthened, and the state 
apparatus are more familiar with serving the people.26 For example, some 
commune councilors in Site 2 have changed their working attitude towards 
communities after study tours organized by NGOs.27 Besides, with per diems, state 
officials have been extrinsically motivated to work harder. An NGO program 
officer added: “[A]fter the existence of the CFi sub-decree, the CFDD is more 
active in helping the communities with its establishment and management; 
however, incentives and financial support from NGOs are still necessary.”28 
Finally, some LNGOs (and INGOs) conduct relevant research and communicate 
the findings to the government and hence boost its capacity. 
2.2. Factors Limiting NGOs’ Community Capacity Enhancement 
Since 1990, Cambodia has been a testing ground for community empowerment for 
international donors via NGOs’ catalysis.29 With little financial support from the 
state and private entities, LNGOs are dependent on foreign financial assistance. 
Yonekura, for example, finds that four out of sixty NGOs she had surveyed were 
                                                          
24 Cf. Bradley, Natural Resources Management Networking in Cambodia: Status, Lessons Learned, 
and Future Possibilities: 8; Sithirith Mak and Sokkhoeun Te, "Flooded Forest Clearance for 
Reservoir and Irrigation or Taking Flooded Forestland for Ownership: A Case Study of the Conflict 
Between Community in Poy Tasek Village and a Private Company," (Phnom Penh: Fisheries Action 
Coalition Team); Manfield and MacLeod, Advocacy in Cambodia: Increasing Democratic Space: 
51; Seng, Te, and Mak, "Construction of Space for Small Fishermen in Tonle Sap: Building the 
Fisherman Organization," 6. 
25 Informant 25-27. 
26 Cf. Khai and Thai, "Community Participation in Fisheries Management: A Case Study from 
Tboung Khlaa and O Mreah Villages, Stung Treng Province, Kingdom of Cambodia," 8; Vuthy Ly, 
"Inland Fisheries Management and Institutional Changes in Fisheries in Cambodia," in Governance 
and Institutional Changes in Fisheries: Issues and Priorities in Research, ed. Susana V. Siar, et al. 
(Penang: WorldFish Centre, 2006), 75. 
27 Informant 70. 
28 Informant 13. 
29 van Acker, Cambodia's Commons: Changing Governance, Shifting Entitlements?: 32. 
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solely depended on foreign funding and 68% reported that their main financial 
resources came from foreign donors.30 This heavy reliance on foreign assistance 
affects their ability to assist community building. First, it affects their sustainability 
and sustained support provision to the communities. An NGO leader, for instance, 
confided that his organization would collapse if donors terminated their funding.31 
NGOs in the sub-sectors are no exception. One of the two prominent NGOs in 
province B ceased assisting thirteen partner CFCs due to the funding cuts, and the 
other has reduced the numbers of communities assisted since 2010 because of 
funding reduction. Such are the experience of some NGOs in Province A,32 and 
indeed elsewhere throughout the country. 
Figure 3: Simplified Interaction between Actors in Fisheries Management 












Another factor minimizing the positive impacts of NGOs is the nature in which 
their agendas are set. Contrary to their language of participation empowerment,33 
many donors implicitly or explicitly set the agendas and approaches for LNGOs. 
According to an NGO director, “there are certain donors who impose models of 
                                                          
30 Hughes, The Political Economy of Cambodia's Transition, 1991-2001: 155; Kato et al., 
Cambodia: Enhancing Governance for Sustainable Development: 46-47; ———, "Summary of 
Cambodia Governance Assessment," 11; Yonekura, "The Emergence of Civil Society in Cambodia: 
Its Role in the Democratisation Process," 95. 
31 Malena et al., Linking Citizens and the State: An Assessment of Civil Society Contributions to 
Good Governance in Cambodia: 8; Un, "State, Society and Democratic Consolidation: The Case of 
Cambodia," 239. 
32 Informant 65; Informant 70; Informant 84-85. 
33 Cf. Janet Hunt, "Aid and Development," in International Development: Issues and Challenges, 
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development on their partners and control their growth and direction.” That is, to 
obtain funding, LNGOs have to ‘accept the donor’s rules and play the donor’s 
game.”34 This power imbalance occurs in the subsectors too. For instance, an NGO 
director articulated: “Again, NGOs are feeding up.”35 
To illustrate, the Culture and Environment Preservation Association’s (CEPA’s) 
objectives in community empowerment, instead of being elicited from the 
community, run parallel to those of Oxfam GB, whose policies are set by its UK-
based headquarters.36 This applies to a prominent Scandinavian INGO, whose 
program officer agrees that the objectives and approaches are set by the 
headquarters. For example, since it does not work on livelihood issues, it does not 
support such projects; hence LNGOs wanting its funding must align their proposals 
with its vision and missions. LNGOs thus learn to ‘gauge the direction of the wind’ 
and raise a ‘marketable project’.37 
According to the program officer above, since 2011 his organization has started to 
focus on climate change, a mission set by the headquarters, and helped train some 
partners’ officers to produce proposals for such projects.38 A researcher observed 
the evolution of this funding: “[A]gain donors are coming and the way community 
fisheries are now really about climate change and food security, so if you want to 
get anything funded in fisheries you have to link it to climate change or food 
security.”39 Therefore, many LNGOs working on fisheries/forests now have a 
climate change component in their projects. Besides linking fisheries/forests to 
climate change and food security, the other trend is the shift to funding CBO 
projects. For instance, CEPA had its funding temporarily suspended because it did 
not operationalize its livelihood enhancement component of its fisheries program. 
The funding has apparently continued but the focus has shifted to self-help 
groups.40 This shift occurs in other provinces. Three CFi heads in Province B 
indicate that their funders now conduct more meetings with the self-help groups 
                                                          
34 A CDC’s analysis as cited in Curtis, "Beyond Transition: Cambodia in the Post-UNTAC Period," 
Chapter 5, 30.  See also Malena et al., Linking Citizens and the State: An Assessment of Civil 
Society Contributions to Good Governance in Cambodia: 8; Un, "State, Society and Democratic 
Consolidation: The Case of Cambodia," 239.  
35 Informant 12; Informant 14. van Acker, "Don't Trust Fish When They Are in Water: Cambodia's 
Inland Fisheries in Transition," 41-42. 
36 For more details, see Whittingham, "Sites of Practice: Negotiating Sustainability and Livelihoods 
in Rural Cambodia," especially Chapter 6. 
37 Informant 5; Informant 70; Informant 84-85.  
38 Informant 5. 
39 Informant 14. 




and less with the CFCs.41 An NGO team leader in Province A explained her 
organization’s shift from CFi to CBO: 
The funding to the CFi by Oxfam GB ended in 2008. Therefore, since then there has 
been no financial assistance to CFis supported by us. Since 2009, we began to link 
associations and groups, such as CFis, Livelihood Rehabilitation Association, self-help 
groups, and Farmers’ Associations within each village to create a CBO under the 
sponsorship of VSO. Because of the availability of funding for CBOs, our organization 
began to discuss with committee members of these associations and groups about 
establishing a CBO within their village. After agreeing to the essence of CBO, we 
submitted a draft funding proposal to VSO and upon approval of the draft fund, a 
finalized proposal is submitted. Before 2006 we got the funding from Oxfam GB for 
the CFi program; the funding ended in 2008; VSO jumped in. ICCO and EED funded 
the entire CBO program for its founding and strengthening since 2008. Their intention 
and focus are on CBOs, not for CFis, so they are not interested in funding CFis.42 
All in all, with heavy reliance on external funding and little bargaining power, 
LNGOs are limited in what they can do and approaches they adopt. This is not to 
criticize that these agendas and approaches are bad, but that they are determined by 
global trends of funding and therefore lack local inputs as to what is necessary. One 
NGO board member explained: 
I am not criticizing that agenda because on the whole like the work on human rights, 
the work on participation, on transparency, on better use of the resources, all of these 
are good things. I do often feel that the agenda is driven by what donors are able to 
fund, and if I am to say more broadly the limitation of NGOs is that…they can only do 
what donors want.43 
The limited bargaining power finally falls to the communities. A Tonle Sap 
Fishers’ Network (TFN) staffer, for example, explains that what he is doing 
responds to the CFC’s needs. However, the CFC must ‘respond to the five 
principles of the Fisheries Action Coalition Team (FACT)’.44 
LNGOs’ external dependency and lack of grassroots support within the context of 
narrow rural political space limit their political space and maneuver and dictate 
how they seek support when they are in trouble or want to push for reforms. Un, for 
example, finds that advocacy NGOs usually call for donors to pressure for judicial 
reforms, which is not always fruitful.45 Similarly, their participation in 
fisheries/forest consultation meetings organized by DoF/FiA was often made 
possible only after INGOs’ interventions.46 CEPA alleged that the governor of 
Stung Treng wanted to exert control onto its operation and to deal with this 
                                                          
41 Informant 86-88. 
42 Informant 70. Original quote with the name of the NGO replaced by ‘us/we’. The informant could 
not give the full names of ICCO and EED. 
43 Informant 12. 
44 Informant 23.  
45 Un, "State, Society and Democratic Consolidation: The Case of Cambodia," 237. 
46 Manfield and MacLeod, Advocacy in Cambodia: Increasing Democratic Space: 48-49. 
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pressure, it implicitly urged the CFi it supported to demonstrate in front of PFO, 
but more importantly sought the support from the Swedish embassy.47 In short, 
instead of seeking support from communities they assist, LNGOs often turn to their 
foreign backers to open up their ‘space of engagement’ which is not always 
effective.  
Finally, due to their external dependence and no grassroots membership, LNGOs 
are poorly accountable to the people they claim to represent and fail to cultivate 
‘social embeddedness’ with villagers. Therefore, any ‘effort to empower citizens, 
promote grassroots participation or build civil society from the bottom-up is still 
limited in scale and scope.”48 That is, since LNGOs are run by elites and 
professionals, ‘their societal depth, engagement and representation can be 
questioned.’ Hughes rightly argues that the NGO sector ‘is primarily urban, 
professional, intellectual and existing in a didactic relationship to the weak, 
uneducated and rather dangerous grassroots.”49 In other words, NGOs have failed 
to build a sense of ‘civil society’ in rural areas, developed at the expense of overall 
growth of civil society and unintentionally sustained patronage in rural society. 
Apart from external dependency, NGOs’ community capacity enhancement is 
further affected by NGO elitism, limited grassroots support and participation and 
narrow political space in the countryside which can result in three negative 
repercussions. First, most NGOs concentrate in Phnom Penh and major provincial 
towns and have many projects there and fewer in the rural areas where their 
intended beneficiaries reside. A survey, for example, shows that 70% of NGOs are 
based in Phnom Penh and half of the rest in such large provinces as Battambang, 
Kandal and Siem Reap.50 That NGOs’ activities center in Phnom Penh and 
provincial towns is probably less true for NGOs working in the two subsectors as 
their beneficiaries are on or near the water bodies. Second, since many staff are not 
from the communities they work for, they lack enthusiasm in activism and 
                                                          
47 Whittingham, "Sites of Practice: Negotiating Sustainability and Livelihoods in Rural Cambodia," 
124-25. One survey correctly shows that LNGOs prioritize the pursuit of international cooperation 
ahead of building grassroots support. Cited in Hughes, The Political Economy of Cambodia's 
Transition, 1991-2001: 155. 
48 Malena et al., Linking Citizens and the State: An Assessment of Civil Society Contributions to 
Good Governance in Cambodia: 8; van Acker, Cambodia's Commons: Changing Governance, 
Shifting Entitlements?: 34-35; ———, "Don't Trust Fish When They Are in Water: Cambodia's 
Inland Fisheries in Transition," 41-42.  
49 Hughes, The Political Economy of Cambodia's Transition, 1991-2001: 156-66; Ojendal and Kim, 
"Korob, Kaud, Klach: In Search of Agency in Rural Cambodia," 526. 
50 Cf. Cambodia New Vision, "Inaugurating Ten School Buildings in Ba Phnom, Prey Veng 
Province," Cambodia New Vision January 2002, 3; Hughes, The Political Economy of Cambodia's 
Transition, 1991-2001: 155; Malena et al., Linking Citizens and the State: An Assessment of Civil 
Society Contributions to Good Governance in Cambodia: 8-9; Un, "State, Society and Democratic 
Consolidation: The Case of Cambodia," 239-40. 
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commitment of activists.51 Finally, there is less meaningful or effective 
participation from the communities in decision-making and a lack of soliciting 
initiatives from them. According to Yonekura, only 17% of CAs in her study 
consulted with their target beneficiaries in decision-making.52 NGOs interviewed 
claim that they hold discussions with villagers before deciding a course of action or 
introducing a new project/approach.53 However, due to power asymmetry and the 
patronage nature of Khmer NGO structure and process, discussions can be a fait 
accompli or simple going through the motions. Some NGOs even work for or in 
place of the communities. They, for instance, draft CFi agreements and hand them 
to the communities. CSID is, for example, reported to have handed over a by-law 
to the community in Site 1. Community (even CFC) members claimed that they did 
not participate in its production. This NGO allegedly did many other things on 
behalf of the CFC.54 
Table 17: Level of Participation in Decision-Making55 
Participation Level % Number 
Participation of target beneficiaries in decision-making 17% 10 
Participation of staff or ordinary members in decision-making 43% 26 
Decision-making by leaders only 40% 24 
Three other limitations that restrict the impacts of NGOs’ interventions are the 
absence of phase-out plans, limited coordination/cooperation amongst each other 
and with the state and project duplication. Two informants lament the lack of an 
exit plan once a project is over. According to Informant 12: 
When an NGO is paid to do a project, it tends to almost become a form of better 
management whereas it does not have a hand-over plan of full ownership to the 
communities. That’s a blanket statement…but you also find example of it where an 
NGO doesn’t have a phase-out plan, a hand-over plans, that sort of thing, which I 
personally find ridiculous because there is always more work to be done, it is not like 
funding away one project to be sustainable in a community means that it works.56 
                                                          
51 Manfield and MacLeod, Advocacy in Cambodia: Increasing Democratic Space: 21; Marschke, 
"Livelihood in Context: Learning with Cambodian Fishers," 196. 
52 Asian Development Bank, A Study of NGOs: Cambodia: 2; Kato et al., Cambodia: Enhancing 
Governance for Sustainable Development: 46-47. In the language of the CDC, NGOs argue over 
what is the best development approaches between: “we are the educated and expert and powerful 
and we know best’ approach and the ‘we must encourage and support the local community to 
articulate its own development needs’ approach. Cited in Curtis, "Beyond Transition: Cambodia in 
the Post-UNTAC Period," Chapter 5, 31-32.  
53 Informant 70; Informant 84-85.  
54 Informant 45-59. Some other things it did on behalf of the community include erecting sign and 
guard posts at the sanctuary. This could not be confirmed by the NGO. CSID stands for Community 
Support Improve Development. Manfield and MacLeod, Advocacy in Cambodia: Increasing 
Democratic Space. 
55 Data source: Yonekura, "The Emergence of Civil Society in Cambodia: Its Role in the 
Democratisation Process," 96-99. 
56 Informant 14. 
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As for coordination/cooperation among NGOs, there has been some effort to 
improve their networking and coordination. That is, some formal networks have 
developed ‘well-organized systems and structures for regular information exchange 
and coordination.” There are also sector-specific umbrella organizations. 
Nevertheless, their coordination and cooperation are still limited. Cooperation and 
coordination amongst sub-national NGOs is even more limited because of funding 
competition, leadership personalization and little technical and financial support. 
As a result, ‘efforts to build up a strong society as a counter-balancing power to the 
government’ is further weakened57 
In the subsectors, no formal network for sharing information, coordination and 
collaboration was found before the reforms. FACT, established in 2000, began the 
coordination with initially eight NGOs and as of 2006 with twelve national and 
thirty-six province-based NGOs.58 Individual NGOs, however, still reserve their 
rights on how to implement their projects. One result of such limited coordination 
is uneven geographical project distribution, project duplication and limited build-up 
of interventions. An INGO program officer indicates that some CFis receive 
support from multiple NGOs, while others receive little or none. According to his 
observation, NGOs usually work in areas that are easily accessible, leaving areas 
with difficult access with little support.59 This has been confirmed by interviews in 
the field. For example, CFis in the middle of the Tonle Sap Lake receive less 
support. Besides, NGO workers believe that there are many project duplications on 
the ground. An NGO in province A shows that projects in some of its target areas 
overlapped with TSEMP (2004-2008), PACT’s project (2004-2009) and more 
recently Fintrac’s (2011-); another reports that its target areas also received TSSLP 
(2009-2010). One NGO in province B witnessed similar interventions by the 
Mekong River Commission (MRC) in selected villages that it worked during 2001-
                                                          
57 Formal networks include NGO Forum on Cambodia, the Cooperation Committee of Cambodia 
and Star Kampuchea. Sectoral networks include the Cambodian Human Rights Action Committee, 
MediCam, and FACT. Asian Development Bank, A Study of NGOs: Cambodia: 2 and 12-17; Curtis, 
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59 Informant 5. 
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04. Some informants reveal that there has been no discussion amongst them about 
their projects; therefore, some interventions have been duplicated.60 Due to the lack 
of coordination, many of these projects are not linked up and do not build up the 
previous efforts by other organizations. 
Finally, two other limitations that restrict their contribution to community building 
merit some attention. First, many LNGOs’ operational capability is still weak due 
to their embryonic or building-up stages. Therefore, instead of full dedication to 
community building, many are also concerned with development of their 
organizations.61 Second, many NGOs’ interventions are based on a single issue.62 
For example, in Site 1, there are at least four externally assisted associations: one 
CFi, two agricultural associations and one so-called CBO. Such is the experience in 
other communities visited. This threatens to be divisive to the building of a 
coherent community or fragment communities into various small factions. 
2.3. NGO-State Relations 
The state formally admits NGOs’ contribution in reconstruction, development and 
reforms of Cambodia. Policies usually “promise” to provide NGOs with favorable 
environment for their operation. To quote the government’s language: “The Royal 
Government welcomes the participation of the NGOs in the process of socio-
economic rehabilitation and development and the promotion of Democracy and 
respect for human rights.”63 The actual relationship is best described as ‘complex 
                                                          
60 Informant 7; Informant 69, 22nd July, 2011; Informant 70; Informant 86-88; Informant 90. 
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61 Cf. Asian Development Bank, Developing the Capacity for Reconstruction and Development: 23; 
Cambodia New Vision, "Inaugurating Ten School Buildings in Ba Phnom, Prey Veng Province," 3; 
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Cambodia, First Five Year Socioeconomic Development Plan 1996-2000: especially 46-56. 
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and still being defined,’ ‘controversial,’ ‘mixed’ and ‘competing for external 
funding’.64 
The state’s attitude towards NGOs can be described as liberal because it permits 
association and networking quite freely.65 However, generally cooperation is 
hindered by mistrust and poorly devised and infrequent joint projects. A CPP 
parliamentarian, for instance, said: “Some NGOs rock the boat.”66 The wary 
relationship and limited trust are also seen in the subsectors. To illustrate, an 
ADB’s internal report reveals that the delay of Component 2 of TSEMP was due in 
part to ‘the reluctance of the government to work with NGOs’ as the contract 
required that 50% of the government counterpart fund would be executed by 
NGOs.67 A Tonle Sap Biosphere Reserve (TSBR) secretariat consultant 
distinguishes between ‘acceptable’ and ‘unacceptable’ NGOs when asked whether 
TSBR can work with NGOs.68 Despite all these, the state is often supportive of 
NGOs’ initiatives, and DoF and NGOs have engaged with each other and worked 
in some joint projects.69 
State-NGO relationships must be viewed as spatial and temporal and can be both 
place and issue-based. NGOs have more interactions with state agencies in Phnom 
Penh because of larger political space and presence of donors’ agencies.70 In big 
                                                          
64 Campbell, Department of Fisheries Institutional Review: 16; Mak, "Cooperation in the Mekong 
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67 Asian Development Bank, "1939-CAM: Tonle Sap Environmental Management Project – BTOR 
for Project Completion Review Mission (23 November – 17 December 2009)," (2009). Also, Mak, 
Heun, and Pen, "Decentralization and Natural Resource Management in Cambodia: Implication of 
the Decentralization Process to Date, A Case Studies in Pursat Province," 27.  
68 Middleton, "The Expansion of the ADB’s Influence in Cambodia’s Water Sector: Judging the 
Effectiveness of ADB Water Management Projects in the Tonle Sap Basin," 16-17.  
69 Campbell, Department of Fisheries Institutional Review: 16; Mak, Heun, and Pen, 
"Decentralization and Natural Resource Management in Cambodia: Implication of the 
Decentralization Process to Date, A Case Studies in Pursat Province," 10. 
70 Hughes, The Political Economy of Cambodia's Transition, 1991-2001: 166.  
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provinces such as Kampong Thom and Battambang, where there are more 
interactions and a relatively large NGO community, there is more (informal) 
cooperation and less mistrust. In the smaller and more remote provinces as Kratie 
and Preah Vihear, the relationship is less cordial.71 
Over time, this relationship has also improved. In the early 1990’s, there was more 
suspicion between the state and LNGOs and some state agencies saw NGOs as a 
threat. Furthermore, there were no formal mechanisms to facilitate interactions 
between the two.72 Interactions and dialogues in the last decade and a half have 
built more trust and the two have seen each other in a more favorable light. As the 
RGC now puts it: NGOs are now called ‘a development partner’. Some signs of 
improving relations include more access to information by and consultation with 
NGOs in policy and legislation formulation and more participation by state 
officials in events NGOs held.73 In fisheries/forest management, the pre-reform 
period likewise saw tension between NGOs and provincial/local authorities and 
DoF; more recently, there has been increasing engagement with NGOs and 
communities.74 In Phnom Penh, more formal and systematic mechanisms for 
interactions have been established – for FiA, it is the TWGF.75 There are some 
shortcomings in the interactions, though. One is that advocacy and interventions 
are usually done through personalities, rather institutionalization. Second, 
Yonekura finds that CAs with special support from the government, such as having 
state officials affiliated with them in some way, have less ‘problematic 
relationship’ with state agencies.76 Third, while NGOs have more input to laws and 
policies, their inputs into sub-laws are more restricted.77 
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74 Cf. Campbell, Department of Fisheries Institutional Review: 50-51; Manfield and MacLeod, 
Advocacy in Cambodia: Increasing Democratic Space: 39.  
75 Informant 90. Fisheries Administration, The Strategic Planning Framework for Fisheries: 2010-
2019, 2: 10.  
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Apart from temporal and spatial specific, state-NGO relations are based on the 
issues NGOs pursue and activities they carry out. NGOs working on social service 
delivery enjoy a better working relationship with the state, whereas their 
counterparts working on human rights and democracy promotion have less amiable 
(and sometimes harsh) relationship with the state. Over time, the state even 
encourages NGOs to work on social development issues.78 In the subsectors, many 
NGOs working on CFis have had more or less good cooperation from local 
authorities and DoF, especially after 2001.79 A watchdog role usually makes 
advocacy NGOs, including those working on fisheries/forest management, ‘a thorn 
in the eyes’ of state agencies as they dig up their passivity and negative attributes. 
This leads to oftentimes poor relationship and distrust.80 This is true with regards to 
relationship between some NGOs and FiA since “a watchdog role sometimes 
requires NGOs to say things that are difficult for the government to swallow.” For 
instance, when a LNGO uncovered and published concessionaires’ abuses and 
corruption of DoF’s staff and local authorities in the late 1990’s, DoF was unhappy 
with what it did. When NGOs shout outside the system or do tasks DoF thinks 
overstep its jurisdiction, the relationship is even worse.81 
FACT-FiA relationship is a telling example of an advocacy NGO and a state 
agency. While many NGOs ‘are easy to work with,’ FACT is ‘going into a 
different direction,’ according to an FiA leader.82 A cantonment leader describes 
FACT as ‘shaking hands and stamping on the feet’ and impossible to work with 
‘since FACT works mostly on advocacy and criticizes the government’ and he is a 
government official.83 One NGO advisor puts the problem down to the fact that 
“FACT was very critical of the FiA’s performance and accountability and its ability 
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to manage fisheries,” accusing the administration as being pro-elite.84 Others agree 
that there is an uneasy relationship between FACT and state agencies, including 
FiA due to the nature of its work.85 One NGO board member describes the 
relationship as a power struggle between the NGO sector and FiA and the latter’s 
unwillingness to treat NGOs on an equal term. The government released the lots en 
masse in 2001 and NGOs had been actively involved in establishing and 
strengthening the communities for years without much DoF’s interference. It was 
when TSEMP was operational in 2005 that saw the heightening of the 
relationship.86 Over the last three years, however, there has been some 
improvement due probably to more interactions via the TWGF and the changing 
attitudes on the part of FACT as it tries to seek for DoF’s cooperation in its 
projects. Indeed, other NGOs have tried to improve their relationship with FiA 
too.87 One TFN staff, for instance, describes his role as a lobbyist to link all statal 
stakeholders to CFCs and adds that his regional boss advises him to cultivate good 
relationship with all actors involved, including FiA’s staff.88 
All in all, the NGO-FiA relationship has been changing. There was not much 
interaction as CFis were not yet established in early 1990’s and were in a pilot 
stage in late 1990’s. Then, there was little cooperation but suspicion on the part of 
the state towards NGOs’ initiatives.89 The early 2000’s saw a heated relationship 
because NGOs now advocated on the behalf of fishers. There were probably fewer 
interactions (though animosity remained) until TSEMP started when DoF more 
forcefully re-asserted itself into CFi management, and when they were reluctant to 
share the stage over the best approach to community management.90 The 
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relationship has improved over the last three years as some advocacy NGOs were 
invited to the TWGF and DoF officials attend NGO events. One source describes 
the evolution: 
The relationship between NGOs and FiA has seen improvement over the years. Before 
and a few years after the reforms, the relationship was not good, as a large number of 
NGOs worked mostly or totally on ‘advocacy’ and digging out the inactiveness and 
negativity of FiA to donors; however, simultaneously there were NGOs that worked 
along with DoF. Later, there have been changes in NGO working habits, with many 
turning to work and support FiA.91 
These continuing interactions help cement state-NGO relationships. Nonetheless, 
the good relationship is further enhanced because FiA officials receive per diem for 
their work with or for NGOs. Given their meager salary, these supplementary 
incomes to sub-national officials provide them with some external motivation.92 
The relationship is also promoted by donor-sponsored projects. For example, a 
fisheries official in Province A relates his close relationship to NGOs to TSEMP, 
which allows the cantonment and NGOs to work together.93 Two things are 
noteworthy. Cooperation is issue-specific. FiA is more cooperative when it comes 
to attending NGOs’ meetings, providing them with “less sensitive” documents and 
participating in less controversial activities.  NGOs complain that DoF sub-national 
officials are less cooperative in dispute resolutions between communities and 
fishing lots and with crackdown on illegal activities within CFi areas.94 Second, 
personal relationship helps facilitate cooperation. Yet, although nurturing 
relationships with lower level officials is easier, they are not often in a position to 
make decisions, and they usually need their provincial boss’s authorization if they 
want to work with NGOs.95 
The relationship between sub-national authorities, especially CCs, and NGOs has 
also changed. In the 1990s, they were unhappy with local NGOs, which exposed 
their inaction and caused them a loss of revenue from bribery and other activities. 
Moreover, the NGO presence challenged their de facto monopoly over local power; 
thus there was a need to co-opt or control how they operated. Such is the case of 
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the Stung Treng governor as discussed earlier.96 However, even then, there were 
informal mechanisms in some provinces for coordination and information 
exchange.97 Yet, since 2002 elections (and more so since the indirect 
district/provincial council elections in 2009), the CCs have been closer to the 
people, and there has been more cooperation and interactions with NGOs which are 
perceived as local ‘development partners’ which inject substantial money into their 
communes. NGOs are, for example, invited to fund projects in CDPs and District 
Integration Workshops (DIWs), including fisheries/forest-related projects. This 
cordial relationship is further re-enforced by the monetary incentives (per diem and 
travel allowance) provided by NGOs for their cooperation and other assistance 
schemes, such as NGOs’ funding of CCs’ study tours and their monthly meetings. 
Two CCs and two LNGOs interviewed thus speak of improvement in relationship 
and more frequent interactions over the years.98 
There are limitations in their relationship, nevertheless. Some NGOs lack the 
attention to the local governance structure – formal and informal – hindering the 
‘buy-in’ from local authorities.99 An LNGO in Province B, for instance, agrees that 
before 2005 it viewed local authorities as unimportant for its operation and did not 
bother to cultivate good relationship with them.100 Besides, there are instances of 
responsibility evasion on the part of local authorities, especially towards issues that 
are hard to deal with. There are complaints that local authorities push NGOs to 
seek assistance from FiA instead when it comes to complaints about illegal 
activities within CFi areas or when there are abuses from concessionaires or 
operators.101 All in all, there has been improvement in state-NGO relations; this is 
especially true for NGOs working on development issues. In addition, there have 
also been more interactions and improvement in relations with advocacy NGOs. In 
terms of power relations, NGOs’ bargaining power is still weak, though that is 
increasing through more interactions with state agencies. In the subsectors, this 
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weak power-relation reflects itself, for instance, in the limited incorporation of the 
10-point recommendations from NGOs and communities into the CF sub-decree.102 
3. Community Fisheries and Their Committees 
3.1. Strength of CFis and CFCs 
Unlike predatory states, the Cambodian state has tried to build up communities of 
various sorts. This manifests in the formation and increase in CFis and other rural 
groups. In this sense, Cambodian social landscape is said to be now ‘vastly more 
integrated,’ ‘more plural, more complex and more open.’103 
Table 18: Number of CFis104 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
30 165 246 316 359 423 447 447 467 469 
‘Communities’ created by outside agents with sufficient sustained technical, legal 
and financial support prove to be functional.105 According to an NGO director: 
“Some [CFCs] are very new; some are just established for two years and they don’t 
have the core members to keep it going, while other community fisheries groups 
have been operational for nearly ten years, and they have a very strong leader, they 
have administrative capacity to manage themselves, administratively, 
financially.”106 Other key informants agree that there are successful CFCs and 
CFi/CFC members that show willingness, determination and enthusiasm in their 
work throughout the country.107 NGOs and CFi/CFC members interviewed indicate 
that generally at least 1/3 to ½ of CFC members are actively involved in the CFis’ 
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management.108 Furthermore, with NGO and FiA support, many CFCs’ 
administrative skills have improved, resulting in less corruption and more 
transparency. Some have engaged with relevant state agencies more often and even 
helped their communities diversify their livelihood options.109 
These attributes have brought about some positive impacts. First, over the decade 
and in comparison to public access areas, destructive fishing practices in most CFi 
areas have dramatically decreased.110 A study in Pursat, for example, shows that in 
2003-04, in Anlong Raing CFi area only 16% of respondents used brush parks, 
while a nearby non-CFi area saw 66% of respondents using this gear.111 Second, 
studies and field interviews show that there are communities which see or perceive 
increase in fish catch and income.112 Third, communities have been less subservient 
and shown signs of more solidarity. They are more courageous, better informed of 
their rights and more knowledgeable.113 Finally, some CFCs have contributed to 
local development via monetary contribution to the aged, the poor and vulnerable, 
provision of counterpart funds to various self-help groups and contribution to 
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building local infrastructure.114 While some people applauded their considerable 
progress in natural resources management and local development, others are more 
reserved in their judgment since successful cases are scattered at best.115 
3.2. CFCs’ Weaknesses in Resource Management 
All stakeholders concur that overall CFCs’ capacity to manage the resources is 
limited. Their knowledge, skills and experience do not suffice for effective 
management.116 Three CFC heads in Province B state that despite constant NGOs’ 
training and sharing workshops, half of their members experience little 
improvement in capacity.117 Besides, most CFis are in the initial phase and ‘have 
not reached a stage beyond the creation of institutional structure and the 
articulation of basic resource use regulations.’ Worse still, some CFCs only exist 
on paper.118 
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director describes the evolution of CFCs as a parabola with communities’ interests and 
determination in CFi affairs increasing since 2001 and with more engagement from FiA and donor’s 
financial support via NGOs. This state of affair peaked in 2005-06 before the release of the CFi sub-
decree and has nose-dived ever since due to the lack of cooperation from FiA and concerned state 
agencies. Informant 69.  
116 See for example, Asian Development Bank, Cambodia: Country Environmental Analysis: 13; —
——, Country Operations Business Plan: Cambodia 2008-2010: 6 and 42; Cambodia New Vision, 
"Keynote Address: “The Economic Government and Strategies to Enhance Rural Livelihood”," 
Cambodia New Vision May 2003, 5; Fisheries Administration, The Strategic Planning Framework 
for Fisheries: 2010-2019, 2: 71-74; Ly, "Inland Fisheries Management and Institutional Changes in 
Fisheries in Cambodia," 77; Mak, "The Environmental Management in Tonle Sap Lake, 
Cambodia," 12-13; Oxfam Great Britain, Evaluation of the Impact of the Fisheries Reform in 
Cambodia on the Livelihoods of Poor Fishers: 6; Sverdrup-Jensen, Poul, and Ahmed, Guide to 
Fisheries Policy Research in Cambodia – The Institutional and Legal Context: 28; Wildlife 
Conservation Society and Administration, "Comparson between Outcomes under the Proposed Prek 
Toal Sanctuary and Alternative Management Regime," 107; World Bank, Country Assistance 
Strategy for the Kindgom of Cambodia: 92. Informant 20; Informant 24; Informant 67. 
117 Informant 86-88.  
118 Mak, "The Tonle Sap and Its Fisheries Management: A Case in Cambodia," 12-13; Mak and 
Grundy-Warr, "Spaces of Engagement and Contested Territories of the Tonle Sap," 19-21; Seng, 
Impact of Community Fisheries Management on Livelihood of Small-Scale Fishers in Cambodia: 1. 
Numerous case studies prove that their capacity is limited. For example, Khaing, Sung, and Un, 
"Participation in Fisheries Co-Management in Kandal," 146; Koroma, "Local Reforms of 
Community Forest and Fisheries Management," 305; Mak and Te, "Community Fisheries--Up and 
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One manifestation of incapacity is that in all CFi areas there is illegal fishing and 
forest clearance. In some CFis, it is a total rule breakdown.119 There are cases 
where even sanctuaries are fished, where CFC members themselves get involved in 
illegal fishing and forest clearance and/or where CFCs are not able to make 
outsiders conform to their internal rules. In one case study, illegal fishers from 
outside the community made up of more than 2/3 of perpetrators.120 Anecdotally, 
villagers in a floating CFi complain that the CFC is quick to arrest or fine them, but 
rarely take action against outsiders.121 Out of the 32 bor in Site 1 only a few belong 
to insiders and the CFC cannot get rid of destructive practices by nearby lots. This 
‘muscle power’ exercised by outsiders occurs elsewhere as well.122 Another 
manifestation is the sale of fishing rights by selected CFCs, skirmishing of NGOs’ 
support and moonlighting by some CFC patrol teams.123 Some CFCs are plagued 
by poor governance, such as lack of transparency and accountability, poor 
consultation in decision-making and top-down mentality. All these sometimes lead 
to total community breakdown.124 Villagers in Site 1, for example, reveal that their 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Down the Hill: A Case Study of Phat Sanday Community Fishery in Kampong Svay District, 
Kampong Thom Province," 2. 
119 Such is the case of Site 1. 
120 See for example, Chap, "Effectiveness of Participation in management and Use of Community-
Based  Fishery Resources in Kampong Siem District, Kampong Chhnang Province," 32-33; Chhom 
and Leng, "Monitoring Report on the Activities of Fisheries Issues, April-June, 2005," 3; Keang et 
al., "Conflicts Arising from Re-Allocation of Fishing Lots: Perceptions from Community Fisheries 
in Cambodia," 58; Mak and Te, "Enabling Fisheries Conflict Management: A Case Study in 
Cambodia."; Mak, Vann, and Te, "Communication Strategies for Fisheries Conflict Management: A 
Case Study in Cambodia," 24-25; Oxfam Great Britain, Evaluation of the Impact of the Fisheries 
Reform in Cambodia on the Livelihoods of Poor Fishers: 10; Viner et al., Development of Fisheries 
Co-management in Cambodia: A Case Study and Its Implications: 20; Wildlife Conservation 
Society and Administration, "Comparson between Outcomes under the Proposed Prek Toal 
Sanctuary and Alternative Management Regime," 107. Informant 1; Informant 15; Informant 20; 
Informant 23; Informant 25-27; Informant 28; Informant 29-43; Informant 71-78. 
121 Informant 21.  
122 Informant 24; Informant 25-27; Informant 28; Informant 29-43; Informant 44; Informant 45-59. 
Bin, "Report on the Result from Implementing Decision 39 SSR Dating 01 July 2011 of the Royal 
Government of Cambodia on the Establishment of Commission to Inspect Development Lot around 
the Tonle Sap Lake."; Vannaren Chea, "Fisheries Activities in Stung Treng Province, Cambodia," in 
Present Status of Cambodia’s Freshwater Capture Fisheries and Management Implications: Nine 
Presentations Given at the Annual Meeting at the Department of Fisheries, Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries, 19-21 January, 1999, ed. Nicolaas Van Zalinge, Thuok Nao, and Leoung 
Deap (Phnom Penh: Mekong River Commission and Department of Fisheries, 1999), 60; Mak and 
Grundy-Warr, "Political Geography of Floating Villages – Maps and Counter-Maps: Local Realities 
of Floating Villages in Tonle Sap Lake," 14-15.  
123 For example, Keang et al., "Conflicts Arising from Re-Allocation of Fishing Lots: Perceptions 
from Community Fisheries in Cambodia," 58. Informant 20; Informant 24; Informant 25-27; 
Informant 29-43; Informant 45-59; Informant 60; Informant 65; Informant 79.  
124 For example, Battambang Fisheries Cantonment, "Report on the Implementation of TSEMP in 
Battambang," (2010); Fisheries Administration, The Strategic Planning Framework for Fisheries: 
2010-2019, 2: 71-74; Malena et al., Linking Citizens and the State: An Assessment of Civil Society 
Contributions to Good Governance in Cambodia: 45-46; Tath et al., "Case Study on Community 
Fisheries Established in Kampong Chhnang and Battambang Provinces, Cambodia."; van Acker, 
Cambodia's Commons: Changing Governance, Shifting Entitlements?: 33-35; ———, "Don't Trust 
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leaders have never informed them of progress of their four protests against illegal 
fishing. CFCs in Site 4 show that they have never receipted the ‘facilitation’ money 
offered to CC members and FiA staff and that there is no mechanism to follow up 
how these packages given to authorities are spent.125 Finally, a sense of community 
in many CFis is questionable. Many CFi members, for instance, are not keen in 
patrolling when there is no chance for personal benefit.126 
Building cohesive CFis faces many challenges. First, communities’ historical roots 
are shallow and this is further destroyed by protracted conflicts; therefore, local 
institutions must ‘start with a handicap.’127 Second, rather than building strong 
institutionalization in the first place, many state agents established CFis to meet 
central requirements. Elections were conducted in haste, sometimes lacking broad 
participation, and many poorly qualified villagers are elected into the committees. 
Such elections have thus resulted in drastic increase in CFi quantity, not quality.128 
Third, community leadership in many CFis is still weak – a Danida representative 
describes them as ‘raw people’ with little leadership and management skills and 
technical knowledge. Fourth, there is the issue of CFi/CFC members’ participation 
and harmony. Some CFC members (around half) are not actively involved in the 
CFi affairs.129 Related to this are that many CFCs lack unity and a culture of 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Fish When They Are in Water: Cambodia's Inland Fisheries in Transition," 40-41. Informant 21; 
Informant 23; Informant 45-59; Informant 60.  
125 Informant 29-43; Informant 86-88.  
126 See for example, Chap, "Effectiveness of Participation in management and Use of Community-
Based  Fishery Resources in Kampong Siem District, Kampong Chhnang Province," 32-33; Chhom 
and Leng, "Monitoring Report on the Activities of Fisheries Issues, April-June, 2005," 3; Keang et 
al., "Conflicts Arising from Re-Allocation of Fishing Lots: Perceptions from Community Fisheries 
in Cambodia," 58; Mak and Te, "Enabling Fisheries Conflict Management: A Case Study in 
Cambodia."; Mak, Vann, and Te, "Communication Strategies for Fisheries Conflict Management: A 
Case Study in Cambodia," 24-25; Oxfam Great Britain, Evaluation of the Impact of the Fisheries 
Reform in Cambodia on the Livelihoods of Poor Fishers: 10; Viner et al., Development of Fisheries 
Co-management in Cambodia: A Case Study and Its Implications: 20; Wildlife Conservation 
Society and Administration, "Comparson between Outcomes under the Proposed Prek Toal 
Sanctuary and Alternative Management Regime," 107. Informant 1; Informant 15; Informant 20; 
Informant 23; Informant 25-27; Informant 28; Informant 29-43; Informant 71-78.  
127 See for example, Asian Development Bank, Participatory Poverty Assessment in Cambodia  
(Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2001). 2; John Kurien, Nam So, and Sam Onn Mao, "Fishing 
Lots in Cambodia's Fisheries," Samudra 3 May, 2007, 2-3; Middleton, "The Expansion of the 
ADB’s Influence in Cambodia’s Water Sector: Judging the Effectiveness of ADB Water 
Management Projects in the Tonle Sap Basin," 16-17; van Acker, "Don't Trust Fish When They Are 
in Water: Cambodia's Inland Fisheries in Transition," 43.  
128 As of 2010, out of 469, 236 were registered; 60% had by laws, 31% had maps, 13% had action 
plans and 17% had sanctuaries. Fisheries Administration, The Strategic Planning Framework for 
Fisheries: 2010-2019, 2: 45; Ministry of Agriculture, "Achievements after Ten Years of Fisheries 
Reforms (2000-2009)." See also, Tep et al., Asserting Rights, Defining Responsibilities: Small-Scale 
Fishing Communities and Fisheries Management. Perspectives in Asia, A Study on Cambodia: 12-
13.  
129 See for example, Asian Development Bank, "Technical Assistance Kingdom of Cambodia: 
Preparing the Tonle Sap Lowland Stabilization Project," 8-9; Chap, "Effectiveness of Participation 
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teamwork. In Site 1, unity and cooperation were curtailed by personal disputes 
between the head and her deputy and uneven distribution of bribery among the 
leadership and/with the patrol team.130 Besides, a fisheries official indicates that the 
elections of political party-affiliated individuals and/or perpetrators into CFCs 
often destroy their unity and cooperation.131 
The sustainability of many CFis is at risk as they are dependent on little or 
uncertain external funding. This is exacerbated by donors’ late intervention into the 
subsectors. The belated TSEMP and TSLLP were meant to inject some capital into 
CFCs to enable them to generate more revenue. However, as a CFC in Province A 
complains, the revenue is too little to matter.132 Many CFCs thus lack financial 
resources for CFi management.133 While CFis’ by-laws stipulate that membership 
fees shall be paid annually; in reality this is not the case and there is little effort to 
enforce this.134 Some CFCs manage to ‘rent’ sections of CFi areas; however, large 
                                                                                                                                                                 
in management and Use of Community-Based  Fishery Resources in Kampong Siem District, 
Kampong Chhnang Province," 32-33; Mak, "The Tonle Sap and Its Fisheries Management: A Case 
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130 Informant 24; Informant 25-27; Informant 45-59.  
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projects, for example, even after NGO’s withdrawal of financial support. Informant 69.  
133 Asian Development Bank, "Technical Assistance Kingdom of Cambodia: Preparing the Tonle 
Sap Lowland Stabilization Project," 8-9; Asian Development Bank and Cambodia Development 
Research Institute, "Rapid Analysis of the Commune Workshops in Tonle Sap," 14; Fisheries 
Administration, The Strategic Planning Framework for Fisheries: 2010-2019, 2: 71-74; Meas, 
"Effectiveness of the Participation Management of Fisheries Resources as Community Fishery-
Base, in Srey Chik, Kanh Chor Commune, Konn Dieng District Pursat Province," 44; Patrick, 
Melissa, and Puadyal, Flood Forest, Fish and Fishing Villages: Tonle Sap, Cambodia: 28-29; 
Senate, "Report on Study Tour to Evaluate Collection of Fish Yield in 2004/5 in Pursat and 
Kampong Chhnang by Senators," (27 January, 2005); van Acker, Cambodia's Commons: Changing 
Governance, Shifting Entitlements?: 46-47. Informant 3; Informant 7; Informant 20; Informant 23; 
Informant 62-64; Informant 71-78.  
134 Informant 65; Informant 71-78; Informant 84-85. As an illustration, upon his election, a CFC 
head, instead of encouraging fee payment, promises: “I am going to delegate my duties to my 
deputy for some time and go out to seek funding.” Informant 45-59.  
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part of the revenue is used for socio-economic development rather than for CFi-
related activities.135 
Table 19: Use of the Proceeds from 2011 Renting Fee in CFi A 
Village Development Amount 
Building a sacred hall 100,000 riels 
Subtotal 100,000 riels 
CFC Purpose Amount 
Gratitude contribution to CFC members and patrolling 100,000 riels 
Subtotal 100,000 riels 
Total 200,000 riels 
Table 20: Use of the Proceeds from 2011 Renting Fee in CFi B 
Village Development Amount 
Repairing a bridge 1,000,000 riels 
Counterpart fund for building a common toilet 528,000 riels 
Counterpart fund for repairing a village road 1,000,000 riels 
To contribute to funerals in the village 200,000 riels 
Subtotal 2,780,000 riels 
CFC Purpose Amount 
Inundated tree nursery 200,000 riels 
CFC patrol team, CFC members, Woman Group and 
Village Chief, totally 35 persons (20,000 riels each) 
700,000 riels 
CFC Activities and Materials: paper, pens, patrol, out-of-
village meetings (per diem, patrol and food for 
participants) 
720,000 riels 
Subtotal 1,420,000 riels 
Total 4,200,000 riels 
Table 21: Use of the Proceeds from 2011 Renting Fee in CFi C 
Contribution to the Local Authorities Amount 
Amount contributed to the CC 750,000 riels 
Payment to the village chief 300,000 riels 
Subtotal 1,050,000 riels 
Village Development Amount 
Purchasing utensils for a sacred hall 1,000,000 riels 
Counterpart fund for building a commune road 500,000 riels 
Subtotal 1,500,000 riels 
CFC Purpose Amount 
Gratitude contribution to 11 CFC and 14 patrol team 
members 
45,000 * 25 = 1,125,000 riels 
Payment to hiring villagers to guard inundated trees in 
the forest (for 1 year) 
200,000 riels 
Tar to repair a patrol boat 300,000 riels 
Conservation (25 concrete tubes) 1,000,000 riels 
Patrol (for a year) 2,375,000 riels136 
Petrol and office stationery 100,000 riels 
Subtotal 5,100,000 riels 
Total 7,650,000 riels 
                                                          
135 Informant 84-85; Informant 86-88.  
136 Researcher’s subtraction of gratitude contribution, payment to hire villagers to guard inundated 
trees, tar for boat repair and conservation from a total package of 5 million riels. 
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The biggest challenge to building a capable community is the limited ownership of 
the community due to the rushed elections, involuntary nature of community, and 
members’ restricted involvement in preparation of internal rules and regulations,137 
or more broadly in fisheries/forest management. Cambodian communities are 
generally loose and lack common interests and activities.138 Furthermore, some 
CFis have heterogeneous racial composition and huge wealth gaps (with rich 
villagers less interested in CFis),139 which hinders successful community building 
and resource management. Besides, according to the five CFCs interviewed, 
membership lists have never been updated.140 Because of this absence of formal 
community-wide inclusion and representation, many CFCs may lack real 
legitimacy. Overall, many fishing communities seem to lack a sense of community. 
Some scholars advocate for broad citizens’ participation as ‘a necessary condition 
for the success of the state’ and its good governance.141 Such conditions in natural 
resource management in Cambodia are not large-scale or ‘militant’ enough to bring 
about good governance. For instance, Vuthy Ly and others describe CFi members’ 
active participation in fisheries management as a ‘thorny matter’.142 If participation 
is defined as people as beneficiaries of development and stakeholders, decision-
                                                          
137  Involuntary because it is being initiated by the government and/or external agencies. See for 
example, Asian Development Bank, Cambodia: Country Environmental Analysis: 13; Mak, "The 
Tonle Sap and Its Fisheries Management: A Case in Cambodia," 12-13; Seng, Impact of Community 
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Assistance Kingdom of Cambodia: Preparing the Tonle Sap Lowland Stabilization Project," 8-9. 
This is also a problem with other types of communities. See for example, Malena et al., Linking 
Citizens and the State: An Assessment of Civil Society Contributions to Good Governance in 
Cambodia: 42-43. 
141 Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century: 32-35; Hunt, "Aid 
and Development," 86; Kingsbury, Political Development: 61-62 and 162-68; ———, "Political 
Development," 207.  
142 Sim et al., "Overall Analysis and Synthesis," 61; van Acker, Free Riders and Social Fences: 
Common Property, Collective Action and Decentralized Natural Resource Management in 
Cambodia: 89.  
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makers and implementors of development activities,143 CFi members’ participation 
in CFi affairs is far from adequate. Not many villagers actively participate in CFis’ 
management.144 Van Acker correctly added: ‘[T]he existence of an association does 
not necessarily mean that people will work together.’145 In an election observation 
in Site 1, only some 100 people went to cast their votes although there were more 
than 600 families in this village. Besides, people rarely attend and/or express ideas 
in a meeting. According to the three CFC heads in Province B, in their quarterly 
meetings with CFi members, some ¼ to 1/3 of them show up and amongst the 
participants, only 3 or 4 speak up.146 This is the pattern in other locations and types 
of meetings too.147 
Yet, the rural social landscape is far from being dormant and unchanging. For 
example, CFi members interact with their CFCs more actively and forcefully when 
there is no pressure, such as in state agents’ absence or when there is a good 
facilitator.148 In Site 2, with good facilitation from an NGO and the CFC, villagers 
indeed participate in their CFi development. A case in point is its members’ and the 
local pagoda’s active involvement in the fish sanctuary rehabilitation. They bought 
                                                          
143 Kato et al., Cambodia: Enhancing Governance for Sustainable Development: 2-3. 
144 See for example, Chap, "Effectiveness of Participation in management and Use of Community-
Based  Fishery Resources in Kampong Siem District, Kampong Chhnang Province," 30; Chap, "The 
Situation of Inundated Forest after Fisheries Reform: A Case Study in Thnal Dach Community in 
Sotra Nikorm District, Siem Reap Province," 42; Marschke, "Livelihood in Context: Learning with 
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Management in Kandal," 146. For some possible explanations for this low participation, see for 
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148 Informant 2; Informant 14; Informant 15.  
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1,000 and 2,500 truckloads of soil, respectively, from a private company in 
exchange for the digging fees.149 
Building a cohesive fishing community is also affected by the violation of internal 
rules by fishers from outsider the community. With weak leadership, poor CFi 
members’ participation and inadequate support from state agencies, it is doubtful 
how effective the CFis/CFCs can deal with outside ‘free riders’ and their backers. 
Some interviewees in Site 1 complained: ‘[W]e have the CFC, but it does not have 
any authority’ over free riders.150 Institutionalization of norms and values into the 
society is complex and more variegated.151 Such institutionalization as gear 
specification in a fragmented community where the more powerful outsiders are 
also entitled to fish is indeed much harder, and this further divides up the 
community and weakens its building. 
The last big challenge to building a capable community is how to link the CFCs 
and other CBOs in a locality and all CFCs together. One study shows that at the 
commune level, such linkage is very limited.152 Some NGOs have established the 
so-called CBOs linking all groups within a locality. This is still in an early stage 
and again initiated by outsiders. The biggest challenge yet is linking the 500 
CFCs/CFis so that they can learn from one another and create larger ‘space of 
engagement’153 with state agencies. In this regard, the establishment of the 
Coalition of Cambodian Fishers (CoCF) in 2004 linking CFis in the six provinces 
around the Tonle Sap (and later in the Mekong and coastal regions) was a good 
start. It has carried out some awareness raising activities and workshops, for 
example.154 However, it is still nascent, inexperienced, powerless vis-à-vis state 
agencies and financially dependent on external agencies.155 In a national seminar in 
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150-53.  
152 Malena et al., Linking Citizens and the State: An Assessment of Civil Society Contributions to 
Good Governance in Cambodia: 48.  
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2011, CoCF listed its challenges as: weak CFi facilitation, limited information flow 
from top to bottom and vice versa, limited ability to write reports and lack of 
communication with NGOs/IOs for funding.156 
3.3. CFi and CFC Relations with the State 
Contacts between the upper levels of the Cambodian state and the citizens 
throughout history were infrequent, and the state was not eager to empower its 
citizens either. Further, citizens rarely dared to demand much from the state for fear 
of retribution; they probably did not even feel that they were entitled to do so.157 
Khmer culture further reinforces the mentality that the knowledgeable, powerful 
and resourceful are to give orders.158 The MAFF, for example, was reluctant to 
relinquish authority to CFis.159 The last decade has witnessed more encouragement 
of citizens’ participation in natural resource management. However, their 
participation only comes in the final stage, and the final decision still rests with 
state agencies.160 Their contacts with the legislature as an institution are rare and 
often the approach is more personal. With NGO facilitation, there are occasions 
when CoCF has had chance to meet with certain legislative commissions. Relations 
with elements of the armed forces are probably the thorniest, and in weak CFis, 
these elements still abuse their power for personal benefits.161 
The relations with the local authorities, especially with CCs, changed in 2002. 
Before then, contacts between fishers and CCs were sparse and their relations were 
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Fisheries in Transition," 33.  
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160 See for example, Asian Development Bank, Cambodia: Country Environmental Analysis: 33-34; 
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riels ($25) to the CFi but continue disallowing the villagers to fish in the bia. Tep et al., Asserting 
Rights, Defining Responsibilities: Small-Scale Fishing Communities and Fisheries Management. 
Perspectives in Asia, A Study on Cambodia: 24. 
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suspicious and distrustful of one another at best, with the CCs being accused of not 
supporting their constituencies or involving in illegal sales of common access areas 
or keeping a blind eye to illegal activities.162 The relations intensified in early 
2000’s as some council members saw the reforms as a loss of income and fishers 
received little support from them in the disputes with concessionaires/operators.163 
The councils were first brought closer to the citizens with VDC introduction, and 
the relationship has later been cemented by direct CC elections.164 This is further 
reinforced by having the CFCs in the councils’ monthly meetings and having 
CFCs’ projects added to CDPs. TSSLP as discussed earlier has also linked the 
councils to its constituencies. Probably, informal linkages such as some councilors’ 
pocketing profits from CFi area renting and patrol teams’ entrepreneurialism help 
foster the relationship.165 
Not all news is good, though. The commune councils’ assistance to the CFCs is 
limited due to their focus on infrastructure projects and the belief that strengthening 
the CFCs is a line agency’s task.166 Further, councils are more supportive towards 
the communities with light matters and are accused of not taking strong enough 
actions against illegal practices. Some even allegedly support illegal fishing, are 
reluctant to relinquish authority to CFCs, and intimidate fishers who pose a threat 
to their benefits.167 Protesters in Site 1, for example, were threatened by council 
members because of their protest against illegal fishing in the sanctuaries.168 
Chandler rightly utters that ‘deep conservatism persists among older people and in 
rural areas” and that it is doubtful whether such concepts as human rights, 
                                                          
162 See for example, Gum, Inland Acquatic Resources and Livelihoods in Cambodia: A Guide to the 
Literature, Legislation, Institutional Framework and Recommendations 110; Kato et al., Cambodia: 
Enhancing Governance for Sustainable Development: 72; Koroma, "Local Reforms of Community 
Forest and Fisheries Management," 312; Schneider, Ka, and Roy, Private Sector Assessment for the 
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163 See for example, Degen et al., "People, Power, and Fisheries Policy: Fisheries Management 
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167 See for example, Whittingham, "Sites of Practice: Negotiating Sustainability and Livelihoods in 
Rural Cambodia," 194-203.  
168 Informant 29-43. Those went to Phnom Penh were photographed at the council office. Though 
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pluralism and rule of law ‘have taken root in a significant way among those holding 
power in the country, who continue to act…as if these imported concepts had no 
bearing on their behavior or on how the country is governed.”169 
Fishers’ relations with DoF were adversarial and severely alienated during the 
1990’s because of its focus ‘mainly on control and surveillance through policing’ 
and its ‘dysfunctional regulation,’ which prevented the cooperation between 
stakeholders after the reforms.170 A CFDO assessment in 2004 reported that some 
fisheries officials considered the fisheries reforms as a “baby born before its 
parents,”171 whose inference is that the relations were not even good at the very 
beginning. Some DoF officials allegedly did not crack down quickly and some 
even colluded with illegal fishers. However, DoF counter-attacks that CFCs usually 
violated their jurisdiction by carrying out unilateral crackdowns.172 Besides, DoF 
was reluctant to hand over authority to CFCs due to their limited management 
capacity; however, it generally spares little effort to improve it.173 Moreover, there 
was limited mutual trust and cooperation, and some DoF officials viewed CFCs as 
a disadvantage.174 
In the last few years, however, DoF has had increasing engagement with the 
communities, and many CFC heads interviewed have admitted better cooperation 
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170 For example, Ahmed, Touch, and Nao, "Sustaining the Gifts of the Mekong: The Future of 
Freshwater Capture Fisheries in Cambodia," 5; Fisheries Action Coalition Team and Environmental 
Justice Foundation, Feast or Famine? Solutions to Cambodia's Fisheries Conflicts; Nao, Long, and 
Taing, "Fisheries Monitoring, Control and Surveillance in Cambodia," 29-30; Nao and Ly, "Review 
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lately.175 This may be made possible by NGO projects and TSEMP. During the 
fieldwork the PM’s 001 Order had contributed to more cooperation. However, as 
witnessed in Site 1 where the CFC was weak, DoF’s officials were quick to exploit 
the loopholes.176 The relation between CoCF and state agencies have been less well 
documented and was not dealt in depth during this fieldwork. However, existing 
evidence shows that the atmosphere between DoF and CoCF is far from 
cooperative and trusting.177 
All in all, the state-CFC relation is far from predatory. Nor is it close to being 
institutionalized or ‘embedded’. It is also neither ‘power over’ nor ‘power through,’ 
being somewhere in between. Assistance is not mapped out in ‘clear and detailed 
strategic plans’.178 The release was done quickly with a sub-decree rather than 
through an articulate policy; therefore, many officials were forced to simply fulfill 
the order from their bosses. DoF provides CFCs with limited support; therefore, 
many still cannot carry out even basic operations.179 
In terms of power relations and despite the rhetoric of community empowerment, 
fishing communities are far from being empowered although some ‘space of 
engagement’ has been established.180 Poor consultation with fishers on lot release, 
poor acceptance of their recommendations and CFCs’ subservience to the letter of 
the law attest to this. The survey with 27 conflict managers indicates that 2/3 of 
them agree that ‘the power relation of small fishers to other government officials is 
                                                          
175 Informant 71-78; Informant 86-88. Campbell, Department of Fisheries Institutional Review: 39. 
176 Informant 23; Informant 24; Informant 25-27; Informant 29-43; Informant 45-59; Informant 60. 
Order 001 was the order to crackdown on illegal fishing issued in 2011. 
177 Cf. Bradley, Natural Resources Management Networking in Cambodia: Status, Lessons Learned, 
and Future Possibilities: 42-45; Em and Team Members, "Approach to Build up Assembly of 
Cambodia’s Fishers around Tonle Sap Lake," 17; Middleton, "The Expansion of the ADB’s 
Influence in Cambodia’s Water Sector: Judging the Effectiveness of ADB Water Management 
Projects in the Tonle Sap Basin," 16-23.  
178 Cf. Clarke, "Poverty: Concepts, Measures, Trends and Responses," 115; Evans, Embedded 
Autonomy: State & Industrial Transformation: 59-72; Matthew Lange and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, 
"State and Development: What Insights Did We Learn?," in States and Development: Historical 
Ancedents of Stagnation and Advance, ed. Matthew Lange and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (New York: 
Palgrave McMillan, 2003), 252.  
179 Cf. Degen et al., "People, Power, and Fisheries Policy: Fisheries Management Reform 
Addressing Community Fisheries in Cambodia," 23; Ly, "Inland Fisheries Management and 
Institutional Changes in Fisheries in Cambodia," 77; Sverdrup-Jensen, Poul, and Ahmed, Guide to 
Fisheries Policy Research in Cambodia – The Institutional and Legal Context: 28; Thay, Sim, and 
So, "Community Fisheries Development and Networking," 126-27.  
180 Cf. Mak and Grundy-Warr, "Spaces of Engagement and Contested Territories of the Tonle Sap," 
19-20. For some rhetorical evidence, see for example, Cambodia National Mekong Committee, 
Integrated Water Resources Management in Cambodia: National Sector Review: 58; Degen et al., 
"People, Power, and Fisheries Policy: Fisheries Management Reform Addressing Community 
Fisheries in Cambodia," 17-18. 
165 
 
also weak.’181 Their bargaining power vis-à-vis the local authorities and line 
officials is no doubt weak. These officials are reluctant to resign some authority to 
the communities and forgo the power to ‘rape the law’ when oversight is weak and 
when CFis and CFCs are reluctant to impose their will on these officials, overstep 
the boundaries and demand for good governance.182 In the words of some fishers: 
“We just stay beneath the concerned authority.”183 Referring to their unsuccessful 
protests against illegal practices but threats from the local authorities, another 
group of fishers added: “Our people are very afraid of power. They now do not 
dare to do anything affecting powerful people. Our people are afraid of being 
steamed. The threat over the years has weakened our spirit.”184 
4. Fishing Lot Association? 
To achieve economic development and in this case also sustainable resource 
management through embedded autonomy, a strong social partner is required so 
that “a concrete set of connections that link the state intimately and aggressively to 
particular social groups with whom the state shares a joint project of 
transformation’ are made possible through ‘clear and detailed strategic plans’.185 
This is missing in Cambodia. Business associations as civil society groups are a 
new concept. There are some newly established business associations, yet the 
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formal private sector is undeveloped186 and business associations are even more 
premature, alien and noted for their absence in the countryside. This applies as well 
to fishing lots. As a civil society group, they are probably the weakest of all. There 
has never been a lot association of any sort; therefore, concessionaires’ interactions 
with state agencies and agents are ad hoc and individualized.187 Owing to the lack 
of peer pressure and weak oversight, their operations are at best ‘exploitative’.188 
The acute lack or prematurity of business associations is a corollary of protracted 
civil strife alienating business elite cooperation and the young culture of 
networking and teamwork. The DK, for instance, not only worsened mutual trust 
but also decimated human capital and grinded the market institution to a haul.189 
Because of the informal and/or illegalized private businesses in the 1980’s, they 
could not work together and were sometimes suppressed. Former PM Chan Si said 
in 1983: “The unique thing about Cambodia is that Pol Pot annihilated all the 
capitalists, and we must do whatever we can not to allow them to raise their heads 
again.”190 Upon the perestroika and glasnost, the informal private sector did not 
bother to consolidate themselves either while the fishing and farming krom samaki 
was dismantled. Since 2000, the state has urged some businesses to form 
associations. However, fishing lots apparently receive less encouragement. Donors’ 
focus on the private sector consolidation likewise came too late and probably too 
little.191 
In terms of state-business relations, as discussed earlier, there were little and 
sporadic contact and consultation in the 1990’s. The Public-Private Sector Forum 
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has increased the interactions and dialogues. Unfortunately, fishing lots are not 
linked up and hence have little bargaining power. A concessionaire complains that 
they usually do not have rights to talk to DoF officials because when they do talk 
the latter reply that they are the experts and hence have the technical knowledge.192 
To conclude, civil society groups’ capability, albeit slowly improving, is generally 
weak. Building a functional civil society to counter balance the state’s despotic 
power still has a long way to go. Society is more than less dispersed, 
compartmentalized and disorganized, and grassroots participation in communities’ 
affairs and resource management is sparse. Donors’ demands for state-society 
interactions and the ‘intermediate’ nature of the state have somewhat improved the 
state-society relations and given some ‘voice’ to civil society. However, the 
relations and cooperation are still limited and power still inclines towards the state. 
Indeed, poor and fractured Cambodia suffers from a lack of trust between its 
citizens and the state, hindering relation building and reliance on despotic power 
more common. 
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Chapter 8: State Autonomy 
Evans argues that for ‘embeddedness’ to generate capacity, the state must be 
autonomous from social groups.1 The previous chapters prove that ‘embeddedness’ 
in Cambodia is not strong enough. This chapter will demonstrate how the state is 
not autonomous from social forces and the limited independence of each branch of 
the state, which further weakens its capacity. Like Timothy Colton and Migdal, this 
study adopts state and capture disaggregation.2 
The discussion of the limited autonomy here is threefold. First, it draws attention to 
macro-level accommodation. The communist legacy of state agencies’ and agents’ 
subjugation to the party and its top cadres is their lack of insulation from 
politicians’ intervention into their affairs. The bureaucracy should have ‘relative 
autonomy’ from politicians’ interference to enable it to ‘check on the potential 
patronage and corruption.’3 However, politicians in post-communist countries 
usually abuse their statuses and interfere into the affairs of the politically weak 
bureaucracy and judiciary via informal institutional practices in favor of particular 
social forces or their proxies.4 Second, it focuses on micro-level state capture by 
business interests (including fishers) and the state’s inability to curb its agents’ 
rent-seeking activities. In (neo)-patrimonial, soft or post-communist states, one 
recurring theme is the collusion between state agents and private 
individuals/groups, private extraction from the state and the state’s inability to 
control its agents in the ‘corruption games’.5 Finally, each branch of the state 
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should be autonomous from one another for them to act as checks and balances on 
one another.6 This chapter will argue that this, too, is missing in Cambodia. 
1. The Invisible Hands 
Skocpol, Stepan and others suggest that there is a clear boundary between state and 
society.7 This is not always the case for many developing countries. These neo-
patrimonial states adopt a legal-rational structure. However, this is masked by 
patrimonial practices. Therefore, the formal system is transformed into a ‘wealth 
accumulation network’ by powerful state figures to serve themselves or their 
networks and to link lower level officials to vertical private networks. Such states 
can extract and distribute rents, but this is done in a particularistic and privatized 
manner.8 Such neo-patrimonial practices apply to many post-communist states. 
Here formal and informal practices are used to gain or award contracts to allies 
through opaque accounting procedures, and elites gaining initial access to 
economic, political and/or ideational resources have upper hands in any dealing 
with the state.9 Many other authors likewise highlight the poor public-private 
distinction, the corollary manipulation of the state for private benefits, corruption, 
collusion and resistance to institutional reforms.10 In such states, challenging big 
business interests, especially those linked to political, military and bureaucratic 
leaders is hard to overcome as technocratic authority is circumscribed by elite 
power, while the leaders are quick to protect the status quo.11 
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Patrimonialism linking Cambodians to local patrons and through the latter to 
central ruling elites in a lopsided relationship has been a part of Cambodian 
culture.12 With this comes poor legal culture, rise of the personality cult, power 
over law/authority, and love of and devotion to power, whose consequence is the 
‘emergence of nepotism, favoritism and corruption, etc.’13 Resulting from such 
practices is the intermingling between the private and public spheres. The decade-
long rule under communism further reinforces this and underpins the prominence 
of selected political leaders – whose effects can still be felt even after the 
perestroika and glasnost.  
The WB believes that the evolution of the rule of law is hampered by the imperfect 
political system, weak governance and unwarranted political interference and that 
the ‘boundaries between the public and private sectors remain ill-defined’.14 The 
externally imposed ‘democratic’ reforms have introduced new political and 
institutional structures such as elections, freedom of association and expression, 
participation, accountability and transparency, yet they are all still young and are 
implanted on overlapping patronage structures.15 Moreover, such control agencies 
as the Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs and Inspection, the National Audit 
Authority, the Anti-Corruption Unit (ACU) are new, understaffed, ill-equipped, 
under-financed and under-operational, and undermined by limited independence 
from especially the executive; the in-built inspection departments within each 
ministry suffer from similar plagues.16 Therefore, the state apparatus is vulnerable 
to financial and political pressure, and state-society interactions become 
‘decentralized and particularistic,’ privileging those with wealth, arms or political 
connections.17 Echoing a WB report, two researchers concur that though the formal 
                                                          
12 See for example, Chandler, A History of Cambodia: 128-31.  
13 Cf. Aun, Democracy in Cambodia: Theories and Realities: 39-44.  
14 Cited in Kato et al., Cambodia: Enhancing Governance for Sustainable Development: 42; World 
Bank, Country Assistance Strategy of the World Bank Group for the Kingdom of Cambodia: 9-10; 
———, "2008 Country Policy and Institutional Assessment for Cambodia," 19. Researcher’s 
emphasis. 
15 Cf. Asian Development Bank, Participatory Poverty Assessment in Cambodia: 33; Kato et al., 
Cambodia: Enhancing Governance for Sustainable Development: 120; Marschke and Sinclair, 
"Learning for Sustainability: Participatory Resource Management in Cambodian Fishing Villages," 
207-08; World Bank, Country Assistance Strategy for the Kindgom of Cambodia: 17 and 54. 
16 Cf. Asian Development Bank, Country Operations Business Plan: Cambodia 2008-2010: 15-16; 
Cambodia New Vision, "Remarks at the Parliamentary Affairs 2005 Stock-taking Meeting," 
Cambodia New Vision May 2005, 2-3; Kato et al., Cambodia: Enhancing Governance for 
Sustainable Development: 42 and 89.  
17 Cf. Hughes, The Political Economy of Cambodia's Transition, 1991-2001: 80; Manfield and 
MacLeod, Advocacy in Cambodia: Increasing Democratic Space: 8.  
171 
 
state institutions’ strength is increasing, the informal institution of patronage still 
plays a more dominant role in resource distribution.18 
One result of the blurring state-society boundaries in Cambodia is the culture of 
intervention, especially by political figures into the state’s affairs on behalf of their 
clients, or what this research calls the ‘invisible hands’. Bemoaning party 
domination over the state and hence the limited neutrality of public administration, 
Porn Moniroth Aun added: ‘Everyone depends on their backers and their 
networks.’19 The invisible hands have aggrandized powerful political figures’ 
words over laws/authority and the executive and ruling parties over the state, its 
bureaucracy and the other two branches, let alone the regional and local 
governments and implementors, breeding both petite and big corruption.20 Aun 
furthered: 
Law is respected and applied only in instances where one’s own interest is protected or 
enhanced. In many cases, law and social ethics are practically abused almost by 
everyone and everywhere. Corruption, bureaucracy, nepotism, favoritism and extortion 
have become a way of life. The powerful officials will squeeze more while the less 
powerful will squeeze less, respectively.21 
The PM’s warning to senior officials to refrain from interventions and appeals for 
an end to the ‘culture of interventions’ indicate their urgency.22 His biographers 
correctly note that ‘the most formidable stumbling blocks’ for this ‘strongman’ 
from achieving his vision of a prosperous Cambodia come from the ‘influential 
politicians and powerful civil servants.’23 With little investment but high returns via 
the invisible hands within the context of weak governance, these people will resist 
‘changes introduced by new policies or projects.’24 
Like other state agencies, FiA is plagued by ‘poor governance,’ which is conducive 
to the thriving of the invisible hands. As discussed earlier, poor governance and 
manipulation of the auction committees allow the generation of economic capital 
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out of political capital and the pocketing of state revenues by officials and 
concessionaires.25 The introduction of research lots with no public bidding and 
closed door negotiations with little good governance further exacerbates lot 
mismanagement and favors politics of intervention by politicians on behalf of 
selected clients in research lot granting.26 While fisheries officials and experts call 
such an informal management ‘complicated,’ Manfield and MacLeod accuse the 
government of doing little to prevent powerful figures from transforming political 
power to economic power.27 
Agencies responsible for natural resources management wield more influence in 
post-communist states, according to Grzymala-Busse and Luong.28 However, as the 
Cambodia’s case shows, such agencies are also under economic elites’ intense 
pressure and politicians’ interventions. MAFF and FiA are no exception.29 Piseth 
Chiep and Thuon Try argue that khnong and khsae ease fishing and fish trading.30 
Such is the case for research lot applications as well. Many studies allege that 
through opaque dealings, lucrative research lots have been granted to wealthy 
and/or well-connected individuals to veteran politicians, often via ‘intermediaries 
with strong connection with powerful politicians.’31 A report by Thomas Olesen 
cites officials from the senate, parliament and Red Cross as beneficiaries. Fisheries 
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Commons: Changing Governance, Shifting Entitlements?: 12.  
26 Cf. Kato et al., Cambodia: Enhancing Governance for Sustainable Development: 17; Manfield 
and MacLeod, Advocacy in Cambodia: Increasing Democratic Space: 46; Touch and Bruce, The 
Inland and Marine Fisheries Trade in Cambodia: 135-36; van Acker, Free Riders and Social 
Fences: Common Property, Collective Action and Decentralized Natural Resource Management in 
Cambodia: 58-62.  
27 Ly, Yin, and Degen, "Management Aspects of Cambodia’s Freshwater Capture Fisheries," 98; 
Manfield and MacLeod, Advocacy in Cambodia: Increasing Democratic Space: 8.  
28 Grzymala-Busse and Luong, "Reconceptualizing the State: Lessons from Post-Communism," 
532-33.  
29 Asian Development Bank, Agriculture and Rural Development Sector in Cambodia: 16-17; 
Degen et al., "People, Power, and Fisheries Policy: Fisheries Management Reform Addressing 
Community Fisheries in Cambodia," 25; Degen and Nao, "Inland Fishery Management in 
Cambodia: Is the Fishing Lot System the Basis for Improved Management or Should It Be 
Abolished?," 7; Kol, "Review of Wetland and Aquatic Ecosystem in the Lower Mekong River 
Basin of Cambodia," 39 and 71; Nao, Long, and Taing, "Fisheries Monitoring, Control and 
Surveillance in Cambodia," 16; Touch and Bruce, The Inland and Marine Fisheries Trade in 
Cambodia: 18 and 123.  
30 khnong and khse = Literally a back and a string. See, Try, "Making Space and Access in Fisheries 
Resource Management for Local Communities in Stung Treng Province," 15-16. 
31 Cf. Mak and Grundy-Warr, "Spaces of Engagement and Contested Territories of the Tonle Sap," 
19; Mak, Vann, and Te, "Communication Strategies for Fisheries Conflict Management: A Case 
Study in Cambodia," 9; Mitchell, Tonle Sap Biosphere Reserve Policy Analysis and Secretariat 




officials and a concessionaire interviewed likewise support that political 
intervention into the granting of research lots on behalf of big businesses exists.32 A 
review of DoF documents and written comments on selected applications show that 
since 1997, some politicians and military figures have intervened on behalf of 
many applicants.33 A former provincial deputy governor observed: ‘[A] majority of 
research lots have a powerful person at the back. They request for a lot and then 
sell it…”34 According to Informants 65 and 68, concessionaires have to pay 
‘facilitation’ fees to multiple individuals, while Informant 7 adds that pressure is 
high in this field as money is involved.35 
With this extra power for many concessionaires state capacity to manage the 
resources is curtailed. The capacity to appropriate and extract has been restricted 
and many lots are barely penetrable as discussed earlier. The regulation within lots 
is generally left up to the concessionaires and thus is chaotic. The deputy PM’s 
report, for instance, underlined: ‘[T]here are no inspections of gears and activities 
within lots and no crackdowns on illegal activities within lots by fisheries officials 
                                                          
32 Informant 5; Informant 7; Informant 65; Informant 68. Cited in Fisheries Action Coalition Team 
and Environmental Justice Foundation, Feast or Famine? Solutions to Cambodia's Fisheries 
Conflicts: 20. 
33 See for example, Department of Fisheries, "Request to Keep Fishing Lots 5 & 6 for Exploitation, 
Development and Rehabilitation for Ten Years 2003-2013," (Phnom Penh: Department of Fisheries, 
19 June, 2002); ———, "Request to Keep Fishing Lots 2, 9 & 10 for Exploitation, Development 
and Rehabilitation for Ten Years 2003-2013," (Phnom Penh: Department of Fisheries, 19 June, 
2002); ———, "Request to Keep Lot 4 in Kandal for Exploitation, Technical Research and 
Rehabilitation for Three Mandates 2000-2006," (Phnom Penh: Department of Fisheries, 21 
December, 1999); ———, "Request to Keep Lot 1 in Kampong Cham for Exploitation, Technical 
Research and Rehabilitation for Three Mandates 2000-2006," (Phnom Penh: Department of 
Fisheries, 21 December, 1999); ———, "Request to Keep Lots 3 & 4 in Prey Veng for 
Exploitation, Technical Research and Rehabilitation for Three Mandates 2000-2006," (Phnom Penh: 
21st December, 1999, 21 December, 1999); ———, "Request to Keep Lot 4 in Kampong Chhnang 
for Exploitation, Technical Research and Rehabilitation for Three Mandates 2000-2006," (Phnom 
Penh: Department of Fisheries, 21 December, 1999  ); ———, "Request for Extension of 
Exploitation Rights to Dai Lot 10 in Kandal for 2003-2007," (Phnom Penh: Department of 
Fisheries, 28 February, 2003); Forestry and Fisheries Ministry of Agriculture, "Meeting Minute on 
Fishing Lots Issues," (Phnom Penh10 August, 2000 ); Pov Sok, "Request for Intervention to His 
Excellency Dr. Chan Sarun, Minister of Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries for 
Rehabilitation and Development of Dai Lot 15C in Kandal for Four Years 2009-2013," (2 February, 
2009). There are also occasions that MPs seek interventions or were asked to intervene on behalf of 
fishers in disputes with lot concessionaires and local authorities. For example, Soth  Chea, "[A 
Letter] to His Excellency Ly Kimhan," (31 January, 2000); National Assembly, "Request for 
Withdrawal of O’Chek Fishing Domain in Prakeab Village, M’sakrang Commune, Stong District, 
Kampong Thom Province and to Keep as Fishing Domain for Family Scale Fishers," (25 October, 
2007); Chy  Sou, "[A Letter] to His Excellency Provincial Governor of Kampong Chhnang," (6 
January, 2000).  
34 Committee to Review and Evaluate Research Lots, "Meeting Minute on the Establishment of 
Committees to Review and Evaluate Research Lots," (7 August, 2001).  
35 Informant 7; Informant 65; Informant 68.  
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or other competent authorities.’36 Officials from cantonment downwards are afraid 
to crackdown on lots with strong connections. To recall what a sangkat leader 
raised somewhere above here: concessionaires are too powerful, well-connected 
and well-protected for field implementors to challenge them.37 As seen in the 
research lot, researchers may be reluctant to unearth the concessionaires’ 
wrongdoings. Evans’s warning that ‘without autonomy the distinction between 
embeddedness and capture disappears’ and that the individualistic nature of 
relations degenerates into a super-cartel aiming to uphold the status quo applies 
here.38 Supporting what Swift wrote in 1997, a former fisheries official echoed: 
“Implementors do not dare to deal with big businesses with big backers, especially 
backers at the central level as directly confronting these people may result in the 
loss of one’s position.”39 As discussed in Chapter 6, this is applied to other micro-
level agencies dealing with natural resources as well.40 A report by the Center for 
Advanced Studies likewise attests their powerless, underlining that in disputes 
involving ‘higher-ranking officials or influential outsiders, a commensurately high 
ranking or influential interlocutors are needed to resolve the dispute.’41 
2. Capture of State Apparatus 
The local strongmen’s power, aided in many cases by powerful political backers, 
partly explains why these subsectors are messy. However, to understand why the 
actual policy implementation is very poor is to probe the actual practices from the 
inspectorate level downwards, especially those of the implementors and other 
relevant non-DoF local agencies. While lower level fisheries officials, local 
government officials and elements of the armed forces are reluctant to deal with 
                                                          
36 Bin, "Report on the Result from Implementing Decision 39 SSR Dating 01 July 2011 of the Royal 
Government of Cambodia on the Establishment of Commission to Inspect Development Lot around 
the Tonle Sap Lake." Cf. Ing, Sao, and Thay, "Small-Scale Fisheries Management in Cambodia," 
34. They claim that illegal fishing activities and transport happen the country over and this is 
supported by ‘high-ranking officers’. 
37 Informant 65; Informant 67; Informant 80; Informant 89. 
38 Evans, Embedded Autonomy: State & Industrial Transformation: 57-59.  
39 Informant 7. Swift cited in Gum, Inland Acquatic Resources and Livelihoods in Cambodia: A 
Guide to the Literature, Legislation, Institutional Framework and Recommendations 26-32; Swift, 
Developing a Research Framework for the Fishing Lot System in Cambodia: Two Preliminary Case 
Studies on Fishing Lots in Takeo and Kompong Chhnang Provinces: 20.  
40 Cf. Informant 62-64; Informant 79. A case of inundated forest clearance in Poy Tasek in 
Battambang in which provincial level officials downwards were reluctant to take action against the 
company though the act was wrong. Mak and Te, "Flooded Forest Clearance for Reservoir and 
Irrigation or Taking Flooded Forestland for Ownership: A Case Study of the Conflict Between 
Community in Poy Tasek Village and a Private Company."  
41 Cited in van Acker, Free Riders and Social Fences: Common Property, Collective Action and 
Decentralized Natural Resource Management in Cambodia: 115-16.  
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fishing lots, many quickly grab existing opportunities to make extra pocket money. 
Migdal correctly underlines that local politics ‘holds the richest and most 
instructive hints’ on how societies in developing countries affects resources 
management.42 
Migdal’s politics of administration fits squarely here. To deal with local strongmen, 
a strong political base is required; however, this is the missing link in ‘weak states.’ 
State leaders at the apex are busy with the politics of survival, and this has swayed 
the politics of local administration in that it ‘lessens backing and threat of sanctions 
from supervisors’ and made the implementors reluctant to deal with the strongmen 
and enter into a triangle of accommodation with them and the local political and 
administrative elites. In short, such politics ‘diminishes accountability and control’ 
and opens up the opportunities for strongmen to capture implementors and other 
local agents and for the latter to moonlight.43  
As discussed in the literature chapter, Phnom Penh politics has always been nasty, 
especially during the first mandate with heightened inter- and intra-party power 
struggle44 and political parties’ interest advancement. While reforms and 
strengthening of state institutions are relegated to secondary importance, the 
conflicts were usually over the division of major state positions, balance of power 
and how to keep each other in check. Power leans towards the CPP, though 
FUNCINPEC has managed to keep some balance even as late as 2006. Besides, 
party leaders need to manage intra-party factionalism, divisions or competition.  
                                                          
42 Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the 
Third World: 247-48; ———, State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and 
Constitute One Another: 88.  
43 ———, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the 
Third World: 200-56; ———, State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and 
Constitute One Another: 53-116. That is, they need to deal with strongmen in the capital (both local 
and foreign) and subordinate political elites to ensure that they will not challenge their power – and 
in the case of Cambodia, major rival political parties, especially between 1993 and 2008. For a 
review, see also Sok, "State Building in Cambodia: The Politics of Land Management and 
Administration in Cambodia - Focusing on Ratanakiri Province," Chapter 2. Evans also argues that 
in predatory states, ‘[p]ersonalism and plundering at the top destroys any possibility of rule 
governed behavior in the lower levels of the bureaucracy, giving individual maximization free rein.’ 
Evans, Embedded Autonomy: State & Industrial Transformation: 41-46. This study believes that 
Cambodia is more than less an ‘intermediary state’. Myrdal likewise argues that in a ‘soft state,’ its 
softness allows ‘conservative and reactionary forces in the rural and urban areas’ whose conduct 
state officials are to regulate capture them; thereby, railroading the state’s ideal policies for 
‘modernization’. Myrdal cited in Leftwich, "States of Underdevelopment: The Third World State in 
Theoretical Perspective," 56-58.  
44 See for example, Peou, Intervention and Change in Cambodia: Towards Democracy; Roberts, 
Political Transition in Cambodia: Power, Elitism and Democracy.  
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Politics has been about mistrust of one’s partner, winner-takes-all approach and 
weakening of opponents by all means.45 
The quest for internal legitimacy, as discussed in Chapter 10, requires the ruling 
parties to keep local governments, bureaucrats and armed forces on their sides. 
Such co-optation results in the government providing them with ‘de facto 
protection’ in their endeavor to amass wealth through resource exploitation in 
exchange for their loyalty and missions. The ‘protection and facilitation further 
weaken the central government’s control of the local authorities’46 and indeed state 
capacity. That is, to maintain informal clientage networks, political elites must be 
cautious with state capacity enhancement.47 
The politics of survival and a need for sub-central state agents as a bridge in the 
context of prevalent social forces and weak civil society have produced one severe 
repercussion: rent-seeking activities by sub-central state agents and their capture by 
vested interests. In newly democratized ‘limited states,’ ‘[t]he very state institutions 
meant to facilitate effective government seem just as likely to frustrate it,’ 
aggravated by the ruling elites’ inability or unwillingness to prevent its agents’ 
power abuses and rent-seeking.48 This applies to the Cambodian state. While the 
PM occasionally warned: ‘No one at any level of the society or within the 
government can be above the law,’ he admits that corruption is ‘gigantic and 
pervasive in all walks of life’ and that ‘having access to power sources are prone to 
bribes.’49 Many middle and low-level agents allegedly use their positions to 
                                                          
45 This ability to hold some balance manifested in having a co-minister for the Ministries of Interior 
and Defense, a first secretary of state for the Ministry of Economy and Finance with the nominal 
rank of a minister and retaining 40% of the cabinet though it won only 26 seats (against the CPP 73) 
in the 2003 general elections. Over the last two decades there has also been ongoing and dramatic 
increase in positions from secretaries of state to central deputy departments and in many 
provinces/municipalities provincial/municipal deputy governors as political compromise and 
accommodation. For a more extensive discussion, see for example, Sok, "State Building in 
Cambodia: The Politics of Land Management and Administration in Cambodia - Focusing on 
Ratanakiri Province," Chapter 3. 
46 Hughes, The Political Economy of Cambodia's Transition, 1991-2001: 15-76.  
47 Cf. Chabal & Daloz cited in Englehart, "State Capacity, State Failure, and Human Rights," 166; 
Try, "Making Space and Access in Fisheries Resource Management for Local Communities in 
Stung Treng Province," 7-8.  
48 Englehart, "State Capacity, State Failure, and Human Rights," 163-65; Evans, Embedded 
Autonomy: State & Industrial Transformation: 24; O'Dwyer, Runaway State-Building: Patronage 
Politics and Democratic Development: 1. 
49 See for example, Cambodia New Vision, "Address of Samdech HUN SEN to the Consultative 
Group Meeting (Paris, 25-26 May 2000)," Cambodia New Vision May 2000, 2; ———, "No Illegal 
Checkpoints - Closing the Good Governance for Poverty Reduction and Development National 
Seminar," 4; ———, "No to Corruptions - Opening the Good Governance for Poverty Reduction 
and Development National Seminar," 6; ———, "Address to the Launching of the New Building 
and the 50th Anniversary of the Customs and Excise Department," 3.  
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generate extra income and even pass up some proceeds to their higher bosses. That 
is, ‘the Cambodian state is weak in demanding allegiance of its employees and in 
maintaining its coherence.’50 
In what Englehart calls ‘agency loss’ or what others label crises of governance, 
capture of state agents by fishers and concessionaires have been common and well-
documented.51 Some fisheries officials interviewed agreed with this.52 While a 
2003 prakas warned enforcement officers of “loose implementation,” some 
watchdogs denounce that bribery has been ‘common-place’ and that concerned 
officials have turned a ‘blind eye’ to illegal activities.53 Many have been ‘hijacked’ 
and instead of protecting the resources, they ‘reportedly compete for turf.’54 In 
Province A, for example, according to an implementor, a bor user in his locality 
pays fisheries officials, local authorities and joint forces a sum of 4 million riels per 
long bor. Similar arrangements in other places are confirmed by interviews with 
CFC and CF members in another area, where officials from various agencies are 
involved in collecting varying amount of bribes from lake/stream pumping, electro-
fishing, big drag nets, etc.55 A RGC’s report emphasized: “[T]he enforcement of 
                                                          
50 Peou as cited in Hughes, The Political Economy of Cambodia's Transition, 1991-2001: 13. See 
also, Cock, "External Actors and the Relative Autonomy of the Ruling Elite in Post-UNTAC 
Cambodia," 251; Kato et al., Cambodia: Enhancing Governance for Sustainable Development: 88. 
51 Englehart, "State Capacity, State Failure, and Human Rights," 164; Sokhem and Sunada, "The 
Governance of the Tonle Sap Lake, Cambodia: Integration of Local, National and International 
Levels," 399; Nicolaas van Zalinge, "Update on the Status of the Cambodian Inland Capture 
Fisheries Sector with Special Reference to the Tonle Sap Great Lake," Mekong Fish Catch and 
Culture 2002, 7. See for example, Philippe Cacaud and Sok Phal Sam, "Draft Review of the 
Regulatory Framework and Comments and Recommendations on Draft Fisheries Law and the Draft 
Subdecree on Communities Fisheries," (Phnom Penh: Asian Development Bank, 2003), 26; 
Fisheries Action Coalition Team and Environmental Justice Foundation, Feast or Famine? 
Solutions to Cambodia's Fisheries Conflicts: 23; Gum, Inland Acquatic Resources and Livelihoods 
in Cambodia: A Guide to the Literature, Legislation, Institutional Framework and 
Recommendations 23-24; Mak and Grundy-Warr, "Spaces of Engagement and Contested Territories 
of the Tonle Sap," 17-18; Mak, Vann, and Te, "Communication Strategies for Fisheries Conflict 
Management: A Case Study in Cambodia," 30; Oxfam Great Britain, Evaluation of the Impact of 
the Fisheries Reform in Cambodia on the Livelihoods of Poor Fishers: 9; Thay, "Current 
Perceptions of Local Fishers of Community Fisheries or Co-Management of Fisheries: A Case 
Study," 37; Wildlife Conservation Society and Administration, "Comparson between Outcomes 
under the Proposed Prek Toal Sanctuary and Alternative Management Regime," 108-12.  
52 Informant 5; Informant 65; Informant 67.  
53 Chap, Carl, and Leng, "Fisheries Conflict and a Failed Community Fishery in Phat Sanday 
Commune, Kampong Svay District, Kampong Thom Province," 4-5; Patrick, Melissa, and Puadyal, 
Flood Forest, Fish and Fishing Villages: Tonle Sap, Cambodia: 8; Royal Government of 
Cambodia, "Prakas on Elimination of Electro-Fishing and Mosquito-Net Gears," (Phnom Penh: 
Royal Government of Cambodia, 1 September, 2003); van Acker, "Don't Trust Fish When They Are 
in Water: Cambodia's Inland Fisheries in Transition," 96.  
54 Keang et al., "Conflicts Arising from Re-Allocation of Fishing Lots: Perceptions from 
Community Fisheries in Cambodia," 10; van Acker, Free Riders and Social Fences: Common 
Property, Collective Action and Decentralized Natural Resource Management in Cambodia: 96.  
55 Informant 23; Informant 24; Informant 25-27; Informant 29-43; Informant 45-59; Informant 60; 
Informant 67. A local representative in a public forum in Battambang also complained of pervasive 
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existing legislation is somehow deficient in the country because of unacceptable 
behavior and lack of accountability by some government representatives.”56 That 
is, ‘the very agencies that should be responsible for enforcement of the law are 
often amongst the worst violators,’ to conclude many studies.57 In lot areas, 
especially before 2000, many of these officials assist concessionaires/operators to 
establish their rules and regulations. In offering his explanation for hundreds of 
illegal 1,000-2,000-meter dragging nets in Tonle Sap public access areas in 2009, 
the Kampong Thom governor opined: “Such a practice can be resulted from 
collusion with expertise officials and other concerned authorities in provinces 
around Tonle Sap since the perpetrators use hundreds of pair dragging nets days in 
and days out and can catch thousand tons of small and big fish to transport to 
Kampong Luong and Chnok Tru for sales. There are plenty of fisheries officials on 
Tonle Sap, but they do not take any measures.” He also cites fishers and CFCs 
complaining the lack of measures by expertise officials “who stand and watch lot 
concessionaires pumping water out of big lakes and electrocuting fish everywhere 
within lakes. These officials cannot see such acts as well.”58 Even concessionaires 
report that they have to pay multiple and multi-layers of officials to gain fishing 
rights and fishing operations.59 In common access areas, weak CFis and even in 
                                                                                                                                                                 
illegal fishing activities in his locality, while a Battambang fisheries official complained that other 
agencies and local authorities were involved in confiscating lakes for sales. NGO Forum on 
Cambodia, "Public Forum on Lot Boundary Disputes in Battambang," 10-34. A Study by Keang 
Seng in 2006 found out that even after the reforms fishers have to pay illegal fees to officers of 
various agencies. In Upper Mekong, before the reform in 2000 on average a fisher paid 90,000 riels 
and in 2005, 28,000 riels. In Tonle Sap region, the illegal fees increased from 66,000 riels during 
the pre-reforms period to 96,000 riels in 2005. Seng, Impact of Community Fisheries Management 
on Livelihood of Small-Scale Fishers in Cambodia: 25-26.  
56 Royal Government of Cambodia, National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan  (Phnom Penh: 
Royal Government of Cambodia, 2002). 69.  
57 Wildlife Conservation Society and Administration, "Comparson between Outcomes under the 
Proposed Prek Toal Sanctuary and Alternative Management Regime," 107.  
58 Kampong Thom Provincial Hall, "Report on the Illegal Fishing in Tonle Sap in Phat Sanday and 
Peam Bang Communes in Kampong Thom."  
59  Swift, Developing a Research Framework for the Fishing Lot System in Cambodia: Two 
Preliminary Case Studies on Fishing Lots in Takeo and Kompong Chhnang Provinces: 18; Touch 
and Bruce, The Inland and Marine Fisheries Trade in Cambodia: 120-31. Informant 68. Lots 1 and 
2 in Takeo reported payment to the following officials: police and army in the village, village and 
commune chiefs, fisheries inspectors, government officials, department of agronomy and provincial 
governor. Norman-Lopez, "Effect of the Reform of Fishing Lots in the Year 2000 to the 
Commercial Fisheries and Family Scale Fisheries in the Province of Takeo," 83. A complaint by 8 
lot concessionaires around the Tonle Sap to DoF in 1997 also requested for the reduction of 
agencies responsible for crackdowns as more of them meant more illegal activities as these agencies 
were involved in corruption. "Complaint by Lot Concessionaires,"  (20 June, 1997).  
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some sanctuaries, being bribed by fishers or forcing them for a bribe they set up 
inconsistent informal rules with little regards for the rule of law.60 
2.1.  Capture of Fisheries Officials 
The inspectors from the Regional Inspectorate down to the sangkat officials 
probably bear the direct blame, for they are directly involved in small and medium 
scale bribery.61 Two FiA leaders disparage that officials ‘loved’ to work in the 
Inspection Office/Unit before the reforms as that was considered ‘a lucrative 
position’ with ‘an opportunity to generate pocket money.’62 In the 1980’s and 
1990’s, a catchphrase was: ‘A forestry/fisheries position is oily [profitable].’63 
According to Mercedes Logarta, for example, 82% of Kampong Thom PoF’s staff 
worked as inspectors.64 The mismanagement peaked in 2000, resulting in the PM 
blasting some officials of ‘eating money,’ labeling the fisheries bureaucracy as 
‘rotten to the core’ and in the immediate removal of some senior and all field staff 
from the water body.65 In a 1999 report, Chhea Song, the MAFF minister, criticized 
that there were ‘ongoing collusion between fisheries officials and perpetrators’ and 
warned such officials to refrain from doing it.66 Reaffirming existing reports, an 
FiA leader agrees that even after their re-assignment, some officials have still 
colluded with the perpetrators. Besides, some cantonments are captured by 
provincial administrations. This is the case of the forestland clearance in Kampong 
                                                          
60 Cf. Degen et al., "Taken for Granted Conflicts over Cambodia's Freshwater Fish Resources," 11-
22; Mitchell, Tonle Sap Biosphere Reserve Policy Analysis and Secretariat Strategic Action Plan: 8; 
Neou et al., "Towards a Holistic Approach to Wetland Governance: The Legal and Institutional 
Framework and Economic Evaluation of Wetland Resources in Cambodia," 73-74; van Acker, 
Cambodia's Commons: Changing Governance, Shifting Entitlements?: 15; Whittingham, "Sites of 
Practice: Negotiating Sustainability and Livelihoods in Rural Cambodia," 204.  
61 Cf. Degen et al., "People, Power, and Fisheries Policy: Fisheries Management Reform Addressing 
Community Fisheries in Cambodia," 15; Department of Fisheries, "Inland Fisheries Review," 90; 
Ing, Sao, and Thay, "Small-Scale Fisheries Management in Cambodia," 34; Resurreccion, "Rules, 
Roles and Rights: Gender, Participation and Community Fisheries Management in Cambodia's 
Tonle Sap Region," 438.  
62 Informant 11; Informant 20.  
63 A Cambodian catchphrase to mean that a position is lucrative as one can generate a fortune out of 
it. 
64 Cited in Degen et al., "People, Power, and Fisheries Policy: Fisheries Management Reform 
Addressing Community Fisheries in Cambodia," 15.  
65 Ibid., 17; Department of Fisheries, Impacts of the Fisheries Policy Reforms in Kampong Cham, 
Pursat and Takeo Provinces: First Round Assessment Report: 48; van Acker, "Don't Trust Fish 
When They Are in Water: Cambodia's Inland Fisheries in Transition," 11-30.  
66 Department of Fisheries, "Meeting Minutes on Annual Meeting for 1999 and Action Plans for 
2000," (Phnom Penh: Department of Fisheries, 27-28 January, 2000).  
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Thom, where a former cantonment head colluded with the then governor and 
stopped the information from reaching DoF.67 
Accusations that sub-central fisheries agents turn a blind eye to illegal fishing by 
medium and small scale fishers in public access areas or sanctuaries for personal 
profits are typical – though the current scale is probably not as serious as before 
2001. Swift documented in 1997, for instance, that to use cast-nets in a closed 
season, fishers in Kampong Chhnang allegedly paid 15,000 riels to officials from 
the Fisheries Inspection and 10,000 riels to those from Tonle Sap Inspectorate. In 
July 2011, a newspaper reported that a sangkat officer in this province extorted 
between $18-25 per fisher who used floating nets larger than the sizes allowed. A 
month later, the deputy PM’s report showed that relevant officials were colluded to 
allow dai fishing extending to two or three kilometers in public access areas.68 
Where CFis/CFCs are weak, they also profit from collecting bribe from mega-
medium scale fishers and other illegal fishers. Complaints over unexpected and 
untimely releases of perpetrators are rife.69 According to a former fisheries official 
                                                          
67 Informant 11. An NGO board member also heard from fishers of collusion between sub-national 
fisheries officials and medium scale fishers: “I heard from fishers again and again of like medium 
scale fishers doing illegal fishing activities, but having in their hands a piece of paper which 
authorizes them by local, provincial or district level fisheries officials…” Informant 12. See for 
example, Fisheries Action Coalition Team and Coalition of Cambodia Fishers, "National Seminar 
on the Consultation to Determine the Priority Challenges to Submit to the National Level Decision-
Makers for a Solution and to Reflect on the Activities for the Early Part of 2011."; Manfield and 
MacLeod, Advocacy in Cambodia: Increasing Democratic Space: 48; Ratner, "Community 
Management by Decree? Lessons from Cambodia's Fisheries Reform," 82-83; Thay, Sim, and So, 
"Fisheries Policy Reform and Legal Framework for Community Fisheries," 99. A former fisheries 
official explains that apart from personal gains, this is necessary to serve other purposes, such as 
paying for central officials’ visits. Informant 7.  
68 Bin, "Report on the Result from Implementing Decision 39 SSR Dating 01 July 2011 of the Royal 
Government of Cambodia on the Establishment of Commission to Inspect Development Lot around 
the Tonle Sap Lake."; Sorn Sopheak, "Chong Koh Sangkat Fisheries Head Is Making Windfall 
Profits," Koh Santepheap Tuesday, 5 July, 2011; Swift, Developing a Research Framework for the 
Fishing Lot System in Cambodia: Two Preliminary Case Studies on Fishing Lots in Takeo and 
Kompong Chhnang Provinces: 62. Bin, "Report on the Result from Implementing Decision 39 SSR 
Dating 01 July 2011 of the Royal Government of Cambodia on the Establishment of Commission to 
Inspect Development Lot around the Tonle Sap Lake." See also, Asian Development Bank, 
Participatory Poverty Assessment in Cambodia: 34-65; Fisheries Action Coalition Team and 
Environmental Justice Foundation, Feast or Famine? Solutions to Cambodia's Fisheries Conflicts: 
25; Koroma, "Local Reforms of Community Forest and Fisheries Management," 310; Swift, 
Developing a Research Framework for the Fishing Lot System in Cambodia: Two Preliminary Case 
Studies on Fishing Lots in Takeo and Kompong Chhnang Provinces: 10-17; van Acker, Cambodia's 
Commons: Changing Governance, Shifting Entitlements?: 13-14. Informant 25-27; Informant 62-
64; Informant 92.  
69 See for example, Blomley et al., "Review of the Community Forestry and Community Fisheries 
in Cambodia."; Mak, Vann, and Te, "Communication Strategies for Fisheries Conflict Management: 
A Case Study in Cambodia," 24; Oxfam Great Britain, Evaluation of the Impact of the Fisheries 
Reform in Cambodia on the Livelihoods of Poor Fishers: 16; Viner et al., Development of Fisheries 
Co-management in Cambodia: A Case Study and Its Implications. Informant 23; Informant 24; 
Informant 25-27; Informant 45-59; Informant 60; Informant 61; Informant 70. In Site 1, the alleged 
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instead of protection the resources, they ‘rather go along with them than to prevent 
outsiders from encroaching on the communities.’ Another phenomenon is the 
acceptance of ‘tea money’ or ‘facilitation fees’ from assisting CFCs to seek 
permission from provincial administration for renting CFis’ areas.70 Such poor 
regulation and enforcement lead to unsustainable harvest, destruction of forestland, 
inequitable resource distribution and loss of state revenues. 
As for fishing lots, collusion starts from how to obtain them. Even the PM 
condemned some fisheries officials for “using the fishing lot system as their 
‘chhnangbai’ [cooking pots]…Some of these men, they are really corrupt.”71 
Collusions between auction committees and bidders are common, and potential 
bidders have to pay facilitation fees to a fisheries official for the arrangements. 
Forty concessionaires revealed: ‘[E]normous expense is unavoidable from making 
arrangements with strong competitors and government bureaucracies…often [the 
arrangements] need skilled intermediaries who can manage the collusion.’72 The 
TSA investigation in 2011 of lot bidding showed that collusions occurred in some 
provinces.73 A study of business registration shows that almost all businesses 
depend on a facilitator (usually an officer within a concerned ministry) to do it for a 
fee.74 As discussed in Chapter 5, this too is the case for research lots. 
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Order for ACU Oversight.."  
74 Schneider, Ka, and Roy, Private Sector Assessment for the Kingdom of Cambodia: 55. And the 
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The report above furthers that inspections of business establishments by concerned 
authorities mean opportunities for profit generation.75 Likewise, many 
implementors and their provincial supervisors can squeeze some profits out of their 
missions, including patrolling, turning a blind eye to lot expansion or illegal 
activities by operators, aiding them to disenfranchise smaller scale fishers, hiding 
actual catch statistics and alleged collusion to set up scenes of destruction by the 
Khmer Rouge. To quote fishers in Takeo, ‘these people have been bought off.’76 
While the TSA report reasoned that crackdowns and inspections within lots are 
curtailed by the concessionaires’ sponsorship of everything, including petrol and 
meals, the deputy PM is blunt to report that fisheries officials are captured by 
‘leasees and sub-leasees so that the latter can use illegal gears and activities.’77 As 
discussed in Chapter 5, even R&D activities within research lots have been dictated 
in the concessionaires’ interests. 
2.2.  Capture of Local Authorities  
Throughout history, local authorities held considerable power; some were allowed 
to keep thousands of armed personnel at their disposal. The power to collect taxes 
and poor records allowed them to ‘increase their own opportunities for profits.’78 
Similarly, the PRK/SoC’s local governments could make discretionary 
arrangements and retain some discretion, enabling them ‘to develop their personal 
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power bases, which allowed some commune chiefs, and some village chiefs, to 
take advantage of their positions.’79 In the 1990’s, buying their loyalty was even 
more indispensible given the politics of legitimacy and intense power struggle. 
That the district and commune authorities were the CPP’s backbone and its most 
trusted agents suggested that it needed their support and loyalty; however, as 
Hughes alleged this came at a price: de facto support of their exploitation of 
privatization.80 
The local authorities’ manipulation of the fisheries privatization was diverse. 
Before the reforms, many authorities from village to district levels were involved in 
protecting and illegally collecting bribes from illegal fishing.81 More seriously, 
many appropriated open access areas and sanctuaries to lease out for paid 
exploitation. Mak, echoing many reports, raised: “[T]here is an accusation that 
local authorities appropriate common access areas outside the fishing lot, privatize 
them and sell them to economically powerful individuals. Any subsequent 
complaints of villagers about their exclusion from access to the common access 
areas are broadly ignored.”82 For example, a DoF report in 1998 recorded 
numerous illegal sales of fishing rights in many provinces, including such sales of 
some lakes/streams by two commune chiefs in Kampong Cham, 42 lakes by a 
district chief in Prey Veng, three streams and a location by district and commune 
chiefs in three districts in Kandal, 60 lakes in Kampong Chhnang, and 50 lakes in 
Banteay Meanchey by commune and district heads.83 In such provinces as Siem 
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Reap and Kampong Thom, they were alleged to permit large-scale farmers to block 
rivers or clear flooded forest to build reservoirs.84 Some even assisted 
concessionaires/operators to exclude small-scale fishers from areas they are entitled 
to, confiscated common access areas and sold fishing rights to 
concessionaires/operators and were reluctant to aid small-scale fishers in their 
disputes with concessionaires/operators.85 Van Acker wrote: ‘Frequently, the 
military, and village and commune chiefs were also in cahoots, in exchange for 
specific exclusive rights.’ Swift and Wayne Gum estimated that while MEF 
collected between $1-4 million per year, the ‘local authorities probably collect[ed] 
far larger amounts of informal income from fisheries.’86 While often these were 
done for monetary profits, sometimes they were under pressure from ‘other 
economically and politically powerful parties to accommodate their interest.’87 
History shows that provincial and local leaders resisted any reforms that 
jeopardized their interests.88 Such resistance emerged after the 2001 reforms 
though it was subtle due to the upcoming multi-party commune elections. 
Ruechemeyer claims that restructuring is resisted by a body of officials who see the 
imposed policies as being at odds with their orientation of benefits.89 This was the 
case for the reforms. In Phat Sanday, for example, the local authorities blocked a 
meeting organized by CFDO to elect a CFC unless there were ‘orders from their 
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immediate superiors.”90 Upon the reforms, reports from NGOs and DoF indicate 
that parts of the released areas were captured by local authorities which ‘still 
controlled and rented the release areas to private individuals for personal incomes.” 
There were complaints that in some areas the powerful and sophisticated networks 
that characterized former lot operations tried to capture the reforms in new guises.91 
One common guise was the renting of CFi sections under the name of CFCs. A 
notification from MoI to some provincial governors in 2002 read: “There have been 
ongoing occurrences of large scale fishing in former fishing lots under the banner 
of CFis and in some places renting of some lots for individual exclusive fishing by 
local authorities in almost all municipalities and provinces that have fishing lots.”92 
Even in 2004, such complaints continued, though some local authorities reasoned 
that the proceeds were used to develop their communes.93 In some CFis visited, the 
latest evolution is that the renting is now managed by CFCs with money kicked up 
to relevant CC members and with verbal agreements from village to district chiefs. 
The three CC chiefs in Site 4 where such renting occurred in 2011 are reported to 
receive 1,310,000 riels, 1,500,000 riels and 750,000 riels (with the latter another 
300,000 riels separately given to a village chief), respectively. The informants 
confided that such had been a practice since 2001.94 Such renting occurs in other 
provinces. A DoF report in 2001 stated: “There emerges a phenomenon of fishing 
by bamboo fences under the banner of CFis. In reality, the local authorities 
colluded with each other and sell the fishing domain to a group of individuals – 
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such fishing occurs in Prey Veng, Kampong Cham, and so on.”95 Subsequent 
reports in 2004 and 2006 complained that such industrial scale fishing with 
collusion from local authorities still continues.96 
Besides, some local authorities are involved in supporting or collecting bribes from 
illegal fishers operating in CFi areas. Fishers and a TFN staffer in Province A 
reported that their village chief collects money from illegal fishers, with proceeds 
apparently kicked up to commune and district authorities.97 In a mapping exercise 
with the newly elected CFC and a few villagers, the participants complained: “The 
participation of the local authority, such as commune councils, in the protection of 
inundated forest is still weak – as weak as zero…. The local authority has never 
cared to take care of the natural resources – they don’t even eke their heads in.”98 A 
group of fishers in the village added: 
The CFC has organized three protests thus far since 2004. In 2004, we thumb-printed a 
complaint against an achar who was in love with pumping a common ancestral stream. 
But we did not pay attention to the letterhead. I was involved in this protest. Villagers 
thumb-printed against pumping the lake…I brought it to the then district head. The 
result, because we were ignorant of what was written at the top, they falsified the 
document, writing that the people agreed to sell the stream to the achar at more than 1 
million riels to build this and that…We don’t know who falsified the documents, but I 
brought the documents to the district quarter. We did not receive any money; it was 
apparently the expertise officials…We had another protest related to illegal fishing, to 
which I don’t remember the year. We complained up to the National Assembly, during 
the second mandate, probably in 2007…More than 20 people went to protest in Phnom 
Penh. The National Assembly told us to deal with the problem at the district level.  
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When we came back, the district took photo of us one by one. We were very 
frightened. They took the photos and kept them at the district…They accused us of 
complaining against the district chief and counter-protested that we accused them of 
accepting bribes. We were so frightened of being handcuffed and imprisoned and 
swore that we would never involve ourselves in any protest again. The result was 
‘useless’. Some people were so frightened that they secretly left the village. No one has 
ever been arrested or imprisoned; they just threatened us. They usually just called the 
organizers in to threaten; we then came back to our village and informed each other. In 
most of the cases, they just asked the ‘heads of the wind’ in to threaten and when they 
came back, everything is quiet.99 
According to two fisheries officials, such ‘green light’ illegal fishing takes place 
elsewhere in this province. Likewise, three CFC heads in Province B complained: 
‘There is quite widespread inundated forest clearance by villagers within the CFi 
areas. However, when the CFCs temporarily arrest them and send them to the 
commune councils; the latter rarely take action against the perpetrators.”100 
Provincial governments hold considerable power. Before 1993, the administration 
held de facto autonomy, including financial autonomy. Even the center had 
problems in communicating with them. A 1979 party decision referred to ‘the 
phenomenon of [the provinces] working according to impulse without reports or 
without requesting the opinion of the central committee.’101 Even after the D&D 
reforms, provincial governments across the board have ‘been implicated in a range 
of corrupt and abusive activities.’ Even with the introduction of the Seila program, 
one interviewee confided to Hughes that governors still wear ‘two hats, a black one 
and a white one. When we work with Seila, we wear our white hats.”102 In the 
subsectors, their ‘black hats’ are worn in lot auctions and research lot requests, for 
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they are the committee heads and a signatory of the applications, respectively.103 A 
fisheries official alleged that apparently the ‘head of the committee receives a 
largest share of the money.’ Two others add that building good relationship with 
the governorship is necessary for such a business.104 While a study in Takeo shows 
that a governor was paid, a Takeo DoA document alleged that the ‘provincial 
[administration] demanded $20,000 to sign off’ an application for a research lot in 
2001.105 
In addition, provincial authorities are sometimes reluctant to confront powerful 
local businesses; such was the construction of a 100-hectare reservoir in Poy Tasek 
village in 2007.106 An FiA leader raises that “some provincial authorities delay 
crackdown missions via delaying granting permissions for the crackdowns – this is 
done through the delay in signing off the ‘mission letters’ for the concerned 
envoys. That is, when there are personal interests involved, concerned actors are 
quick to protect them.”107 Further, as existing research shows, before and upon the 
reforms, the Stung Treng administration granted fishing concessions illegally. In 
one instance, the money allegedly went to private pockets and in a meeting 
‘authorities at all levels in the province accepted the fact that the concessions are 
illegal but suggested that all in the province should help keep this a secret.” In the 
other, local villagers were advised by the provincial administration to follow the 
commune chief’s ideas.108 Manfield and McLeod bemoan that “no amount of 
legislation or directives from the central government can instill political will within 
provincial authorities to solve fisheries dispute.”109 The PM also observed: 
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‘Provincial or sub-national level authorities dare make decisions that are relating to 
their interests but they are not if they are not involving their interests.”110 
2.3. Capture of the Armed Forces 
Of all state actors that tip the greatest balance towards social forces against any 
rules of law are probably elements in the armed forces. While in medieval Europe, 
a strong standing army was one element for state building, in many limited states 
with a weak army institution, they are part of the problem.111 Further, when 
patronage is needed to bind the fragmented army leaders to the state leaders, the 
situation can even be worse, as witnessed in Soharto’s Indonesia and Lon Nol’s 
Cambodia.112 Even after 1993, the military and security services still hold ‘a 
dominant power in Cambodia’ with general impunity from prosecution for their 
wrongdoing and exercise considerable autonomy. Toshiyasu Kato and others 
complained: ‘[T]he military and police forces have contributed to the lawlessness, 
insecurity, and fear of violence that pervade Cambodia.’113 While Un and Hughes 
link such state of the affairs to patronage politics,114 to rein them in can probably 
endanger the government’s cohesion. 
The armed forces’ contribution to the lawlessness in the subsectors, especially 
before 2001, is notorious. Then, there were numerous complaints that elements of 
the armed forces confiscated public access areas for sales of fishing rights, 
provided protection to illegal fishers who even fished in sanctuaries and closed 
seasons, or conducted illegal fishing by themselves. Throughout the 1990’s, such 
complaints by PFOs and DoF were common. In 1997, the DoF annual report 
criticized: “Gunmen protect perpetrators of illegal fishing crimes both (petty and 
serious) without any fear of rule of law… A majority of perpetrators who use 
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illegal gears are protected by armed forces.”115 PFO annual reports painted the 
same picture. In 1998, for example, the Pursat PFO complained: “Armed forces are 
involved in illegal fisheries crimes; therefore, the fisheries officials find it very 
hard to crackdown on them.”116 In May 1999, Chhea Song raised the issues in a 
Council of Ministers (CoM) meeting. He reported: “In the last few years there have 
been different forms of anarchy such as expropriation of thousands of hectares of 
protected domains in Tonle Sap…by armed men who poled 2,000 to 3,000 hectares 
of them… and allowed those who paid them for fishing…”117 The follow-up of the 
meeting was a prakas to control and eliminate anarchy in the subsectors, with one 
provision targeting the armed forces, stipulating: “Call for concerned ministries and 
authorities to take serious measure against the armed forces that involved in these 
illegal activities.”118 This was actually preceded by a call from the PM to ‘put an 
end to bad elements in the armed forces – those who perform illegal businesses or 
back such businesses.”119 
Numerous reports and a complaint from eight concessionaires similarly lamented 
the lawlessness created by the armed forces. The ADB, for instance, underlines that 
‘widespread interference by other authorities, including the military and the police’ 
is one of the six major unresolved fisheries issues.120 Swift in 1997 documented 
illegal fishing activities backed by military officers in Kampong Chhnang and 
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Takeo, adding: ‘Each military group has its own territory, and people from other 
military groups, can only fish there with permission of the local group.”121 Such 
territorialization took place in Province A. A fisher recalled fishing in public access 
areas: 
Before the PM released the area to the community, we had to pay to fish in the public 
access areas…As for me, I used to work as a soldier and knew all soldiers, so they did 
not charge me – even a cent. But for people from outside, such as from Chikreng, they 
did charge them. I also paid to the armed forces when I fished further from the 
community area, as it is their territory. We also needed to pay to military police. We 
paid 10,000 riels each to the three docks of the DoF sangkat, military police and 
soldiers.122 
A group of concessionaires complained against elements in the armed forces in 
1997, reporting: “Inundated forest clearance for samrah in thousands of locations, 
swooping fingerlings, electro-fishing, and catching fish using electric lights in 
closed seasons happened in all provinces around Tonle Sap except in Banteay 
Meanchey.”123 Some reported that senior local military leaders were involved. A 
former fisheries official reported: “[T]here are cases in which rich fishers colluded 
with the Inspectorate or big military figures to fish in the reserve lots.”124 Likewise, 
in an interview with Hughes, one judge reported: 
Since the recent [1993] election, we have become independent [but] … in reality, we 
have pressure from the military, local authorities, other departments. Sometimes there 
is violence, sometimes oral threats. To deal with these cases we depend on the local 
authority. Sometimes they can protect us. But sometimes it’s a big leader of the Armed 
Forces and they cannot … Most of the time we have got to be careful. Our safety is not 
guaranteed. People who violate the law are normally people with arms.125 
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As discussed elsewhere, elements of the armed forces, including their local leaders, 
benefited from assisting concessionaires with their businesses. That is: ‘The 
fisheries inspectors, police, and army protect the system rather than the letter of the 
law, in exchange for benefits from the concessionaires.”126 
Probably the greatest problem arose during the transition to CFi management. A 
report by an NGO complained: “Communities across Cambodia report problems 
from the military and police units protecting illegal fishers in exchange for 
money.”127 An NGO officer who was monitoring fishing in Tonle Sap recalled: 
“Immediately after the reforms, illegal fishing was mushrooming…These illegal 
fishers were mostly not ordinary people, as they were backed by military, military 
police or soldiers.”128 In February 2001, a MAFF secretary of state likewise raised: 
“[O]ther agencies such as traffic police, economic police, navy, a research and 
intelligence department, military police, port police, etc. and other bad guys also 
take the opportunity to demand money from fishers.”129 Besides, they helped 
protect some former concessionaires to exploit the lots in defiance of the sub-
decrees.130 
Kingsbury claims that in Thailand and Cambodia, ‘the role of the military in 
political affairs has declined.’131 A veteran observer of the subsectors likewise 
contended: “Before 2001, the crackdown on illegal fishing, for example, sometimes 
was carried out by DoF staff alone or by other agencies, such as police, military 
police, or soldiers, separately. There has been more respect for one’s duties 
amongst concerned agents since 2001.”132 Since then DoF and its PFO annual 
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reports have never complained of armed forces’ involvement in their affairs. This 
probably hints at interference reductions. However, elements of the armed forces 
are reported to continue to protect illegal fishing. A FiA leader, for example, said: 
“There are places where commune chiefs or police chiefs, etc. ask for monthly fees 
from perpetrators.”133 Evidence from the fieldwork suggests that actually the 
interference has been transformed to joint demands for money with DoF ground 
staff, through joints patrol missions, for example.134 This may partly contribute to 
the fact that fishers and LNGO workers in both provinces see them as one and refer 
to them as ‘mixed forces,’ ‘expertise officials’ or ‘competent authorities’ – which 
usually include local fisheries officials, military, military police and police 
forces.135 A group of fishers indicated: “I saw the FiA official collect money from 
the ‘head of the wind’ of the bor users. It is a mixed force who collected the 
money. The military police and police were also seen receiving money. We don’t 
know whether they issued any paper, we just saw them hand out money.”136 The 
village chief agreed: “The joint forces and expertise officials also go to investigate 
onsite, but when they hear the perpetrators moan about the challenges with their 
livelihoods… [They] began to understand their situations and compromise, by 
simply fining the [illegal] activities to cover their travel and snack – just a little.”137 
A provincial fisheries official added: “The crackdown team can make a lot of 
money out of the mission as money must be paid to different institutions involved 
in the crackdowns.”138 
Reports on demands for money, withholding of support to CFi patrol teams and 
payments by large-medium scale and other illegal fishers to fish illegally within 
CFi areas to elements of the armed forces are not uncommon either. CFi patrol 
teams in two provinces complain that the joint district forces who participated in 
patrol never send offenders to court, but insisted on keeping them ‘for resolving at 
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their office.”139 Fishers interviewed complained of lake/stream pumping in their CF 
area: “To pump, they also have to buy the lakes/streams. I do know some of the 
sellers, but I cannot reveal the names. The sellers can be military police and other 
armed forces or fisheries officials. Now they do not talk about selling. They talk 
about, for example, to pump a lake, one has to pay 1 million riels to the military 
police, one million riels to police.”140 In Province B, three CFC heads report that 
traffic police, economic police and a nearby district army unit come to demand for 
money when “Fish Yield Collection Groups’ begin fishing operations.141 All in all, 
their involvement is ongoing – though transformed. Even the PM repeatedly warns 
elements of the armed forces to step back from illegal acts or supporting them, 
including those that destroy natural resources.142 
2.4.  Capture of the Courts 
“An expanded set of judicial courts’ is another tool for state building. By contrast, 
an underpaid and subservient judiciary is subsumed to corruption and political 
manipulation.143 The capture of the courts in Cambodia, as in many developing 
countries, is a serious problem. The court system is perceived to ‘be riddled with 
corruption’ ‘at every step of the legal process from the police to the courts.’ In 
1999, a senior government official candidly said: “Cambodian courts are so 
corrupted they’re beyond help.”144 Even the PM agrees with his critics that 
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progress in judicial reforms ‘lags behind other reforms’ and that amongst the three 
branches, ‘the power of the court seems to have failed.’145 
Many judges, prosecutors, clerks and lawyers whom Un interviewed agreed that 
corruption occurs in the judiciary, though refuting the magnitude widely believed 
by the public. One judge admitted: “The court is corrupt and that I am not denying. 
But there are some good people. There are some bad people but these people are 
the product of poverty.”146 Surveys of citizens’ perceptions support that the ‘rule of 
law’ is a distant future. A qualitative survey in 2003 reported that participants 
perceived that little progress was made to combat crime and corruption because of 
a weak and corrupt judicial system which favored the resourceful and powerful.147 
Likewise, the corruption perception index for the judiciary barely improved during 
2005-09, according to TI surveys. 
Table 22: Impacts from Corruption on Selected Sectors and Institutions148 
 Legislature Military Police Tax Registry Legal System/Judiciary 
2005 2.4 2.5 3.2 3.1 3.9 
2007 3.7 2.9 3.9 3.4 3.3 
2009 2.7 3.5. (public officials) 4.0 
(Note: Scale 1-5; 1 = not corrupt at all & 5 = extremely corrupt) 
In the subsectors, there have been numerous court cases on fee reductions and 
disputes between concessionaires and smaller scale fishers. Whether there were 
interventions in these cases is not known. However, many judicial staff in Un’s 
studies agreed that selected interventions by powerful political figures into courts’ 
affairs in favor of their clienteles occurred and that when such happened, they were 
often subsumed to the requests for fear, affection, safety or professional security.149 
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As discussed in Chapter 4, the majority of fishing infractions do not reach the 
courts. Courts are reportedly weak and corrupt and offer judgments that are unfair 
to poor and powerless fishers. Prosecution of the military guards and 
concessionaires/operators were rare and rulings generally were in their favors.150 
For example, a report raises two cases where community members confiscated 
illegal gears found in their community areas; however, they were sued by the 
illegal fishers to whom the court sided. The survey with conflict managers revealed 
that 2/3 of them agree that due to the weak legal and judicial system, ‘the powerful 
groups will be able to win their conflicts over the less power groups of fishers.’151 
Some key informants agree that the courts are also parts of the problem. To an 
NGO worker: “DoF is not totally to blame. The court was involved. Sometimes the 
culprits were caught today and released the next … In sum, it is like ‘trey ngeat 
chhleat pong.” A catchphrase which literally means ‘a dried fish opportunistically 
tries to lay eggs,’ simply refers to a person who is an opportunist.152 Another 
added: “We hear again and again [when we go to the fields] that the courts cannot 
be trusted, especially when it goes to the provincial level.”153 Fisheries officials and 
CFC members concur. A division head elaborated: 
In crackdowns, if the team only sees the illegal gears, it just destroys them. It can arrest 
perpetrators only when they are caught red handed. In such a case, a form is filled to 
send the perpetrator to court. The investigation and decision as to whether to punish the 
perpetrators is within the jurisdiction of the court. In many cases the court simply lets 
free the alleged within one or two weeks on bail for further investigation. There are 
occasions when I asked the court how long the investigation period lasted and the 
answer that I got from one prosecutor during a workshop was that ‘the period was 
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indefinite.’ I used to ask a prosecutor why the perpetrators were usually let free, and he 
replied that it was the privilege of the judges to decide whether to punish the alleged 
based on evidence.154 
He exemplified this with three current cases: 
In 2010, [my] division sent three cases to court – the perpetrators were set free in a few 
months’ time at best. One of the cases in 2010 involved cutting inundated forest…and 
two others involved electro-fishing... In 2011 it sent one case, involving eight persons 
who were alleged of cutting inundated forests, to court in May, and they were set free 
in July.155 
Three CFC heads supported these accounts: 
With serious offenses such as electro-fishing, when a CFC reports to the fisheries 
officials or when they see them during their patrol, they rarely let the perpetrators go; 
they usually fill in the form and send the perpetrators to court. We never see the court 
punish these perpetrators as severely as the law stipulates. The most serious 
punishment that we observe is two or three month imprisonment or even a few weeks’ 
imprisonment. In most cases, the court simply suspends the sentence with bail 
payment, which can be up to $250 per person. In this case, there is a receipt of bail 
payment. There are cases in which the court asks the perpetrator to sign a contract to 
allow the alleged to stay out for further investigation with some informal payment.156 
A DoF report likewise points to the courts’ leniency and inaction, arguing: “Such 
dealing with criminal cases did not punish the accused as they shall have to 
pressure the perpetrators from quitting’ illegal activities.157 Philippe Cacaud and 
Sok Phal Sam stated: ‘[C]ourts are powerless and judges are corrupted resulting in 
alleged violators being routinely released for lack of evidence.’158 There are 
likewise complaints of unfair dealing with debt arrears and claims. A MAFF report 
said: “To those who stubbornly refused to pay fishing lot fees, DoF filed a 
complaint to the courts, but there have never been any positive responses.”159 MEF, 
too, used to complain about unfair rulings on lot fee reductions.160 
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3. The Checks and Balances of State Institutions 
For a state to properly function and for government agencies be accountable for 
what they do, checks and balances of the three central branches of the state are 
necessary. Many policies support strengthening all branches and express the will to 
ensure their independence and neutrality to increase these checks and balances. The 
RGC political platform, for example, lays out: “The Royal Government will 
continue to strengthen…the legislative, executive and judicial bodies so that they 
could effectively fulfill their roles and duties with accountability.”161 Despite the 
rhetoric, the executive is more powerful and capable than the other two whose 
ability to act as checks and balances against the former is limited, and the 
separation of power between the three is not clear. Kato and others, for example, 
agree that currently there is little effective separation between the three branches, 
resulting partly from “the prevalence of party politics which touches everything 
connected with government or public policy. The result is the absence of genuine 
checks and balances within Cambodia’s system of governance and the 
concentration of power in the hands of a few individuals.”162 Englehart argues that 
in ‘weak’ states, the government sees this as necessary for it to freely ‘indulge in 
patronage, corruption and repression without fear of being checked by other public 
authorities.”163 
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According to Peou, the legislature’s ability to check the executive’s arbitrary 
exercise of power is limited.164 In the subsectors, for example, there were few 
occasions when the legislature invited the government to clarify on fisheries 
issues.165 The government and aid agencies play a role (deliberately or 
unintentionally) in neutralizing and marginalizing it and often fail to ‘consult or 
even inform [it] about major policy or legislative initiatives’166 timely. Moreover, 
the legislature’s capacity is limited. One manifestation is that a majority of bills are 
initiated by the executive, while the legislature usually plays a ‘reactive’ role of 
deliberating and passing the drafts167 often in totality as proposed or only with 
slight correction. As of 2002, all but some of the 140 laws enacted were proposed 
and prepared by government agencies,168 and “[g]overnment officials are usually 
involved in meetings of the Assembly commissions when draft laws are 
reviewed.’169 As seen in Table 23, only twenty and thirty-five members of 
parliament (MPs) of the last two mandates, respectively, completed graduate and 
post-graduate studies. That bills are drafted by the executive is therefore 
understandable because the legislature, including the technical commissions, lacks 
human resources, technical expertise and collective experience for oversight 
function170 and legislation initiation, contributing ‘to imbalance in the system of 
checks and balances’ and ‘adversely affect the quality of good governance.’171 
                                                          
164 Peou, "Cambodia after the Killing Fields," 54. The frequent accusation is that it is a ‘rubber 
stamp’. Hughes, The Political Economy of Cambodia's Transition, 1991-2001: 116-17.  
165  For two requests, see for example, National Assembly, "Request to Have His Excellency to 
Clarify to Third Committee of National Assembly," (Phnom Penh: National Assembly, 9 April, 
2001); ———, "Questions to Government," (Phnom Penh: National Assembly, 13 December, 
1999).  
166 Kato et al., Cambodia: Enhancing Governance for Sustainable Development: 123; Peou, 
Intervention and Change in Cambodia: Towards Democracy?: 191-93; ———, "Cambodia after 
the Killing Fields," 54-56.  
167 Kato et al., Cambodia: Enhancing Governance for Sustainable Development: 41; Peou, 
"Cambodia after the Killing Fields," 54-56.  
168 Manfield and MacLeod, Advocacy in Cambodia: Increasing Democratic Space: 33.  
169 Kato et al., Cambodia: Enhancing Governance for Sustainable Development: 41.  
170 Ibid., 41, 89 and 123; Shawcross, Cambodia's New Deal: 56.  
171 Kato et al., Cambodia: Enhancing Governance for Sustainable Development: 8-9. There are a 
few occasions that the legislature flexes its muscle, though. Such were the rejection by the senate in 
1999 of a draft bill stipulating that the minister for the Ministry of Women’s Affairs shall be a 
woman and the other on financial institutions on the ground that the five day period was too short 
for consideration. ibid., 19.  
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Table 23: MPs’ Levels of Education172 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Graduate Post-Graduate Honorary Total 
3rd Term 5 28 63 16 4 5 123 
4th Term 2 27 58 30 5 6 123 
Harold Laski contends that the separation of the judiciary from other state 
apparatus, especially the executive, is ‘very great’.173 This is not the current case 
with the Cambodian judiciary, which has weak capacity and lacks independence 
and separation, especially from the executive.174 This is partly the legacy of 
communism and the decimation of people with legal backgrounds during the DK; 
hence many judicial posts were filled by people with no such backgrounds. For 
example, a prosecutor Un interviewed stated: “Under the Communist regime, the 
court had no independence at all. In court cases related to serious crimes, the court 
had to go to the party for advice. The party was the institution that determined the 
degree of punishment. [Currently] judges do not ask for advice in making their 
judgment. However, the court’s independence remains limited.” His studies, 
moreover, indicate that interventions into court cases by executive and powerful 
figures on the grounds of ‘nepotism, patronage and politics’ were frequent. A 
judge, for example, revealed: “Intervention is normal. Any judge experiences this 
with cases over which he presides. The issue is complicated. When this issue arises, 
we have to think of our safety.” That is, the judiciary is sometimes manipulated to 
‘strengthen the executive power at the expense of the principle of checks and 
balances.”175 Kato and others correctly note that developing an independent 
                                                          
172 For the first three categories, some reached but did not necessary finished the study. Adapted 
from Committee for Free and Fair Elections in Cambodia, Directory of the Fourth National 
Assembly of Cambodia 2008-2013  (Phnom Penh: Comfrel, 2009). 48; Committee for Free and Fair 
Elections in Cambodia and Neutral and Impartial Committee for Free and Fair Elections in 
Cambodia, Directory of the Third National Assembly of the Kingdom of Cambodia 2003-2008  
(Phnom Penh: Comfrel and Nicfec, 2005). 33. For complete profiles of each member, see 
Committee for Free and Fair Elections in Cambodia, Directory of the Fourth National Assembly of 
Cambodia 2008-2013: 49-171; Committee for Free and Fair Elections in Cambodia and Neutral and 
Impartial Committee for Free and Fair Elections in Cambodia, Directory of the Third National 
Assembly of the Kingdom of Cambodia 2003-2008: 35-157. 
173 Laski, The State: In Theory and Practice: 178-79.  
174 Kato et al., Cambodia: Enhancing Governance for Sustainable Development: 44-45. See also, 
Kingsbury, South-East Asia: A Profile: 212-13; ———, Political Development: 100; Peou, 
"Cambodia after the Killing Fields," 49-56; van Acker, Cambodia's Commons: Changing 
Governance, Shifting Entitlements?: 6.  
175 Un, "State, Society and Democratic Consolidation: The Case of Cambodia," 232-33; ———, 
"The Judicial System and Democratization in Post-Conflict Cambodia," 84-93. See also Hughes, 
The Political Economy of Cambodia's Transition, 1991-2001: 43-44. There were also occasions that 
the legislature oversteps the authority of the Supreme Council of Magistrates  – such was the 
questioning of the two suspended judges by a senate commission. Kato et al., Cambodia: Enhancing 
Governance for Sustainable Development: 82. 
201 
 
judiciary ‘is in its early stages. Some confusion and reliance on past practices is to 
be expected.’176 
Besides limited independence, the judiciary is plagued by the lack of resources 
(human and financial) and poor governance. A study in 2000 shows that only 30%, 
67% and 1 person of the lowest, appellate and supreme courts, respectively, 
received a bachelor’s or associate degree in law; 40% reached lower or higher 
secondary school; 7% primary school, and the rest possessed other non-legal 
qualifications. Prosecutors fared even more poorly – only 9% received a bachelor’s 
degree in law and 22% some legal training.177 The situation has improved over the 
last decade, though statistics is not available. According to the PM, with 133 judges 
and 65 prosecutors in 2002, their ratio to the population was 1:50,000.178 In terms 
of financial resources, though the MoJ is a priority ministry, its share of the total 
expenditure as seen in Chapter 4 is minimal.179 Up to 2002, average salary for court 
officials, including judges and prosecutors, was $24; a reform measure in 2003 
increased salary for judges and prosecutors to between $320 and $400.180 This low 
salary indeed is one root cause of corruption. The appointments, promotions and 
transfers of judges, prosecutors and other court officials, especially to lucrative 
positions or locations, also lack transparency. Insiders revealed that such were done 
based on patronage and bribery. A prosecutor, for example, complained: “Within 
the court system if someone wants to be promoted he/she has to make a request and 
the request involves paying a bribe.” Another judge indicates that some judges are 
incompetent; however, they can retain their position because of the power of the 
purse.181 All in all, the politics of interventions by politicians into state agencies’ 
affairs, capture of relevant state agents by businesses and limited checks and 
balances present challenges to the state’s full capacity. 
                                                          
176 ———, Cambodia: Enhancing Governance for Sustainable Development: 82. See also, ———, 
"Summary of Cambodia Governance Assessment," 10; van Acker, Cambodia's Commons: 
Changing Governance, Shifting Entitlements?: 6, 24 and 81.  
177 Kato et al., Cambodia: Enhancing Governance for Sustainable Development: 45 and 84-95. For 
details, see ibid., 84.  
178 Cambodia New Vision, "Addressing the Seminar on Judge and Prosecutor Works," 2.  
179 For an illustration of how the budget was shared, see for example, NGO Forum on Cambodia 
and Economic Institute of Cambodia, Guide to the National Budget: 44. See also Kato et al., 
Cambodia: Enhancing Governance for Sustainable Development: 36.  
180 ———, Cambodia: Enhancing Governance for Sustainable Development: 45; Un, "The Judicial 
System and Democratization in Post-Conflict Cambodia," 81 and 91.  
181 ———, "The Judicial System and Democratization in Post-Conflict Cambodia," 83-84. See also 
———, "State, Society and Democratic Consolidation: The Case of Cambodia," 231-32.  
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Chapter 9: State Structure and Resources 
This chapter examines how the Cambodian state structure and resources affects its 
capacity. According to Hun Sen, “[C]ompetent public officials with good ethics are 
key to success in reforms and improving the credibility of the country…[T]he 
government needs highly competent and clean officials with good moral.”1 What 
this statement suggests is that state institutions and qualified state agents matter. On 
the theoretical front, many scholars agree that the state’s appropriate internal 
structure and sufficient resources are crucial to attaining state capacity and 
effectiveness since they allow ‘the growth of infrastructural in addition to coercive 
power,’ to quote Rueschemeyer.2 Yet based on extensive analyses on DoF/FiA and, 
to much lesser extent, on CCs, this chapter will show that ‘modern’ Cambodian 
public administration lacks any historical depth and suffers from protracted wars. 
The resulting inefficacy therefore disenables it from achieving its utmost capacity. 
This is further exacerbated by top-down management, limited resources, sectoral 
power struggle, poor actual career path setting, poor inter- and intra-agency 
coordination/cooperation and responsibility duplication. 
1. The State Structure Development at a Glance 
Cambodian administration had taken shape by early 7th century or earlier. 
According to Ma Tuan-lin, the court of Isanarvarman I (616-635) showed 
sophistication and hierarchy.3 The administration underwent major development 
during Angkor, especially under Rajendravarman II (944-968). Inscriptions show 
highly developed administration with levels of officialdoms from top to bottom. 
Despite this advancement, regional and local leaders retained substantial 
discretionary power, and loyalty existed between persons, not offices; likewise 
power emanated from persons, giving rise to nepotism, favoritism and patronage.4 
These features continued into post-Angkorean Cambodia, yet the turbulence at the 
center further increased regional and local leaders’ power – resulting in 
                                                          
1 Cambodia New Vision, "Presenting Diplomas at the Royal School of Administration," Cambodia 
New Vision December 2003, 2. 
2 Rueschemeyer, "Building States - Inherently a Long-Term Process? An Argument from Theory," 
143-44. 
3 Coedes, The Indianized States of Southeast Asia: 73; Mabbett and Chandler, The Khmer: 51-60 
and 85.  
4 Cf. Chandler, A History of Cambodia: 40-56; Coedes, The Indianized States of Southeast Asia: 
120; Kingsbury, Political Development: 71; Mabbett and Chandler, The Khmer: 154-71. James 
Scott defines patron-clientelism as “a special case of dyadic ties involving a largely instrumental 
friendship in which an individual of higher socio-economic status (patron) uses his own influence 
and resources to provide protection and/or benefits for a person of lower status (client) who, for his 
part, reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, including personal service, to the 
patron.” Cited in Hughes, The Political Economy of Cambodia's Transition, 1991-2001: 18-19.  
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diminishing central control and poor public administration rationalization. 
Appointments were based on patronage and favoritism, and there was no rigid 
promotion system for small and big positions alike.5 
Another best bet for systematic bureaucratization was the almost century-long 
Western colonization. This period, too, witnessed more continuity than 
transformation. France initiated some public administrative reforms with mixed 
successes. Overall, there were few moves ‘to train Cambodians in a systematic way 
to replace Frenchmen in the administration.”6 Meaningful reforms that could have 
transformed post-independence political and administrative landscape came too late 
and too little.7 Of similar repercussions was its limited focus on education beyond 
the primary level. As an illustration, seventy-five years after its control, only four 
Cambodians had graduated from the sole Lycee Sisowath and probably a dozen 
from tertiary institutions abroad.8 As for the subsectors, commercial fishing started 
in 1884, and it was a main source for the colonial revenues. Nevertheless, it was 
not until 1947 that the National Fisheries Team was created and there were no 
trained personnel in fisheries. The Institute for Fisheries Research was established 
in 1949, yet before 1950 technical research and fact-finding had been conducted by 
the French.9 In summary, France put little effort to strengthen Cambodian state’s 
administrative capacity to manage the fisheries/forest resources in particular and 
public administration in general. 
                                                          
5 Cf. Aun, Democracy in Cambodia: Theories and Realities: 33-34; Chandler, A History of 
Cambodia: 111-12 and 50; Mabbett and Chandler, The Khmer: 224-28; Milton Osborne, The 
French Presence in Cochinchina and Cambodia: Rule and Response (1859-1905)  (Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press, 1969). 181-232. “The scribe Nong’s royal chronicle delineated 
the key holders of prestige and power in the kingdom as royalty, religious leaders including the 
chief monk (sanghareach), Brahmins, literati, “sages, scholars, poets,” and “high-ranking 
mandarins, the four ministers (of justice, finances and palace, land transport and war, and sea and 
water transport); and the functionaries and servants in their service.” Cited in Edwards Penny, 
Cambodge: The Cultivation of a Nation, 1860-1945  (USA: University of Hawai'i Press, 2007). 70-
71.  
6 Chandler, A History of Cambodia: 200-03. See also, ibid., 175-78; Osborne, The French Presence 
in Cochinchina and Cambodia: Rule and Response (1859-1905): 212-49; ———, Politics and 
Power in Cambodia: The Sihanouk years  (Camberwell: Longman, 1973). 24-25; Penny, 
Cambodge: The Cultivation of a Nation, 1860-1945. 
7 Mabbett and Chandler, The Khmer: 234-38.  
8 Chandler, A History of Cambodia: 200-01; Osborne, Politics and Power in Cambodia: The 
Sihanouk years: 28. Vickery also bemoans this lack of focus on education, reporting that in 1936 
there were only 50-60,000 primary school students. By the second year of independence, the 
number of primary and secondary school students climbed to 271,000 and 3,300, respectively and 
only 144 finished the baccalaureate. Michael Vickery, Cambodia 1975-1982  (Chaing Mai: 
Silkworm, 1984). 19.  
9 John Bardach, Report on Fisheries in Cambodia  (Phnom Penh: USOM, 1959). 42-43; Nao and 
Po, An Executive History of the Creation of Fisheries Laws of the Kingdom of Cambodia: 15-16; 
Zurbrugg, "Where There Is Water, There Is Fish: An Analysis and Critical Assessment of 
Cambodia's Tonle Sap Fisheries," 154. 
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After independence, Sihanouk inherited fragmented state and political structures: 
immature and inexperienced ‘bureaucracy’, a young assembly, immature political 
parties and contests, etc. Besides, he inherited political factionalism and ‘powerful’ 
regional leaders.10 During 1970-75, state building faced further hiatuses as 
Cambodia was plunging into the Indochina and civil wars and undergoing frequent 
changes in governments, providing the public administration with little opportunity 
to mature. 
The public administration suffered the heaviest blow during the DK. The previous 
regime’s administration was dismantled and the new one was staffed by mainly 
new and inexperienced cadres. Moreover, officials of previous regimes were 
targeted and many were killed. When the regime fell and the PRK took power, 
merely 15% of the intellectuals were believed to have been left behind in its 
territory, and almost all were non-communists and chose not to return to their 
professions.11 The PRK thus had a daunting task of “recreat[ing] from scratch a 
non-productive administrative and service sector.”12 Many DPs note that even more 
than a decade later the ‘public institutional infrastructure was left in a state of 
disarray’ and most institutions “were barely functioning’ when the new coalition 
government was established.13 
The PRK/SoC was far from building Weberian bureaucracy, but it managed to set 
up ‘a solid structure of administration from Centre to grassroots.’14 With the 
Vietnamese intervention, the regimes adopted Marxism-Leninism and one-party 
rule, which enhanced the command-control mindset.15 With lax oversight, its 
central and local leaders were quick to consolidate power and dispensed patronage, 
and its civil servants were allowed to moonlight as long as they respected 
                                                          
10 Osborne, Politics and Power in Cambodia: The Sihanouk years: 63.  
11 Cited in Gottesman, Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge: Inside the Politics of Nation Building: 72-
74; Slocomb, The People's Republic of Kampuchea 1979-1989: The Revolution after Pol Pot: 113-
14.  
12 Vickery cited in ———, The People's Republic of Kampuchea 1979-1989: The Revolution after 
Pol Pot: 51. See alsoAsian Development Bank, The Mekong Region: An Economic Review: 7; 
Cambodia New Vision, "Social and Economic Responses for Handicapped Soldiers," Cambodia 
New Vision April 2008, 5; Gottesman, Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge: Inside the Politics of 
Nation Building: 50; Peou, "Cambodia after the Killing Fields," 36; Royal Government of 
Cambodia, National Strategic Development Plan 2006-2010: i and 16.  
13 Asian Development Bank, Country Assistance Program Evaluation for Cambodia: 29; ———, 
Country Strategy and Program 2005-2009: Kingdom of Cambodia: 1 and 5. See also ———, 
Country Assistance Plan 2001-03: Cambodia; ———, Cambodia: Enabling the Socio-Economic 
Renaissance: 6-14; ———, Cambodia: Growth and Sector Reforms: 2-3; Narayan and Godden, 
Financial Management and Governance Issues in Cambodia: 15-16; World Bank, Country 
Assistance Strategy of the World Bank Group for the Kingdom of Cambodia: 1-2.  
14 Shawcross, Cambodia's New Deal: 82; Margaret Slocomb, "Commune Elections in Cambodia: 
1981 Foundations and 2002 Reformulations," Modern Asian Studies 38, no. 02 (2004): 448-49.  
15 Cf. Verbaas, "Starting from Scratch: Building Capacity in Cambodia," 63.  
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‘hierarchy’ and kick-backed some profit to their supervisors.16 In preparation for 
the political solutions, the regime and party calculated that it was more necessary to 
permit these officials ‘to benefit directly and personally from local economic 
activity… [to] create networks of happy officials whose loyalty the regime could 
count on.’17 
DoF likewise suffered from the DK’s legacy and communism. It was dissolved and 
many officials perished under the DK. It was re-established in 1979 mainly to fish 
to supply to party cadres and state officials. In 1980, it recruited one engineer, three 
vocational graduates and four basic technicians to re-vamp the administrative 
structure. Overall, it lacked qualified human and financial resources, and owing to 
the communist influence, the management was top-down and focused on policing 
and extraction, especially since 1987.18 
2. Hindrance to DoF/FiA Institutional Capabilities 
2.1. Dysfunctional Public Administration 
The RGC recognizes that the public administration is under-qualified and vows to 
enhance its efficacy and good governance. One reform agenda, for instance, states 
its objective as ‘to establish a State administration that is neutral, responsible, 
transparent, closer to its citizens, and responsive to the needs of the people.’19 
However, the administration, including FiA, is still far from functional. 
The public administration is ‘extremely weak’ across the board from 
macroeconomic to natural resources management; therefore; public service quality 
is severely compromised, and the state capacity ‘to formulate policy and implement 
development programs is still severely constrained.’20 In addition, its ‘institutional 
                                                          
16 Gottesman, Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge: Inside the Politics of Nation Building: 111-34 and 
325-35. Sim Kar added, “In some cases [of embezzlement of state property] when we conduct really 
deep research, there are a great many connections right up to provincial Party secretaries, and some 
soldiers are involved, too.” Cited in ibid., 324.  
17 Ibid., 299-300.  
18 Cf. Csavas et al., Cambodia, rehabilitation and development needs of the fishery sector: 3-4 and 
47; Department of Fisheries, "Report on Present Status and Development Project of Cambodian 
Fisheries Field," (Phnom Penh: Department of Fisheries, 1991), 3-5; ———, "Inland Fisheries 
Review," 34; Gum, Inland Acquatic Resources and Livelihoods in Cambodia: A Guide to the 
Literature, Legislation, Institutional Framework and Recommendations 20-21; Nao, Ahmed, and 
Sam, "Cambodia’s Great Lake: How to Sustain Its Ecological and Economic Diversity," 40; Nao, 
Long, and Taing, "Fisheries Monitoring, Control and Surveillance in Cambodia," 16; Nao and Po, 
An Executive History of the Creation of Fisheries Laws of the Kingdom of Cambodia: 19-21. 
19 Cited in Kato et al., Cambodia: Enhancing Governance for Sustainable Development: 59-60. See, 
for example, also Royal Government of Cambodia, Rectangular Strategy for Growth, Development, 
Equity and Efficiency in Cambodia: 6; Schneider, Ka, and Roy, Private Sector Assessment for the 
Kingdom of Cambodia: 48.  
20 See for example, Asian Development Bank, Country Assistance Program Evaluation for 
Cambodia: 64; ———, Country Strategy and Program 2005-2009: Kingdom of Cambodia: 29-30; 
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weaknesses remain endemic,’ and the state has ‘limited success in improving the 
efficiency and management of public institutions’ and its effort to reform the 
administration has seen little progress.21 As late as 2008, the RGC admits that 
despite significant progress in key areas ‘the quality, efficiency and delivery of the 
public service still remain as challenges and could not yet respond fully to the real 
needs of the people.”22 Kaufmann and others’ longitudinal analysis attests that its 
effectiveness has only slightly improved – a stance supported by a WB report. 
Table 24: Cambodian Government Effectiveness23 
Country 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Brunei 1.13 0.93 0.91 0.81 0.68 0.06 0.59 0.77 0.86 0.89 
Cambodia -1.02 -0.78 -0.83 -0.81 -0.76 -0.89 -0.92 -0.90 -0.86 -0.81 
Indonesia 0.06 -0.85 -0.50 -0.63 -0.56 -0.43 -0.46 -0.37 -0.39 -0.29 
Laos -0.07 -0.65 -0.76 -0.74 -1.03 -0.92 -1.01 -0.79 -0.87 -0.84 
Malaysia 0.86 0.53 0.89 0.85 0.96 0.99 0.99 1.06 1.11 1.13 
Myanmar -1.22 -1.19 -1.20 -1.37 -1.30 -1.60 -1.61 -1.53 -1.64 -1.68 
Philippines -0.13 -0.26 -0.19 -0.17 -0.15 -0.28 -0.11 -0.09 -0.04 0.00 
Singapore 2.60 2.13 2.26 2.11 2.19 2.23 2.13 2.29 2.45 2.53 
Thailand 0.48 0.10 0.07 0.17 0.29 0.22 0.36 0.25 0.17 0.11 
Timor-leste    -0.92 -0.94 -0.65 -1.06 -0.97 -1.12 -1.00 
Vietnam -0.34 -0.62 -0.47 -0.46 -0.41 -0.50 -0.30 -0.34 -0.35 -0.31 
 
Table 25: Public Sector Management and Institutional Capacity24 
Public Sector Management and Institutional Capacity 2006 2007 2008 
Property Rights and Rule-Based Governance 2.5 2.5 3.0 
Quality Budgetary Financial Management 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Efficiency Revenue Mobilization 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Quality of Public Administration 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Trans. Acc. & Corruption in Public Sector 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Average  2.5 2.7 2.8 
(NB: A scale from 1 to 6, one being very weak and six being very strong.) 
Public institutions dealing with natural resources face the same problems partly 
because many ‘are still in their formative stage.’25 Csavas and others describe the 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Schneider, Ka, and Roy, Private Sector Assessment for the Kingdom of Cambodia: 78; World Bank, 
Country Assistance Strategy of the World Bank Group for the Kingdom of Cambodia: 2; ———, 
Cambodia: Progress in Recovery and Reform  (Washington D.C.: East Asia and Pacific Region, 
World Bank, 1997). 24; ———, Country Assistance Strategy of the World Bank Group for the 
Kingdom of Cambodia: 16.  
21 Asian Development Bank, Country Assistance Plan 2000-2002: Cambodia: 7; ———, 
"Cambodia: Overview of NGOs," 2; ———, Cambodia: Growth and Sector Reforms: 35; 
Schneider, Ka, and Roy, Private Sector Assessment for the Kingdom of Cambodia: 77.  
22 Royal Government of Cambodia, Rectangular Strategy for Growth, Development, Equity and 
Efficiency in Cambodia: Phase Two: 5-6.  
23 Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, Governance Matters VIII: Aggregate and Individual 
Governance Indicators 1996-2008.  
24 World Bank, "2008 Country Policy and Institutional Assessment for Cambodia."  
25 Cambodia National Mekong Committee, Natural Resources-Based Development Strategy for the 
Tonle Sap Area: 56-57.  
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DoF structure as ‘burdensome, non-functional and likely to be inefficient.’26 
Complaints of its inability to achieve sustainable resource exploitation, poor 
governance in research lot granting and lot auctioning, poor law enforcement and 
poor service provision are common.27 To exemplify, fishers in Province A 
complained: “We used to lodge a complaint to the FiA sangkat and the Commune 
Council. But they have never taken any action.”28 A researcher experienced fishers 
voicing their agreement, saying: “Providing the necessary support to the village is 
not always in the interest of the fisheries department officials as they have a 
livelihood to attend to and they may have some interest in turning a blind eye to 
illegal fishing.”29 DoF staff also suffers from low morale. One former fisheries 
official expresses that local fisheries officials and the local authorities seem to ‘do 
their work simply to fulfill their duties.’ An FiA leader concurred: “There are also 
our officials who do not care much about their work.’30 Sovanna Nhem adds that 
government staff who are supposed to provide services are ‘not necessarily 
committed to providing the support they are mandated to provide… A challenge for 
local governance is how to ensure departments actually look after local 
resources.’31 The removal of all field implementors and demotion of former DoF 
Director in 2001 are a testimony to the fact that both the central and sub-central 
officials are the cause for fisheries mismanagement. 
2.2. Limited Capable Human Resources 
Civil service performance is constrained by numerous factors. First, it is 
constrained by the low education of its staff. A report in 2007 indicates that more 
than 50% of civil servants attained only high school education or lower. Almost a 
quarter had some post-secondary vocational training and only 11% held college 
                                                          
26 Csavas et al. cited in Kim and Hav, "Fisheries and Aquaculture in Cambodia’s Wetland 
Management," 7-8.  
27 See for example, Fisheries Action Coalition Team and Environmental Justice Foundation, Feast 
or Famine? Solutions to Cambodia's Fisheries Conflicts: 9; Ing, Sao, and Thay, "Small-Scale 
Fisheries Management in Cambodia," 35; Mak, "The Tonle Sap and Its Fisheries Management: A 
Case in Cambodia," 15; Mak, Heun, and Pen, "Decentralization and Natural Resource Management 
in Cambodia: Implication of the Decentralization Process to Date, A Case Studies in Pursat 
Province," 7; Mao, "Improving Inland Fisheries Management in Cambodia," 30; Try, "Making 
Space and Access in Fisheries Resource Management for Local Communities in Stung Treng 
Province," 5. Informants 65, 71-78 & 79, for instance, complain of the lack of access to the burden 
books though they are a fisheries official, CFC members and a commune council chief, respectively. 
Informant 65; Informant 71-78; Informant 79.  
28 Informant 25-27.  
29 Informant 2. See also Chhom and Leng, "Monitoring Report on the Activities of Fisheries Issues, 
April-June, 2005," 5.  
30 Informant 5; Informant 11.  
31 Nhem, "Mainstreaming Natural Resources and Environmental Management: The Seila 
Decentralization Program," 87.  
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education.32 An analysis of civil servants’ education in DoF reveals a similar trend, 
although officials with post-graduate and undergraduate degrees are increasing 
substantially. Even as late as 2005, non-skilled employees still accounted for 37%, 
decreasing from 66% in 1993. The tabulation of the sub-central staff’s education – 
as illustrated with the case of Siem Reap – shows similar patterns. 
Table 26: Fisheries Officials' Levels of Education33 
 
Fisheries Fisheries Non-Fisheries Skilled Non-Skilled Total 
Post-
Grad. Tertiary Associate Basic Tertiary Associate Basic    
1993 2 84 142 89 27 30 53 6 855 1,288 
1994 5 108 161 90 30 33 42 6 839 1,314 
1995 7 130 205 88 46 40 31 12 863 1,422 
1996 11 187 203 110 46 32 45 16 807 1,457 
1997 11 252 212 136 49 34 53 11 784 1,542 
1999 30 250 230 143 51 37 49 9 798 1,597 
2000 33 256 236 143 53 36 67 21 722 1,568 
2202 52 230 237 128 40 37 65 1 551 1,341 
2005 78 229 194 128 53 34 55 0 446 1,217 
Table 27: Siem Reap Fisheries Officials' Levels of Education34 





Tertiary Associate Basic Tertiary Associate Basic    
1993 1 5 2 7 1 0 0 0 37 67 
1994 1 5 8 6 1 0 6 0 38 65 
1995 1 5 9 2 1 0 0 1 39 58 
1996 1 5 11 6 1 0 6 0 35 65 
1997 0 9 12 6 1 0 6 0 34 68 
1998 2 9 13 6 1 0 6 0 31* 68 
1999 1 9 13 6 1 0 6 0 31* 67 
2000 1 7 12 5 1 0 5 0 29* 60 
                                                          
32 International Monetary Fund, "Cambodia: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix," (Washingont 
D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 2007), 16.  
33 Data source: Campbell, Department of Fisheries Institutional Review; Department of Fisheries, 
"Meeting Minutes on Annual Meeting for Fisheries Sector for Fishing Season 1996-97 and First 9 
Months of 1997," (Phnom Penh: Department of Fisheries, 1 October, 1997); ———, "Meeting 
Minute for Annual Report for Fisheries Sector for Fishing Season 1998-1999 and First Semester of 
1999," (Phnom Penh: Department of Fisheries, 23 July, 1999); ———, "Annual Report for 1993 
and Action Plans for 1994."; ———, "Annual Report for 1994 and Action Plans for 1995."; ———
, "Annual Report for 1995 and Action Plans for 1996."; ———, "Annual Report for 1996 and 
Action Plans for 1997."; ———, "Report for Fishing Season 1999-2000 and Semester 1 of 2001."; 
———, "Annual Report for 2002 and Action Plans for 2003."  
34 Data source: ———, "Annual Report for 1993 and Action Plans for 1994."; ———, "Annual 
Report for 1994 and Action Plans for 1995."; ———, "Annual Report for 1995 and Action Plans 
for 1996."; ———, "Annual Report for 1996 and Action Plans for 1997."; Siem Reap Cantonment, 
"Annual Report for Fishing Season 2007-08," (26 May, 2008); Siem Reap Department of 
Agriculture, "Report for First Nine Months of 2003," (12 September, 2003); ———, "Annual 
Report on Fisheries Sector for 1999-2000."; ———, "Annual Report for 1997."; ———, "Annual 
Report for 2002," (18 December, 2002); ———, "Report for Semester One of 2007," (26 March, 
2007); ———, "Report for Fishing Season 1998-99."  
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2002 1 8 13 6 0 0 3 0 28* 59 
2003 1 8 13 6 0 0 3 0 28* 59 
2007 1 6 10 4 0 0 1 0 31* 53 
2008 3 8/7** 6/7** 3 2** 0 0 0 20* 56 
(NB: *Some with short-course training; **Attending; associate = two-year college training; basic = one-year 
college training) 
A related issue is the lack of skilled and experienced staff. Many civil servants are 
new recruits. Many institutions have few qualified staff, resulting in poor service 
quality, low absorptive capacity, underemployment and unproductivity.35 An ADB 
report describes the shortage as ‘acute’ and ‘across all sectors.’ A WB report agrees 
that weak technical and managerial skills are severe, ‘particularly in the areas of 
implementation, planning and financial management.’36 Another report added: 
The current Government inherited a civil service that was poorly remunerated, lacking 
in the skills and knowledge necessary to manage a technical bureaucracy in a market 
economy, and suffering from a distorted demographic profile. There are relatively few 
staff in the 30 to 40 age group and younger staff are poorly equipped to perform. Older 
staff, while better trained, are poorly motivated and their skills are unsuited to a market 
economy.37 
A study commissioned by CRDB in 2008 also noted: 
Gaps in trained and experienced staff appear to be particularly acute at the middle and 
lower levels of the public service, in the provinces and in particular technical sectors, 
departments and functions. Most observers pointed to excellent but overworked staff at 
the top of many public agencies followed by ‘missing middles’ that constrain the 
progress of work, resulting in poor policy execution and a recurring demand for 
technical assistance.38 
Agencies managing natural resources similarly have limited staff with professional 
and administrative experience and too many unqualified ones. The ADB stated: 
                                                          
35 See for example, Asian Development Bank, Developing the Capacity for Reconstruction and 
Development: 12; ———, Cambodia: Enabling the Socio-Economic Renaissance: 12-13; ———, 
Country Assistance Program Evaluation for Cambodia: 5-6; ———, Country Strategy and 
Program 2005-2009: Kingdom of Cambodia: 6; Cambodia New Vision, "Conferment of Diplomas 
at Build Bright University," Cambodia New Vision August 2009, 5-6; ———, "Action Plan 2009-
2013: Administration Reform Directions," Cambodia New Vision February 2009, 8; Cambodia 
National Mekong Committee, Natural Resources-Based Development Strategy for the Tonle Sap 
Area: 56-57; Cock, "External Actors and the Relative Autonomy of the Ruling Elite in Post-
UNTAC Cambodia," 248; Kato et al., "Summary of Cambodia Governance Assessment," 13; Peou, 
"Cambodia after the Killing Fields," 46; World Bank, Country Assistance Strategy of the World 
Bank Group for the Kingdom of Cambodia: 1-8; ———, Country Assistance Strategy of the World 
Bank Group for the Kingdom of Cambodia: 2 and 11; ———, "2008 Country Policy and 
Institutional Assessment for Cambodia," 17-18.  
36 Asian Development Bank, Developing the Capacity for Reconstruction and Development: 16; 
World Bank, Country Assistance Strategy of the World Bank Group for the Kingdom of Cambodia: 
1-2.  
37 ———, Cambodia: Progress in Recovery and Reform: 24.  
38 Anthony Land and Peter Morgan, "Technical Cooperation for Capacity Development in 
Cambodia: Making the System Work Better," (Phnom Penh: Cambodia Rehabilitation and 
Development Board, Council for the Development of Cambodia, 2008), 12.  
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“The number of people who have received suitable and sufficient training in 
environment-related disciplines is still low.”39 MAFF and MOWRAM concede that 
their ‘[m]anagement remains weak [and] many staff has limited skills and 
experience,’ inhibiting their research and extension services.40 DoF does not fare 
any better. Only a handful of officials hold undergraduate and graduate degrees. 
Many interviewees agree that it still faces shortage of skilled staff. An FiA leader 
admitted: “Though the number of higher degree holders in FiA is increasing, there 
is a lack of human resources both in terms of number and human capacity. Though 
there are hundreds of master’s degree and a dozen or so of PhD holders, the human 
capacity of the FiA is still limited.”41 An NGO director, suggesting that the number 
of competent individuals does not suffice to fill in the gap, furthered: “A vast 
majority of the staff doesn’t have profiles of training or sometimes even motivation 
to do well in their jobs. I think it is very common in a government job… The 
competent people go into the management positions, and they all get very busy.”42 
The problem of insufficiency is further complicated by the fact that it is not 
permitted to replace its retirees and lack of formal ‘technical and skill transfer’ 
within the administration.43 The fieldwork indicates that it is the less competent 
employees that are unemployed or underemployed. A former fisheries official 
recounted: “Generally, it can be said that 30% to 40% of the staff members are 
active, especially when working for projects, while the less educated staff members 
                                                          
39 Asian Development Bank, Country Assistance Plan 2000-2002: Cambodia: 3. Cf. ———, 
Developing the Capacity for Reconstruction and Development: 32; ———, Cambodia: Country 
Environmental Analysis: 25; Cambodia National Mekong Committee, Natural Resources-Based 
Development Strategy for the Tonle Sap Area: xii; Csavas et al., Cambodia, rehabilitation and 
development needs of the fishery sector: 55; Patrick, Melissa, and Puadyal, Flood Forest, Fish and 
Fishing Villages: Tonle Sap, Cambodia: 11; van Acker, "Don't Trust Fish When They Are in Water: 
Cambodia's Inland Fisheries in Transition," 48-49. 
40 Technical Working Group on Agriculture and Water, Strategy for Agriculture and Water 2006-
2010: 59.  
41 Informant 11. 
42 Informant 6. 
43 Chan, The Review of the Roles and Linkages of Sub-National Fisheries Institutions for Service 
Deliveries: 8. Informant 6; Informant 10; Informant 11. See also Ahmed and Van Zalinge, 
"Management of Freshwater Capture Fisheries of Cambodia," 1; Department of Fisheries, "Inland 
Fisheries Review," 33; Fisheries Action Coalition Team and Environmental Justice Foundation, 
Feast or Famine? Solutions to Cambodia's Fisheries Conflicts: 9; Kim and Hav, "Fisheries and 
Aquaculture in Cambodia’s Wetland Management," 1; Mak, "The Tonle Sap and Its Fisheries 
Management: A Case in Cambodia," 15; Nao, Long, and Taing, "Fisheries Monitoring, Control and 
Surveillance in Cambodia," 12-13. 
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cannot work for a project and do not have much to do. Some just go to office once 
a while, whereas others simply sit around with few things to do.”44 
The staff distribution analysis in Chapter 4 reveals that more competent and more 
staff is concentrated in the capital and provincial towns, leaving fewer and less 
competent ones to division and sangkat levels. FiA admits that even “the capacity 
of Cantonment staff is limited, especially management, competency, technical 
knowledge, planning and coordination with key players in the province.’45 
According to an NGO board member, the field officials are amongst the most 
‘unmotivated’ due to the poor incentives from higher up.46 The low technical and 
administrative capacity at these levels has inhibited de-concentration, perpetuated 
centralization and constrained their contribution to planning, management and 
implementation of development policies.47 This occurs in other agencies too. 
Verbaas reveals that ‘in selected provinces up to 80 percent of provincial staff was 
based in the provincial capital,’ inhibiting the extent of provincial service 
delivery.48 
CFDO/D and the Exploitation Office/Department of Fisheries Affairs (DFA) suffer 
from the same problem –lack of skilled staff, especially at the sub-central levels. 
CFDO was established in a reactive manner, putting even more constraints on its 
operation. DoF managed to put a few competent individuals to lead the central 
office; however, the tasks were new. It was tasked to establish and assist CFis as 
                                                          
44 Informant 5. This view is agreed upon by other officials. Informant 7; Informant 20; Informant 
67; Informant 80.  
45 Fishereis Administration, The Strategic Planning Framework for Fisheries: 2010-2019, 1: 39. 
See also Asian Development Bank, Agriculture and Rural Development Sector in Cambodia: 16-17; 
Csavas et al., Cambodia, rehabilitation and development needs of the fishery sector: 40; Gum, 
Inland Acquatic Resources and Livelihoods in Cambodia: A Guide to the Literature, Legislation, 
Institutional Framework and Recommendations 81; van Acker, Cambodia's Commons: Changing 
Governance, Shifting Entitlements?: 27.  
46 Informant 12.  
47 Asian Development Bank, Cambodia: Country Environmental Analysis: 81-82; ———, Country 
Strategy and Program 2005-2009: Kingdom of Cambodia: 35; ———, Country Operations 
Business Plan: Cambodia 2008-2010: 44; World Bank, Country Assistance Strategy for the 
Kindgom of Cambodia: 92. Asian Development Bank, Country Operations Business Plan: 
Cambodia 2008-2010: 44. See also Kato et al., Cambodia: Enhancing Governance for Sustainable 
Development: 72; Middleton, "The Expansion of the ADB’s Influence in Cambodia’s Water Sector: 
Judging the Effectiveness of ADB Water Management Projects in the Tonle Sap Basin," 9; Milner 
et al., "Cambodia: Establishment of the Tonle Sap Basin Management Organization 2," 9.  
48 Verbaas, "Starting from Scratch: Building Capacity in Cambodia," 38-39. This view is supported 
by other studies. See for example, Mak, Heun, and Pen, "Decentralization and Natural Resource 
Management in Cambodia: Implication of the Decentralization Process to Date, A Case Studies in 
Pursat Province," 26-27; World Bank, Country Assistance Strategy of the World Bank Group for the 
Kingdom of Cambodia: 2.  
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soon and as many as possible, yet it lacked capable human resources, especially at 
the sub-central levels.49 An Oxfam evaluation argues that if the initial 
establishment was to be done properly, it ‘would have required a number of years,’ 
but CFDO was given just three months to finish it. That is, the responsibility ‘is 
huge but the resources and capacity to cope are limited.’50 DoF echoes that the 
reforms lacked ‘a corresponding programme of institutional support and capacity 
building, or clear legal guidelines regarding roles and responsibilities of different 
players.’51 
Since the CFDO’s inception, capacity building of such skills as CFi facilitation, 
monitoring, etc. to its staff has not significantly improved and is reckoned not 
sufficient for proper operation.52 Sten Sverdrup-Jensen and others observed: “[T]he 
capacity-building support from the Department of Fisheries and the Provincial 
Fisheries Offices has been limited and is far from sufficient to meet the challenges 
to effectively implement such Community Fisheries Organizations.”53 As for 
TSEMP, no local staff went through any training in CFi management, and it was 
conducted by trained cantonment staff, rather than division and sangkat officials.54 
The funder rightly appraised that the subsectors have seen a more pro-poor 
approach, in which the communities take a more proactive approach to fisheries 
management; however, “capacity of both fisheries officials and local communities 
to fully implement the reforms is weak.”55 
                                                          
49 Cf. Cambodia National Mekong Committee, Natural Resources-Based Development Strategy for 
the Tonle Sap Area: 56-57; Degen et al., "People, Power, and Fisheries Policy: Fisheries 
Management Reform Addressing Community Fisheries in Cambodia," 17; Department of Fisheries, 
Impacts of the Fisheries Policy Reforms in Kampong Cham, Pursat and Takeo Provinces: First 
Round Assessment Report: 67; Oxfam Great Britain, Evaluation of the Impact of the Fisheries 
Reform in Cambodia on the Livelihoods of Poor Fishers: 16; Sales, "Improving the Regulatory and 
Management Framework for Inland Fisheries," 7-8; Thay, Sim, and So, "Community Fisheries 
Development and Networking," 126.  
50 Degen et al., "People, Power, and Fisheries Policy: Fisheries Management Reform Addressing 
Community Fisheries in Cambodia," 23; Oxfam Great Britain, Evaluation of the Impact of the 
Fisheries Reform in Cambodia on the Livelihoods of Poor Fishers: 12.  
51 Fisheries Administration, The Strategic Planning Framework for Fisheries: 2010-2019, 2: 45.  
52 Cf. Campbell, Department of Fisheries Institutional Review: 48-49; Department of Fisheries, 
Impacts of the Fisheries Policy Reforms in Kampong Cham, Pursat and Takeo Provinces: First 
Round Assessment Report: 52-53; Ly, "Inland Fisheries Management and Institutional Changes in 
Fisheries in Cambodia," 74-75.  
53 Sverdrup-Jensen, Poul, and Ahmed, Guide to Fisheries Policy Research in Cambodia – The 
Institutional and Legal Context: 28.  
54 Informant 80; Informant 81; Informant 89.  
55 Asian Development Bank, Country Operations Business Plan: Cambodia 2008-2010: 42.  
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As for DFA’s research on ‘research lots,’ Dirk Lamberts notices that the ‘capacity 
of the Department of Fisheries to effectively carry out this research is 
insufficient.’56 Some lot researchers were not up to the tasks, and it was the central 
officials who carried out the ‘research’.57 In a sense, though the FiA’s mandates 
have been expanded into areas that it is unfamiliar with and beyond pure command 
and control, ‘re-orientation and re-tool[ing]’ of its staff from mere law enforcement 
is poor.58 
2.3. Poor Internal Organizational Structure and Interactions 
Former DoF organizational structure (effective as of 2009) presents some 
challenges to efficiency and efficacy. It was divided into the central department, 
regional inspectorates and provincial/municipal offices and their affiliated sangkat. 
However, there was ‘a lack of clear definition of roles and responsibility’ between 
each level, while PFOs had considerable discretion ‘to determine their own policies 
and programmes.’59 Besides, they were placed under the provincial DoA, leading to 
slow and weak communication with DoF, weak linkages between each PFO and 
the provincial administration as PFO did not attend its meeting, weak linkages 
between DoF and PFOs, and sometimes conflicting interests between DoA and its 
PFO.60 There were no fisheries sangkat in areas with no water bodies, and many 
sangkats’ jurisdiction did not conform to the communes’ physical boundaries, 
making cooperation between fisheries sangkat and CCs difficult.61 
Performance is also affected by unclear division of responsibilities even after the 
DoF restructuring. The new structure was adopted in 2006. The law redefines its 
roles and responsibilities and revamps its organizational structure, elevating it to 
FiA (an equivalent of a general department) with more autonomy from MAFF and 
its central offices to departments, detaches PFOs from DoAs and upgraded them to 
                                                          
56 Lamberts, Tonle Sap Fisheries: A Case Study on Floodplain Gillnet Fisheries in Siem Reap, 
Cambodia: 56.  
57 Informant 5; Informant 80; Informant 89.  
58 Cf. Blomley et al., "Review of the Community Forestry and Community Fisheries in Cambodia," 
16.  
59 Csavas et al., Cambodia, rehabilitation and development needs of the fishery sector: 40.  
60 Campbell, Department of Fisheries Institutional Review: 44; Chan, The Review of the Roles and 
Linkages of Sub-National Fisheries Institutions for Service Deliveries: 7; Lamberts, Tonle Sap 
Fisheries: A Case Study on Floodplain Gillnet Fisheries in Siem Reap, Cambodia: 61; Nao, Ahmed, 
and Sam, "Cambodia’s Great Lake: How to Sustain Its Ecological and Economic Diversity," 3-4; 
Nao and Ly, "Review of the Fisheries and Aquaculture Sector in Cambodia," 8.  
61 Informant 80; Informant 89.  
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cantonments, adds divisions as a new layer over sangkat and re-structures its 
sangkat in conformity with communes’ physical boundaries. However, it was not 
until 2009 that full restructuring was completed. There are currently five levels 
from sangkat to FiA, if MAFF is excluded. Due to its newness, role and 
responsibility division between each level is not yet clear. The cantonments 
established in 2008 lack clearly defined roles and responsibilities between and 
amongst the leadership, while the organizational structures are different from 
province to province and offices under each cantonment are yet to be established.62 
Poor vertical and horizontal coordination and cooperation within DoF/FiA is 
another weakness. Corporate coherence and connectedness within an agency is ‘the 
underlying structural basis for successful state involvement in industrial 
transformation.’ However, the state ‘is often an entity riven by internal tensions.’63 
MAFF, like other state agencies, has a structure that ‘reveals overlap, with 
duplication of roles and responsibilities among its departments’ and poor vertical 
communication.64 The DoF/FiA structure likewise poses a problem. Under the 
former four-tier structure, there were ‘weak and erratic’ vertical coordination, 
overlapping responsibilities, poor and untimely vertical communication, potential 
rivalry between the different levels, and excessive discretion to inspectorates and 
PFOs.65 Poor bottom-up information flow contributed to non-systematic, 
incomplete and poor evidence-based policy formation.66 Three hierarchical levels 
(sangkat, provincial and inspectorate) were all involved in patrolling, leading to 
duplication and inefficiency. With the new five-tier administration, vertical 
coordination and duplication are not yet resolved.67 
                                                          
62 Informant 66; Informant 80.  
63 Evans, Embedded Autonomy: State & Industrial Transformation: 12; Haynes, Third World 
Politics: A Concise Introduction: 27-28.  
64 See for example, Asian Development Bank, Cambodia: Country Environmental Analysis: 31; —
——, Country Operations Business Plan: Cambodia 2008-2010: 44; Cambodia New Vision, 
"Addressing the 6th Cambodia Consultative Group Meeting," Cambodia New Vision June 2002, 6; 
Verbaas, "Starting from Scratch: Building Capacity in Cambodia," 38-39.  
65 Csavas et al., Cambodia, rehabilitation and development needs of the fishery sector: 40-42; 
Department of Fisheries, "Inland Fisheries Review," 34; Kim and Hav, "Fisheries and Aquaculture 
in Cambodia’s Wetland Management," 7-8; Kol, "Review of Wetland and Aquatic Ecosystem in the 
Lower Mekong River Basin of Cambodia," 71-72.  
66 Campbell, Department of Fisheries Institutional Review: 41.  
67 Informant 5; Informant 66. Cf. Mak, Vann, and Te, "Communication Strategies for Fisheries 
Conflict Management: A Case Study in Cambodia," 23; Nao, Long, and Taing, "Fisheries 
Monitoring, Control and Surveillance in Cambodia," 15. 
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Horizontal coordination/cooperation is probably as serious. There was a 
disagreement between the former department director and his deputy. A leader 
recalled: “In meetings, I raised the appointments of people with master’s degrees or 
higher into the heads of offices; however, the previous director usually dismissed 
my ideas.”68 Discussing the current situation, he adds that amongst the seven 
departments and two research institutes, there are some that ‘even have internal 
problems. For instance, there are cases in which the heads just work alone without 
delegating the duties to others.”69 Cross-departmental coordination is likewise 
limited. Campbell wrote: “[D]ivisional plans tend to be prepared in isolation from 
each other with limited coordination around a common policy framework.’70 One 
informant believes that there is a conflict of interest between CFDD (advocating 
more community-based management) and DFA (advocating fishing lots).71 
Provincial cantonment and sangkat leadership reveals that animosity and poor 
working relationship amongst the leadership also takes place. One cantonment 
leader complained that once the issue was raised to the higher level, there was no 
solution, but threat of all-inclusive demotion.72 All said, Jock Campbell reports that 
there was a ‘strong informal network within the department’ and a monthly 
meeting for communication. This has facilitated coordination/cooperation. 
Nevertheless, these were ‘unstructured and irregular,’ and the meetings focused on 
‘outlining constraints to progress rather than a more general flow of 
communication to achieve greater cooperation and coordination.’73 
2.4. Power Centralization and Unclear Responsibility Division 
The DoF/FiA capacity is also affected by power centralization. Fritz demonstrates 
that ‘it has not been easy to transition from previous top-down, and often 
                                                          
68 Informant 11.  
69 Ibid.  
70 Campbell, Department of Fisheries Institutional Review: 41. Poor horizontal and vertical 
coordination is a ‘government-wide challenge’. See for example, Chan et al., "Cambodia Evaluation 
of Aid Effectiveness," 19.  
71 Informant 14.  
72 Informant 66; Informant 67; Informant 80. This is not to downplay that some within the 
leadership do go along and work well with one another. An annual meeting in 2000 shows that such 
friction also happened to DoAs and received the same response from the minister, who is quoted as 
saying: “As for the leadership, we have also received information that some heads and deputy heads 
of DoAs do not go along well. This is something disgusting and leads to failure at workplace. In 
such cases, there must be a quick change [in attitude]; otherwise both would be demoted.” 
Department of Fisheries, "Meeting Minutes on Annual Meeting for 1999 and Action Plans for 
2000," 18.  
73 Campbell, Department of Fisheries Institutional Review: 41.  
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oppressive control systems to the kind of horizontal and vertical control systems.’74 
Hun Sen contextualizes this, stating: “Behavioral change of the officials is a big 
issue in any reform’ as there are ‘officials who are addicted to power and 
position.”75 Cambodian public administration is generally centralized and 
hierarchical, leading to slow and cumbersome decision-making, inequitable 
resource distribution, lopsided accountability, ruling rather than serving mentality76 
and increasing red tape. Van Acker commented: “Cambodian ministries involved 
in natural resource management conceive of their mandate not so much as the 
custodian and supervisor of a specific resource base, but as its owner… These 
departments have traditionally been ‘command and control’ agencies without much 
appreciation for bottom-up approaches.”77 Two related negative impacts of the 
entrenched centralization is: that many officials ‘who were trained to meet the 
expectations of a centralized, hierarchical, communist system…now occupy 
important, mid-level positions in the bureaucracy” and that these officials and their 
subordinates thus either dodge their responsibilities or are reluctant to make a 
decision for fear of making mistakes.78 Even the PM showed his irritation: “They 
[government officials] should not wait for Hun Sen to have a say on all issues. I 
want the whole mechanism to function all at once without having to wait for order 
all the time. It has been annoying that everyone seems to have attached 
                                                          
74 Fritz, "State Weakness in Post-Communist Countries: The Concept of State Capacity," 16-17.  
75 Cambodia New Vision, "Addressing Workshop on Public Administration Organic Law," 
Cambodia New Vision December 2007, 4 and 7. See also Kato et al., "Summary of Cambodia 
Governance Assessment," 13. The PM also contends that ‘changing people's mentality takes time. I 
can assure you that it is not easy like changing clothes.” He laments the lack of devolution of 
functions by some central agencies. Cambodia New Vision, "Address to the International 
Conference on “Building a Coalition for Transparency” (An Excerpt)," Cambodia New Vision 
August 2001, 5; ———, "Addressing the SEILA Program National Workshop," Cambodia New 
Vision September 2003, 5. 
76 Cf. Asian Development Bank, Country Assistance Plan 2000-2002: Cambodia: 6; Asian 
Development Bank, Agriculture and Rural Development Sector in Cambodia: !6-17; Kato et al., 
Cambodia: Enhancing Governance for Sustainable Development: 47 and 72; Mak, Heun, and Pen, 
"Decentralization and Natural Resource Management in Cambodia: Implication of the 
Decentralization Process to Date, A Case Studies in Pursat Province," 25; Peou, "Cambodia after 
the Killing Fields," 41-42; Try, "Making Space and Access in Fisheries Resource Management for 
Local Communities in Stung Treng Province," 7; World Bank, Country Assistance Strategy for the 
Kindgom of Cambodia: 64.  
77 van Acker, "Don't Trust Fish When They Are in Water: Cambodia's Inland Fisheries in 
Transition," 48-49. See also, Milner et al., "Cambodia: Establishment of the Tonle Sap Basin 
Management Organization 2," 7.  
78 Cited in Kato et al., Cambodia: Enhancing Governance for Sustainable Development: 63 and 72; 
van Acker, Cambodia's Commons: Changing Governance, Shifting Entitlements?: 33-34.  
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“recommendation of Samdech Prime Minister” to their actions. I am quite 
concerned with this.”79 
DoF/FiA is no exception. It adopts a ‘top-down management system’ and is 
unlikely to ‘advocate participatory approach to management.’ With few capable 
sub-central staff and vast size of the resources, such management practices are not 
conducive to effective management.80 Some illustrations of centralization are lack 
of sangkat and division’s participation in the deliberation of ‘research lot’ hiring 
and their need for permission from the cantonment to participate in activities 
organized by NGOs.81 Moreover, many projects and responsibilities are 
concentrated in Phnom Penh.82 One cantonment leader complained: 
D&D [Decentralization & De-concentration] only exists in the policy. In reality, it was 
the central FiA which allocate tasks to the cantonment, which is to implement the 
policies. There are certain minor issues that the cantonment can decide such as the 
provision of permit to transport fish, family aquaculture, permits to establish a site for 
fish transaction and digging ponds below 5,000 m2. For more huge issues, the 
cantonment is to make recommendations to MAFF for decisions.83 
An NGO director concurred: 
I think everything is still very much controlled at the central level, so authority is not 
properly decentralized where the real action takes place. The Fisheries Administration 
is in the process of decentralization, building the capacity of the cantonment offices 
and delegate more authority to them, but it is still very much in just talking about it, not 
so much doing it, implementing it. I think it is pretty common with other ministries as 
well… I think it [the central level] is where all the decisions are made and all the 
money is held.84 
A researcher added: “There is always the busy work of what people higher up ask 
people to do – it can be hard for people in the middle level to respond to the lower 
level. Everyone is managing up. That makes it tough to manage fisheries just up the 
                                                          
79 Cambodia New Vision, "Norton University's Graduation and Diploma Presentation," Cambodia 
New Vision June 2010, 5.  
80 Cf. Mak, "The Tonle Sap and Its Fisheries Management: A Case in Cambodia," 15; Marschke, 
"Livelihood in Context: Learning with Cambodian Fishers," 59; Nao, Ahmed, and Sam, 
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81 Informant 89. Bradley, Natural Resources Management Networking in Cambodia: Status, 
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82 Informant 7.  
83 Informant 80.  
84 Informant 6. See also, Mak, Vann, and Te, "Communication Strategies for Fisheries Conflict 
Management: A Case Study in Cambodia," 22; Neou et al., "Towards a Holistic Approach to 
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level. I think there is good upward accountability in Cambodia, but less downward 
accountability.”85 
Associated with this is the issue of power relations within and without DoF. A 
report raised: ‘Power tends to be highly centralized, steeply hierarchical and 
personalized rather than institutionalized.’86 Though Cambodia has talked 
extensively about D&D, power actually concentrates in the PM, ministers, and in 
most, if not all, central and local agencies in each agency’s head. This mandala-
styled work arrangement, according to Kingsbury, is further reinforced by 
communism.87 The 2001 reforms, including the lot release and field staff 
withdrawal, and the 2011/12 reforms, including the lot suspension and 
nullification, Order 001 on crackdowns and demotion of five cantonment heads, 
were initiated by the PM, while DoF/FiA and MAFF were probably caught by 
surprise.88 This is not to downplay that before these events many officials had 
created a huge mess. Another instance of more permanent power concentration in 
CoM is that the final decision on granting ‘research lots’ fishing rights since 2001 
rests in the final say from the PM.89 This was again implemented in response to 
irregularity in granting ‘research lots’ fishing rights. While such responses should 
be applauded for their good intention, it will not help establish good governance in 
the long-run.90 
The minister still practically holds substantial power despite the 2006 re-
structuring. This applies to the approval of auction lot fishing rights, (dis)approval 
of civil society’s inputs on bills and policies and CFC recognition. Referring to the 
omission of the recommendations from civil society groups for the draft CFi sub-
decree, an NGO board member raised: “It seems to me that the fisheries policy is 
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concentration of power in CoM via establishment of autonomous agencies from relevant ministries, 
such as the National Petroleum Authority. Cock, "External Actors and the Relative Autonomy of the 
Ruling Elite in Post-UNTAC Cambodia," 2.  
90 Cf. Kato et al., Cambodia: Enhancing Governance for Sustainable Development: 97; Kingsbury, 
South-East Asia: A Profile: 7-8.  
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influenced quite heavily by the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries… It 
seems to me that the Fisheries Administration was barely in control in developing 
the law.”91 Many officers complain that ‘their research is not particularly valued by 
their senior managers in the ministries, and that there is little understanding of what 
research is and how it can help policies and approaches to managing resources.’92 
Even the PM weighs in the shortcoming of this power asymmetry. He raised on the 
2011 Fish Day: “So far there is no one who can control them [some cantonment 
heads] – even His Excellency Nao Thuok [General Director] finds it difficult to 
manage some of them since they were appointed by His Excellency Chan Sarun 
[minister] and are supervised by His Excellency Nao Thuok.”93 
An FiA leader complains of the power asymmetry with regards to the previous DoF 
head and some current department/institute heads.94 Similar complaints are heard 
from two cantonment and one sangkat leaders in the two provinces. One 
cantonment leader complained: “The demoted head of cantonment is good at 
administration… However, when it comes to working, he seemed to work on 
everything (especially those which money was involved) and rarely did he delegate 
tasks to other deputies.”95 The leader in the other province showed similar 
grievance: 
He [the recently demoted head] rarely used his four deputies…The head was to be 
responsible for the overall affairs. All the tasks in the sangkat, divisions and 
cantonment were to go through him. The four deputies were to assist with (not 
responsible for) [overall management]… Most tasks did not go through the deputies. 
The other three deputies therefore did not have any feeling to work, as the head usually 
just worked with the deputy assisting him on Inspection, Lot Exploitation and Research 
Lots.96 
2.5. Poor Career Path Setting 
Another factor affecting the DoF/FiA performance is the poor civil service’s terms 
of references (ToRs). The ADB and WB attribute civil service’s poor performance 
to the ‘absence of clear hiring’ policies, lack of a well-defined motivating career 
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path, and poorly-defined “[f]unctional responsibilities, formal accountabilities, and 
integrity structures.’’97 Csavas and others complained about poor ToRs within DoF 
in 1994,98 and this has been a concern since. For example, Danith Chan, writing on 
PFOs, shows that “no Terms of Reference for individual PFO staff had been 
developed other than a very brief and broad description of the roles and 
responsibilities of each unit and sangkat… The final version was agreed by the 
PDA [DoA], but did not appear to be followed or regarded.”99 The lack of clear 
ToRs also plagues CFDO/D and DoF/FiA as a whole. According to Jock Campbell, 
“many staff are operating without clear terms of reference or their positions or are 
operating outside of their mandate. Some have little clear understanding of what 
they are supposed to be doing.”100 
Related to TORs is the issue of appointments, promotions and incentives. Korea 
first institutionalized exam-based civil servant recruitment in 788.101 It was in 1906 
that France introduced such exams to Cambodia. Such ceased altogether in DK and 
PRK/SoC, and it was not until 1994 that it was again re-instituted.102 Thus, poor 
public administration is partly caused by ‘poor quality of recruitment and 
promotions.’103 The WB criticized: “Although hiring and promotion is formally 
merit-based, patronage-based practices continue to prevail in nearly all of 
government as a legacy of post-conflict settlement.”104 Even the PM disparages 
interventions by some high-ranking officials’ wives into their husbands’ state 
affairs, including appointments and promotions.105 
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MAFF and DoF/FiA are not immune against such practices. In 1996, the minister 
issued a notification stressing that ‘the ministry observes that appointments, 
promotions and re-shuffling of officials in the agricultural field lack good 
implementation and uniformity countrywide.’106 In 2011, FiA officials still 
complained about irregular appointments, promotions and unfair incentive 
practices. Two former officials allege that to obtain a lucrative position, one has to 
spend thousands of dollars for facilitation. One of them added: 
There is a lack of transparency in appointment and promotion. It can be said that there 
is lack of systematic promotion and appointment. The appointment and promotion, 
especially to profit-making positions, are done based on who is the highest bidder; 
while offices which are not profit-generating see more push for competent individuals 
to occupy.107 
The other recalled: 
I was recommended by DoF in principle for a promotion to a rank of deputy office 
chief twice during my time at DoF. However, since I did not follow it up to the 
ministry for the facilitation, I was never promoted, and the position was slotted to other 
officers instead. This was the experience of other colleague and classmates of mine 
who were proposed by DoF for promotion and who were hard working and committed 
both as a student and officer, spending most of their time at their offices.108 
A provincial official talked about similar experience of being persuaded to spend 
money for facilitation and failed to obtain the post of deputy provincial office head. 
His negligence and an apparent interference by a rich concessionaire failed his 
application. He added: “Officials who see prospects from making money out of 
their positions usually dare to bribe to have a position as they know that they can 
make money out of their positions just from occupying the position in the first year 
to cover up the money spent to buy the position.”109 A cantonment leader recounted 
actual promotion and incentive implementation: 
There is no clear policy in promotion and incentives in practice. I began with a 
Kor3/13 in 1988, when I graduated with a bachelor’s degree and with a master’s 
degree now – my rank is Kor10. Some officials with only a certificate began with 
Khoor10, for example, some of these officials currently hold Kor6 and hold only a 
bachelor’s degree. Incentives are also not fair. My medal started with a bronze and has 
been upgraded to a silver and gold (ever since). Some lower ranking officials have 
received higher medals. What they did was to contact the accounting office and paid a 
few hundred dollars and could be awarded with these medals.110 
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A sangkat leader likewise lamented irregularity in promotion, adding: 
some Sangkat officials have to make money by colluding with perpetrators within and 
without the lots and give a portion of the proceeds to the cantonment head to be able to 
stay in the posts. These implementors have to often pay a package of money to the 
central level officials who visit the areas under their control and to pay for their food, 
means of transport. Those officials who do not know how to make money or not much 
money are usually not the favorite and are not promoted…. There is no clear criterion 
for promotion. It is usually done on a ‘string’ basis. For example, the head of the 
cantonment favors a group of individuals; these people usually get higher positions and 
can get some share of the benefits from him. However, those whom he does not like, 
despite qualification and work experience, rarely get promoted. The promotion of the 
sangkat and division officials hinges on their good relationship with the cantonment 
leadership, and hence they have to build good relationship and give benefits to it to be 
able to get promoted.111 
One former official cited earlier added: “There are also officials who benefit from 
corruption and these people are unlikely to support reforms as the money generated 
from corruption is much higher than their salary several folds.”112 
The experiences of the local authority are not much different. The PM complained: 
“As far as I know, some officials at the local level have not been encouraged. 
Those who have been clerks for a long time have not been promoted at all.”113 A 
former district joint force member responsible for crackdowns on illegal fishing 
recalled: 
When we came back from crackdowns, we needed to kick back some [money] to our 
bosses so as to stay in the position for long. If we went and just piled up the number of 
illegal cases on the desk, they would not be happy and want to keep us. If we came 
back with 2,000,000 or 5,000,000 riels and gave the bosses some, they would be very 
contented with our work. This is the reality. I am talking about what had happened 
through my experience.114 
Van Zalinge, Nao and Sam would call it living corruption and a need for money to 
purchase ‘positions in government hierarchy.’115 Aun would add: 
Thus, the competition to obtain official position which offers possibilities for earning 
unofficially more money has led to the emergence of nepotism and favoritism. 
Everyone depends on their backers and their networks. Presently, these negative 
behavioral characteristics have transformed themselves into work habits and are deeply 
ingrained in the mentality and the way of life of the Cambodians.116 
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In summary, the patronage practice within a state agency ‘destroys any possibility 
of rule governed behavior in the lower levels of the bureaucracy,’ allows powerful 
patrons and interest groups to plunder and impedes long-term development. Many 
African and Asian countries are trapped in this dilemma.117 Cambodian public 
administration is no exception. This neo-patrimonial arrangement has thus limited 
the state’s administrative and transformational capabilities, made it unwilling or 
unable to hold itself or its agents accountable for misconducts, affected public 
service provision and rule-of-law maintenance,118 and demotivated and corrupted 
its agents. Chan and others correctly add that such a practice ‘greatly compounds 
the difficulties of being able to get the most capable people in the right places’ and 
that this informal structure of interests and incentives is ‘usually more influential’ 
than the formal system.119 
2.6. Poor Remuneration and Limited Financial and Material Resources 
Poor remuneration poses probably the greatest challenge. High salary, as Evans 
attests, guarantees the insulation of the bureaucracy and ensures efficacy.120 
Cambodian civil servants are poorly paid. Here are some illustrations. In 1995, 
their average monthly salary was $20-30, while the private sector paid on average 
$150.121 In 2000, there was little increase in salaries, and they were categorized the 
lowest paid, whereas the living wage was $200-300. In 2007, the internationally-
adopted compression ratio benchmark was 12; that for Cambodia stood at 5.5 and 
the salary was still far below the markets122 and subsistence. The FiA staff similarly 
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suffer from poor, albeit increasing, remuneration.123 Discussions with some DoF 
officials reveal that there has been a bigger gap in salary between different 
categories of officials. In 1993, an office chief was paid $14.5-16; the lowest 
category $12. In 2011, a department (former office) head could collect more than 
$200 from salary and allowance; the lowest category was paid $30-40.124 
This low salary has devastating impacts on the public sector, leading to poor 
performance, demotivation, absenteeism, underemployment, moonlighting, poor 
governance, brain drain and non-service provision.125 DoF/FiA acknowledged: 
‘[T]he wages of government staff are so low many lack motivation or may be 
attracted to participate in corrupt practices. This results in an under-performing 
sector with limited capacity for change and a weak knowledge base in government 
for effective planning within the sector.’126 There are several patterns to generate 
extra income. Many well-educated staff choose to work in the private sector or earn 
extra income from an FiA-affiliated project; some take a second job; some, 
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especially field and supporting staff and powerful individuals, from eliciting money 
from their clients or a combination of them.127 
The indifference of many ‘best and brightest’ to the civil service and more 
competitive salary from the private sector and IOs/NGOs induces staff outflow 
from state agencies and presents difficulties in recruitment. A senior CoM official 
noted: ‘Fresh graduates eye for the private sector rather than the civil service 
positions.’128 The ADB observed: “While technical skills have improved 
throughout the public sector, project management skills continue to be in short 
supply, and as the private sector grew, the Government’s ability to attract and 
retain skilled young engineers and technicians diminished.”129 The WB added: “A 
serious consequence of this situation [low salary] is that investments in training in 
the public sector may be ineffective, because the trainees, when qualified, will 
simply join the private sector or will try to find employment in donor-financed 
projects.”130 
The DoF/FiA situation is not any better. In 2001, the newly appointed director 
issued a notification to office and unit heads, warning: “[S]o far in DoF there are 
some fisheries officials who have left to work for various international 
organizations without seeking permissions. Such a practice has detracted some 
work they shall do and produced disorderliness within DoF.”131 A 2006 DoF 
institutional review also cautioned against ‘outward migration of the better staff 
into the NGO and private sectors’ and its ‘effect of depleting badly needed skills, 
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experience and knowledge.’132 While an FiA leader downplays the brain drain of 
competent staff via their promotions to ‘good positions and delegating tasks to 
them,’ two former fisheries officials argue that ‘substantial’ number of ‘active’ 
staff or those ‘with big degrees’ but do not have connections and ‘are not well-
taken care of’ leave FiA to work for NGOs and IOs.133 
Financial resources and extraction from society are crucial for state building. 
However, in ‘lame leviathans’ resources at state’s disposal are scarce,134 and 
extraction from society is minimal. This quite accurately describes Cambodia. The 
state’s extraction capacity is limited. Moreover, it lacks the necessary budgets to 
cover every priority that is essential for the state building. The PM underscored: 
‘[E]verything tends to be priority, but clearly we lack the resources to meet all 
priorities,’ impeding the comprehensive reform program implementation.135 
Agencies managing natural resources, including FiA, face the same problems. 
Reviews of its annual reports point to one convergence: ‘lack of budgets’ and 
means to carry out their activities, inhibiting it from implementing its policy 
‘across the whole spectrum of policy areas.’136 
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To illustrate, CFDO/D is given a huge task, yet it has been allotted insufficient 
budget for its operation. A former CFDO official revealed that when CFDO was 
established, it was provided with $127,420 for its annual operation. According to 
an unpublished document, the requested fund for its 2007 activities was roughly 
$49,000.137 Similarly, a few officials in the central leadership reported that the 
funding is so limited. Sub-national officials also complain of a shortage of 
operating funds. The 2011 Fisheries Action Plan indicates that the funding for the 
entire CFC activities is $814,288 (with the RGC’s budget of $66,210, donors’ 
support of $317,531, and a shortfall of $430,547) and separate funding of $39,853 
(of which $37,950 from donors and a budget gap of $1,903) to selected 
cantonments for CFC related issues.138 The funding from the RGC is still limited 
and is even less than the initial support. 
Parallel with skewed staff distribution is financial and material resource 
distribution. The further it is from the center, the fewer resources there are. A 
report in 2002 went: “Those [provincial] offices are very poor and do not have any 
modern office materials such as computers, photocopy machines, fax, phones, etc. 
These commodities are only found at headquarters.”139 According to the field 
observation, cantonments are better equipped though equipment is limited and 
variable. Divisions and sangkats lack even basic office equipment. Some do not 
even have offices and some offices are rented.140 A report from the Battambang 
cantonment fully captures this: There is a “lack of offices at the division and 
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sangkat levels to provide fisheries-related services to concerned stakeholders. 
[There is a] shortage of office stationery such as tables, chairs, cupboards, 
computers, telephones and fax services.”141 Field implementors complain about 
limited budget for patrol, monitoring of lot fish lifting and information 
dissemination.142 The alleged ‘siphoning of the fund’ as it travels from top was 
another issue. An officer alleged: “As far as I know, the cantonment does receive 
some fund for petrol, but the former head of the cantonment never gave it to his 
subordinates and the patrol teams also did not receive money for the missions.”143 
3. Hindrance to Local Governments’ Institutional Capabilities 
Most shortcomings discussed above apply to the local governments. Ergun 
Ozbuden and Levy call for enhancement of their capabilities to make public 
administration more effective and to counter-balance the central government.144 
Cambodian state also bets better governance on more effective local governments 
as reflected in many policies and reform measures.145 However, decentralization is 
generally slow and the government structure is still very much top-down. Even the 
PM lamented: “The change in practices and attitudes at the ministries and national 
institution levels to support decentralization process, which involves the transfer 
and delegation of authority, role and resources to the local authorities, are still 
limited.”146 
                                                          
141 Battambang Fisheries Cantonment, "Battambang's Fisheries Cantonment 2009 Activities and 
Action Plan for 2009-2010 Fishing Season."  
142 Informant 22; Informant 66; Informant 89. See also, Council of Ministers, "Report on the 
Investigation of Complaint by Fishers in Chong Khneas village, Chong Khneas Commune, Siem 
Reap District and the Collection of Information on the Tax Payment of Hotel, Guesthouses, 
Massage Clubs and Restauratns in Siem Reap."; Csavas et al., Cambodia, rehabilitation and 
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Management in Cambodia," 34.  
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this allegation with cantonment leadership in both provinces. 
144 Levy, "Mexico: Sustained Civilian Rule Without Democracy," 146; Ergun Ozbudun, "Turkey: 
Crises, Interruptions, and Reequilibrations," in Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing 
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146 Cambodia New Vision, "Addressing the First-Term CC/Sangkat’s Performances," Cambodia 
New Vision August 2006, 4. See also, Nhem, "Mainstreaming Natural Resources and Environmental 
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Before 2002, CCs lacked clear roles and responsibilities.147 Despite the elections 
and better legislated roles and responsibilities, their authority is still limited, albeit 
improving, and they continue to face poor incentives, limited human and other 
resources and weak institutional capacity, while many councilors and clerks are 
new to this young system.148 Their duties have shifted from pure regulation to local 
investments and development. Nonetheless, their ability to generate revenues, 
revenue allocation from above and implementation and extension capacity are quite 
restricted. In 2006, for instance, the average fund transferred to each commune was 
some $11,700. The PM admits that fiscal decentralization is limited; however, he 
accurately brands it a ‘complicated task.’149 
Their capacity to help manage the two subsectors is limited owing to their limited 
resources, skills and technologies.150 Besides, because of the high premium on 
natural resources, they face resistance of authority devolution from concerned line 
offices and departments and sometimes difficulties in coordinating them.151 The 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Management: The Seila Decentralization Program," 83; Schneider, Ka, and Roy, Private Sector 
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12. 
147 Hughes, "The Seila Program in Cambodia," 111.  
148 See for example, Asian Development Bank, "Cambodia: Overview of NGOs," 2; ———, 
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Common Property, Collective Action and Decentralized Natural Resource Management in 
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149 Asian Development Bank, Country Strategy and Program 2005-2009: Kingdom of Cambodia: 6-
7; Cambodia New Vision, "Addressing the First-Term CC/Sangkat’s Performances," 4; Kato et al., 
Cambodia: Enhancing Governance for Sustainable Development: 10; NGO Forum on Cambodia 
and Economic Institute of Cambodia, Guide to the National Budget: 27; Try, "Making Space and 
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150 Asian Development Bank, Country Operations Business Plan: Cambodia 2008-2010: 6; 
Department of Fisheries, Impacts of the Fisheries Policy Reforms in Kampong Cham, Pursat and 
Takeo Provinces: First Round Assessment Report: 67; Mak, Vann, and Te, "Communication 
Strategies for Fisheries Conflict Management: A Case Study in Cambodia," 27; Middleton, "The 
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Policy Analysis and Secretariat Strategic Action Plan: 2.  
151 Cf. Mak, "The Tonle Sap and Its Fisheries Management: A Case in Cambodia," 17; Mak, Heun, 
and Pen, "Decentralization and Natural Resource Management in Cambodia: Implication of the 
Decentralization Process to Date, A Case Studies in Pursat Province," 14-25. Informant 14.  
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nature of fisheries and forest management sometimes demands cross-commune 
collaboration; nevertheless, as van Acker notes, “such experiences have been very 
limited.”152 The corollary of these shortcomings is, as discussed earlier, their 
limited contribution to CFC and lot management.  
Due to low incentives, some local officers are demotivated, as attested in the 
precarious nomination of CFC candidates by the village chief and less meaningful 
CC participation in CFC elections in Site 1. The village chief invited 7 non-fishers 
out of 14 nominees and some fishers with a history of using illegal gears to stand 
for a CFC election for the 2011-14 mandate. Some of these nominees were elected 
into the new CFC. The CC representative was not present in this election process 
and only showed up when the vote counting started and left immediately after it 
ended.153 Though this case cannot be generalized, it may be a usual practice given 
the little pay that they get from performing their duties. 
Commune councilors generally possess restricted authority vis-à-vis line offices 
and local strongmen, yet many do have discretionary power. As Ojendal and Kim 
spell out, the power abuses include ‘day-to-day corruption, unjust allocation of 
resources and occasional work opportunities, and foot-dragging.’154 Different forms 
of power abuses in the subsectors are fairly common. Weak capacity and authority 
and arbitrary power more than less apply to the district and provincial 
administrations.155 
 
                                                          
152 van Acker, "Don't Trust Fish When They Are in Water: Cambodia's Inland Fisheries in 
Transition," 46.  
153 Informant 24. Personal observation of an election in Province A. 
154 Ojendal and Kim, "Korob, Kaud, Klach: In Search of Agency in Rural Cambodia," 512-15. See 
also Hughes, The Political Economy of Cambodia's Transition, 1991-2001: 170; Kato et al., 
Cambodia: Enhancing Governance for Sustainable Development: 88.  
155 The district and provincial administration likewise face many shortcomings. After the 1993 
elections, financial autonomy and discretion were taken away from them, leaving them with limited 
sources of tax revenues and power over expenditure, and they were transformed ‘into administrative 
units to implement national budgets determined by the central government.’ Therefore, they were 
left with limited budget for district and provincial development activities. The re-alignment of line 
agencies has also taken away their authority to monitor progress of line departments and offices – 
with some of them allegedly failing to collaborate with the district and provincial admirations. See 
for example, ———, Cambodia: Enhancing Governance for Sustainable Development: 43-77; 
Peou, "Cambodia after the Killing Fields," 45. Informants 8-9. Like their commune counterparts, 
despite limited authority and capacity, they do hold arbitrary power. In the fisheries and inundated 
forest subsectors, for example, sales of common resources, backing of inundated forest clearance, 
demands for tea money for lot applications, and delays of patrol mission letters are usually heard of. 
To cite Hughes, they do wear ‘black hats’. Hughes, "The Seila Program in Cambodia," 106.  
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4. They Do Their Tasks and We Do Ours 
States are not a monolithic entity; thus overlapping jurisdictions, competition for 
resources, poor coordination/cooperation and jurisdictional and interest warfare 
amongst their agencies often exist. This certainly affects state capacity. Though 
state agencies in developed countries face these challenges, in post-communist 
countries they present even more challenges because of the benefits at stake when 
resources change hands.156 
Cambodia’s public administration too is far from perfect. SAW agrees that the 
public administration has ‘some gaps, overlaps and poor coordination functions.’157 
Hughes and Tim Conway maintain that each ministry or agency treats its 
jurisdiction as a fief ‘with leaders of certain ministries treating sectors as personal 
territories or domains’ and avoiding interference into the affairs of others158 in hope 
for reciprocal non-interference. Because of the high premium on natural resources 
for rent-extraction, jurisdictional and interest protection and responsibility 
compartmentalization are probably fiercer. Overviews of reports and studies 
written or commissioned by ADB reveal consistent patterns of complaints. Its 
2001-2003 Country Assistance Plan branded the ‘development of water resources’ 
as being ‘at a crossroads’ and raised the concern over restricted inter-
agency/sector-wide coordination and cooperation, contestation amongst ministries 
for the control of various sub-sectors, and unclear and overlapping mandates.159 
Another report in 2005 added: “Conflicts among agencies arise from broad 
interpretations of law and unwillingness to work together for common benefit… 
Cambodian institutions often appear to stake out claims for control of land, water 
                                                          
156 Cf. Barkey and Parikh, "Comparative Perspectives on the State," 11; Dauvergne, "Weak States, 
Strong States: A State-in-Society Perspective," 2; Haynes, Third World Politics: A Concise 
Introduction: 27-28; Holmes, "Conclusion: The State of the State in Putin's Russia," 300; Migdal, 
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157 Technical Working Group on Agriculture and Water, Strategy for Agriculture and Water 2006-
2010: 4. See also Asian Development Bank, Developing the Capacity for Reconstruction and 
Development: 16-17; Cambodia New Vision, "Addressing the 6th Cambodia Consultative Group 
Meeting," 6; Kol, "Review of Wetland and Aquatic Ecosystem in the Lower Mekong River Basin of 
Cambodia," 70; van Acker, Free Riders and Social Fences: Common Property, Collective Action 
and Decentralized Natural Resource Management in Cambodia: 116.   
158 Cited in Pak et al., Accountability and Neo-Patrimonialism in Cambodia: A Critical Literature 
Review: 60.  
159 Asian Development Bank, Country Assistance Plan 2001-03: Cambodia: 61. Also ———, 
Cambodia: Country Environmental Analysis: 25-35; ———, Country Operations Business Plan: 
Cambodia 2008-2010: 42-44.  
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and biotic resources and, where these claims overlap, compete among each 
other.”160 
These instances are ‘one of the major stumbling blocks for environmental 
management,’ the repercussion of which is inefficient management.161 Other DPs 
and researchers raise similar concerns. For example, Marschke wrote: “Institutions 
working on resource management issues are not connecting, let alone considering 
the linkages between environmental and poverty issues.”162 Lamberts attributed this 
turf war on the high premium on natural resources for personal gain. He reasoned: 
The underlying explanation is that there is much more at stake than just management 
authority. With the latter comes direct and indirect control over a huge informal 
income and benefits system. This enables senior staff to allow subordinates to generate 
indispensable supplements to inadequate government salaries, and to generate benefits 
for themselves and their own superiors.163 
Fisheries and forest management is likewise vested in many agencies, each of 
which is separately responsible for different aspects of the sub-sectors. To 
exemplify, FiA is responsible for fisheries and inundated forest; the Ministry of 
Environment (MoE) protected area management, such as the Tonle Sap biosphere 
reserve and Mekong Ramsar Sites; MOWRAM water resource management, the 
Ministry of Rural Development (MRD) rural development, and local authorities 
local development. In the biosphere reserve, there are fishing lots and CFis and in 
the Ramsar Sites there exist CFis and subsistent fishing, which fall within the FiA 
jurisdiction. MRD is tasked with rural development, including community 
development, while FiA is responsible for CFi development. Their cooperation and 
coordination are thus of utmost importance for successful resource management 
given their overlapping and complementary responsibilities. Yet this is mainly the 
missing link. This section chiefly discusses the challenging relationship between 
                                                          
160 Mitchell, Tonle Sap Biosphere Reserve Policy Analysis and Secretariat Strategic Action Plan: 2.  
161 Asian Development Bank, Cambodia: Country Environmental Analysis: 50-51; ———, Country 
Strategy and Program 2005-2009: Kingdom of Cambodia: 81-82.  
162 Marschke, "Livelihood in Context: Learning with Cambodian Fishers," 193. See also, Toby 
Carson, Kalyan Hou, and Serey Rotha Ken, "Practicing CBNRM in Cambodia," in The 
Development of CBNRM in Cambodia, ed. Serey Rotha Ken, et al. (Phnom Penh: CBNRM 
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FiA and MoE and FiA and CCs as illustrations of limited inter-agency 
coordination/cooperation. 
FiA and MoE face some inter-agency issues. First, there are jurisdictional 
confusion, competition and conflicts over the management of fishing activities and 
inundated forest in the biosphere reserves and Ramsar Sites owing to broad 
legislation interpretation, discrepancies between legislated and actual 
responsibilities and policy and jurisdictional wrangling.164 FiA admits the impacts 
from overlapping institutional responsibilities, underscoring: “There is also a lack 
of cross-sectoral clarity about which agency has the responsibility to legislate and 
enforce regulations in different environments which leads to confusion and wasted 
resources.”165 Before the passage of FL, there was also jurisdictional competition 
over the fisheries and forest management in the overlapping areas.166 According to 
Informant 14: 
In general, the ministries don’t get along. I don’t think there is a good cooperation 
between the Ministry of Environment and FiA. In fact, I’m sure there is not. They 
don’t like each other because it is a competing interest. Environment is broad and it 
covers everything, including water areas, biosphere reserve, natural resources, whereas 
the Department of Fisheries is more specific. I think in Cambodia, the MoE suffers 
from the same problems as most MoEs suffer from, which is that it is weak. Because it 
is broad, it seems to have a weak mandate. It also does not have a way to generate 
revenues so easily, whereas FiA within MAFF gets a clear way to generate money, 
therefore FiA gets more power…In the last five years, I’m not sure. I’m really talking 
about like 1998-2005.167 
Even after 2005, they have harbored some resentment against each other over 
policy and legislation interpretation, competition for external funding and 
management of certain areas168 and government funding. 
Second, at stake are cooperation and coordination on policy formulation and 
implementation. The sectoral nature of resource management leads to poor or non-
                                                          
164 Cf. Cambodia National Mekong Committee, Natural Resources-Based Development Strategy for 
the Tonle Sap Area: 56-57; Campbell, Department of Fisheries Institutional Review: 8; Kol, 
"Review of Wetland and Aquatic Ecosystem in the Lower Mekong River Basin of Cambodia," 71-
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166 Mak, Heun, and Pen, "Decentralization and Natural Resource Management in Cambodia: 
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existent institutional cooperation/coordination, preventing ‘inter-ministerial 
monitoring, coordination and the sharing of resources and expertise’ and 
sometimes to conflicting decisions.169 When asked about cross-ministerial projects, 
an FiA leader responded: ‘They do their tasks and we do ours. There is a different 
budget package for each department handling the same project.’170 An ADB officer 
describes the state agencies’ coordination in the Tonle Sap area as ‘very 
complex’.171 A former fisheries official attributes this to ‘protection of individuals’ 
or institutions’ interests,’ and an NGO program manager to a ‘conflict of interests’ 
and ‘conflict of power,’ adding: “Usually, if the tasks are involved two or three 
agencies, it is difficult to get them work together or elicit support from all of them. 
For example, if one NGO works with FiA on a project in the Prek Toal protected 
area, it may get facilitation from the FiA staff; however, it faces some 
administrative burden when dealing with the MoE.”172 
The overlapping responsibilities, conflicts and competitions at the center have an 
impact on their respective sub-central implementing agencies. Mak, Honey Heun 
and Raingsey Pen argue that the provincial line departments work more 
collaboratively on managing communities fisheries and forestry;173 however, two 
informants view them as competing for their agenda at the provincial and district 
levels and protecting ‘one’s interests rather than working for a common goal.’ 
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Bunheur Neou and Chan likewise report that there is little coordination between the 
two agencies.174 
Cooperation and coordination between line agencies and local authorities are 
another issue. Before 2001, there was widespread belief by DoF staff that many 
mass protests by villagers were instigated by local authorities in order to control 
and exploit the fishing domain by/for themselves.175 DoF reports then also 
complained of poor cooperation from local authorities in the resource management. 
An FiA leader agrees that the working relationship between the local authorities 
and FiA was ‘not good’ during 1993-2006. Though there has been some 
improvement since then, there are still limitations. A sangkat leader complains that 
some elements of the local authorities and armed forces pressure fisheries officials 
‘to cooperate and live in harmony’ with them via the protection of illegal fishing. A 
cantonment leader criticizes that some CCs are reluctant to deal with fisheries 
complaints and usually ‘push the grievance parties in disputes to complain to the 
FiA,’ though after some negotiations ‘there have been some changes in attitude and 
some CCs began to facilitate disputes.’176 The reactions from the local authorities 
are similarly mixed. While three CC members in Site 1 show some resentment over 
the fact that fisheries and forestry are mainly under the expertise offices’ control, a 
CC leader in Site 2 describes the working relationship as ‘fairly good’ with 
occasional fierce arguments, raising an example of FiA allowing businesspeople to 
dig ponds in his commune without informing him and not giving him the burden 
book.177 
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In the main, the technical offices’ authority outweighs that of the local 
authorities’.178 The ambivalent relationship, animosity and partial cooperation are 
the result of competition for turfs, lack of clear roles and duties and de-
concentration with little decentralization and decentralization with little de-
concentration. Agencies such as DoF prefer to devolve authorities and functions to 
their line agencies rather than to or through the local authorities.179 Likewise, CCs 
have few contacts with the line agencies. According to Chan, ‘during the 
preparation of the [Provincial Development] Priority Action Plan (annually) for PIF 
funding, the fisheries officials, had little involvement or [are] not consulted by the 
commune councils about the fisheries demand in their localities.’180 
A few permanent central inter-sectoral bodies have been established or initiated for 
inter-agency coordination. Two noticeable ones are the Cambodia’s National 
Mekong Committee and the Tonle Sap Authority. They too face many challenges. 
CNMC has weak technical capacity and scarce financial resources and is 
sometimes by-passed by its member agencies.181 Before TSA was established in 
2007, the ADB initiated two short-lived agencies: TSBR Secretariat in 2001 and 
the never-born Tonle Sap Basin Management Organization (TSBMO) under 
CNMC. The prelude to the TSBMO and TSBR Secretariat establishment saw line 
agencies trying to neutralize or water down its authority as much as they could.182 
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The more extensive TSBMO, extending from the secretariat to the district level, 
was never adopted, and the government initiated the Phnom-Penh-based TSA 
under the leadership of MOWRAM minister instead. It has been quite active in 
fisheries and forest management, including the destruction and modification of 
some mega-water reservoirs in the inundated forest around Tonle Sap, two major 
rounds of illegal fishing clampdowns and one round of lot auction monitoring. 
How much it can assist with the resource management is to be seen as it is still 
young and competent staff is few.183 MAFF is likely to protest its dominance. In a 
clarification letter to the PM, its minister, for example, wrote: “I would like to take 
this opportunity to thank TSA that concerns for the disasters to fisheries resources 
though the Authority does not have any jurisdiction”184 over the issues. 
The TWGF is another good mechanism for tri-alogue between NGOs, DPs and 
concerned government agencies working on fisheries and forestry issues; however, 
participation from other central agencies in bi-monthly meetings organized by the 
TWGF is likewise limited. A frequent attendee reasoned: ‘There is little cross 
pollination. There is little collaboration between each group… so the TWG is not 
so effective for inter-ministerial coordination.’185 Another informant added: Other 
state agencies ‘have no interests [in participating in the TWGF] or they do not gain 
anything from engaging with it.’186 
To conclude, the low institutional state capacity and limited resources contribute to 
bureaucratic dysfunctionality. The state is notable for the absence of the Weberian 
bureaucratic characteristics. It has adopted the modern state garb, but not 
necessarily modern state behavior.187 Such characteristics as meritocratic 
promotion, competency-based recruitment, file-based management, separation 
between office and officers, non-exploitation from offices, high material rewards 
and social honor, hierarchical and non-interfering decision-making and systematic 
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disciplines are either absent or weak.188 To cite Evans, the bureaucracy is not the 
problem, but its scarcity is. An internal robust cohesive structure, inter-agency 
coordination/cooperation and a sense of unity amongst bureaucrats are feeble, 
leading to inefficiency and ‘incursions by the invisible hand of individual 
maximization.’189 Like the Solomon Islands and Indonesia, bureaucratic agencies 
work with insufficient funds, equipment, and trained personnel and breed patronage 
networks.190 Building an ‘effective bureaucracy is an arduous task’ and without 
history of ‘deeply rooted bureaucratic traditions,’ the task is even more daunting as 
‘there is no guarantee that supply will match demand.’191 Furthermore, in the 
absence of a competent bureaucracy, norm and value internalization and 
institutionalization amongst the officials take even more time.192 These perfectly 
apply to the Cambodian state structure and FiA in particular. Paradoxically, like 
Fred Block recommends to post-communist countries, these state agencies also 
require de-bureaucratization: more autonomy to junior employees, a shift from 
procedural to substantive regulation (and as Evans suggests midwifery and 
husbandry) and more civic participation.193 
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Chapter 10: The Quest for Internal Political Legitimacy 
The discussion so far shows that civil society and state agencies in Cambodia are 
weak. This chapter will prove that the opposition and one of the main coalition 
partners in the governments are likewise weak. In such a context, the quest for 
internal political legitimacy does not significantly enhance state capacity and build 
its institutional capacity. Instead it allows the dominant ruling party or parties to 
raid state apparatus in order to build and strengthen itself/themselves and enables 
them to intensify and diversify patronage politics. Besides, the politicization of 
state agencies contributes to state debility and weak institutional capacity since the 
ruling parti(es) are reluctant to hold state agencies and their agents accountable for 
their misconduct. However, the transformation from elite to mass-patronage has 
somehow allowed the dominant parti(es) to make state agents and dominant 
businesses contribute to the socio-economic development of the country. 
With the end of the Cold War, external powers backing the Cambodian conflict 
were more seriously committed to ending the Cambodian war and pushing all 
factions into negotiations. With their patrons’ withdrawal of support, they were 
more serious about ending the protracted war. Hence, the Paris Peace Agreement 
was finally signed on 23rd October 1991. This agreement saw the four factions in 
principle agree to multi-party liberal democracy and to seeking political legitimacy 
via election under the supervision from the UN in 1993. Properly calculating its 
unpopularity, the Khmer Rouge defaulted on the agreement and withdrew from the 
elections. The other factions along with the UN proceeded with the elections, 
which saw millions of Cambodians go to the polls for the first time in two decades.   
The elections saw a surprise victory for FUNCINPEC, which had little time to 
prepare for them, and a defeat by the CPP, although they were held mostly in 
territory under its previous control and there was systematic foul play by its party 
members.1 However, FUNCINPEC did not win a decisive two-third majority to 
rule by itself; hence it needed CPP’s support to form a coalition government. After 
protracted negotiations, a coalition government of parties with seats in the 
Assembly was formed with Ranariddh as the first PM, Hun Sen the second and 
ministerial posts divided amongst all winning parties with no opposition party. 
From here, the coalition of the strange bedfellows began their shaky political 
journey. 
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1. From a Shaky Coalition to a Dominant Ruling Party and Weak 
Oppositions 
The People’s Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea (PRPK), the CPP’s predecessor, 
started almost from scratch in 1978 when its members teamed up to oppose the 
DK. At the beginning it had roughly 200 cadres. When the DK fell, the 
membership was still small as many DK cadres went with their leaders to the 
Cambodian-Thai border. It was slowly increasing; however, even in 1988, the party 
had merely 22,000 cadres (excluding the core groups) in nearly 3,000 party 
branches. At the lowest level, only two-thirds of the communes had party branches. 
Even Hun Sen admits that the bigger mistake ‘was neglecting to build the party at 
the base.”2 The pre-election years witnessed the party mass-issuing party 
memberships and claim to have millions of members.3 Even in 1993, the party was 
thus quite weak. However, it was closely linked to the SoC’s agencies. The 
PRK/SoC “sought to replicate the vast, ubiquitous structure of the Vietnamese 
Communist Party, establishing Party branches in every state institution, from 
ministries to local government offices, military units, schools, and hospitals. 
Initially, however, the lack of Party members forced the regime to rely on the next 
best thing: core groups.”4 
Such a practice put the party, whose central committee had re-established state 
institutions, at the helm and blurred the party-state distinction. Party committees for 
internal security, national defense and diplomacy were established and placed 
under the party’s direct control. Besides, by 1989 it had managed to hold a firm 
grip over the commune administration.5 Envisioning the imminent political 
solution, ‘it decided to transfer the states entire industrial sector over to the Party.”6 
Therefore, by the early 1990’s, the party had ‘built the state into a cohesive and 
                                                          
2 Gottesman, Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge: Inside the Politics of Nation Building: 48; 
Slocomb, The People's Republic of Kampuchea 1979-1989: The Revolution after Pol Pot: 125-42 
and 99. ibid.  
3 According to Cheam Yeap, in 2012 the party has 5,570,000 members. Yuthana Kim and Bridget 
Di Certo, "Parties Gear up for Elections," Phnom Penh Post Monday 21 May, 2012.  
4 Chandler, A History of Cambodia: 279-80; Gottesman, Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge: Inside 
the Politics of Nation Building: 48-49. “The [Vietnamese] technical specialists and economic 
experts who advised Cambodian state institutions ranged from deputy ministers, seconded from 
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145.  
5 ———, Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge: Inside the Politics of Nation Building: 48; Kato et al., 
Cambodia: Enhancing Governance for Sustainable Development: 8; Slocomb, "Commune Elections 
in Cambodia: 1981 Foundations and 2002 Reformulations," 449. 
6 For the details, see Gottesman, Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge: Inside the Politics of Nation 
Building: 318.  
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loyal apparatus.’7 In line with the sequencing thesis because the party competition 
took place before the state consolidation, the party builders raided the state to build 
the party first through patronage politics.8 While one of UNTAC’s roles was to 
neutralize the administrations of all factions during the transition, it could do little; 
thus the CPP gained the leverage since it had the most extensive public 
administration and most numerous soldiers in the largest territory.9 The legacy 
from its inability to neutralize the administrations is the CPP’s domination over the 
state apparatus which is tied together by patronage. 
Consequently, though FUNCINPEC achieved electoral success, the CPP could 
bargain for a favorable power sharing deal, including the second-premiership, 
almost equal ministerial and provincial governor posts, co-ministership for defense 
and interior and consensus-based decision-making. More importantly, when the 
government was formed, the existing bureaucracy, local and provincial 
governments and a majority of the armed forces still answered to the CPP, while 
Funcinpec was slow to assert ‘firm leadership.’10 According to Harish Mehta and 
Julie Mehta: 
Although Ranariddh took charge as the first prime minister he could not control the 
vast provincial administration that was run by second prime minister Hun Sen’s party. 
Too small and too thin on the ground [sic] Ranariddh’s party lacked the manpower. 
Hun Sen’s party, in contrast, controlled the administration through its network of army 
commanders, police chiefs, and governors, most of whom had fought alongside their 
prime minister in the war of liberation against the Khmer Rouge. The powerful 
provincial figures were handpicked by Hun Sen, and they remained loyal to him. 
Ranariddh’s partymen generally held foreign passports, and did not appear to have the 
stomach for the heat and dust of the poverty-stricken countryside, or the bullets that 
flew out of the tall grass. Compared to the CPP, Funcinpec was minuscule.11 
Nate Thayer concurred: 
…the traditions of real power in Cambodia are rooted in control of the armed forces, 
security apparatus, state bureaucracy and, importantly, the provincial political 
structures which control police, armed forces, tax collection, and civil service. These 
areas remain under the control of the CPP and respond to political loyalties before 
central authority.12 
                                                          
7 Laura Summers cited in Hughes, The Political Economy of Cambodia's Transition, 1991-2001: 
39-40.  
8 O'Dwyer, Runaway State-Building: Patronage Politics and Democratic Development: 7-8.  
9 See for example, Shawcross, Cambodia's New Deal: 17-21.  
10 Cf. Chandler, A History of Cambodia: 288-89; Gottesman, Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge: 
Inside the Politics of Nation Building: 352; Harish Mehta, Warrior Prince: Norodom Ranariddh, 
Son of King Sihanouk of Cambodia  (Singapore: Graham Brash, 2001). 135; Mehta and Mehta, Hun 
Sen: Strongman of Cambodia: 169; Peou, Intervention and Change in Cambodia: Towards 
Democracy?: Parts 2 and 3; Shawcross, Cambodia's New Deal: 93.  
11 Mehta and Mehta, Hun Sen: Strongman of Cambodia: 111-12 and 66-67.  
12 Cited in Curtis, "Beyond Transition: Cambodia in the Post-UNTAC Period," Chapter 2, 6.  
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The two junior parties were even more powerless. The Buddhist Liberal 
Democratic Party secured the leadership of the Ministry of Information; it was 
riven by internal power struggle, resulting in its split in 1995. The Moulinaka 
Party, winning only one seat, was offered one position of Under-Secretary of State 
at MRD by FUNCINPEC.13 Therefore, the government was weak, shaky, fragile 
and volatile and beset with power struggle especially between the two main parties, 
and the coalition would last only if and until when Funcinpec agreed to 
accommodate to the dominant CPP’s interests.14 The splitting of the International 
Development Association-sponsored project into two components was a good 
illustration of power struggle. In 1994, IDA proposed an agricultural and rural 
development project; however, because MAFF “was dominated by CPP staff, and 
the Ministry of Rural Development by FUNCINPEC staff, …the project concept 
foundered until the project was split—one for agriculture and one for rural 
development. The rural development project was postponed until FY99.”15 
It was the 1997 factional fighting between the two main coalition partners that 
decided once and for all the CPP’s domination over Cambodian politics and 
Funcinpec’s decline.16 The CPP has the largest and most sophisticated 
organizational structure and is the richest party with many wealthy and educated 
members.17 Since 1993, it has had a better grip over the bureaucracy, military, 
provincial and local government (controlling all provincial and district 
governorship from 2008, winning 98% of the commune chief positions in 2007 and 
2012 elections, controlling 99.5% of the village chief positions since 2007), and the 
Assembly (winning more than two-third of the seats in 2008).18 The hegemonic, 
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institutionalized Institutional Revolutionary Party of Mexico blocked other parties 
from achieving party institutionalization; such is applied to the CPP. Since most of 
its supporters are rural dwellers, it has thwarted other parties, especially the main 
opposition party, from building a stronghold in the countryside.19 
The rise of the CPP, especially of Hun Sen, runs parallel with the decline of 
FUNCINPEC, especially of Ranariddh and eventual demise of the two junior 
parties in the first coalition. FUNCINPEC has declined since 1993, reflecting in its 
inability to fully penetrate the countryside, reduction of assembly’s seats from 54 in 
1993 to 2 in 2008, reduction to a sole junior coalition partner, division into many 
parties, and above all demotion of Ranariddh and his decision to leave Funcinpec to 
form a new party in 2007.20 The Norodom Ranariddh Party (NRP) has been not so 
successful either, getting only two seats in the 2008 elections. 
As for opposition parties, it was not until 1995 when Sam Rainsy, the former 
finance minister, was demoted and sacked from Funcinpec that a real opposition 
party was born. In the 1950’s and 1960’s, Sihanouk showed little tolerance towards 
the opposition.21 The legacy of wars and a culture of political hegemony are 
probably the main challenges for the acceptance of a ‘loyal’ opposition.22 Thus, 
oppositions, or even coalition partners, are seen as threats and hence are targeted 
via divide-and-rule tactics, law suits, alleged sponsored defections, intimidation 
and threats and restrictions of political maneuver, especially in the countryside, by 
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the dominant party.23 The oppositions’ structure itself poses a problem. Like the 
ruling parties, they are organized top-down and are elite-based. However, with 
weaker bases, they mainly call on the ‘international community’ to assist them with 
space-of-engagement expansion.24 Besides, the opposition groups, like 
FUNCINPEC, are in disarray with no consolidation, but increase in numbers and 
little intent to forge a unified opposition.25 
2. Weakening and Co-opting State Apparatus 
When the first coalition government was formed in 1993, there was no downsizing 
of the existing public administration. Moreover, more personnel from the other 
parties were added to the former SoC’s administration due to the politics of 
compromise – resulting in the ‘inflation of positions and staffs’ and appointments 
of many non-qualified civil servants, as Hun Sen usually laments.26 The WB 
reported that 18,000 staff was incorporated for ‘political balancing under the peace 
agreement’ – a practice a provincial department director labels as “dumping” of 
parties’ members into the civil service.27 To be fair to the other parties though, the 
SoC’s extensive personnel were all kept intact, although many were under-
qualified.28 The final integration by the Khmer Rouge further enlarged the size of 
the civil service. 
Because of the political uncertainties and instability, especially during the first two 
mandates, the two major ruling parties were less interested in building a capable 
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and autonomous civil service, but to build patronage networks.29 Besides the 
bloating of (deputy) ministerial posts, there were promotions and appointments of 
unqualified personnel – something that Hun Sen referred to as ‘bitter experiences’ 
or ‘political prices’ for ‘political reconciliation,’ although he admits that “the 
incidents of appointing officials in a non-virtuous manner, or through lobby of 
wives or concubines have not been the problem of FUNCINPEC alone, but a 
matter that has been found also in CPP.”30 A cantonment leader agreed that some 
‘integrated officials’ to DoF ‘do not possess high qualifications – what they had 
was certificates from attending short courses at the border camps,” while another 
official alleged that more positions were created to generate more money to 
parties.31 Pak and others observed: “Politics influence the entire structure and size 
of the bureaucracy, as positions are created and filled in accordance with the whim 
of powerful patrons who appoint members of their political network as a reward for 
positive performance or as part of a wider process of political negotiations and 
compromises.”32 
It was not until 2008 when Hun Sen announced the end of ‘quotas’ for non-political 
administrative positions.33 By then, the CPP was certain that it could govern alone 
thanks to the constitutional amendment allowing a party winning 50% plus one of 
the votes to form a government on its own and its ability to grab more than two-
thirds of the seats in the Assembly for the first time in 2008. All in all, the political 
compromise in the first three mandates had ‘added another layer of patron-client 
networks’ and created ‘two bureaucracies running the government, which was 
expensive and unwieldy.’34 
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A communist legacy is the belief in infiltration into other organizations, including 
state apparatus, while the consequence of ‘economic development’ first is the 
confluence of a party and the state. This is especially the case when the state was 
created by a party or individuals.35 The intertwining of the dominant party and the 
state is not new to Cambodian politics. The Democratic Party won the elections in 
1946 and 1952 through ‘the exploitation of networks of local administrative 
control’ by maintaining provincial and district committees within the state 
apparatus and through tapping into customary structures of authority.36 Sihanouk’s 
movement did not spare the bureaucracy either.37 The PRPK’s fusion with the 
SoC’s structure and UNTAC’s inability to separate them has given leverage to the 
CPP ever since.38 
Though FUNCINPEC has had some loyalists appointed to the bureaucracy and 
together with SRP and NRP has gained some control over the CCs, the CPP still 
wins the loyalty of and dominates most of the public administration and all 
branches of the state ‘with its vast political networks extending deep and wide into 
communes and villages.’39 ADB and WB reports bemoan the heavy influence of 
‘party politics’ over “a poorly paid, patronage-based civil service system.”40 
Similarly, Mehta and Mehta noted: “The dividing line between the party, the 
government, and the civil service had been erased. Civil servants and ministers 
were required to be members of parties, and this had politicized the entire 
government machinery and the administration – a nexus that was impossible to 
sunder.”41 To be fair to the CPP, FUNCINPEC also had little interest in insulating 
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the public administration from party politics, but endeavor to increase its share of 
patronage within the state apparatus, including the judiciary and district 
administration.42 
The CPP’s manipulation of the state apparatus to achieve its electoral success can 
be divided into two main stages, the first of which is the strengthening of their 
allegiance to the party via permitting them to extract from the state and society and 
reliance on them for material goods distribution to party members, surveillance and 
intimidation of voters, etc., and soliciting their financial support to win elections. 
Hughes was an early writer to highlight the protection of ‘entrepreneurial’ activities 
‘to strengthen the political attachment of local authorities to deliver the electoral 
victories.’ Such a practice enriched individual civil servants rather than the 
Treasury and discouraged systematic reforms when they ‘appeared to become too 
threatening to loyalty structures.’43 At this stage, the CPP was observed to use more 
heavy-handed methods to stay in power.44 Given the rural nature of the 
constituency, poor trust between citizens and the state and local authorities’ power 
and influence, the authorities’ catalases were necessary to win an election. 
FUNCINPEC too joined this game of gift distribution and rewards of state 
positions to major funders.45 Cock argued that the extraction from the state and 
society and the passage of income to the superiors have created a relatively stable 
ruling elite group.46 
The ‘entrepreneurial’ activities are applied to natural, including fisheries, resource 
exploitation. Billon argued:  “In 1994, the government permitted the military to 
secure the forest sector in exchange for its allegiance. With this permission, the 
                                                                                                                                                                 
and National Democratic Institute, "Cambodian Public Opinion in Advance of the 2003 Elections," 
2 and 13-14; Mak, Heun, and Pen, "Decentralization and Natural Resource Management in 
Cambodia: Implication of the Decentralization Process to Date, A Case Studies in Pursat Province," 
14-15; Peou, "Cambodia after the Killing Fields," 46 and 67; Try, "Making Space and Access in 
Fisheries Resource Management for Local Communities in Stung Treng Province," 8; Un, "State, 
Society and Democratic Consolidation: The Case of Cambodia," 229. 
42 Gottesman, Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge: Inside the Politics of Nation Building: 353; Mehta, 
Warrior Prince: Norodom Ranariddh, Son of King Sihanouk of Cambodia: 106 and 71-73; Un, 
"State, Society and Democratic Consolidation: The Case of Cambodia," 233.  
43 Hughes, The Political Economy of Cambodia's Transition, 1991-2001: 13-80 and 176. See also 
———, "The Politics of Gifts: Tradition and Regimentation in Contemporary Cambodia," Journal 
of Southeast Asian Studies 37, no. 03 (2006); Thayer, "Cambodia: The Cambodian People's Party 
Consolidates Power," 88; Un, "State, Society and Democratic Consolidation: The Case of 
Cambodia," 226-29.  
44 See for example, Shawcross, Cambodia's New Deal; Un, "Patronage Politics and Hybrid 
Democracy: Political Change in Cambodia, 1993-2003." 
45 Hughes, The Political Economy of Cambodia's Transition, 1991-2001: 119-36. See also Pol, 
"Cambodia," 165-78.  
46 Cock, "External Actors and the Relative Autonomy of the Ruling Elite in Post-UNTAC 
Cambodia," 244-64.  
248 
 
army, working through networks of businesspeople, forestry bureaucrats, 
politicians, and provincial authorities sold timber for personal gain and to raise 
funds for the civil war.”47  Even the subsequent bans did ‘not eliminate illegal 
logging in all areas, because of the ongoing dominance of patronage-based 
politics.’48 Mak likewise claims that there was a lack of transparency in lot 
management, opening the room for ‘corruption, including diversion of government 
revenue to the accounts of political parties.’49 
It is noted that the need for legitimacy from dominant groups is more important 
than from the population;50 hence in many developing countries patronage 
dispensing to buy loyalty and to elicit their support to garner votes is indispensable. 
This in turn hinders the states’ endeavor to reform and curtail their capacity.51 Deng 
and others acutely notes such a phenomenon in Africa, stating: 
Financial assistance [from private as well as official sources] for the special use of 
individual parties has generally been handled confidentially. It is reasonable to expect 
that political parties acceding to power on the strength of such assistance would remain 
beholden to their patrons and, accordingly, endeavor to return some favors… While 
some return of favors might be expected even in the more mature democracies, in 
African countries this phenomenon is particularly troublesome since parties could 
remain beholden to a few large supporters capable of controlling governments to 
further individual ends.52 
By contrast, Diamond, Linz and Lipset argue that ‘the more successful a regime 
has been in providing what people want, the greater and more deeply rooted tends 
to be its legitimacy.’ Such a position is supported by other scholars.53 In Cambodia, 
in the eyes of many people, livelihood and possibility for its enhancement (or more 
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generally economic development) are more important than full-fledged democracy. 
With substantial aid money and better macro-economic management, Cambodia 
has experienced remarkable economic growth. Consequently, the CPP and its 
leaders are confident of their ‘ability to deliver on the promise of economic growth’ 
and improving the welfare of the rural dwellers.54 It has therefore shifted its 
electoral strategy from more coercive means and ad-hoc gift distribution to more 
systematic countrywide rural development programs via PWGs, especially since 
the 2nd general elections. Elections and election seasons have also been less and 
less violent. Hughes and others noted the changes in strategies: 
By the turn of the century, although local authorities were still blamed for intimidation 
around elections, tales of commune and village chiefs or policemen getting away with 
violent assaults, rapes and outrageous landgrabs had become far scarcer, as the 
Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) began to attend more assiduously to its popular 
image and to rein in loose cannons at the local level.55 
According to Pak and Craig, many state officials and businesspeople who are CPP 
members are allocated to PWGs ranging from the central to commune levels. The 
projects mainly focus on basic physical infrastructure and pagodas. Considerable 
contributions are required, and 
Even poorly paid central officials will contribute $20, $30, $50 a month to a fund held 
in the name of their District Working Group head. The head will also actively solicit 
money from central figures and networks, and supplement funds from their own 
(including family) resources… Those entirely dependent on government for income 
sources have the most compelling incentives to participate. In any case, party 
contributions are closely watched, expected, acknowledged and calculated as a part of 
an overall assessment of a party member’s (and especially a potential role or office 
candidate’s) capability, loyalty, “internal solidarity” (willingness to fit into party 
arrangements), morality, influence, and potential for popular appeal.56 
Generally, such contributions from lower level officials were made as ‘private 
contributions to development projects bearing the name of a prominent official, as 
a way of getting close to and expressing loyalty towards a patron, something that 
occurs nation-wide’ and ‘with an eye to securing support and patronage in the 
future, or perhaps to enabling an actor to become a public political figure 
himself.’57 FiA’s officials who are party members similarly contribute substantially 
to their respective PWGs. According to two informants, sangkat and division 
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officials also contribute financially to their PWGs ‘though they usually do not need 
to spend much. Officials from the provincial and central administrations spend 
more.’58 These officials are to contribute monthly to a PWG plus on an ad hoc basis 
during an election. In this latter stage, the dominant party has thus moved from 
capturing the state for a small group’s benefits to capturing it to strengthen itself 
and begun a more systematic and institutionalized redistribution of private and 
public goods to its supporters. 
These projects have given the CPP considerable credits and enhanced its electoral 
success. Thayer, for example, agrees that ‘the CPP government under the 
leadership of Hun Sen was genuinely popular, especially in rural areas.”59 
However, such a development strategy has intensified patronage politics within 
state agencies and induced a development approach in which state officials are 
required to contribute to party coffers, leading to corruption and ‘rampant 
exploitation of natural resources.”60 Hughes concurred that in the politics of 
“politicized, party-owned rural development projects… Provincial governors are 
required to contribute both to raising the necessary funds, through a range of 
practices associated with corruption and natural resource exploitation.” The 
politicization of the state apparatus to achieve political ends has put ‘pressure on 
provincial governments to deliver political support at crucial times [which] makes 
it difficult for provincial governors to ‘switch hats’ easily.”61 Even some donors 
highlight that monetary incentives from some donor-sponsored projects are often 
‘shared among many people: superiors, the party, other people in the clan and 
ministry.”62 This politicized development also affects FiA’s operations. A 
cantonment leader, for instance, raised that the contributions to party’s coffers has 
‘impacts on the effectiveness of the work of state officials,’ while a former fisheries 
officials added that sometimes lower level officials have to allow illegal fishing to 
exist so that they can kick up ‘part of the money gained from illegal activities to 
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support party politics.”63 Van Acker added: “There have been many cases where 
irrefutable evidence exists of unlawful activities, yet the culprits got away scot-free 
because of their status as public servants or members of the security forces, or their 
adherence to particular parties.”64 A TWGF’s officer attributes the lack of a long-
term vision within FiA and other government institutions to the leadership’s 
‘busyness with the institutional and party responsibilities.”65 
The quest for political legitimacy also impacts the appropriate use of resources. 
Major reforms are usually done in haste before an election and with insufficient 
preparation and follow-up. Such was the conversion of residential and farmland 
from state to private property in 1989 to compensate for SoC’s unpopular policies, 
contributing to massive land disputes even since. The picture is likewise quite 
messy in fisheries reforms. The rushed lot privatization and krom samaki 
termination in 1988, for example, was done to ‘keep their party cadres content’ and 
to raise revenues.66 Subsequent reforms were similarly conducted in haste. Some 
reports link the 2001 lot release to the looming 2002 commune and 2003 general 
elections and a need to draw popularity.67 And indeed the CPP won an across-the-
board and landslide victory in both elections. As discussed earlier, the poorly-
planned, top-down reforms resulted in ineffective CFCs, weak CFDO/D and 
massive illegal fishing and forest clearance upon the reforms.68 In March 2012, the 
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government initiated another major reform – the abolition of all research lots 
around the Tonle Sap and in four provinces along the Mekong.69 These provinces 
are large in terms of population. Again, this was done three months before another 
commune election, in which the CPP has won a landslide victory. The haste 
reforms were conducted in the context that FiA had received insignificant budget 
for capacity building and operations. The reforms have an impact on state revenue 
collection (and by extension its midwifery and husbandry capacity) and regulation. 
Interviews with some fisheries officials, a former member of the district joint force 
and CFCs show that in selected locations there are interventions from communes 
and district authorities or even PWG leadership to loosen crackdowns in election 
years. According to an FiA leader: “When there are strong crackdowns on illegal 
fishing, there are also ‘reactions’ and ‘interventions’ from other concerned actors, 
for example, the commune or district levels and even the working groups to relax 
the crackdowns.”70 A division leader added: “They [CCs] sometimes do not 
cooperate and ask FiA sangkats and division not to crackdown too often as that 
may affect their political activities and popularity. In an election year, commune 
and district officials usually ask the FiA sangkats and cantonment not to carry 
frequent crackdowns.”71 The former district officer gave a similar account: “There 
are also cases in which the crackdown team is asked to reduce the crackdowns 
before a national/commune council election by the local authority.”72 Though some 
CFCs do not report such incidences, a CFC head in Province B concurred that this 
happens in his CFi, adding: “[T]here was an order from the commune authority to 
the CFCs for not conducting frequent crackdowns during the election year.”73 
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3. Business Co-optation 
Another potential group to be co-opted for the wealth they hold and hence power 
they have is businesses. That the fall of the Sangkum was partly attributed to them 
attests to their power, as Milton Osborne argued in late 1969 ‘the urban elites were 
no longer prepared to accept the existing situation. The decline in the economy had 
finally reached a point where palliatives could no longer stand in the place of root 
and branch cures.”74 Surveys and voter turnout rates suggest that Cambodians are 
still interested in elections.75 Businesspeople therefore are needed to fund political 
campaigns and other activities. Theng Bunma admitted that he had given millions 
of dollars to fund CPP’s political campaigns.76 Likewise, other heavy-weight 
businesspeople ‘are directly linked to the ruling party and the government…[and 
many] have monopolies over critical economic sectors such as the importation of 
medicines, extraction of natural resources, and management of national heritage 
and tourist sites.’ Many provincial businesspeople are also linked to the ruling 
party and government through appointments to positions of advisors to senior party 
leaders. A report thus underscored that ‘big money’ corruption is ‘widespread’ 
partly because money is needed ‘to support systems of political patronage and 
influence.”77 
As Pak and Craig argue above, Cambodian politics has moved from elite to mass 
patronage in which winning an election via material goods provision and 
‘development’ projects is more prominent. Thus, big business elites sit in the 
PWGs and contribute significantly to their coffers. They are usually well- and 
extensively-connected, even to the top and hence are influential.78 
While these elites argue that their contribution is for humanitarian purposes and 
local development, there are counter-arguments that such is done with business 
interests in mind – that is, there is a benefit to associate oneself with a government 
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position or to high ranking state officials. Un, Hughes, Calavan and others argued: 
“[P]atronage systems have also extended themselves to cover business’ activities to 
exploit the privatization of state resources. Many rich businessmen try to build 
connections with people in the government, providing financial supports in 
exchange for favourable treatment from the government.”79 Un furthered that these 
‘development donations’ enabled them to ‘tap government monopolies and buy 
influence and… [to] have access to state resources, protection, and a wide range of 
kickbacks.’ This patronage politics hence results in ‘a web that breeds corruption 
and breeches the rule of law.’80 
The link between ‘development donations’ and businesspeople having a stake in 
natural resource exploitation and its ineffective management is also clear. A WB 
evaluation report complained: “Forestry concessions were granted to the military 
and others based on regional party affiliations. Revenue from log exports, which 
enriches political and military leaders and funds partisan political activity, did not 
flow through the budget.”81 Evidence from the sub-sectors paints quite a similar 
picture. Mak, Piseth Vann and Sokkhoeun Te contend that the granting of research 
lots with little transparency has caused the ‘loss of government revenue, leaving it 
open to corruption, including diversion of government revenue to the accounts of 
political parties.’82 A CPP veteran in his request on behalf of potential 
concessionaires stated: “…In order to contribute more energetically to [my] 
constituency in the upcoming elections, I have cooperated with businesspeople in 
Kampong Cham, Kandal and Prey Veng to find budgets to support the 2003 
elections.”83 Other party members likewise intervene on behalf of their clients into 
DoF’s affairs to seek fund for electoral activities.84 In 2000, there was a great 
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momentum to abolish research lots and convert them to auction lots; however, 
‘before the elections in 2002, the lots were again reversed to the research lots with 
an extension of leasing from four to six years.”85 A review of concessionaire lists 
reveals that a PWG member who is an advisor to a prominent politician held more 
than a dozen of lots. Hence, a concessionaire’s allegation that some lots ‘do not 
serve the state and are usually personal or party lots” holds merit.86 
4. Socio-Economic Development 
Cambodia is far from a predatory state – one adopting neither competition nor mass 
redistribution, intentionally weakening state agencies’ capacity and ‘plunder[ing] 
without any more regard for the welfare of the citizenry.”87 However, it is far from 
a developmental state. Over the last two decades, it has transformed from a more 
fusion to an intermediate clientelistic state, to adopt terminology from Grzymala-
Busse and Evans. Yet instead of strengthening the state apparatus per se to deliver 
public services, dominant parties are more inclined to strengthen the parties’ 
working groups and co-opt state agents to work for the parties’ benefits and to 
deliver public services. In this sense, Grzymala-Busse rightly judged: “State seizure 
does not simply corrode the state.”88 Intermediate clientelistic states in particular 
are more likely to experience dominant parties building party and to a lesser extent 
state structures to re-distribute wealth to the mass. In Cambodia, with quite a large 
purse and conducive state and party organizational structures from central to group 
levels, the CPP mounts its campaign of mass rent-redistribution to attain socio-
economic development via the PWGs. Though this shadowy arrangement has 
disadvantages as discussed above, it has contributed to socio-economic 
development, especially in rural areas. A need for electoral victory/legitimacy has 
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also pushed it to adopt other reforms that make resource distribution more equitable 
or brought about better governance. 
Rent redistribution is not confined to current politics in Cambodia. Though 
Angkorean rulers gained legitimacy from their royalty and genealogical linkages, 
territorial expansion and warfare skills, another source of legitimacy was the 
capacity to sustain their subjects’ welfare. Such great kings as Yashovarman I, 
Suryavarman I and Jayavarman VII sponsored many public projects, including 
irrigation works, hospitals, bridges and roads.89 
The CPP’s concern for the rural dwellers’ welfare dates probably to 1982 when 
Hun Sen was a deputy PM. During the PRK, even PMs and deputy PMs were 
allocated to supervise work of a few provinces each, and Hun Sen was ‘taking his 
new provincial duties seriously.” A meeting minute cited him as saying: “I propose 
that comrade prime minister and the deputy prime ministers…visit, examine, and 
follow the situation in the provinces, in accordance with this work system, we visit 
the provinces two months out of the year.”90 He and his entourage frequented rural 
Cambodia to assist farmers with rice planting or harvest, and the like.91 With the 
lack of traditional and waning charismatic legitimacy based on aggrandizing the 
‘liberation’ and ‘political stability,’ the CPP’s best bet is electoral legitimacy 
through economic performance, above all the enhancement of rural wellbeing. 
Since 1993, it has showered Cambodia with ‘development projects,’ including 
school buildings, pagodas, bridges and roads, and this has gathered pace since 
1998. Hun Sen has been an outstanding figure in this. As of 1998, 1,753 school 
buildings, 65 bridges, 23 water pumps, 178 water canals and 103 laterite roads 
were built across Cambodia by him or in his name. As of early 2010, the school 
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buildings bearing his name reached 3,458 and water pumps/stations 53.92 Though 
data for other amenities are unavailable, media coverage indicates that their 
numbers have increased substantially. 
Besides, public infrastructure built by or in the name of other public figures 
personally and via the PWGs is considerable. Although there has been no over-
arching study on this, Pak and Craig’s case study research in three districts shows 
that PWGs’ investment on these amenities is substantial. In Case One, $1,050,000 
was spent to build public infrastructure during 2003-07. In the second, 75 
classrooms, 14 roads, 6 bridges, 75 pipes, 3 dams, 5 canals, 11 ponds, 1 pumping 
station and 222 wells were constructed in the CPP’s name over the same period. 
There was significant contribution to the third district too.93 Because the PWGs are 
a countrywide system, their contribution to infrastructure building thus is sizeable. 
There has been no systematic study on the impact of these projects on socio-
economic development and poverty reduction either; however, given their public 
nature and low discriminatory attitudes towards opponents, it has certainly 
contributed to poverty reduction from 46% to 30% over the last two decades, local 
economic development and achieving CMDGs.94 For example, rural roads and 
bridges link up rural to urban areas and ease the transport of goods and people to 
urban markets, and canals and pumping stations can improve agricultural activities 
and outputs. Even some harsh critics of the CPP partly attribute the improvement in 
human development indicators and remarkable poverty reduction to the 
‘investment in infrastructure, as a result of mass patronage by the CPP government 
and investment via initiatives” of ASEAN and ADB.95 
The quest for electoral legitimacy, especially via the commune elections, has also 
given the CPP opportunities to weed out ‘the most unpopular of the old guard and 
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left behind a more reform-oriented cadre.”96 Since the first commune elections, it 
has grasped the opportunity to arrange internal party voting for grassroots activists 
of popular candidates to stand for the elections – a practice it still adopted for the 
third elections in June 2012. To boost its chance to win and maintain its rule via 
some semblance of democracy, the party requires a strong institutional structure to 
the very grassroots and peripheral level; consequently it is genuinely committed to 
maintaining an acceptable degree of good local governance. 
Specifically for the sub-sectors, the two rounds of lot release were done 
immediately before the elections and can be argued as CPP’s tactics to win 
elections. So was the medium-scale fishing fee abolition. In offering the options as 
to whether the fee should be kept, a CPP secretary of state offered three options: 
Option 1: Request the issuance of a sub-decree to eliminate fees on all medium-scale 
gears not only to help fishers but to stop opportunists from taking this opportunity to 
demand money from them. Moreover, we can gain tremendous political leverage…. 
Options 2 and 3 [fees on selected gears] are quite similar in meaning; however, the 
revenue from them is not much, while opportunists can take this opportunity to demand 
money from fishers, which can tarnish our political benefits.97 
These options were weighed both on their possibility to alleviate poverty and 
refrain ‘opportunists’ from demanding money, and on the political benefits (before 
the elections in 2002 and 2003). Option one was finally selected by the PM. It can 
thus be safe to assume that the release too was done with political benefits in mind. 
Moreover, the PWG mechanism has allowed CPP-member-cum-FiA officials and 
wealthy concessionaires to return some benefits they have gained from clean and/or 
corrupt practices to the populace. As seen in media coverage, FiA-based PWGs are 
as active as others in contributing to the development of localities they are 
responsible for. Some PWGs help villagers dig family ponds for aquaculture to 
reduce pressure from fishing in natural water body, for example. Further, the 
mechanism gives rich concessionaires a chance to return some of the excessive 
benefits from fishing to local communities, however meager that may be. Some 
concessionaires who belong to the PWGs, for instance, build local infrastructure, 
often in the names of prominent figures. There are also cases in which 
commune/district council members, provincial governors or their deputies or even 
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et al., "Local Leaders and Big Business in Three Communes."  
97 Tong Iv Chan, "Regarding Taxes on Medium Scale Fishing Gears or Fees for Freshwater Fishing 
Domain," (18 February, 2001). Researcher’s emphasis. 
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parliamentarians (at least one) who support selected CFCs or their applications to 
make money from their CF areas.98 This has opened up opportunities for CFCs to 
make some revenues to self-finance and contribute to local development. 
To conclude, at best the impact of the quest for political legitimacy in the context 
of a dominant ruling party, and weak coalition partners, opposition, state agencies 
and civil society on state capacity and its institutional building are mixed, though 
negative impacts probably outweigh the positive. In this context, the state agencies 
are not detached from the dominant ruling parti(es), but instead patronage politics 
is further entrenched. The operation of the politicized state agencies with weak 
checks and balances is mostly ineffectual. Specifically, the quest for legitimacy has 
seen more injection and maintenance of un/under-qualified civil servants in the 
state apparatus. Injections of resources from party members into the PWGs and 
substantial release of natural resources to rural communities have contributed to 
poverty reduction, socio-economic and rural development and redistributive justice. 
Yet critics argue against the pork-barrel nature of the financing and resource 
management, while the release was done without a master plan and in a reactive 
manner. Moreover, little effort was made to enhance state agencies, including FiA, 
institutional capability and state capacity. 
                                                          
98 See for example, Yeap  Cheam, "To His Excellency Chan Sarun, the Minister for Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries," (19 July, 2007); ———, "To His Excellency Chan Sarun, the Minister for 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries," (20 July, 2009).  
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Chapter 11: Development Partners and State Capacity 
This chapter presents a review of Development Partners’ contributions to 
Cambodian state and institutional capacity building over the last two decades. It 
also discusses the impacts of insufficient coordination/cooperation between DPs 
and between DPs and Cambodia have on state capacity and institutional capacity 
building. 
Financial dependence on external actors is not new to the modern state of 
Cambodia. Since its inception in 1953, each regime, to a variable extent, depends 
on external financial support to stay intact. Sihanouk’s governments, for example, 
were dependent on funding from France, China, the United States and Soviet 
Union; the Khmer Republic from the United States. Different factions in the 
Cambodian conflicts in the 1980’s relied on different backers, with the Phnom 
Penh government receiving aid from the Eastern bloc and Vietnam and the rest 
mainly from China, the United States and a few ASEAN countries. After the Peace 
Agreement since 1991, Cambodia has received aid from more diverse international 
actors. According to the Cambodia Rehabilitation and Development Board of the 
Council for Development of Cambodia (CDC/CRDB), between 1992 and 2011, 
more than $12 billion was disbursed, and as seen in the graph, the disbursement has 
been increasing over the years.1 
Figure 4: Aid Disbursement to Cambodia2 
 
                                                          
1 There was a significant drop in 1997 as donors cut or froze the assistance due to the July factional 
fighting. Aid in this study refers to both grant aid and loans. Majority of aid to Cambodia comes in 
the form of grant aid; however, over the decades the share of loans has been increasing 
significantly. 
2 Data source: Cambodia's Development Council, "The Cambodia Aid Effectiveness Report 2007," 
(Phnom Penh: Cambodia's Development Council, May 2007), 11-16; ———, "The Cambodia Aid 
Effectiveness Report 2010," (Phnom Penh: Cambodia's Development Council, May 2010), 7 and 
19; ———, "The Cambodia Development Effectiveness Report 2011," (Phnom Penh: Cambodia's 
Development Council, November 2011), 13 and 19; ———, "The Cambodia Aid Effectiveness 
Report 2008," (Phnom Penh: Cambodia's Development Council, November 2008), 1, 8 and 16; 
Chanboreth Ek and Hach Sok, "Aid Effectiveness in Cambodia," (USA: Wolfensohn Center for 
Development, December 2008), 12; Godfrey et al., Technical Assistance and Capacity Building in 
an Aid-Dependent Economy: The Experience of Cambodia: 16.   
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The effects from this assistance to Cambodian state capacity and institutional 
capacity building have been ambivalent and double-edged. Aid has improved state 
capacity to provide basic services, to reduce poverty and usher in rural 
development,3 to collect more revenues, to prepare bills, to plan and better execute 
the plans/strategies, to link the state and the private sector and rural communities, 
etc. Moreover, certain donors have pressured the state to adopt harsher reform 
measures and assisted with capacity building of state agents and agencies and 
institutionalization.4 Specifically to the sub-sectors, various donors have assisted to 
build the capacity of DoF/FiA, local authorities and communities. Danida, for 
example, has improved FiA staff’s capacity in research and data quality and 
supported the working of the TWGF and drafting of the SPF. Since the late 1990’s, 
more resources from donors have been allotted to strengthen local authorities’ 
capacity to assist with managing natural resources and to establish CFCs and to 
build their capacity.5 The WB correctly notes that Cambodia has ‘a very active and 
committed donor...community,’6 while the PM thanks DPs7 for their contribution to 
Cambodia’s ‘remarkable achievements.’8 
However, there are numerous shortcomings from reliance on external support. 
First, that donors have more power to fund activities and programs of their choices9 
can undercut the positive impacts on state capacity and institutional capacity 
building. Second, weak coordination/cooperation between donors and between 
donors and state agencies has a similar impact. Third, many donors have dodged 
the use of state systems – where they exist – and relied heavily on foreign experts 
                                                          
3 Cf. Asian Development Bank, "Cambodia: Overview of NGOs," 5; Cambodia New Vision, "First 
Cambodia Development Cooperaiton Forum Meeting," Cambodia New Vision June 2007, 2.  
4 Cf. ———, "Opening Speech to the Cambodia Consultative Group Meeting Tokyo, Japan 25-26 
February 1999," Cambodia New Vision Febuary 1999, 1. According to a former fisheries official, 
for example, there are occasions that state agencies work cooperatively when there is donors’ 
pressure for such a thing. Informant 7.  
5 See for example, Department of Fisheries, "Discussion Document on Adopting Programmatic 
Support for the Fisheries Sector," 2-3; Koroma, "Local Reforms of Community Forest and Fisheries 
Management," 304-05; Nao and van Zalinge, "Challenges in Managing Cambodia’s Inland 
Fisheries: How Can We Meet Them?," 13-14.  
6 World Bank, Country Assistance Strategy of the World Bank Group for the Kingdom of 
Cambodia: 16.  
7 Development partners and donors are used interchangeably here. 
8 Cambodia New Vision, "Address to the Launching of the New Building and the 50th Anniversary 
of the Customs and Excise Department," 1.  
9 Royal Government of Cambodia, National Strategic Development Plan 2006-2010: ii. According 




to plan and implement their projects or programs; such a practice certainly 
undermines the build-up of state institutional capacity in the long-run.10 
External support to Cambodia since 1992 can be divided into three phases.11 The 
first between 1992 and 1999 is a decade of ‘total’ donor-ship, characterized by 
donors controlling how their money was spent and usually choosing to spend it 
themselves, a focus on rehabilitation and reconstruction, especially of basic 
physical and social infrastructure, piecemeal capacity building of state agents and 
agencies, weak state agencies and agents, weak aid coordination agencies (CDC as 
the RGC’s aid coordination focal point) and heavy bypassing of state agencies and 
use of international consultants.12 The second phase between 1999 and 2004 saw 
more effort to coordinate aid and cooperate between donors and between donors 
and RGC via the establishment of five donor working groups in 1999 and 
corresponding government reform councils, introduction of sector-wide approaches 
(SWAps) in such key sectors as education, health and D&D, and a shift to focus on 
traditional investment projects.13 Though there was some improvement in aid 
coordination and cooperation, they were still very weak. The 
coordination/cooperation meetings were ad hoc and donor-dominant;14 the use of 
the state systems was minimal and assistance was still very much project-based. 
This period also saw increasing assistance from non-traditional bilateral donors 
such as China and Korea. 
                                                          
10 The reliance on aid money has, as Englehart argues, impeded the state from developing a ‘strong 
state apparatus’ and negatively impacted the state’s revenue collection capacity. Englehart, "State 
Capacity, State Failure, and Human Rights," 168. The dwarf of revenue collected over the last 
decade and weak revenue-collecting agencies in Cambodia are probably a good case in point. 
11 This excludes the intervention period by UNTAC, which can constitute a phase in itself.  Over the 
decades the Cambodian state has claimed more leadership over aid management and proven more 
capable to manage aid coordination, while donors have also relented their control over their aid 
money. This is nominally reflected in the change of chairpersonship from total donors’ domination, 
to co-chairmanship and finally under Cambodia’s leadership and the change of venue for high level 
talks from overseas to Cambodia. 
12 See for example,  Asian Development Bank, Developing the Capacity for Reconstruction and 
Development: 12-17; Kato et al., Cambodia: Enhancing Governance for Sustainable Development: 
25-26; World Bank, Country Assistance Strategy of the World Bank Group for the Kingdom of 
Cambodia: 12-13. CDC was established in 1994. 
13 See for example, Asian Development Bank, Country Assistance Program Evaluation for 
Cambodia: 47; Cambodia's Development Council, "Building Partnerships for Development: An 
Update," (Phnom Penh: Cambodia's Development Council, 2004), 13; ———, "Cambodia’s Report 
on Progress toward Enhanced Aid Effectiveness," 8; Ek and Sok, "Aid Effectiveness in Cambodia," 
30; World Bank, Country Assistance Strategy of the World Bank Group for the Kingdom of 
Cambodia: 16-17.  
14 Asian Development Bank, Country Assistance Program Evaluation for Cambodia: 47-56; 
Cambodia's Development Council, "Cambodia’s Report on Progress toward Enhanced Aid 
Effectiveness," 8.  
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The third phase from 2004 to the present sees more effort to coordinate and 
cooperate between donors and between donors and Cambodia. In 2004 the six ad 
hoc working groups were transformed to seventeen thematic/sector Joint 
Government-Donor Technical Working Groups (TWGs); the ad hoc donor-
government joint stocktaking meetings were transformed to the Government Donor 
Coordinating Committee (GDCC), to which the TWGs report. This year witnessed 
twelve major donors signing a non-binding declaration to harmonize and align their 
assistance with a single forthcoming NSDP and joint country strategy development 
by the ADB, WB and DFID (British Department for International Development).15 
More aid agencies began to buy in to coordination/cooperation from strategy 
preparation to project/program evaluation and a wider application of SWAps.16 The 
use of country systems has been increasing, albeit still limited, and there has been 
increasing numbers of sector/thematic strategies. 
1. Donors’ Support and State Capacity  
As discussed earlier, the quest for international support from major multi-lateral 
and some bilateral donors has seen many developing countries under pressure to 
reforms. With limited budgets and numerous issues and demand groups to deal 
with, some ‘external sovereignty’ has to be sacrificed in exchange for access to 
resources and assistance.17 Such conditionality influences the domestic discourses 
on the norms of legitimation, affects the power resources of domestic contestants 
and leads to establishment of ‘formal’ political, economic and social institutions, 
etc.18 Due to years of isolation, Cambodian rulers require international legitimacy – 
particularly in the 1990’s. Donors thus use aid as a carrot or a stick to push for 
critical reforms.19 
                                                          
15 This is followed by a 2006 Cambodia Declaration in which 16 donors agreed to harmonize and 
align their assistance. 
16 See for example, Asian Development Bank, Country Strategy and Program 2005-2009: Kingdom 
of Cambodia: 12; World Bank, Country Assistance Strategy for the Kindgom of Cambodia: 94-95.  
17 Cf. Becker and Goldstone, "How Fast Can You Build a State? State Building in Revolutions," 
201; Dauvergne, "Weak States, Strong States: A State-in-Society Perspective," 3-4; Deng et al., 
Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa: 27 and 125; Jackson, "The State and 
Internal Conflict," 72; Leftwich, "Theorizing the State," 223-24.  
18 Cf. Alagappa, Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority, 48-49; 
Grzymala-Busse and Luong, "Reconceptualizing the State: Lessons from Post-Communism," 531-
37.  
19 Cf. Peou, "Cambodia after the Killing Fields," 61-62; Un, "Patronage Politics and Hybrid 
Democracy: Political Change in Cambodia, 1993-2003," 211. For some reforms demanded by the 
ADB, World Bank or IMF, see for example, World Bank, Country Assistance Strategy of the World 
Bank Group for the Kingdom of Cambodia: 12-13; ———, Country Assistance Strategy of the 
World Bank Group for the Kingdom of Cambodia: 12-21; ———, Country Assistance Strategy of 
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The (conditional) financial support has contributed to enhancing state capacities 
and building state agencies’ and agents’ capacity. Overall, they have improved 
governance, including better participation from civil society groups in the 
management of certain resources, contributed to economic growth, and brought 
about democratization (at least procedural), decentralization and de-concentration, 
including devolution of limited authority to local authorities and communities. 
Conditional support results in the state carrying out some harsh reform measures 
which improve its capacities. For example, the first few IMF’s Enhanced Structural 
Adjustment Facility arrangements contributed to civil service and military reforms, 
including reduction of (ghost) civil servants and military personnel, amongst others 
in exchange for loan disbursement (penetration).20 Donors also demand for and/or 
assist with better revenue collection, for example, conditioning assistance on better 
management of logging concessions and value-added-tax introduction (extraction), 
preparation of policies and laws (legislation and policy production), better 
regulation of the economy, including natural resources and establishment and 
strengthening of regulatory agencies (regulation), more spending on priority sectors 
(appropriation), and provision of assistance and facilitation to private businesses 
and establishment and running of local communities (midwifery).21 In summary, 
the external assistance and conditionality have contributed to some improvement in 
state capacity. 
Many donors have contributed to building capacity of state agents and agencies via 
provision of stand-alone technical assistance (TA) and/or investment-related 
capacity building projects. A survey by Siddiqui and others, for example, found 
that in 2002 89.5% and 80.3% of multilateral and bilateral projects, respectively, 
provided capacity building training, usually through short courses, workshops and 
seminars to Cambodian counterparts. Agriculture, forestry and fisheries were one 
of the five sectors that received most of the training, valuing at $3.1 million.22 An 
evaluation study by CDC/CRDB on assistance to four sectors, including local 
                                                                                                                                                                 
the World Bank Group for the Kingdom of Cambodia: Annex 9; ———, Country Assistance 
Strategy for the Kindgom of Cambodia: 41.  
20 Cf. Kato et al., Cambodia: Enhancing Governance for Sustainable Development: 60-61. For the 
Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility Framework Paper for 1999-2002, see International 
Monetary Fund,  http://www.imf.org/external/np/pfp/1999/cambodia/#III. 
21 Cf. Asian Development Bank, Country Assistance Plan 2000-2002: Cambodia: 16; ———, 
Country Assistance Program Evaluation for Cambodia: 64; ———, Country Strategy and Program 
Midterm Review 2005-2009  (Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2007). 3; World Bank, Country 
Assistance Strategy of the World Bank Group for the Kingdom of Cambodia: 12; ———, Country 
Assistance Strategy Progress Report for the Kingdom of Cambodia for the Period FY05-08: 3.  
22 Siddiqui, Srickler, and Vinde, "Capacity Building Practices of Cambodia’s Development 
Partners: Results of a Survey," 28.  
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governance and financial management, shows that ‘there are some clear indications 
that individual capacity has been enhanced in all the cases studied.’23 Eva 
Mysliwiec, a prominent aid worker in Cambodia since the 1980’s, concurs that 
there is ‘[i]ncreasing capability on the Cambodian side as a result of technical 
assistance, and [that] the many opportunities for study and training have 
contributed to strengthening and expanding Cambodia’s human resource base.”24 
Table 28: Capacity Building Activities by Selected DPs in 200225 
Capacity Building 
Activity 
Number and Percent of Donor Projects Providing Capacity 
Building Activities 
Multilateral Bilateral NGOs Total 































































Total number of projects 
or NGOs 
86 100 61 100 77 100 224 100 
(NB: In brackets, numbers of national staff employed.) 
The Seila program has certainly built the capacity of local councilors and clerks, 
improved the councils’ capacity in planning for local development, opened up 
dialogues between councilors and their constituents or representatives and provided 
the former with funding for local projects.26 Likewise, there is an overall agreement 
that the support from the ‘international community’ has contributed to capacity 
development, including research capacity, of FiA and its officers.27 One self-
assessment report covering the period 1995-2008 by the ADB rates positively its 
contribution to the development of the agriculture sector, pointing to amongst 
others the following outputs: ‘passage of fundamental legislation,’ ‘preparation and 
adoption of policies and medium-to-long-term strategies,’ ‘establishment of an 
institutional and administrative structure for the development and environmental 
protection of the Tonle Sap Basin’ and ‘demarcation of community fisheries areas 
                                                          
23 Government-Donor Partnership Working Group, "Practices and Lessons Learned in the 
Management of Development Cooperation: Case Studies in Cambodia," 17-18.  
24 Eva Mysliwiec, Envisioning a New Paradigm of Development Cooperation in Cambodia  (Phnom 
Penh: Cambodia Development Research Institute, 2004). 16.  
25 Data source: Siddiqui, Srickler, and Vinde, "Capacity Building Practices of Cambodia’s 
Development Partners: Results of a Survey," 16 and 49.  
26 Cf. Hughes, "The Seila Program in Cambodia," 91-114.  
27 Nao and Ly, "Review of the Fisheries and Aquaculture Sector in Cambodia," 27-28. An NGO 
program manager concurs with Nao & Ly, raising that ‘after the reforms [in 2001], there have been 
effort by donors and NGOs to strengthen the capacity of the government institutions.’ Informant 13.  
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and the formation of community fisheries organizations around Tonle Sap Great 
Lake.’28 It added: 
Personnel at the national and provincial levels in MAFF, MOI, MOWRAM, MRD, and 
the Ministry of the Environment have received both formal and on-the-job training 
from their exposure to ADB activities… In addition, projects and TA under the TSI 
[Tonle Sap Initiative] (in particular) have been instrumental in building capacity 
among government personnel at the commune council level and beneficiary groups… 
Sector investments and TA have also provided support to agriculture and fisheries 
research and extension, a national water strategy, and the establishment of the Tonle 
Sap Basin Authority.29 
Relevant stakeholders interviewed agree that DPs’ projects have increased the FiA 
capacity and its capacity to assist communities. A fisheries officer participating in 
various donor-sponsored projects agrees that his capacity in research and 
community facilitation, amongst others, has improved. Referring to the ADB-
sponsored project, he added: “after TSEMP, a large number of fisheries officers are 
more capable in research methodology and conduct of research, conservation and 
facilitation skills, for instance.”30 Two more officers added: “TSEMP has trained 
the officials to a large extent. For instance, before the training, some officials did 
not even know what a community was.”31 Donor representatives, NGO workers 
and local beneficiaries agree that external assistance has built up the capacity of 
FiA and its officers.32 As discussed in Chapter 5, TSEMP enabled cantonment 
officials to assist selected CFCs with capacity building, preparation of necessary 
legal requirements, provision of necessary equipment, institutional setup, etc., 
while TSSLP, building up on this project, enabled CCs to assist smaller number of 
CFCs through establishment of some localized livelihood programs. As discussed 
in Chapter 9, Danida, starting from 2009, has experimented with de-concentration 
in planning and execution within FiA. 
Despite the positive contribution to enhancing state capacity and capacity building, 
conditionality by and assistance from external actors do not always yield positive 
or utmost results. Fukuyama argues that hanging onto a certain structure of political 
power is often a life-and-death issue for leaders in poor countries.33 In the case of 
Cambodia as the WB attests, reforms in forestry, demobilization and economic 
management faced particular problems, including a breach of fiduciary duties in 
                                                          
28 Asian Development Bank, Agriculture and Rural Development Sector in Cambodia: 12-13. For 
the outcomes, see ibid., 15.  
29 Ibid., 30-31.  
30 Informant 65.  
31 Informant 80; Informant 81.  
32 For example, Informant 3; Informant 10; Informant 12; Informant 23.  
33 Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century.  
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some Bank-funded projects because the RGC responded too slowly to the reforms 
or ‘because the incentives for resisting reform were extremely strong.’34 There are 
cases where reform measures stall or particular activities cease to function once aid 
for a particular project dries up or when donors turn their emphases to other 
(sub)sectors (for example, the case of forestry reform35 and assistance to CFCs). In 
addition, the private sector has criticized donors’ strong emphasis on legislation 
and policy production with little regard for their implementation.36 Van Acker 
underlines the establishment of formal organizations conforming to donor demands 
‘without changing the underlying institutional relations.’37 Some reform measures 
even backfire. Fukuyama notes that in African countries due to the strength of neo-
patrimonialism, some structural adjustment measures did not reduce unnecessary 
state scope, such as reducing spending on D&S, but rather its strength, such as 
scaling back on education and health care.38 This was what Cambodia experienced 
in the 1990’s though the main motive was the need to fight the Khmer Rouge 
insurgencies and inter-party power struggle.39 Besides, poor 
coordination/cooperation and donor-ship have undermined the positive impacts on 
state capacity and capacity building. 
The rise of non-traditional lenders, together with the global agenda on aid 
effectiveness, has given the Cambodian state more elbow room to be more 
assertive in demand for ownership, adjustment of assistance approaches and mutual 
accountability from donors.40 China is particularly singled out for being ‘easy to 
communicate with’ and ‘talk[ing] less but do[ing] more.’41 However, on the flip 
side of such unconditional assistance is the ability of the ‘ruling elites’ ‘to navigate 
and deflect pressures from’ necessary reforms on such issues as human right abuses 
                                                          
34 World Bank, Country Assistance Strategy for the Kindgom of Cambodia: 17; ———, Country 
Assistance Strategy Progress Report for the Kingdom of Cambodia for the Period FY05-08: 7-16.  
35 See for example, Ear, "The Political Economy of Aid and Regime Legitimacy in Cambodia."  
36 As cited in Kato et al., Cambodia: Enhancing Governance for Sustainable Development: 95.  
37 van Acker, Cambodia's Commons: Changing Governance, Shifting Entitlements?: 42.  
38 Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century: 15-17.  
39 See for example, Asian Development Bank, Country Assistance Program Evaluation for 
Cambodia: 63. The demand for the cap on civil servant number also decreases the state’s absorptive 
capacity. Heavy reliance on external support as Hughes argues might also disrupt the relationship 
building between state-society in the long-term, including an indigenous demands for accountability 
from state agencies by its citizens, weakening of extraction capacity (as funding is more or less 
available), etc. Hughes, The Political Economy of Cambodia's Transition, 1991-2001: 113.  
40 Cf. Chan et al., "Cambodia Evaluation of Aid Effectiveness," 16.  
41 See for example, Cambodia New Vision, "Building Sihanoukville’s Special Economic Zone," 
Cambodia New Vision Febuary 2008, 2; ———, "The Fifth Asia Economic Forum — Selected 
Comments," Cambodia new vision April 2009, 6; ———, "Inaugurating Cambodia China 
Friendship Bridge Prek Kadam," Cambodia New Vision May 2010, 2; ———, "Visiting New 
Bridge Prek Kadam, Connecting Last Segment," Cambodia New Vision September 2009, 3 and 5.  
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and impunity, grand and systematic corruption, substantial democratization and 
other sensitive issues that may cut deep into the patronage networks.42 
Figure 5: Disbursement from China and South Korea43 
 
(NB: In million dollars) 
2. Insufficient DP-DP and DP-RGC Cooperation and Coordination 
To maximize the benefits from the external assistance to strengthen state capacity 
and capacity building requires donors’ coordination/cooperation with each other 
and with Cambodia. In Cambodia where a majority of projects are small and hence 
assistance is highly fragmented, coordination/cooperation is of paramount 
importance. Yet over the two decades, coordination and cooperation between and 
amongst these two sets of actors have been weak, albeit improving. 
High fragmentation is reflected in the number of on-going projects. In 1997, twenty 
DPs supported 257 projects; in 2005 there were only 22 DPs, but the project 
number increased to 532. A majority of the projects are small in value. In 2007, 
622 out of 759 active projects totaling $142 million valued each less than $1 
million, averaging $229,000.44 Another indication is the Hirschmann-Herfindahl 
Index (HHI). The average HHI for Cambodia during 1996-2005 was 0.08, putting 
                                                          
42 Cf. Cock, "External Actors and the Relative Autonomy of the Ruling Elite in Post-UNTAC 
Cambodia," 259-61; Ek and Sok, "Aid Effectiveness in Cambodia," 14; Thayer, "Cambodia: The 
Cambodian People's Party Consolidates Power," 97.  
43 Cambodia's Development Council, "The Cambodia Aid Effectiveness Report 2010," 37; ———, 
"The Cambodia Development Effectiveness Report 2011," 15; ———, "The Cambodia Aid 
Effectiveness Report 2008," 9-10 and 35.  
44 ———, "The Cambodia Aid Effectiveness Report 2008," 19-20. According to Chanboreth Ek 
and Sok in 2006, 10 out of 39 bilateral donors provided a combined ODA of less than $1 million, 
while other 22 bi- and multi-lateral donors provided only $5 million combined. Ek and Sok, "Aid 






















































it in the highly fragmented aid recipient category, well below 0.3 for all developing 
countries and 0.22 for Sub-Saharan Africa.45 An analysis of sectoral HHI in 2006 
confirms that aid to many sectors/thematic areas, including agriculture and 
governance, was highly fragmented.46 “Aid that is donor driven and fragmented is 
less effective,” to cite an Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) report. It increases transaction costs to the recipient country, 
reduces the value for money, risks duplication of efforts and inefficient aid 
allocation, negatively impacts economy of scales, challenges aid coordination and 
sucks out local capacity.47 
Table 29: The Cost of Managing Development Assistance48 
 1997 2005 
ODA Receipts (million dollars) 383 617.9 
Number of DPs 20 22 
Share of ODA (5 largest donors) 52% 57% 
Number of active projects 257 532 
Aid coordination/cooperation in Cambodia can be divided into three phases. First, 
the period between 1992 and 1999 is labeled as ‘a decade of donor-ship’ or 
‘development anarchy’ with little coordination/cooperation between donors and 
between donors and the state. An early observer of the ‘aid market’ criticized: 
Donors were equally if not more to blame for the lack of effective coordination. As a 
whole, donors showed a marked lack of interest in either coordination or being 
coordinated…While the Royal Government could be criticized for not having 
established a coherent policy and coordination framework for specific sectors or 
activities, donors made only limited efforts to avoid duplication of effort, much less the 
elaboration of competing or contradictory programmes and activities. Although 
considerable attention was given to the form of coordination through sectoral and other 
coordination meetings, there was less attention to the substance of coordination, or 
what might be termed donor ‘discipline’.49 
                                                          
45 Note: HHI < 0.1 means high fragmentation/low concentration; HHI between 0.1-0.18, moderate 
fragmentation and HHI > 0.18, low fragmentation/high concentration. In 2006, the HHI for 
Cambodia was 0.087, dropping from 0.093 in 2002. ———, "Aid Effectiveness in Cambodia," 3 
and 20-21.  
46 Cambodia's Development Council, "The Cambodia Aid Effectiveness Report 2007," 6. Such an 
analysis still resonated in 2008. See ———, "The Cambodia Aid Effectiveness Report 2008," 19. 
Even the ADB bemoans the fragmentation of the assistance to Cambodia and its impacts. See Asian 
Development Bank, Country Strategy and Program 2005-2009: Kingdom of Cambodia: 12.  
47 Organization for Economic and Cooperation and Development, Aid Effectiveness 2005-10: 
Progress in Implementing the Paris Declaration, vol. 2 (Organization for Economic and 
Cooperation and Development, 2011). 4 and 13-14; Ek and Sok, "Aid Effectiveness in Cambodia," 
21-23 and 39.  
48 Data source: Adopted from CDC DCR 1997 & CDC Database as cited in Cambodia's 
Development Council, "The Cambodia Aid Effectiveness Report 2007," 6.  
49 Curtis, "Beyond Transition: Cambodia in the Post-UNTAC Period," Chapter 4, 4.  He adds that 
the provision of technical assistance in this period was ‘uncoordinated in the extreme.’ ibid., 
Chapter 4, 18-19.   
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He further observed: “Some donors were very insensitive to the issues of 
Cambodian consultation and participation in the design and decision-making 
process and often hid behind the pretext of maintaining neutrality.’50 Even DPs 
themselves agree that aid coordination/cooperation amongst them and with the state 
was poor. In many reports, the ADB and WB raise the issue of weak 
coordination/cooperation between aid agencies and with the state. Aid 
coordination/cooperation at the sectoral level fared even poorer.51 Specifically for 
the sub-sectors, Gum laments that there was ‘insufficient donor, project and inter-
sectoral coordination.”52 
The period between 1999 and 2004 constituted a second phase witnessing more 
coordination/cooperation and learning to work together more closely at the 
sectoral/thematic level between donors and donors and state agencies. To illustrate, 
the ADB’s Agricultural Sector Program resulting in the Land Law was followed up 
by WB’s and the German Development Cooperation’s projects to implement the 
law and provide titles. Besides, it worked closely with UNDP and FAO in TSEMP 
preparation and implementation.53 In 1999, five donors working groups and 
government reform councils were established to discuss and monitor reform 
measures. Despite some improvement, aid agencies and the government still 
complained that aid coordination/cooperation was weak though the levels varied 
from stage to stage of a program cycle54 and (sub)sector to (sub)sector. As an 
illustration, in 2003, donors undertook some 400 missions, yet less than 10% were 
joint missions. According to the ADB, the working groups were ineffective in aid 
coordination/cooperation.55 CRDB/CDC was still quite young; moreover, there was 
                                                          
50 Curtis cited in Mysliwiec, Envisioning a New Paradigm of Development Cooperation in 
Cambodia: 11-12. His work is also discussed in Hughes, The Political Economy of Cambodia's 
Transition, 1991-2001: 98-100.  
51 See for example, Asian Development Bank, Developing the Capacity for Reconstruction and 
Development: 16-17; ———, Country Assistance Program Evaluation for Cambodia: 47; Kato et 
al., Cambodia: Enhancing Governance for Sustainable Development: 112; World Bank, Country 
Assistance Strategy of the World Bank Group for the Kingdom of Cambodia: 10; ———, 
Cambodia: Country Assistance Evaluation 1992-1999: 11 and 27.  
52 Gum, Inland Acquatic Resources and Livelihoods in Cambodia: A Guide to the Literature, 
Legislation, Institutional Framework and Recommendations v.  
53 Asian Development Bank, Agriculture and Rural Development Sector in Cambodia: 29.  
54 See for example, Asian Development Bank, Country Assistance Plan 2001-03: Cambodia: 14; —
——, Cambodia: Growth and Sector Reforms: 2; Government-Donor Partnership Working Group, 
"Practices and Lessons Learned in the Management of Development Cooperation: Case Studies in 
Cambodia," 11-14; Royal Government of Cambodia, "Socio-Economic Development Priorities and 
the Official Development Assistance Needs," (Phnom Penh: Royal Government of Cambodia, June 
2002), 99.  
55 Asian Development Bank, Cambodia: Growth and Sector Reforms: 6-7. OECD/DAC Task 
Team’s 2004 survey on donors’ practices in Cambodia as cited in Cambodia's Development 
Council, "Building Partnerships for Development: An Update," 9. 
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weak inter-agency coordination and procedural harmonization between CDC and 
other government agencies dealing with aid such as MEF and MoP.56 
The situation in the sub-sectors was similarly bleak during this period. The TWGF 
was just established in 2004 and before then “donors worked on their own; they did 
not discuss with the sector [DoF],”57 complained Informant 90, adding: “[B]etween 
1993 and 2005, it was totally stand-alone projects. Donor did not talk to one 
another; they did what they wanted. A large number of projects were duplicated, 
and some were not important to the sector…they did not care whether what they 
were doing responded to the achievement of the benchmarks or whatsoever.”58 
Given that approximately $6 billion was disbursed during these two phases, much 
was lost during this period. 
The third phase between 2004 and the present represents more effort to work 
together between donors and between donors and the state. In 2004, the six 
working groups59 were turned to seventeen TWGs, thereby DPs with solid strong 
record in a particular sector/thematic area have been clustered together to support 
it. Meanwhile, a localized Paris Declaration on Harmonization and Alignment60 
was adopted and followed in 2006 by a Cambodian Aid Effectiveness Declaration, 
to which 14 DPs were signatories and the Action Plan on Harmonization, 
Alignment and Results: 2006-2010. This year saw Cambodia adopted an 
overarching single development plan. This phase also witnessed increasing 
preparation and adoption of sectoral plans and SWAps to assistance. DPs were 
encouraged to align their assistance with these plans. Some donors have taken 
different approaches to coordination/cooperation. The ADB, WB and DFID, for 
example, for the first time jointly formulated their medium-term country strategies 
and each agreed to work in areas with comparative advantages, for example, on 
irrigation, land and forestry, and fisheries and rural livelihoods, respectively. The 
UN family members and EU member states have their own mechanisms for 
coordination/cooperation.61 Cox Marcus thus correctly underscores that DPs ‘are 
                                                          
56 Asian Development Bank, Country Strategy and Program Update: 7; ———, Country Strategy 
and Program Update 2004-2006: 6.  
57 Informant 90.  
58 Ibid. His comments were supported by others in this sub-sector, including Informant 6; Informant 
11.  
59 One more working group on coordination and harmonization was established in 2002. 
60 For the Declaration, see World Bank, Country Assistance Strategy for the Kindgom of Cambodia: 
109-11. The Action Plan for Harmonization and Alignment: 2004-2008 was subsequently devised. 
For the Action Plan, see ibid., 97-106.  
61 See for example, Asian Development Bank, Country Strategy and Program 2005-2009: Kingdom 
of Cambodia: 12 and 28; ———, Country Strategy and Program Midterm Review 2005-2009: 7; 
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cooperating much better at a strategic level, and are providing more coordinated 
policy advice to Government.”62 
This development represents a long journey of cooperation/coordination between 
DPs and DPs and the state. However, instances of DPs working together are still 
limited and have a large room for improvement. The results from the three Paris 
Declaration Surveys below prove that coordination is not only far from the targets 
but also deteriorated over time. 
Table 30: Baseline and Targets for Two Paris Indicators63 
No. Indicators 2005 
Baseline 
2007 2010 2010 Target 
(Revised 2008) 
4 Coordinated technical cooperation 36% 35% 27% 50% 
10a Coordinated missions 26% 12% 19% 40% 
10b Coordinated country analytical work 58% 17% 35% 66% 
The WB agrees that ‘sector coordination arrangements are still at a fairly early 
stage in Cambodia.”64 DP-DP and DP-RGC coordination/cooperation in fisheries 
and inundated forest management is quite new. The TWGF was established in 2004 
and an interim FDAP was adopted for 2004-2008 and the SPF was just adopted in 
2011. Existing literature and field interviews confirm that assistance ‘has tended to 
be an uncoordinated and externally driven process. In part this is due to the lack of 
capacity within DoF to develop policies and plans, to establish effective 
coordination mechanisms and to implement those plans” and in part to the limited 
coordination amongst DPs and between DPs and DoF.65 
                                                                                                                                                                 
World Bank, Country Assistance Strategy for the Kindgom of Cambodia: 1 and 27. The former, for 
example, organize ‘their harmonization agenda around the UN Development Assistance Framework 
(UNDAF) with an annual joint monitoring cycle with the Government,” while EU group adopts 
such measures as: “(a) the maintenance of monthly meetings among EU Development Counselors, 
(b) regular update and sharing of mission schedules, (c) the agreement to nominate one EU lead 
actor for one sector or sub-sector, who will represent other EU external development partners in the 
partnership structure with the RGC, and (d) the convention of technical meetings to discuss and 
consolidate EU positions on thematic issues (where necessary)”. Chan et al., "Cambodia Evaluation 
of Aid Effectiveness," 28-29.  
62 Marcus Cox, What Structures and Processes Are Emerging at Country Level to Support a More 
Effective and Accountable Development Partnership? Cambodia Country Case  (United Kingdom: 
Agulhas, September 2006). 14-15. This view is also shared by the World Bank. World Bank, 
Country Assistance Strategy Progress Report for the Kingdom of Cambodia for the Period FY05-
08: 13.  
63 Cambodia's Development Council,  http://www.cdc-
crdb.gov.kh/cdc/paris/paris_declaration_2011.html; ———, "The Cambodia Aid Effectiveness 
Report 2007," 33; ———, "The Cambodia Development Effectiveness Report 2011," 5; ———, 
"The Cambodia Aid Effectiveness Report 2008," 5; Organization for Economic and Cooperation 
and Development, Aid Effectiveness 2005-10: Progress in Implementing the Paris Declaration, 2: 2.  
64 World Bank, Country Assistance Strategy for the Kindgom of Cambodia: 20.  
65 Asian Development Bank, Cambodia: Growth and Sector Reforms: 39-40; Campbell, Department 
of Fisheries Institutional Review: 3; Department of Fisheries, "Discussion Document on Adopting 
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One major challenge for coordination/cooperation between DPs is that they have 
their own agenda and objectives to defend and promote. This was especially severe 
in 1990’s when DPs bombarded Cambodia with projects of their choices and 
priorities.66 Though coordination/cooperation in the sub-sectors is improving, 
especially in the last five years, DPs’ agenda and objectives still so much define 
their initiatives and what to fund. An INGO director opined: 
Fisheries Administration people are very patient with the donors. I admire them for 
that. Donors come and go, and they have their own interests and priorities, and the 
tendency is that donors would just arrive in and tell them this is what we want to do, 
accept or not. And [in] most cases, Fisheries Administration just said: “Yes. Sure, we’ll 
accept [it]. We’ll do it. We can – we mostly do it the way you want us to do, but we 
will negotiate”.… Some donors have resource sustainability interests; donors like 
ADB, Danida, they have a very strong environmental conservation emphasis, so their 
interest is sustainable resource management; DFID for example [is] more interested in 
community development groups; FAO [has] different interests and emphases. JICA 
[has] more interest in the development of fishing industry and technology.67 
Recalling the SPF preparation, a TWGF officer said: 
Initially, consultation was quite extensive, but when we put the plan to discuss within 
the TWG, there were controversies over the conflicts of interests – so there was 
substantial modification over time. Because when the new lead donor came in, it had 
its own interest, which was different – there was a need to change this and that – that’s 
why it was time-consuming.68 
Such poor coordination and cooperation have negative impacts on state capacity, 
capacity building and development effectiveness, including: adoption of a narrow 
approach to institutional strengthening and attainment of short-term outputs; a lack 
of selectivity and focus in a program; duplicative efforts and piecemeal activities 
and development results; proliferation of different procurement, disbursement, 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Programmatic Support for the Fisheries Sector," 3-4; Mak, "The Environmental Management in 
Tonle Sap Lake, Cambodia," 24. Such a view is supported by a number of Informants, including 
Informant 5; Informant 7; Informant 11; Informant 90. According to one of them, for example: 
“There is a lack of cooperation between donors in implementing their respective projects and 
sharing of certain information due to the fact that different donors have their own rules and 
regulation on information sharing and the busyness of the staff members in implementing their 
projects since project completion comes with certain timeframe and hence constraints.” Informant 7.  
66 Cf. Asian Development Bank, Country Assistance Plan 2000-2002: Cambodia: 17; Cambodia 
National Mekong Committee, Natural Resources-Based Development Strategy for the Tonle Sap 
Area: 16-17; Hughes, The Political Economy of Cambodia's Transition, 1991-2001: 87-100; Jan 
Rudengren and Joakim Öjendal, "Learning by Doing: An Analysis of the Seila Experiences in 
Cambodia," (Stockholm: Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency and Department 
for Natural Resources and the Environment, 2002), 40.  
67 Informant 6.  
68 Informant 90. Wright and others and Middleton argue that the ADB was creating a need 
(TSBMO) when there was no need for such a mechanism since Cambodia already has the CNMC. 
Mak, "The Environmental Management in Tonle Sap Lake, Cambodia," 16-17; Middleton, "The 
Expansion of the ADB’s Influence in Cambodia’s Water Sector: Judging the Effectiveness of ADB 
Water Management Projects in the Tonle Sap Basin," 26.  
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auditing and monitoring systems; over-stretching of state agencies’ capability to 
meet different DP systems; lack of cohesion in demands for good governance from 
the state; disproportionate attention to some crucial (sub)sectors or even within 
sub-sectors (fisheries/forestland receiving limited assistance despite their potential 
to reduce poverty and the focus on CFCs but not fishing lots being the case in 
point);69 uneven geographical distribution of assistance and  little emphasis on 
overall institutional building, especially on cross-cutting issues of governance, 
policy production, information management and human resource management.70 
These shortcomings indeed apply to the two subsectors.71 
3. Aid Coordination Mechanisms 
As seen in Table 31, the country level aid coordination mechanism between DPs 
and Cambodia has evolved from pure donor-ship to more local ownership. Names 
of the meetings and venues have changed. So has chairmanship. UNTAC 
Rehabilitation Office was responsible for aid coordination before 1993 – 
identifying priority needs and directing aid flows.72 The Ministerial Conference on 
the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia (MCRRC) established the 
International Committee for the Rehabilitation of Cambodia (ICORC), which met 
annually alternately in Japan and France.73 Rather than dealing with technical and 
economic aspects of aid, these high level meetings focused mainly on political 
issues. Therefore, aid coordination on the ground was done by UNDP and via ad 
                                                          
69 According to Godfrey and others only 1% of aid money was allocated to the natural resource 
sector and 4% to agriculture, forestry and fisheries. As cited in Marschke, "Livelihood in Context: 
Learning with Cambodian Fishers," 36-37.  
70 Asian Development Bank, Country Assistance Plan 2001-03: Cambodia: 14; ———, Country 
Assistance Program Evaluation for Cambodia: 47 and 56; ———, Country Strategy and Program 
Midterm Review 2005-2009: 7; ———, Cambodia: Growth and Sector Reforms: 2; Cambodia New 
Vision, "Address to the United Nations General Assembly," Cambodia New Vision September 
2005, 3; Cambodia's Development Council, "The Cambodia Aid Effectiveness Report 2007," 5; 
Campbell, Department of Fisheries Institutional Review: 2; Ek and Sok, "Aid Effectiveness in 
Cambodia," 39; Mysliwiec, Envisioning a New Paradigm of Development Cooperation in 
Cambodia: 11-12; Royal Government of Cambodia, "Socio-Economic Development Priorities and 
the Official Development Assistance Needs," 99; Siddiqui, Srickler, and Vinde, "Capacity Building 
Practices of Cambodia’s Development Partners: Results of a Survey," 20; World Bank, Country 
Assistance Strategy of the World Bank Group for the Kingdom of Cambodia: 10-13; ———, 
Country Assistance Strategy for the Kindgom of Cambodia: 65. See Warrior Prince especially 
Chapters 14 and 15 for diverge responses by different external agencies on the 1997 internal 
fighting. 
71 See for example, Campbell, Department of Fisheries Institutional Review: 21 and 42; Department 
of Fisheries, "Discussion Document on Adopting Programmatic Support for the Fisheries Sector," 
2-4.  
72 Asian Development Bank, Developing the Capacity for Reconstruction and Development: 12.  
73 Cambodia's Development Council, "The Cambodia Development Cooperation Forum: Objectives 
and Procedures," (2006).  
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hoc in-country meetings among representatives.74 In 1996, the committee was 
transformed to the Consultative Group Meeting (CG). The first five meetings were 
held in Paris and Tokyo alternately and chaired by WB, while the last three were 
held in Phnom Penh and co-chaired by the RGC and WB. The latter took the lead 
in DP discussions and policy dialogues with the RGC.75 The aim of the CG 
meeting was to discuss socio-economic development; amongst other things, it was 
meant to: evaluate and monitor overall progress and challenges at the country level, 
analyze and discuss policy and reform measures and needs to achieve the goals, 
review progress made in the past year, and reveal DPs’ future aid pledge.76 
In 2007, the mechanism was renamed Cambodia Development Cooperation Forum 
(CDCF) and led by CDC permanent vice chairman. CRDB plays a secretariat role 
in this meeting, while WB functions as Lead Donor Facilitator.77 The functions of 
the CDCF and CG are quite identical. However, instead of pledging short-term 
assistance, many DPs have begun to announce a multi-year pledge to support the 
NSDP.78 Cambodia is planning a review to transform the CDCF to Cambodia 
Development Forum, incorporating the CDCF and the Public-Private Sector 
Forum.79 Citing the pending results from the 4th Global High Level Forum on Aid 
Effectiveness held in Korea in early 2012, the RGC announced the postponement 
of the 4th CDCF, though ‘the existing dialogue mechanism, through bilateral 





                                                          
74 Asian Development Bank, Developing the Capacity for Reconstruction and Development: 16; 
World Bank, Country Assistance Strategy of the World Bank Group for the Kingdom of Cambodia: 
8.  
75 ———, Cambodia: Country Assistance Evaluation 1992-1999: 9.  
76 Cambodia's Development Council, "The Cambodia Development Cooperation Forum: Objectives 
and Procedures." See also ———, "The Government-Donor Coordination Committee (GDCC) and 
Technical Working Groups (TWGs) in Cambodia: A Review," (October 2006), 13.  
77 Ibid.  
78 Some major DPs such as Japan and the USA refuse to provide long-term commitments, though. 
Ek and Sok, "Aid Effectiveness in Cambodia."; ibid., 24-25.  
79 Cambodia's Development Council, "The Cambodia Development Effectiveness Report 2011," 25; 
Royal Government of Cambodia, Rectangular Strategy for Growth, Development, Equity and 
Efficiency in Cambodia: 18.  
80 ———, "Postponement of the Fourth Cambodia Development Cooperation Forum," (Phnom 
Penh: Royal Government of Cambodia, 17 August, 2011).  
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Table 31: Chronology of Country-Level Coordination/Cooperation Meetings81 
Date Name of Meeting Venue Chairmanship 
1992: 21-22 June MCRRC Tokyo Japan and UNDP 
1993: 8-9 September ICORC-1 Paris France (Facilitator UNDP) 
1994:10-11 March ICORC–2 Tokyo Japan 
1995:14-15 March ICORC-3 Paris France 
1996: 11-12 July CG-1 Tokyo WB & Japan 
1997: 1-2 July CG-2 Paris WB 
1999: 25-26 February CG-3 Tokyo WB 
2000: 24-25 May CG-4 Paris WB 
2001: 12-13 June CG-5 Tokyo WB 
2002: 20-21 June CG-6 P.P. WB & RGC 
2004: 6-7 December CG-7 P.P. WB & RGC 
2006: 2-3 March CG-8 P.P. WB & RGC 
2007: 19-20 June CDCF-1 P.P. RGC 
2008: 4-5 December CDCF-2 P.P. RGC 
2010: 2-3 June CDCF-3 P.P. RGC 
2011: 24-25 November CDCF-4 (Postponed) 
To support the country level mechanism, a supporting mechanism was developed 
and has evolved over the two decades. After the CG establishment, UNDP and 
ADB, co-chairing with the RGC, took the rotating lead to organize mid-term CG 
meetings in Cambodia.82 After the 1999 CG meeting, five donors working groups 
each covering a broad sectoral/thematic area of governance, focusing on anti-
corruption and legal/judicial reform, public administration reform, fiscal 
management reform, social development reform and natural resources management 
reform, concentrating chiefly on forestry, were established. The government 
correspondingly set up counterpart reform councils. Each group met quarterly, later 
semi-annually, with their government counterpart to review progress of agreed 
upon reform agenda, set priorities and discuss performance indicators in the 
respective sector/thematic area.83 At the sectoral level, some key ministries or 
agencies established ad hoc committees to coordinate aid agencies for a particular 
                                                          
81 Adapted from ———, "The Cambodia Development Cooperation Forum: Objectives and 
Procedures." 
82 Asian Development Bank, Country Assistance Program Evaluation for Cambodia: 47; World 
Bank, Cambodia: Country Assistance Evaluation 1992-1999: 9.  
83 Asian Development Bank, Cambodia: Enabling the Socio-Economic Renaissance: 43; ———, 
Country Assistance Program Evaluation for Cambodia: 47; Ek and Sok, "Aid Effectiveness in 
Cambodia," 30; Mysliwiec, Envisioning a New Paradigm of Development Cooperation in 
Cambodia: 17; World Bank, Country Assistance Strategy of the World Bank Group for the Kingdom 
of Cambodia: 16-17.  
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program.84 In 2002, the Government-Donor Partnership Working Group was 
established to assist DPs and Cambodia in aid harmonization.85 
Another major effort to restructure the aid coordination/cooperation mechanism 
took place in 200486 when seventeen, later nineteen, TWGs led by a government 
ministry/agency and participated by relevant government agencies, DPs and in 
most cases NGOs and GDCC (led by CDC/CRDB) were established to replace the 
donor-led ad hoc working groups and joint stock-taking meetings.87 The TWGs are 
meant to ‘serve as the mechanism for ongoing dialogue, coordination, issue 
identification, operational planning and resource mobilization’ through a ToR, joint 
action plan and monitoring indicators.88 That is, TWGs are ‘technical and 
operational forums to discuss, agree upon and pursue clearly defined and 
measurable targets at the sector level.’ GDCC is a forum that meets quarterly to 
discuss and share information on policies, reform programs and activities covering 
cross-sectoral/thematic issues, to discuss matters related to overall socio-economic 
development of Cambodia and to develop and agree upon a set of Joint Monitoring 
Indicators (JMIs),89 while CDCF is an overarching country-level forum for 
                                                          
84 For an evaluation study, see for example Government-Donor Partnership Working Group, 
"Practices and Lessons Learned in the Management of Development Cooperation: Case Studies in 
Cambodia."  
85 Cambodia New Vision, "Addressing the Government-Donor Monitoring Meeting," Cambodia 
New Vision September 2004, 4; Cambodia's Development Council, "Building Partnerships for 
Development: An Update," 13.  
86 This occurred after the 2003 First High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Rome. It is of note 
that Cambodia is a member of the OECD/DAC Working Party. 
87 Cambodia's Development Council, "Building Partnerships for Development: An Update," 11; —
——, "Cambodia’s Report on Progress toward Enhanced Aid Effectiveness," 8-9. The role of the 
GDCC is “to provide policy guidance, to set priorities, and to propose measures to solve problems 
raised by joint technical working groups. The GDCC is chaired by Senior Minister, Minister of 
Economy and Finance and the 1st Vice-chairman of CDC.” ———, "Building Partnerships for 
Development: An Update," 11. Many local and international NGOs also participate in a majority of 
TWGs. As late as 2011, 16 TWGs had NGO representatives in their groups. ———, "The 
Cambodia Development Effectiveness Report 2011," 21.  
88 Anthony  Land, "MDSP Independent Review: Capacity Development for Aid Effectiveness," 
(November 2009), 14; World Bank, Country Assistance Strategy for the Kindgom of Cambodia: 85. 
The Partnership Working Group was renamed TWG on Partnership and Harmonization and is 
assigned ‘to coordinate and facilitate the implementation of the Royal Government’s Action Plan on 
Harmonization and Alignment to implement the Rome Declaration’s commitment… continue to 
provide guidance on overall policy on these issues as well as dealing with implementation/ 
operational issues’ [and] to provide guidance on these issues to all Technical Working Groups 
[while] the newly restructured sectoral/thematic Joint Technical Working Groups to take the 
responsibility for the day to day operational management of the implementation of the activities in 
the Action Plan and for monitoring progress in their areas.” Cambodia's Development Council, 
"Building Partnerships for Development: An Update," 16; ———, "Cambodia’s Report on Progress 
toward Enhanced Aid Effectiveness," 9-11.  
89 JMIs are indicators jointly developed by a relevant government agency and DPs to monitor 
progress made by concerned agencies. At the TWG level, the JMIs list down the required processes 
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discussion of Cambodia’s socio-economic development from a broader and longer-
term perspectives, stocktaking progress, pinpointing major and critical areas where 
GDCC shall pay attention to and monitor, and announcement of mid-range aid 
pledges.90 
Table 32: List of TWGs91  
1 TWG on Agriculture and Water 11 TWG on Land 
2 TWG on Decentralization and 
Deconcentration 
12 TWG on Legal and Judicial Reform 
3 TWG on Education 13 TWG on Mine Action 
4 TWG on Fisheries 14 TWG on Partnership and Harmonization 
5 TWG on Food Security and Nutrition 15 TWG on Planning and Poverty Reduction 
6 TWG on Gender 16 TWG on Private Sector Development 
7 TWG on Forestry and Environment 17 TWG on Public Administration Reform 
8 TWG on Health 18 TWG on Public Financial Management 
9 TWG on Infrastructure and Regional 
Integration 
19 TWG on Rural Water Supply, Sanitation 
and Hygiene 
10 TWG on HIV/Aids   
Fisheries and inundated forests were slow to be put on the agenda and it was not 
until 2000 that they were included into the natural resources management theme 
under the CG meeting.92 The TWGF was just established in 2004 to facilitate and 
coordinate all technical issues, technical information and trans-boundary issues 
related to fisheries/forests to harmonize and align DPs’ assistance to achieve targets 
set in the NSDP in a more transparent and accountable manner.93 To achieve the 
end, the TWGF serves as a forum to encourage a program-based approach and 
                                                                                                                                                                 
and actions, while the NSDP indicators focus on outputs and outcomes. Asian Development Bank, 
Cambodia: Growth and Sector Reforms: 7; Cambodia's Development Council, "The Cambodia Aid 
Effectiveness Report 2007," 4. For progress of 2007 JMIs, see ———, "The Cambodia Aid 
Effectiveness Report 2008," 22-25 and Annex 5. and progress of 2008 JMIs, see ———, "The 
Cambodia Aid Effectiveness Report 2010," 22-26 and Annex 5.  
90 ———, "Cambodia’s Report on Progress toward Enhanced Aid Effectiveness," 10-11; ———, 
"The Cambodia Development Cooperation Forum: Objectives and Procedures."; ———, "The 
Government-Donor Coordination Committee (GDCC) and Technical Working Groups (TWGs) in 
Cambodia: A Review," 9.  
91 Adapted from ———, "The Government-Donor Coordination Committee (GDCC) and Technical 
Working Groups (TWGs) in Cambodia: A Review," Annex 1.  
92 Gum, Inland Acquatic Resources and Livelihoods in Cambodia: A Guide to the Literature, 
Legislation, Institutional Framework and Recommendations v.  
93 Informant 10.  
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division of labor amongst major DPs.94 The TWGF meets once every two months 
and reports to the GDCC once every three months against the JMIs.95 Though this 
TWG is new, it is well praised by NGOs and DPs who attend its meetings. One 
NGO board member praises that “the TWGF is one of the most active technical 
working groups.”96 Even NGOs that are critical of FiA participate in its meetings. 
The TWGF allows more transparency of DPs’ operations, including voluntary 
announcement of annual budgets and active/pipeline projects and 
coordination/cooperation between DPs and DP and FiA.97 According to an FiA 
leader, “after the establishment of the TWGF, there has been improvement in 
cooperation between donors and FiA.”98 Besides, donors have come together in a 
pre-meeting to discuss relevant issues before raising it to FiA. As such they can 
talk with ‘one voice’ since 2007.99 
Aid coordination/cooperation mechanisms have improved over the last two 
decades. However, it was not until 1999 that broad working groups and reform 
councils were established. Yet the groups were managed by donors and meetings 
were ad hoc with no overall framework for their operation.100 An ADB report in 
1995 therefore judged the aid coordination/cooperation mechanism as 
‘unsatisfactory,’ leading to ‘instances of duplication, overlapping and competition 
among funding efforts.’101 Even with these groups and councils, another ADB 
report in 2002 gave a blanket judgment that despite the presence of the existing 
mechanism, aid coordination ‘remains weak.’102 In 2005, two WB reports similarly 
note that ‘[f]ragmented donor assistance is still a problem,’ yet ‘resources devoted 
to this [architecture] were grossly inadequate.’103 
                                                          
94 Informant 90.  
95 At the time of the fieldwork, the meetings focused on policy modification/reform measure 
recommendations, establishment of a subsector plan for institutional capacity building and 
discussion of hot issues in the subsectors. ibid.  
96 Informant 12. This is also supported by another NGO staffer. Informant 4.  
97 Informant 10.  
98 Informant 11. This view is shared by Informant 91.  
99 Informant 10; Informant 90. At the sub-central levels, DIWs serve as a coordination meeting 
between local authorities, technical departments and offices and donors/NGOs to reduce duplication 
of efforts. Government-Donor Partnership Working Group, "Practices and Lessons Learned in the 
Management of Development Cooperation: Case Studies in Cambodia," 94.  
100 Cf. Cambodia's Development Council, "Cambodia’s Report on Progress toward Enhanced Aid 
Effectiveness," 8.  
101 Asian Development Bank, Developing the Capacity for Reconstruction and Development: 16.  
102 ———, Country Assistance Program Evaluation for Cambodia: 47.  
103 World Bank, Country Assistance Strategy for the Kindgom of Cambodia: 62; ———, Country 
Assistance Strategy Progress Report for the Kingdom of Cambodia for the Period FY05-08: 4-5.  
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The TWG mechanism has improved sectoral/thematic aid 
coordination/cooperation, and some TWGs have held regular meetings and are 
successful in fulfilling their missions. However, even the PM admits that some are 
‘not smoothly operational.’104 A review by CRBD in 2006 (and confirmed by an 
independent review in 2008) shows that ‘a third of the 18 TWGs are perceived to 
be working very well; a third are just beginning to make progress; and a third are 
still quite some distance away from establishing themselves as effective bodies.’105 
The last two categories consist mainly of the TWGs freshly established in 2004 
or/and those working on politically contentious sectors/thematic areas. Some signs 
of dysfunction include irregular attendance, attendance by government’s junior 
officials and/or DPs’ staff who are generalists or administrators with little relevant 
technical expertise, DPs’ unwillingness to disclose their budgets or align their 
support to Cambodia’s priorities or preferences, insufficient leadership on the part 
of Cambodia and/or jurisdictional rivalries.106 There are cases in which donors 
within a TWG do not communicate well with each other to adopt a consensus, so 
their voice is ‘fragmented’ when they talk with their government counterparts.107 
All in all, Chanboreth Ek and Hach Sok correctly judged: ‘TWGs are not well 
managed and organized and they lack the technical and financial resources needed 
to support the national effort to enhance ownership and align development 
assistance to national priorities and systems.’108 Even the government agrees that 
the existing ‘aid architecture comprising TWGs, the GDCC and the CDCF has not 
yet produced the anticipated results in terms of effective aid delivery and improved 
development impact.109 
                                                          
104 Cambodia New Vision, "Addressing the Government-Donor Monitoring Meeting," 4; ———, 
"First Cambodia Development Cooperaiton Forum Meeting," 2.  
105 Cambodia's Development Council, "The Government-Donor Coordination Committee (GDCC) 
and Technical Working Groups (TWGs) in Cambodia: A Review," 2.  
106 Chan et al., "Cambodia Evaluation of Aid Effectiveness," 21-22; Cox, What Structures and 
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109 Cambodia's Development Council, "The Cambodia Aid Effectiveness Report 2008," 22. Another 
independent review also concurs that ‘CRDB has thus far been less successful at bringing about 
substantive change in key areas of aid effectiveness reform such as harmonization and alignment of 
capacity development support, or adoption of program-based approaches.” Land, "MDSP 
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Despite its novelty, the TWGF’s capacity to coordinate aid has been judged quite 
positively by stakeholders involved. Some shortcomings still exist, though. First, a 
review in 2006 showed that it was still unable to coordinate donors and to adopt ‘a 
more integrated approach to sector funding;’ therefore, funding to FiA continued to 
be project-based.110 Many interviewees complain that such is still the case, albeit 
admitting that it has improved to an extent.111 One reason is that DP’s priorities are 
usually set by their higher-level bosses (their governments or headquarters) and 
could not be changed easily. Thus the TWGF only serves as a forum for ‘some 
negotiations of boundaries, territory, so to speak.’112 Second, some DPs are still 
unwilling to disclose their budgets, adopt a program-based approach or align their 
assistance to the FDAP/SPF.113 Third, though the subsectors are closely related to 
other (sub)sectors, participation from other government agencies is ‘still 
limited.’114 Finally, an NGO advisor concerns with ‘how much teeth’ it has. Since 
the work is technical, controversial or politically sensitive issues are not covered.115 
4. Assistance Approaches 
In a study on aid effectiveness in Cambodia, John McAndrew concluded: ‘[A]id 
infusion between 1992 and 1995 did not improve the recipient’s capacity due to the 
lack of enhancement of its absorptive capacity which was low and the 
mismanagement of the TAs.”116 Poor capacity building indeed applies to the entire 
two decades, albeit to a different degree. One reason for poor enhancement of state 
capacity and slow institutional building despite enormous aid injection is how 
assistance is designed. Generally, DPs adopt a project-based approach (PBA) to 
their assistance. That is, DPs manage the fund directly or indirectly via an attached 
or separate Project Implementation Unit (PIU) with separate disbursement, 
accounting, auditing and reporting procedures.117 
                                                          
110 Campbell, Department of Fisheries Institutional Review: 49.  
111 Informant 4; Informant 6; Informant 90; Informant 91.  
112 Informant 6.  
113 Informant 90.  
114 Informant 6; Informant 10; Informant 90.  
115 Informant 4.  
116 McAndrew cited in Asian Development Bank, Cambodia: Enabling the Socio-Economic 
Renaissance: 25-26.  
117 Cf. Cambodia New Vision, "Opening Speech to the Cambodia Consultative Group Meeting 
Tokyo, Japan 25-26 February 1999," 4; Government-Donor Partnership Working Group, "Practices 




The major reasons cited for the heavy reliance on PBA is the ‘weakness of 
government systems for the management and implementation of development 
projects, in particular public financial management’ and a need for transparency 
and efficiency of the assistance.118 This is understandable given the poor track 
record of the public administration and instances of aid mismanagement.119 
However, as Curtis argues it is also resulted from DPs’ ignorance or explicit 
rejection of the fact that the PRK/SoC had managed to establish a structure of 
public administration.120 Thus, in the 1990’s ‘development cooperation activities 
were planned, managed and delivered by development partners with limited 
ownership of development choices and management process by concerned 
Cambodian institutions.’121 A survey in 2000 showed that 30% of 50 projects 
surveyed were managed independently of the existing state structure.122 During 
1999-2004, PBA was still the main financing modality,123 though Program-Based 
Approaches within certain sectors were gaining currency. 
Table 33: Mode of Project Implementation124 
 Multilateral Bilateral NGO Total 
Outside government, directly by project staff 6%  15% 8% 
Outside government, though intermediary 
organizations 
  35% 14% 
Inside government, through normal structure 67% 100% 55% 70% 
Inside government, through special units 28%   10% 
                                                          
118 Cited in Cox, What Structures and Processes Are Emerging at Country Level to Support a More 
Effective and Accountable Development Partnership? Cambodia Country Case: 3-4; Godfrey et al., 
Technical Assistance and Capacity Building in an Aid-Dependent Economy: The Experience of 
Cambodia: 26-28.  
119 For examples of mismanagement of aid money in some World Bank and WFP-supported 
projects, see for example, Sophal Ear, "Governance and Economic Performance: Credibility, 
Political Will, and Reform," Cambodian Economic Review 1, no. 1 (2005): 38-40; World Bank, 
Country Assistance Strategy for the Kindgom of Cambodia: 27; ———, Country Assistance 
Strategy Progress Report for the Kingdom of Cambodia for the Period FY05-08: 7-16.  
120 Curtis, "Beyond Transition: Cambodia in the Post-UNTAC Period," Chapter 4, 2.  
121 Cambodia's Development Council, "Enhancing Development Cooperation Effectiveness to 
Implement the National Strategic Development Plan," (Phnom Penh: Cambodia's Development 
Council, 2006), 41-42. See also Curtis, "Beyond Transition: Cambodia in the Post-UNTAC Period," 
Chapter 4, 27.  
122 Godfrey et al., Technical Assistance and Capacity Building in an Aid-Dependent Economy: The 
Experience of Cambodia: 38.  
123 Government-Donor Partnership Working Group, "Practices and Lessons Learned in the 
Management of Development Cooperation: Case Studies in Cambodia," 15.  
124 Adopted from Godfrey et al., Technical Assistance and Capacity Building in an Aid-Dependent 
Economy: The Experience of Cambodia: 38.  
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An NGO board member has expressed concerns that PBA ‘is not a stable way of 
running a government.’125 PBA presents some challenges to state capacity and 
capacity building. First, as Curtis argues, PBA, especially parallel PIUs and heavy 
dependence on expatriate TA, diverts the existing limited competent staff, 
especially mid-level officers, from their routine tasks,126 and as the PM asserts, has 
siphoned off tremendous benefits from Cambodians via unnecessary spending,127 
such as hefty expenses on foreign experts and tied procurements. Second, project 
proliferation and demands for different management systems have undermined and 
fragmented the Cambodian administration, overstretching the capacity of the high 
and mid-level officers who are involved in donor-funded projects and put DPs in 
competition with the state for competent staff.128 A CDC report rightly argued: 
The existence of Multiple and Duplicative Systems and methodologies in such areas as 
reporting, audit and evaluation, project and programme management and related areas 
impose[s] an extreme burden on our Government’s management staff (as well as on 
Donor Agencies). There is a proliferation of committees, working groups, structures 
and coordination mechanisms, some of which duplicate one another, and all of which 
impose excessive demands on the time of Government and donor staff alike. The 
existence of such systems, combined with numerous donor sponsored project 
management and implementation units result in Capacity Depletion in many sectors of 
Government and society, and indeed introduce inequities and imbalances in public 
sector human resources management.129 
Third, stand-alone projects usually prioritize ‘control and delivery over capacity 
and sustainability,’ so they fail to build state’s institutional capacity.130 The survey 
cited above maintains that only 58% of the projects ‘were structurally well 
positioned for capacity development.’131 Besides, there are plenty examples where 
once a project is over, staff revert to their previous working practices or look for 
                                                          
125 Informant 12.  
126 Curtis, "Beyond Transition: Cambodia in the Post-UNTAC Period," Chapter 4, 27.  
127 Cambodia New Vision, "800,000 Rural Pupils Can Be Accommodated with Peace Culture in 
School," Cambodia New Vision January 1999, 2; ———, "Visiting a Bailey Bridge in Pusath’s 
District of Kravanh," Cambodia New Vision June 2005, 2.  
128 Cf. Cambodia's Development Council, "A New Development Cooperation Partnership Paradigm 
for Cambodia: Strengthening Development Cooperation and Aid Coordination and Management," 
(Phnom Penh: Cambodia's Development Council, 2000), 1-2; Cox, What Structures and Processes 
Are Emerging at Country Level to Support a More Effective and Accountable Development 
Partnership? Cambodia Country Case: 3-4; Curtis, "Beyond Transition: Cambodia in the Post-
UNTAC Period," Chapter 4, 6; Land and Morgan, "Technical Cooperation for Capacity 
Development in Cambodia: Making the System Work Better," 17.  
129 Cambodia's Development Council, "A New Development Cooperation Partnership Paradigm for 
Cambodia: Strengthening Development Cooperation and Aid Coordination and Management," 4.  
130 ———, "Partnership and Aid Management Processes: Principal Studies and Processes 
Contributing to Policy and Support Services TWG Network Meeting," (September 2010), 1; World 
Bank, Country Assistance Strategy of the World Bank Group for the Kingdom of Cambodia: 16.  
131 Godfrey, et. al. cited in Mysliwiec, Envisioning a New Paradigm of Development Cooperation in 
Cambodia: 20-21.  
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other projects.132 Fourth, PIUs, especially parallel ones, disrupt accountability and 
transparency between the bureaucracy and the government in particular and the 
state in general.133 All in all, PBA is unlikely to help Cambodia build its capacity 
and to develop a capable state structure to attain its long-term development 
goals.134 
Despite its limitations, the first phase of assistance was noted for PBA domination, 
while the second saw the experimentation with program-based approaches in some 
key sectors. The wider adoption of these approaches in the third phase is still on the 
horizon.135 Unlike the narrower definition of the approach the OECD adopted, 
Cambodia adopts a broader definition. Its characteristics, according to the former, 
include: “country leadership over a programme; use of a sector strategy and budget 
framework; and mechanisms for coordination and use of national systems.”136 
Cambodia refines the second component and accepts that programmes are ones 
which are ‘coordinated according to a sectoral strategy or action plan, irrespective 
of whether there is a single budget framework in place.’137 In this sense, DPs can 
freely adopt the form of funding assistance, for instance, a stand-alone project, a 
project within a program, budget support, etc. as far as their assistance buys into a 
sectoral strategy.138  
The government has pointed out some advantages of a program-based approach, 
including more alignment of external assistance with Cambodia’s priorities, aid 
harmonization and cross-project coordination, learning and transfers, enhancement 
of Cambodia’s ownership over the assistance, and increase in efficiency and 
                                                          
132 See for example, Godfrey et al., Technical Assistance and Capacity Building in an Aid-
Dependent Economy: The Experience of Cambodia: 24-25. A technical expert similarly puts it: 
“Projects with a separate office and a PIU will leave nothing behind when they go.” ibid., 38.  
133 Cambodia's Development Council, "The Cambodia Aid Effectiveness Report 2007," 43.  
134 Cf. Chan et al., "Cambodia Evaluation of Aid Effectiveness," 26.  
135 However, there has been wider acknowledgement of the importance of program-based 
approaches and more vocal demands from the state for donors to adopt the program-based 
approaches. 
136 Cited in Cambodia's Development Council, "The Cambodia Aid Effectiveness Report 2010," 28.  
137 Cox, What Structures and Processes Are Emerging at Country Level to Support a More Effective 
and Accountable Development Partnership? Cambodia Country Case: 9. See also, Cambodia's 
Development Council, "Partnership and Aid Management Processes: Principal Studies and 
Processes Contributing to Policy and Support Services TWG Network Meeting," 1; Government-
Donor Partnership Working Group, "Practices and Lessons Learned in the Management of 
Development Cooperation: Case Studies in Cambodia," 61-62.  
138 Informant 90.  
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effectiveness of service provision and capacity building.139 Despite these credits, 
many donors still ‘have not done enough to change their own institutions to support 
aid effectiveness… [and still] have a project mentality’ though some improvement 
in their behavior has been observed.140 The 2010 Paris Declaration Evaluation in 
Cambodia confirms that most projects are still not aligned with a sector strategy, 
for example.141 The aid market is trapped in a ‘low level but stable equilibrium’ 
where risk aversity combines with ‘high volume of uncoordinated projects 
fragments ownership, undermines coherent capacity development and limited (sic) 
focus on project-level outputs.’142 To illustrate high volume of projects, in 2008, 
there were 710 ongoing projects and some 1,000 PIUs, steering committees and 
stand-alone working groups, many of which were of semi-parallel nature.143 As 
seen in Table 34, the reduction of parallel PIUs during 2005- 2010 is still far from 
its target of 19 in 2010. Despite the improvement in the quality of the PFM systems 
(though still way from being perfect but enough to meet the 2010 target), DPs’ use 
of the PFM systems saw little improvement in the five years’ period and met only 
half of the target. Likewise, though DPs’ adoption of program-based approaches 
had increased, this indicator just met roughly half the target.144 
                                                          
139 Cambodia's Development Council, "Cambodia’s Report on Progress toward Enhanced Aid 
Effectiveness," 3-4; Department of Fisheries, "Discussion Document on Adopting Programmatic 
Support for the Fisheries Sector," 4 and 7.  
140 Cambodia's Development Council, "Enhancing Development Cooperation Effectiveness to 
Implement the National Strategic Development Plan," 41; Cox, What Structures and Processes Are 
Emerging at Country Level to Support a More Effective and Accountable Development 
Partnership? Cambodia Country Case: 15. The RGC also understands that some state agencies also 
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"Partnership and Aid Management Processes: Principal Studies and Processes Contributing to 
Policy and Support Services TWG Network Meeting," 3.  
141 ———, "The Cambodia Aid Effectiveness Report 2010," 23; ———, "Partnership and Aid 
Management Processes: Principal Studies and Processes Contributing to Policy and Support 
Services TWG Network Meeting," 2.  
142 ———, "The Cambodia Aid Effectiveness Report 2010," 27.  
143 Presentation at a Conference & WB as cited in Ek and Sok, "Aid Effectiveness in Cambodia," 
23. See also Cambodia's Development Council, "Partnership and Aid Management Processes: 
Principal Studies and Processes Contributing to Policy and Support Services TWG Network 
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their assistance. Government-Donor Partnership Working Group, "Practices and Lessons Learned in 
the Management of Development Cooperation: Case Studies in Cambodia," 27. As an illustration, 
the RGC has established an online tool for DPs to input details of upcoming and previous missions 
so as to rationalize and improve coordination of donor missions; however, very few DPs have input 
their missions into this webpage. Organization for Economic and Cooperation and Development, 
Aid Effectiveness 2005-10: Progress in Implementing the Paris Declaration, 2: 15.  
144 For Indicator 2a, the scale runs from 1 (very weak) to 6 (very strong); Indicator 2b, the nominal 
scale runs between A (the highest) to D (the lowest). ———, Aid Effectiveness 2005-10: Progress 
in Implementing the Paris Declaration, 2: 5.  
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Table 34: Selected Baseline and Targets (Paris Indicators)145 
No. Indicators 2005 
Baseline 
2007 2010 2010 Target 
(Revised 2008) 
2a Quality of PFM systems 2.5 3.0 3.5 3.5 




C No target 
5a Use of country PFM systems (aid 
flows) 
10% 12% 21% (40%) 
5b Use of country procurement systems 
(aid flows) 
6% 16% 24% No target 
6 Parallel PIUs 49 121 66 19 
9 Use of programme-based approaches 24% 28% 35% 66% 
In numerical and normal scales, the survey results are ‘very unimpressive’. The 
overall picture is more promising, however.146 The steady improvement in all but 
one indicator in five years’ time was remarkable. Although there had been no 
comparable survey results from pre-2005, anecdotal evidence points to the fact that 
there has been increasing use of program-based approaches (for example, 14 TWGs 
by 2008 had developed or adopted a sector strategy and the others were on the 
way) and that there is effort to reduce parallel PIUs, for instance, amongst EU 
member states.147 
The situation in the subsectors is not much different. Campbell writing about the 
practices before 2006 reveals many shortcomings in external assistance. The main 
channel of assistance was parallel PIUs; thus the assistance led to a piecemeal 
approach to policy implementation, uneven capacity development within DoF, with 
mainly central DoF staff being trained and hired for projects, uneven distribution of 
benefits geographically (DPs as deciding which locality to fund), competition 
between projects for limited competent DoF staff, resulting in some staff working 
for several projects simultaneously, lack of integration within DoF, and a focus on 
achieving project outputs rather than meeting long-term needs of the subsectors.148 
Interviews with key stakeholders confirm this. Referring to the pre-TWGF 
establishment, Informant 90 revealed that the assistance 
                                                          
145 Data source: Cambodia's Development Council; ———, "The Cambodia Aid Effectiveness 
Report 2007," 33; ———, "The Cambodia Development Effectiveness Report 2011," 5; ———, 
"The Cambodia Aid Effectiveness Report 2008," 5; Organization for Economic and Cooperation 
and Development, Aid Effectiveness 2005-10: Progress in Implementing the Paris Declaration, 2: 2.  
146 Chan et al., "Cambodia Evaluation of Aid Effectiveness," 30.  
147 Cf. ibid; Land and Morgan, "Technical Cooperation for Capacity Development in Cambodia: 
Making the System Work Better," 20-24.  
148 Campbell, Department of Fisheries Institutional Review: 14 and 42-49.  
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was totally stand-alone projects. Donors did not talk to one another; they did what they 
wanted. A large number of projects were duplicated, and some were not important to 
the sector… The plan was based on the plan of individual donor…based on what the 
donor wanted. Such an approach does not respond to the long-term development of the 
sector.149 
An FiA leader added: 
Donor-funded projects were carried out by separate donors, whose projects also 
purchased different equipment and these could not be used by other departments or 
FiA as a whole. Project staff was not under the management of FiA, and hence there 
was the discontinuity in the project implementation once the support ended. There are 
cases in which projects hired people from a different department, and hence when the 
project was over, the people simply went back to their department once the project 
terminated. The projects and FiA back then were ‘enemy’ with one another.150 
Informant 90 concludes that such a practice has undesirable impacts on state 
capacity and capacity building since: the existing system is not used, staff capacity 
is not systematically enhanced, the assistance does not respond to the sector’s 
needs, and there was discontinuity in the projects.151 The lack of transparency in 
the assistance also enabled each department to hide projects from one another,152 
limiting cross-project coordination and building-up of cumulative impacts. 
Despite the TWGF existence since 2004, external funding continues to be project-
based153 since it is ‘difficult to get consensus especially from the donors who have 
their own policy instructions and interests.’154 Projects are still crowded out at the 
central level, demotivating ground staff from working hard, though the trend is 
changing, allowing some cantonment staff to become implementors;155 consultancy 
and capacity building to FiA staff and CFCs are still fragmented;156 joint budget 
allocation between donors and FiA and information sharing between DPs (before 
2011) were missing,157 and trust in the state system is still low.158 Some reports by 
                                                          
149 Informant 90.  
150 Informant 11.  
151 Informant 90. Discontinuity in project is a major problem for projects in general, according to a 
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CDC/CRDB also note that only a few DPs use the FiA systems and many still 
refuse to use them although agreed-upon mechanisms have been developed and it 
was mutually agreed that DPs would use its planning, accounting and monitoring 
systems by the end of 2007.159 Out of the 23 projects during 2005-2011 reported to 
CDC/CRDB, only three used FiA’s procurement and budget executing systems. 
Six partially integrated PIUs were established to implement six projects and one 
fully integrated PIU was established for one project.160 
The adoption of program-based approaches is far from complete and perfect. In 
2009, for example, only Danida/DFID/NZAID and Wet Land Alliance jointly 
funded the FiA’s 2009 Action Plan (67% of total funding) using common FiA 
systems, procedures and existing FiA’s PIU.161 Among the 23 projects reported to 
CDC/CRDB only three adopted a programmatic approach. FiA still adopts the 
broad, flexible definition of a program-based approach and assistance in any form, 
including stand-alone projects, is still welcomed.162 Informant 90 estimates that in 
2011 roughly 50-60% of the assistance bought into the program-based approach, 
meaning simply that the assistance was aligned with the priorities set in the SPF.163 
Overall, the road to Paris is still long and bumpy. However, we can judge that there 
has been improvement in aid coordination and cooperation in the last few years. 
The TWGF is better functioning, and many DPs are more forthcoming in 
disclosing their assistance, negotiating the ‘boundaries’ of their assistance, 
relegating some project implementation to the cantonment, promising to stop 
establishing more unnecessary PIUs, and buying into the SPF. 
The final issue is the capacity building to the bureaucracy by DPs. The PM 
repeatedly calls on the ‘donor community’ to help build public administration’s 
technical capacity.164 The two graphs below show that huge amount of assistance 
has been allotted for TAs, including money spent on hiring foreign experts, 
monetary incentives, equipment and training of Cambodian counterparts. The time 
series breakdown for each component is unavailable. Yet, an extrapolation for the 
                                                          
159 Cambodia's Development Council, "The Cambodia Aid Effectiveness Report 2010," 22-26 and 
Annex 5; ———, "The Cambodia Aid Effectiveness Report 2008," 47.  
160 CDC’s database ———. 
161 ———, "The Cambodia Aid Effectiveness Report 2010," 46.  
162 Informant 90.  
163 Ibid.  
164 See for example, Cambodia New Vision, "Addressing the 6th Cambodia Consultative Group 
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2002 disbursement of $530.9 million put the expenditure of $60 million and $50-70 
million for training and hiring 740 foreign experts, respectively.165 Therefore, large 
amount of money has been spent on capacity building. 
Figure 6: Disbursement Percentage for TA and Non-TA166 
 
Figure 7: Disbursement Amount for TA and Non-TA 
 
The capacity building effort has contributed to building Cambodian state agencies’ 
and agents’ capacity. Moreover, attention has been paid to projects’/programs’ 
capacity outcomes in recent years.167 However, shortcomings in capacity building 
initiatives exist. First, as Fukuyama points out the main focus of aid money is on 
the provision of services, rather than institutional capacity building per se; the 
‘international community’ thus made little headway in ‘creating self-sustaining 
                                                          
165 Siddiqui, Srickler, and Vinde, "Capacity Building Practices of Cambodia’s Development 
Partners: Results of a Survey," 53-61.  
166 Derived from data from Cambodia's Development Council, "The Cambodia Aid Effectiveness 
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"The Cambodia Development Effectiveness Report 2011," 13 and 19; ———, "The Cambodia Aid 
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states.’168 The WB’s 2005 Country Assistance Strategy admitted: “Progress in 
social service delivery has generally been more positive than in the core areas of 
governance reform.”169 In a sense, attention is mainly paid to how much 
projects/programs deliver social services on behalf or in the name of the state rather 
than or together with assisting the state to build a capable public administration. 
Second, tangible project/program outputs take precedence over institutional 
capacity building. Anthony Land and Peter Morgan argue that the ‘product focused 
nature of most contracts and reporting systems’ discourage private firms and 
consultants from focusing on capacity development.170 Other reports confirm that 
many foreign experts fail to impart their expertise to their local counterparts (some 
in blatant violation of their ToRs) and in some cases, local counterparts are absent 
or less interested in capacity building itself.171 Third, related to lack of capacity 
building is the issue of capacity substitution, where experts find it handier to do 
things by themselves rather than to act as ‘advisors and/or supervisors.’172 
Fourth, most capacity building is carried out through on-the-job training or short-
term courses to enable Cambodian counterparts to fulfill their duties within a 
project rather than to contribute to broader goals of capability development of the 
public administration.173 In this regard, the ADB frankly acknowledges that while 
                                                          
168 Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century: 41-42 and 103.  
169 World Bank, Country Assistance Strategy for the Kindgom of Cambodia: 57. See also, Land and 
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many of its projects managed to improve technical skills at the individual level, 
they are less effective in building up the institutional capability.174 Fifth, a majority 
of projects hire central staff as counterparts; therefore, it is they who have more 
chances to undergo capacity building.175 Generally, such a practice is justifiable 
because they are more capable; however, the practice has contributed to widening 
the capacity divide between central and sub-central officers and agencies. Some 
donors’ projects such as the ADB’s TSEMP and Danida’s Project for Management 
of the Freshwater Capture Fisheries of Cambodia did, nevertheless, recruit 
provincial staff as counterparts. Finally, the most serious shortcoming is that 
attention to build an overall ‘coherent, well-conceived strategy of capacity 
development’ is lacking given the piecemeal nature of capacity building 
initiatives.176 
To summarize, DPs have contributed substantially to enhancing Cambodia’s state 
capacity and institutional capacity building. There has been increasing 
cooperation/coordination between DPs and between DPs and Cambodia, especially 
since 2004, in managing external assistance. Cambodia’s capacity to coordinate aid 
has experienced remarkable improvement with the establishment of multi-tier 
mechanisms for aid coordination from technical to country levels. There have been 
better-coordinated efforts to enhance the capacity of the state apparatus and wider 
adoption of program-based approaches to assistance. These experiences are 
reflected in the subsectors. The TWGF has functioned as a forum for discussion on 
issues in these subsectors and to coordinate aid infusion. Its capacity to coordinate 
DPs has improved significantly, and more DPs have bought into the SPF and hence 
align their assistance to the FiA’s priorities. Interviews with FiA staff and evidence 
from existing literature show that many projects have contributed to capacity 
building of the FiA and its staff. 
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Yet, many shortcomings in DPs and DP-Cambodia cooperation/coordination 
persist. DPs are still far from speaking with one coherent voice. Many donors still 
pursue their own agendas and have different objectives in their involvement in 
Cambodia. This has constrained their possibility to work together to demand for 
harsher reforms and good governance from Cambodia. Furthermore, the rise of 
non-traditional donors has further watered down the influence of Western donors 
on Cambodia. Aid infusion is still very much fragmented, and Cambodia’s capacity 
to coordinate aid is still quite limited, while as a recipient it has little influence on 
pressuring DPs to coordinate their assistance and align it with Cambodia’s 
priorities. While the wider application of program-based approaches is plausible 
and encouraging, assistance is very much project-based and Cambodia’s 
government systems are not used and they are still far from being adequate for DPs 
to trust. Large amount of aid has been used for institutional and individual capacity 
building; however, it is questionable whether the money has made proportionate 
impacts on capability enhancement. The fisheries/forest subsectors face many of 
these constraints. Though non-traditional donors play limited roles in these 
subsectors, agenda setting is still in DPs’ hands. That there are many smaller 
players in this field presents a challenge for coordination/cooperation amongst 
them and with FiA. Aid infusion therefore is still quite fragmented. DPs still have 
more room to decide whether to buy into the SPF and align their assistance with it, 
and many opt to ‘work outside the system.’ Though capacity building efforts via 
on-the-job training and short courses are plenty, FiA is yet to produce its HR and 
HR development strategies. 
293 
 
Chapter 12: Conclusions 
 
1. Main Research Findings 
This study investigates the factors affecting post-conflict Cambodian state capacity 
with illustrations from fisheries and inundated forest management. It puts 
Cambodian state and society, external agencies and their relations and interactions 
into the post-communist context to explain how they impact the state capacity. The 
following are the major findings from the research. 
A survey on the existing literature on Cambodian politics proves that academic 
research on the state per se and Cambodian state capacity, more specifically, is 
rather thin. More research has been directed towards democracy, democratization 
and local governance (decentralization) and, to a lesser extent, civil society. That is, 
the politico-socio aspects of political science have been emphasized, while the 
statal aspect is under-researched. 
Overall, Cambodian state capacity is limited, albeit slowly improving. The capacity 
is variable in terms of time, location, sectors and types of capacity. Its penetration 
capacity, as expressed in the population-civil-servant ratio, is quite low. As seen in 
the FiA staff distribution, penetration, especially into the rural areas, is quite 
limited as more staff is concentrated at the central, and to a lesser extent, 
provincial, levels. The last decade has seen the state trying to attain the appropriate 
use of its resources to attain economic development and reduce rural poverty 
through diversion of its expenditure to non-D&S sectors, although the priority 
ministries, including MAFF, still receive quite low funding in real terms and in 
percentage share of the total expenditure. In addition, the state has tried to attain 
more distributive justice through re-distributing more fishing areas and inundated 
forests to small-scale fishers. In 1990’s, however, these resources were mainly 
concentrated into a handful of private concessionaires.  
Its regulation and extraction capacities probably fare the poorest amongst all the 
capacities studied. The poor regulation capacity is reflected in the massive illegal 
fishing activities and forest clearance, poor compliance from and enforcement of 
state’s and communities’ rules and regulations onto all scales of fishers. Although 
its capacity to extract from the society has been somehow increasing, it is still very 
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low, manifesting in significant leakage of revenues, low tax and revenue ratios to 
GDP. And as illustrated in fisheries resource rent extraction, especially from 
industrial scale fishing, the state can extract only minimal rents. 
Its capacity to produce policies and legislation has improved considerably and is 
probably at the top of the chart amongst all the capacities. This is not to downplay 
various shortcomings in policy and legislation production, especially in 1990’s. It 
was not until 2006 that it first had an over-arching national development policy, 
and before then national development policies were fragmented and sectoral 
policies were scarce. Sectoral policies, such as the SPF, come much later. More 
detailed laws, at least those on natural resources management, were enacted in 
2000’s. Many laws, including FL, still need more supporting sub-decrees and 
prakas. The production aside, how much these policies and legislation are put into 
actual practice is questionable.  
The state does realize that to achieve economic development and poverty reduction, 
it needs to provide the private sector and rural communities with favorable 
environment and appropriate support. It has, to a large extent, managed to maintain 
peace and political stability, establish a forum for ongoing dialogues between the 
private and public sectors, link state agencies and rural communities, such as via 
DIWs, provide the private sector with some business facilitation and rural 
communities with some assistance, including setting them up and providing some 
necessary equipment and legal framework. Yet, its capacity to assist private 
businesses, including fishing lots and rural communities, viz. CFCs is fairly 
limited. Its husbandry capacity, as seen in ‘research lot’ research and development, 
fares the poorest amongst all the capacities covered in this study, reflecting in 
dereliction of its agents’ duties, collusion and breach of contracts. 
Social control is very fragmented. In the subsectors, the presence of ego-centric and 
or antagonistic social forces with substantial social control in their hands, namely 
the Khmer Rouge, all scales of fishers, especially medium-scale fishers and lot 
concessionaires and even many newly established CFCs, have crippled the state 
capacity. Many of them (have) even established their rules of the games and 
distorted the state’s legislation and policies beyond recognition. This study traces 
the emergence of business elites, including elite lot concessionaires, to the abrupt 
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economic liberalization and the manipulation of this transition. Their persistent 
domination is partly a result of the politics of intervention and collusion between 
state agents and business elites. 
As seen in Chapter 7, civil society is still weak. The trace of civil society groups 
throughout history is thin. The PRK/SoC managed to set up some state-mandated 
associations and groups. However, they became diluted. When the country adopted 
the liberalized economy, the few associations became enfeebled or disorganized, 
while the solidarity groups, including fishing groups, simply disappeared. Many 
NGOs have emerged since 1991. They have contributed to shaping the socio-
political landscape and helped build the capability of rural communities, including 
CFCs, and some state agencies and agents. However, the NGO sector is nascent, 
and many shortcomings, such as upwards accountability to their funders, poor 
coordination and cooperation amongst them, limited grassroots participation and 
compartmentalization of their assistance to rural communities, exist. 
In the last two decades, different forms of rural community groups, including CFis, 
have been established, mainly by NGOs and state agencies. Some of their members 
and leaders have been quite active in natural resources management and 
contributed to better resource management. Reduction of destructive illegal fishing 
activities within CFi areas and contributions to rural socio-economic development 
are two examples. However, these mass associations are even younger than NGOs, 
and their capacity and institutional capability are more limited. In the subsectors, 
these are reflected in the persistence of illegal fishing and forest clearance in CFi 
areas, limited attributes of good governance in many CFCs’ operation and even 
total breakdown of some communities, and limited ownership of the CFis by and 
limited participation from CFi members in resource management. CFi 
sustainability is also questionable since they are financially dependent on external 
funding, and there is little effort to mobilize the legislated internal funding. Rural 
communities’ social cohesion is also challenged by compartmentalized externally 
induced community group establishment. 
In terms of relations and power relations between civil society and the state, the 
latter still relies more on ‘despotic power’ and its engagement with civil society 
groups, albeit improving, is still far from perfect. As reflected in the FiA-NGO and 
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CC-NGO relations, the engagement was limited in 1990’s and became more 
antagonistic during the transition to more community-based resource management. 
There has been increasing selective cooperation, especially with associations 
working on soft issues, in the last few years. Therefore, though the state is more 
engaging with NGOs working on development issues, its engagement with NGOs 
working on advocacy issues is quite contentious. Certain mechanisms, such as 
TWGs and GDCC, PIFs and DIWs, have provided venues for dialogues; however, 
these are mainly to discuss or simply raise some ‘soft issues’ or to discuss local 
funding from NGOs.  
At the local level, in the 1990’s CBOs working on development issues, including 
natural resources management, were limited in numbers. There were limited 
interactions between fishers and commune councils, provincial line departments 
and district offices. The state agents, moreover, were accurately seen as 
exploitative and coercive, leading to conflicts and animosity. Since 2000’s, more 
CBOs, including CFis, have been established. Their relationship with the local 
authorities and field implementors, albeit improving, is restricted as well. More 
engagement reflects itself in CC’s participation in CFCs’ meetings and vice versa, 
CFCs’ participation in CC’s meetings, inclusion of CFCs’ annual action plans into 
CDPs, FiA’s participation in the preparation of legal documents for CFCs, etc. 
Communities’ bargaining power vis-à-vis state agencies and agents is, however, 
relatively weak. Their dealing with them is often via informal practices and final 
decisions still rest with state agencies with little recourse to address disagreements. 
Fishing lots as a civil society group probably fare the poorest as they are not 
unified to bargain with state agencies, and hence their engagement with them is 
more individualistic and personalized. All in all, state-society relation is neither 
predatory nor developmental. 
State agencies and agents are not insulated from political and social forces’ 
interference into their affairs. The collusion in lot bidding between bidders and 
between bidders and auction committees is an example. Besides, as seen in the 
granting of ‘research lot’ fishing rights, some politicians have interfered into 
fisheries resources management in favor of their clients or probably proxies. At the 
provincial and local levels, state agents have been captured by private interests to 
achieve their goals of profit maximization. As seen in the two sub-sectors, various 
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state agents and agencies, including fisheries officers, elements of the armed forces, 
members of the local and regional authorities and judicial staff have been captured 
by private interests to serve their purposes. Besides, state agencies are poorly 
accountable and engaging with each other, undercutting their efficacy and 
efficiency. The three branches of the state are not autonomous from one another, 
and the legislature and judiciary in the main are not able to curb the power of the 
executive and ruling parties. 
As discussed in Chapter 9, the state structure barely approaches Weberian 
bureaucracy. Cambodia’s ‘bureaucracy’ lacks any historical depth and suffers from 
disruption and destruction by protracted wars and manipulation by politicians and 
dominant rulers. Local and regional administration has a long historical root; 
however, it was not (and has never been) managed through legal-rationalism, but 
has been managed more than less via patronage politics. Overall, the public 
administration as a whole is far from efficient, effective and adhering to good 
governance. As for the sub-sectors, the Fisheries Team was just established in 1947 
and has suffered multiple disruptions. It hardly functioned as a bureaucratic entity 
when it was first re-organized in 1979. Like any other state agencies, it has faced 
many challenges – financial, structural and behavioral. These challenges also apply 
to the local authorities when it comes to natural resources management. Some 
central and local inter-agencies or mechanisms have been established; however, 
they are mainly to ‘co-ordinate’ their members and are relatively powerless vis-à-
vis their members.  
Chapter 10 shows that Cambodian political landscape at the center has transformed 
from a shaky coalition government to a one-dominant ruling party with weak and 
fragmented opposition groups. State agencies and agents have been politicized and 
co-opted to effect political victory. There is thus limited systematic effort to 
increase their autonomy from ruling parties and their agents and to enhance their 
institutional capability. State agencies and dispensing of state positions have been 
used as a tool for political compromise, and state agents and businesses have been 
accommodated to fund party-directed rural development projects. The ‘politicized’ 
rural development projects and quest for political legitimacy have contributed to 
socio-economic development and selective state capacity enhancement. However, 
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they have also undermined state capacity, including the capacity to extract from 
and to regulate the society. 
Chapter 11 shows that foreign development partners have contributed to state 
capacity enhancement and institutional and individual capacity building. However, 
the DP-DP and DP-RGC cooperation and coordination, as reflected in those of the 
DoF/FiA and its external DPs, in the first decade and a half since 1993 had been 
quite limited, and hence DPs’ assistance had been very much fragmented and 
uncoordinated, especially at the (sub)sectoral level. Cambodian capacity to 
coordinate external assistance had likewise been inadequate. It was in 2004 that a 
more systematic multi-level mechanism and framework and more DP-DP 
cooperation amongst selected DPs were developed. These mechanisms are still 
young, and many are not functioning properly. The TWGF, for example, was just 
established in 2004, and before then there was limited coordination between FiA 
and other main players and amongst external agencies. It was not until 2011 that 
the SPF was produced as a guide for coordination and cooperation. Overall, 
coordination and cooperation are still evolving and far from ideal. Due partly to 
ineffective state systems and donor-ship mentality, PBAs have been dominant 
approaches to external assistance. The last few years have seen more effort by both 
the RGC and DPs to systematize the assistance approaches and there have been 
wider adoption of various program-based approaches. However, assistance is still 
very much project-based, and external assistance is still rather fragmented. 
2. Towards an Understanding of Cambodian State Capacity 
The introduction of electoral legitimacy in 1993 and considerable DPs’ financial 
support and pressure present hope for higher state capacity. Indeed, there has been 
some improvement in state capacity, for example, in extraction (increasing 
tax/revenue), appropriation (better resource allocation and distributive justice), 
policy/legislation production (better policies and legislation), and midwifery (some 
business and community assistance and facilitation). The two most outstanding 
achievements are probably peace and political stability maintenance and 
policy/legislation production. 
Yet, despite some improvement and variability in capacity, overall, the capacity is 
limited, almost across the board. This is especially the case of penetration 
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(disproportionate staff distribution and shortage of ground staff), stagnant and 
limited extraction capacity (low tax/revenue generation, poor rent extraction from 
its resources and widespread corruption), weak appropriation capacity 
(disproportionate resource allocation, resource concentration and unsustainable 
exploitation), limited regulation capacity (poor and selective enforcement and low 
compliance) and limited midwifery and husbandry capacity (especially R&D and 
business and community facilitation). 
The attainment of high state capacity is constrained by several factors. First, it is 
constrained by the politics of a weak political society and partial political 
institutionalization. The quest for initially externally imposed electoral legitimacy 
since the late 1990’s has, to some extent, improved some state capacity, such as 
appropriation capacity (better distributive justice and resource de-concentration) 
and midwifery capacity (in particular peace and stability maintenance) and some 
rural development. However, electoral contests playing out in the context of a rapid 
transformation under a dominant ruling party, weak coalition partner(s) and weak 
opposition groups result in ensuing patronage politics; unwillingness to arrest poor 
governance within state agencies since support from state agents is needed to win 
an election and hence a need to return a favorable deal; politicized and weak state 
structure and limited state resources; a favorable deal to businesses in return for 
their support, and in the case of the local governments, a need to capture their 
constituency, especially in election years via leniency in clampdown on illegal 
activities. A dysfunctional state in return contributes to sustaining this politics of a 
weak political society and partial political institutionalization. 
Second, the state capacity is constrained by fragmented external assistance and 
pressure and donor-ship mentality. Coordination and cooperation between DPs and 
between DPs and Cambodia is weak. Coordination/cooperation mechanisms, 
though improving, are still weak and PBAs are widely adopted. Although there is 
rhetoric of recipient country ownership of assistance, empowerment and mutual 
accountability, in the main, donors are reluctant or unwilling to forgo the control 
over their assistance. This, however, is not to downplay the low institutional 
capabilities and poor governance within the existing state systems. The poor DP-
DP coordination/cooperation results in limited pressure for the state to carry out 
harsher reforms and drive for better governance. The emergence of non-traditional 
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latecomers which do not tie their aid to good governance further weakens the ‘one-
voice-ness’. Besides, poor coordination and cooperation between DPs disable them 
to open up bigger space of engagement for civil society groups. This and 
widespread PBA adoption put pressure on the already over-stretched capabilities of 
state agencies and competent agents, lead to unsustainability of development 
programs and lack of over-arching institutional capability building. 
Third, the capacity is constrained by the weak state structure and poor resources. 
Weberian bureaucracy and bureaucratic governance in Cambodia has shallow 
historical depth, and their building has been disrupted by wars and manipulation. 
The little build-up and limited consolidation of state agencies before the 1990’s 
political contests contribute to their being captured by politicians and political 
parties to maintain political domination. The bureaucracy and public service in 
general little resemble Weberian bureaucracy. Due to their novelty, deep historical 
roots of power concentration and post-communist effects, inter-agency 
responsibility duplication and power wrangling, top-down management styles, 
hierarchical authority overstepping and authority concentration are common. The 
quality of the service and dereliction of duties are further plagued by poor material 
resources, poorly motivated, under-qualified and underpaid civil servants, staff 
outflow and poor civil service rationalization and systematization, including 
appropriate staff distribution, poor intra- and inter-agency 
coordination/cooperation, and poor application of merit-based appointments, 
promotions and incentive schemes. 
Fourth, weak civil society and contentious state-society relations cannot help arrest 
state debility. There have been better and more interactions between civil society 
groups with state agencies and some improvement in the strength and capabilities 
of civil society groups, including increasing operational capacity, denser networks, 
fairly flourishing rural communities and stronger civil society groups. However, 
civil society lacks historical depth, and civil society was not permitted in the 
communist regimes (or to be fair, has never taken roots throughout history). The 
dilution and disappearance of state-sponsored groups and associations before the 
democratization are not conducive for representational electoral competition, and 




Therefore since the country opened up, civil society groups (including business 
communities and rural community-based associations) have been weak vis-à-vis 
the state and have fairly restricted capabilities. The upward accountability from the 
rural community-based associations towards NGOs through to INGOs/donors is 
not conducive to creating strong and capable civil society. Community-based 
associations are moreover new and compartmentalized, which further decreases 
their bargaining power with local state and political agencies. In addition, state and 
civil society interactions are constrained by mistrust, a cultural demand for 
subservience from society by state agencies and agents and limited joint projects. 
The weak civil society overall cannot check the misconducts of state agencies and 
agents. Further, their establishment by external agencies has created a sub-class of 
rural elites, many of whom are ‘raw people,’ not familiar with bottom-up 
management, have violated their roles and duties and uphold practices that confirm 
neither to the communities’ by-laws nor to the state’s rules. 
Fifth, the state capacity is constrained by limited state autonomy. The limited 
external pressure, need for financial contribution to sustain electoral legitimacy 
from state agents and businesses, dysfunctional state structure and weak civil 
society are favorable to the capture of the state agencies and extraction from the 
state for personal gains, either for an individual or an organization, and hence 
weaken state capacity. Extraction from the state through the capture by businesses 
and citizens in general and interference from politicians on behalf and in favor of 
their clients into the affairs of the ‘bureaucracy’ and state agencies is common. 
Where the ‘bureaucracy’ is barely functional and businesses as a civil society group 
are weak, the chance for ‘embeddedness’ to succeed and to attain a successful 
‘joint project’ is slim, as attested in the cases of ‘research lot’ research and lot 
rehabilitation and development. The limited autonomy of the other two branches of 
the state from the executive weakens the checks and balances against the latter and 
the dominant parti(es) and disables them to demands for good governance from 
them. 
Finally, the fragmentation of social control is a constraint to state capacity. Before 
1999, the Khmer Rouge presented a challenge to full state capacity attainment. 
Besides, the state capacity is hindered by the sheer size of resource users, from 
whom state agencies are not able to demand their compliance and cooperation. The 
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well-connectedness of business elites to politically powerful individuals and their 
power of the purse do not enable less ‘powerful’ state agents to demand 
compliance or sometimes even to enforce state’s rules and regulations in areas 
under their control. The state inability to rein in their agents allows these businesses 
and citizens to capture or buy support from elements of the state to further their 
goals. 
3. Qualified Hope 
There is some qualified hope in the state to improve its capacity, though such is 
constrained by the factors discussed above. Kato and others complimented: “Given 
the enormity of the challenges facing Cambodia during the last decade, the leaders 
and authorities certainly deserve credit for their efforts and leadership to 
reconstruct and develop the nation.”1 It has moved from a post-conflict to a ‘more 
normal’ state, experiencing ‘unusual period of rapid growth’ and having better 
public administration, including local authorities and line departments/offices.2 For 
example, FiA has substantial number of competent staff,3 and the CFDD’s capacity 
to handle CFCs has improved. An NGO director praised: “I work with so many 
competent, experienced individuals in the Fisheries Administration. I am always 
impressed with how much they know, of what they are capable of,” albeit adding 
that it ‘has a very strong technical capacity. But as a government institution, 
probably only the technical capacity is not enough; you need operational capacity, 
financial management capacity, administrative capacity, [and] people who have a 
good understanding of policy making.’4 
Migdal cautions that state leaders’ engagement in politics of survival does not 
necessarily mean that they do not have a ‘slightest interest in using the state as a 
vehicle for progressive social change.’5 The premier can be described as a 
                                                          
1 Kato et al., Cambodia: Enhancing Governance for Sustainable Development: 125.  
2 Asian Development Bank, Country Strategy and Program 2005-2009: Kingdom of Cambodia: 1; 
Asian Development Bank, Agriculture and Rural Development Sector in Cambodia: 16; Cambodia 
New Vision, "55th Anniversary of National Independence & Armed Forces," Cambodia New Vision 
November 2008, 6; Guimbert, "Cambodia 1998-2008: an episode of rapid growth," 2; NGO Forum 
on Cambodia and Economic Institute of Cambodia, Guide to the National Budget: 26-27.  
3 Informant 6; Informant 10.  
4 Informant 6.  
5 Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the 
Third World: 226.  
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reformist. Some other officials share his view of state modernization.6 The RGC 
recognizes the importance of capable public institutions and vows to ‘revamp the 
structure and size of civil administration and professionalize the public machinery’7 
though this is done one a piecemeal and incremental basis. The FiA re-structuring, 
for example, gives it more autonomy and makes it ‘a more effective service 
provider in the sector especially at the commune level.’8 In addition, the 
government is committed to better management of the Tonle Sap and addressing 
poverty in this area as witnessed in its request for the TSEMP loan to improve CFi 
capacity, an instance that a donor representative describes as ‘uncommon because 
the government usually preferred a grant for such projects.’9 Informant 91 branded 
FiA as open and reform-oriented, and Campbell calls its director a source of vision 
and direction.10 Even an NGO director, who is critical of it, believes that the RGC 
has an intention to improve fisheries and inundated forest policy formulation and 
implementation.11 This partly reflects in the CFDO establishment, staffing it with 
younger, better-trained and more energetic staff.12 
Furthermore, the state has carried out some critical reforms. First, it has established 
such reform institutions as the Supreme Council of State Reform and Council for 
Administrative Reform13 and partially accepted such principals of good governance 
as accountability, transparency, responsiveness and participation. Second, it has 
carried out some reform measures, including civil service censuses and public 
sector functional analyses, D&D, capping civil service size, injecting more youth 
into political positions and lately into the public service via examinations, annual 
salary increase of 10-15% and termination of party-based-quota appointment into 
the civil service.14 Third, it has put some effort to develop institutional and 
                                                          
6 See for example, Kato et al., Cambodia: Enhancing Governance for Sustainable Development: 80.  
7 Cambodia New Vision, "Opening Address at the Cambodia Consultative Group Meeting," 4; 
Royal Government of Cambodia, Rectangular Strategy for Growth, Development, Equity and 
Efficiency in Cambodia: 8. 
8 Department of Fisheries, "Statement of Nao Thuok in 2007 Cambodia Development Cooperation 
Forum," 19-20. Informant 89.  
9 Informant 91. Asian Development Bank, Country Strategy and Program Update 2004-2006: 2-3.  
10 Informant 91. Campbell, Department of Fisheries Institutional Review: 38.  
11 Informant 1.  
12 Degen et al., "People, Power, and Fisheries Policy: Fisheries Management Reform Addressing 
Community Fisheries in Cambodia," 23.  
13 Cf. Asian Development Bank, Country Assistance Plan 2000-2002: Cambodia: 6; Peou, 
"Cambodia after the Killing Fields," 65.  
14 Cf. Asian Development Bank, Country Strategy and Program 2005-2009: Kingdom of Cambodia: 
69; Cambodia New Vision, "National Program: Subnational Democratic Development," 4 and 8; —
——, "Action Plan 2009-2013: Administration Reform Directions," 7; Kato et al., Cambodia: 
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individual capacity.15 Besides learning from participation in donor-sponsored 
projects and line activities, some staff has acquired capacity via donor-sponsored 
projects targeting capacity building.16 TSEMP and TSSLP are good examples. 
Cantonment staff and local councilors participating in them agreed that their 
capacity has improved through on-the-job and actual training.17 The Seila program 
and its predecessors have built local councilors’ capacity and introduced more 
participatory local development planning and execution.18 
D&D has, to some extent, induced some frontline officials and local and central 
decision-makers to embrace civil society groups’ participation in their affairs. The 
FiA director was reported to have welcomed recommendations from NGOs and 
fishers to improve the FL and CFi- sub-decree.19 The relationship between local 
councilors and villagers has improved. The former have become more accountable 
and responsive, and the latter are less afraid of and approach them more often.20 
Some case studies prove that some local authorities are actively involved in CFC 
establishment.21 Moreover, some councilors have participated in communities’ 
meetings and tried to solve their problems, including calling illegal fishers to CC 
halls for ‘education’ and providing counterpart funds for selected CFi activities.22 
More recently, many CCs have tried to seek funding for CFCs under their 
jurisdiction and invited the latter to their monthly meetings and to contribute to 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Enhancing Governance for Sustainable Development: 60-61; ———, "Summary of Cambodia 
Governance Assessment," 12-13. Informants 8-9. The pilot cantonment de-concentration program 
started in 2009. Provincial cantonments were asked to come up with their own activities and budget 
plans. In 2011, with the assistance from Danida selected cantonments were also provided with their 
own budgets. Informant 10. According to a division leader, such de-concentrated planning and 
budgeting also flowed to the sangkat and division levels, though no budget was provided to his 
division and four sangkats under his supervision despite the fact that they were asked to prepare 
their budget and operation plans. Informant 89.  
15 Cambodia New Vision, "First Cambodia Development Cooperaiton Forum Meeting," 5.  
16 Cf. Campbell, Department of Fisheries Institutional Review: 26.  
17 Informant 65; Informant 79; Informant 80; Informant 81. 
18 Cf. Hughes, "The Seila Program in Cambodia," 95-112.  
19 Manfield and MacLeod, Advocacy in Cambodia: Increasing Democratic Space: 49-50. See also 
Fisheries Action Coalition Team and Environmental Justice Foundation, Feast or Famine? 
Solutions to Cambodia's Fisheries Conflicts: 3; Hartmann, "It’s Co-Management or No 
Management," 4.  
20 Cf. Hughes, "The Seila Program in Cambodia," 113; Ojendal and Kim, "Korob, Kaud, Klach: In 
Search of Agency in Rural Cambodia," 517-18. Informants 8-9.  
21 For example, Mak and Te, "Enabling Fisheries Conflict Management: A Case Study in 
Cambodia."; Tath et al., "Case Study on Community Fisheries Established in Kampong Chhnang 
and Battambang Provinces, Cambodia."  
22 Informant 62-64; Informant 70; Informant 71-78; Informant 79. A deputy councilor in Province A 
even encourages NGOs to help conduct CFC elections as there has not been any election ever since 
the committees were first elected in 2001. ibid.  
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their one-year rolling plans and CDP development.23 Two surveys in Battambang 
show that many more CFCs in the province had their plans fully or partially 
integrated into the CDPs in 2010 than three years ago. 24 An NGO director noted: 
Some community fisheries groups are not well situated within the local authority 
system – the village, commune councils. Some community fisheries groups are just 
like a group of fishermen that are self-contained. They only deal with fisheries 
officials, but not with other local authorities. And they are constantly running into 
problems when there is a conflict with non-fishing members of the village who have 
different interests.  When the community fisheries groups are very well integrated into 
the local system, then they are better dealing with problems if they have the support of 
the commune council members.25 
Neo-utilitarianism views state employees as lacking ‘public spirit’ and individual 
maximizers.26 This does not accurately reflect Cambodian civil servants. Though 
the civil service, including FiA, is far from perfect and functional, there are 
committed and hard-working individuals who care for the proper functioning of the 
administration. Margaret Slocomb writing about the PRK commented: “That there 
were committed and honest party cadres must be acknowledged and respected, but 
there were too few of them to make the difference that was required to change 
Cambodia.”27 A Researcher who has contacted a few line departments’ employees 
reported: “Within each department, there are certain individuals who are active and 
hard working.”28  
The FiA’s staffs are of no exception. Non-state actors who have regular contacts 
with some officers express positive attitudes towards and admiration of their skills, 
hard work and commitment.29 An NGO director commended: “Some of these 
individuals genuinely care about the issues. They do care about the sustainability of 
the fisheries resources and the well-being of the community fisheries. And that is 
                                                          
23 Informant 7; Informant 71-78; Informant 79; Informant 86-88.  
24 Troeung, "Community Fisheries Committee Quality Assessment 2007."; ———, "Community 
Fisheries Committee Quality Assessment 2010."  
25 Informant 6.  
26 Evans, Embedded Autonomy: State & Industrial Transformation.  
27 Slocomb, The People's Republic of Kampuchea 1979-1989: The Revolution after Pol Pot: 141.  
28 Informants 8-9.  
29 Informant 4; Informant 6; Informant 7; Informant 14. For example, according to a researcher, 
“[t]he vice chief of the fisheries cantonment in Stung Treng was very active and had a good 
understanding of the wider issues. He as an individual was very capable – kind of individual 
motivation to do the work … He was quite fundamental in making certain things work in that place. 
The fisheries administration [in Stung Treng] as a whole is not very active….In Stung Treng the 
capacity is so limited, but there are a few individuals that make things work.’ Informant 2. See also 
Department of Fisheries, Impacts of the Fisheries Policy Reforms in Kampong Cham, Pursat and 
Takeo Provinces: First Round Assessment Report: 67; Mak, Vann, and Te, "Communication 
Strategies for Fisheries Conflict Management: A Case Study in Cambodia," 27.  
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surely a factor driving them. And they also want to do a good job.”30 CFDO staff is 
particular singled out. According to a researcher, “within the department of 
fisheries, you have the community fisheries department, and I think there are a few 
strong people there, committed as well.”31 Elements of local authorities too are 
well-praised. An NGO officer reported that in a community that used to conduct his 
research a village and a deputy commune chief were very active in crackdowns on 
illegal fishing.32 Besides internal motivation, two things explain the commitment – 
close oversight from above such as the premier’s 001 Order and incentives, such as 
per diem from NGOs, a chance to improve one’s knowledge33 and salary 
supplements. 
Interviews with stakeholders show that during a life-time of a donor-sponsored 
project, employees often actively fulfill their duties. A former officer reported: For 
each office, roughly 30%-40% of officers are involved in projects. People are 
active during the project; however, once the project is over, they simply return to 
their normal work, with some do not even have much to do.34 Referring to TSEMP, 
a TFN staff added: “Now the FiA sangkat only helps establish CFCs and explains 
to the people and CFCs to protect the fisheries resources. A few years ago there 
was a PIU within FiA which helped erect boundary posts around conservation areas 
and guard posts and to determine the CFi boundaries.”35 
Some officials express their frustration over limited separation between their work 
and political obligation and politicians’ interference into their affairs. A fisheries 
officer in Province A and a cantonment leader in Province B want to see clearer 
                                                          
30 Informant 6. See also Ahmed, Touch, and Nao, "Sustaining the Gifts of the Mekong: The Future 
of Freshwater Capture Fisheries in Cambodia," 5. Campbell gives a similar judgment: “The 
fisheries sector involves a large number of government staff who are able to contribute to the 
development of the sector. These are represented at central, provincial and district levels. Amongst 
this group are some very well educated, committed and hard working staff with a willingness to 
learn and apply new processes and knowledge… In spite of the limited funding and the institutional 
weaknesses of DoF, it has a strong base of committed people who contribute to the continued 
implementation of field activities in support of DoF’s plans.” Campbell, Department of Fisheries 
Institutional Review: 39.  
31 Informant 14.  
32 Informant 15. See also Hughes, "The Seila Program in Cambodia," 110-11; Kato et al., 
Cambodia: Enhancing Governance for Sustainable Development: 72; Patrick, Melissa, and Puadyal, 
Flood Forest, Fish and Fishing Villages: Tonle Sap, Cambodia: 11.  
33 Informant 25-27; Informant 86-88. For example an NGO program manager describes an FIA 
official: “[A] CFDD staff member who is a partner with an LI’s project likes taking initiatives and is 
motivated to learn though the financial support from LI is not so much.” Informant 13.  
34 Informant 5. 
35 Informant 23. Also Informant 2; Informant 7; Informant 10; Informant 14; Informant 71-78; 
Informant 80; Informant 81. 
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separation between ‘technical experts’ authorities’ and politicians’ involvement in 
running the public administration. A deputy head of a department in FiA was 
reported as hard working and committed – and to have demands for more 
professional service provision to concerned stakeholders.36 
Because of bureaucratic inefficiency, Brazil adopted “pocket of efficiency,’ 
resulting in some successful transformational projects.37 Likewise, concerned with 
rapid change in the economic sector and its low capacity, the RGC with support 
from donors decided to create ‘a core team of civil servants to promote centers of 
excellence.’38 The ADB and WB assisted with the design of Priority Mission 
Groups (PMGs) and Merit-Based Payment Initiatives (MBPI), respectively. PMGs 
were first established in 2002, and MBPI, providing supplementary salary to 
employees involved in donor-supported projects, was operational in 2005 first in 
MEF and later expanded to other ministries.39 Though the RGC promised to 
expand both schemes, MPBI was terminated in 2010,40 and has been replaced by 
Priority Operation Costs (PoC). While the pay is not much different from MPBI, 
the new scheme divides the recipients into three categories with pay according to 
their ranks in the project rather than to their government positions as in MPBI.41 
                                                          
36 Informant 7; Informant 65; Informant 80.  
37 Evans, Embedded Autonomy: State & Industrial Transformation: 60-65.  
38 Asian Development Bank, Country Assistance Plan 2000-2002: Cambodia: 3; International 
Development Association and International Monetary Fund, "Assessment of Interim Poverty 
Reduction Strategy," 40; World Bank, "2008 Country Policy and Institutional Assessment for 
Cambodia," 17-18. 
39 Partnership Techincal Working Group, "Joint Government-Donor Strategy for Phasing Out Salary 
Supplementation Practices in Cambodia," (Phnom Penh: Partnership Technical Working Group, 26 
January, 2006), 2-3; Schneider, Ka, and Roy, Private Sector Assessment for the Kingdom of 
Cambodia: 3-4; World Bank, Country Assistance Strategy for the Kindgom of Cambodia: 30-31; —
——, Country Assistance Strategy Progress Report for the Kingdom of Cambodia for the Period 
FY05-08: 3-4. According to the sub-decree, proposed monthly ‘merit based pay supplement 
incentives’ for donor funded projects are as follows: For director general = 1,600,000 riels, deputy 
director general = 1,280,000 riels, director of department = 1,080,000 riels, deputy director = 
880,000 riels, administrative officer = 720,000 riels, bureau chief = 480,000 riels, kramka = 320,000 
riels and secretary = 200,000 riels. Royal Government of Cambodia, "Sub-Decree on 
Implementation of Merit-Based Pay Supplement Incentive," (Phnom Penh: Royal Government of 
Cambodia, 5 August, 2006). The monthly remuneration for the PMGs is between $50-150. 
International Monetary Fund, "Cambodia: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix," 19. The PMG 
participants can also earn extra incomes from MBPIs. 
40 Royal Government of Cambodia, Rectangular Strategy for Growth, Development, Equity and 
Efficiency in Cambodia: Phase Two: 14-15. According to a senior CoM official, the reason for the 
termination is that over the years the Cambodian government counterpart fund would increase from 
0% to 100%, while the fund from donors would decrease, accordingly. As interviewed by 
Informants 8-9.  
41 According to the sub-decree, the pay effective from July 2010 is as follows: For national or 
national supporting staff: Program manager or deputy = $350-400; project manager, deputy or 
division head = $200-300 and specialist or supporting staff = $120-180. For sub-national or front 
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The pocket of efficiency is not void of shortcomings.42 So are these schemes.43 
However, they give selected state officials more incentives to work harder. These 
positive attributes of state agencies/agents, together with emerging civil society 
groups, a need for electoral legitimacy via more ‘inclusive development’ and broad 
electoral contests to appease constituents, continuing external support and 
improving coordination/cooperation between DPs and DPs and the state, give some 
glimpse of hope for the betterment of state capacity. 
                                                                                                                                                                 
service officers: Project manager or deputy = $90-110 and specialist or supporting staff = $50-70. 
Council of Ministers, "Regarding Expenditure Table for Priority Operation Expenditure Sponsored 
by Development Partner’s Project Operation Credit," (Phnom Penh: Council of Ministers, 25 May, 
2010).  
42 See Evans, Embedded Autonomy: State & Industrial Transformation.  
43 First, PMGs as of 2007 covered only slightly over 1,000 staff in 20 ministries. Second, the 
supplementary income from these schemes, especially to lower staff, is minimal. Third, MBPI (and 
later PoC) does not ‘provide a sustainable foundation for a broad-based civil service reform.’ 
Fourth, they lack sanctions for non-performance. International Monetary Fund, "Cambodia: 
Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix," 19-20. Though the prevalence is not investigated, Pak 
and others’ interview with a provincial bureaucrat showed that he needed to kick-back his 
supplement incomes to his boss to get a slot in a donor-funded project. Pak et al., Accountability 
and Neo-Patrimonialism in Cambodia: A Critical Literature Review: 62. Such rumors are 
commonly heard, however. 
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Appendix A: Interview Guide 
These questions seek to explore the Cambodian state capacity in general and the 
capacity in inland freshwater fisheries and inundated forest management and the 
possible factors that impact its capacity to manage the resources. 
A. State Capacity in General 
1. What is your assessment of the overall capacity of the Cambodian state 
after the 1993 general elections? 
2. Is there any overall improvement in the Cambodian state capacity over time 
since 1993? 
3. What are the factors that affect the state capacity overall? 
B. State Capacity in Freshwater Fisheries and Inundated Forest Management 
4. What are the major methods that people use to fish in the freshwater 
bodies? 
5. What is the state of the inundated forest around/in the freshwater bodies, 
especially the Tonle Sap Lake and the Mekong River in Cambodia? 
6. What is the state capacity in inland fisheries and inundated forest policy 
formulation? 
7. What is the state capacity to regulate inland freshwater fishing and capacity 
to regulate inundated forests? 
8. Are there enough government officials in the expertise fields to manage 
inland freshwater fishing and inundated forests at the sub-national level? 
9. Does the state use the fisheries resources appropriately? 
10. Do you think the state gains any benefits from the freshwater fishing lot 
concessions? 
11. How does the state facilitate the fishing lot concessionaires in their 
businesses? 
12. To what extent has the state assisted communities in the management of the 
community fisheries since their establishment? 
C. Factors Affecting State Capacity in Inland Fisheries and Inundated Forest 
Management 
13. What are the factors that affect the state capacity to regulate inland 
freshwater fishing and inundated forest around the freshwater bodies? 
14. What are the factors that affect the state capacity to use the freshwater 
fisheries resources appropriately? 
15. What are the factors that affect the state capacity to extract benefits from 
inland freshwater fisheries? 
16. What are the difficulties for FiA and its provincial and district and sangkat 
agencies in executing their duties with regard to fisheries exploitation and 
inundated forest management? 
17. How do you describe the relationship between the central ministries 
(MAFF), in particular, the Fisheries Administration, and its line agencies at 
the sub-national levels/local governments? 
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18. How do you describe the relationship between the FiA’s fisheries sub-
national agencies and the local governments/other local executing agencies 
of other central institutions? 
19. How do you describe MAFF and FiA relationship with other central state 
agencies that have a stake in freshwater management? 
20. What are the difficulties for freshwater fisheries communities in managing 
the community fisheries? 
21. Overall, is there any improvement in the state capacity in its management of 
inland freshwater exploitation and inundated forests since 1993? 
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Appendix B: List of Interviewees 
No Informant Position Interview Date 
1 Informant 1 NGO Director 4-Mar-11 
2 Informant 2 Former PhD Candidate 6&19-Mar-11 
3 Informant 3 Cantonment Leader 11-Mar-11 
4 Informant 4 NGO Advisor 17-18-Mar-11 
5 Informant 5 Former FiA Staff/ NGO Program 
Manager 
6-Apr&3-Jun-11 
6 Informant 6 NGO Director 8-Apr-11 
7 Informant 7 Former FiA Staff/ IO Projector 
Coordinator 
11-Apr-11 
8 Informants 8-9 Researchers 19-Apr-11 
9 Informant 10 DP Representative 22-Apr-11 
10 Informant 11 FiA Leader 2-May-11 
11 Informant 12 NGO Board Member 4&12-May-11 
12 Informant 13 NGO Program Manager 6-May-11 
13 Informant 14 Former PhD Candidate 10-May-11 
14 Informant 15 NGO Staff 13-May-11 
15 Informant 16 Lot Leasee 17-May-11 
16 Informant 17 Fisher 17-May-11 
17 Informants 18-19 Fishers 18-May-11 
18 Informant 20 FiA Leader 25-May-11 
19 Informant 21 Researcher 20-Jun-11 
20 Informant 22 FiA Sangkat Leader 20-Jun-11 
21 Informant 23 Former District Taskforce Head/ 
NGO Staff 
20&22-Jun-11  
22 Informant 24 Village Chief 20-Jun-11 
23 Informants 25-27 Fishers 20-Jun-11 
24 Informant 28 Fisher 21-Jun-11 
25 Informants 29-43 Fishers 21-Jun-11 
26 Informant 44 CFC Head 21-Jun-11 
27 Informants 45-59 CFC and Fishers 21-Jun-11 
28 Informant 60 CBO Member 21-Jun-11 
29 Informant 61 Fisher 22-Jun-11 
30 Informants 62-64 Commune Councilors 22-Jun-11 
31 Informant 65 FiA Officer 19-22, 24&26-
Jul-11 
32 Informant 66 Cantonment Leader 20-Jul-11 
33 Informant 67 Sangkat Leader 21-Jul-11 
34 Informant 68 Lot Concessionaire 22-Jul-11 
35 Informant 69 NGO Deputy Head 22-Jul-11 
36 Informant 70 NGO Leader 24&26-Jul-11 
37 Informants 71-78 CFC 26-Jul-11 
38 Informant 79 Commune Council Leader 26-Jul-11 
39 Informant 80 Cantonment Leader 27-28-Jul-11 
40 Informant 81 FiA Officer 28-Jul-11 
41 Informant 82 Lot Concessionaire 28-Jul-11 
42 Informant 83 Lot Concessionaire 28-Jul-11 
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43 Informants 84-85 NGO Director & Program Manager 30-Jul-11 
44 Informants 86-88 CFC Leaders 29&31-Jul-11 
45 Informant 89 Division Leader 29-Jul-11 
46 Informant 90 TWGF Staff 12-Jul-11 
47 Informant 91 DP Project Officer 31-Aug-11 
48 Informant 92 FiA Staff 7-Jul-11 
49 Informant 93 Ranger 26-Sept-11 
50 Informant 94 Researcher 30-Sept-11 
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